Kant claims that to “pick out from ordinary cognition the concepts that are not based on any particular experience and yet are present in all cognition from experience (for which they constitute as it were the mere form of connection) required no greater reflection or more insight than to cull from a language rules for the actual use of words in general, and so to compile the elements of a grammar” (4:323). The analogy with grammar offers a fruitful way to understand how the categories apply to and structure the materials provided by sensibility and empirical concepts. The categories might be described as providing the rules of a kind of ‘transcendental grammar’ that makes experience possible. Attending to the analogy with grammar reveals that the link between the categories and empirical concepts is far closer than one might initially think, since the content to which the categories apply must be grounded in sensible experience. Grammar does not create new content but rather informs propositions by giving structure to linguistic elements available to speakers of a language; likewise, the categories do not produce new cognition but rather ‘inform’ judgments by giving structure to the sensible contents provided by experience.

This chapter examines how people from the margins of Indian society and territory, the so-called backward tribes (Adibasi), wrote themselves as constitutional actors, engaging with the constitution in the making with even more force than publics across the rest of India. The intensity of tribal expectations, and the failure of the constitution to meet them, led to a range of violent and nonviolent conflicts that have turned the constitution into an open site of struggle, and even transformed the text through constitutional amendments and scheduling, creating, for example, tribal majority states, tribal autonomous governing bodies, recognising groups as tribes, entitling them to affirmative action, and granting recognition to tribal languages. These changes were never benevolent gifts of the state. The alternative tribal visions of the constitution remained resilient as a competing framework that offered resources to reshape the lives of millions of Indian’s tribal people. The chapter examines constitutional debates within tribal groups, between tribal groups and the Constituent Assembly, and the creation of competing constitutional systems, such as in the Khasi States.

This chapter spells out the notion of the espistemology of the secret. It unpacks the two main components of the epistemology of the secret of international law: the necessary presence of hidden, unknown, invisible content in the texts, practices, actors, effects, representations, past, etc. of international law (what is called in this book the necessity of secret content) and the necessity for international lawyers to reveal such hidden, unknown, invisible content (what is called in this book the necessity of revelation). The chapter distinguishes the epistemology of the secret of international law from the hermeneutics of suspicion, the idea of an ideology of secretism and the idea of an economy of secrets.

Uganda is a case of midrange institutional control in which transitional justice has been subsumed within existing state institutions through a strategy of containment. In this chapter I present the Ugandan government’s strategy wherein transitional justice is enmeshed within existing structures of power, which allows the government to monitor and control the risks of norm compliance. The chapter begins with a discussion of the history of armed conflict in Uganda, particularly the war against the Lord’s Resistance Army and the government’s abuse of Acholi civilians. I then examine the government’s adaptation of transitional justice to identify and evaluate the containment strategy in which the risks of accountability are managed by integrating transitional justice into government institutions controlled through patronage, functionally rendering impunity for the state. I explore the containment strategy through three components of transitional justice in Uganda: International Crimes Division, state-regulated customary justice practices, and the National Transitional Justice Policy. To explore the strategy beyond the case of Uganda, I examine transitional justice in Côte d’Ivoire.

Liberated Africans sought freedom and solidarity during their enlistment and indenture that impaired the process of creolisation. Chapter 4 draws out their experiences from several documentary accounts; these often neglect the physical and emotional trauma endured during the crossing. It examines the coercive nature of enlistment, allocation to the estates, the nature of work regimes, and how recaptives wrestled with those conditions. The chapter stresses the restrictions liberated Africans experienced, the ways local and imperial forces sought to 'civilise' them, and how recaptives drew on shared African histories and experiences in the homeland and the Caribbean to pursue freedom.

This introduction surveys existing approaches to the history of work that this book engages with, including accounts of economic change, studies of waged work, understandings of the role of households in the economy, and the importance of gender to all of the above. It introduces the alternative ‘work-task approach’ to be applied in this study.

This chapter uses a case study from Julian’s and Cyril’s engagement to introduce the central argument of the book: that Julian and Cyril are in narrative conflict, a type of intellectual disagreement that can obtain when strong traditions do not share adequate language or criteria by which their representatives can adjudicate weighty differences. The case study revolves around Julian’s and Cyril’s competing interpretation Leviticus 16, and of one ambiguous word: apopompaios. Julian and Cyril each offer confident interpretations, grounded in their traditions’ constituting narrative, but those interpretations look absolutely nothing alike. The chapter briefly explains the concept of narrative conflict and then summarizes the books’ chapters.

This chapter explores the role of ideologies (i.e., socially shared belief systems) to justify or challenge existing social systems. The chapter begins by defining ideologies and examining their origins, focusing on how they are shaped by socialisation, collective identities, and power relations. It then discusses system-justifying ideologies, such as right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and belief in a just world, which legitimise inequality and attribute privilege to merit. In contrast, the chapter also explores system-change ideologies that challenge inequality and promote social change, focusing on the psychological processes that lead advantaged group members to embrace these ideologies and become allies. Psychological dynamics underlying allyship and solidarity are also discussed. In sum, the chapter highlights the complexities of allyship, noting that motivations can vary and that intersectional privileges can either foster or undermine solidarity, depending on shared identities and norms within groups.

Nathan G. Jennings concludes the volume with a synthetic view on liturgical theology, the art of doing theology from and through the celebration of actual liturgies. He introduces the groundbreaking ideas of Alexander Schmemann on the matter and explains how the field has further developed, despite certain tensions with historical claims.

This chapter draws the attention to systems of thought other than international law and that are similarly articulated around a postulation of the necessary presence of some content or substance deemed to be hidden in some way (what is called here the necessity of secret content) and/or the necessary performance of an act of revelation of some content or substance previously unknown (what is called here the necessity of revelation). The attention is drawn on the epistemologies of the secrets at work in Greek logocentric thought, in the Christian governance of the mind, in modern thought, in the idea of critique inherited from modern thought, in bourgeois literature, in Freudian psychoanalysis, in structuralist thought, and in poststructuralist thought.

In this chapter we argue that One Health approaches indicate the need for a re-conceptualisation of public health law. From a regulatory perspective, to address public health effectively we need to attend to our interdependencies with each other, with other animals, and with the environment. This chapter argues that a failure to recognise the interdependence between humans and nature unnecessarily limits the scope of public health law, as it restricts the regulatory interventions and actors available to achieve desired public health outcomes. One Health offers an opportunity to broaden our understanding of what it means to regulate public health in a non-anthropocentric manner. It also allows us to acknowledge that non-state actors that advance animal and environmental health via standard-setting, gathering information, and influencing behaviour can mitigate risks to public health. A core function of public health is prevention and re-conceptualising the scope and actors involved in public health law to encompass the more holistic approach suggested by One Health that is critical to its continued evolution as the twenty-first century progresses.

Misinformation on social media is a recognized threat to societies. Research has shown that social media users play an important role in the spread of misinformation. It is crucial to understand how misinformation affects user online interaction behavior and the factors that contribute to it. In this study, we employ an AI deep learning model to analyze emotions in user online social media conversations about misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic. We further apply the Stimuli–Organism–Response framework to examine the relationship between the presence of misinformation, emotions, and social bonding behavior. Our findings highlight the usefulness of AI deep learning models to analyze emotions in social media posts and enhance the understanding of online social bonding behavior around health-related misinformation.

In this introductory chapter I present the core tension in the study of transitional justice: the frequent failure of transitional justice to bring justice to victims of state violence. I question how governments escape justice in the age of accountability. The strategies through which a government adapts transitional justice to manage potentially risky demands for accountability have implications for who is held responsible for the atrocities of the past, a central factor for political order itself. This chapter engages the literature on norm compliance to situate my theory of strategic adaptation.