ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Summary

Chinese energy and mineral companies have been investing overseas formore than twenty years, and the quantity and size of their projects havebeen growing steadily. Although Southeast Asia is not a preferred regionfor these investments, they remain significant on account of their relativevalue to the host country and because of the geostrategic importance ofthe region for China. Most of the companies making the investmentsor undertaking the projects are wholly or partly owned by the Chinesegovernment at either central or local levels. As a result, the motivations fortheir investment activities reflect a mix of corporate and state objectives.Corporate objectives include securing energy or resource supply chains,increasing or diversifying their asset base, and enhancing their profits ormarket share. Government motivations range from direct support tocompanies for purposes of industrial strategy and resource security toindirect support through development assistance, diplomacy and regionalstrategic positioning.

This chapter presents an overview of the scores of investments and majorinfrastructure projects undertaken by Chinese companies in Southeast Asiain oil and gas, coal, hydroelectricity and metalliferous mining, showing howthe mix of motivations for these activities varies between industries and, toa lesser extent, between host countries. While the economic benefits of theseinvestments to host countries are in most cases evident, there are some risks.The lack of transparency and low operating standards that characterize someprojects can weaken the social license to operate, creating risks for both theChinese companies and the host governments

Introduction

China's economic engagement in Southeast Asia has grown markedly in recent years, and this includes the energy and mining industries. In addition to importing energy and mineral commodities from the region, Chinese enterprises have been investing in primary resources and constructing energy infrastructure. While the objectives of these companies are often primarily commercial, they are also multi-faceted and involve the ambitions of both the enterprises and the Chinese government. In addition, this mix of objectives varies between the different resource industries. The aims of this chapter are to identify the specific motivations of Chinese enterprises and government in their engagements with Southeast Asia's energy and mineral resources, and examine some of the implications from their mix of corporate and state drivers.

Summary

Foreign aid and economic investment have been effective tools used byChina to leverage influence in many developing countries, includingCambodia. China is now the largest aid donor and investor to Cambodia.Despite positive aspects of China's presence, which include an increaseof FDI inflow, infrastructure development, and economic growth, China'ssubstantial investment in natural resource sectors also comes withsignificant costs. As one of the largest holder of economic land concessions,mining licenses and hydro dam construction projects, Chinese companies,often partnering with local companies and elites, have been involved withillegal land grabbing, deforestation, and human rights abuses. These issueshave prompted countless outcries and protests from local peasants, civilsocieties and international community. In addition, opposition parties inCambodia have leveraged these issues to accuse the ruling Cambodia People'sParty (CPP) of promoting a pro-China policy. This chapter explores thecomplex issues that have emerged around Chinese investment in Cambodiannatural resources. First, the chapter analyses structural factors in the Sino–Cambodian relations that have generated a favourable investment climatefor Chinese resource companies. Second, it investigates various recurringproblems emerging around resource sector projects of Chinese companies inCambodia. Lastly, the chapter evaluates the benefits and costs brought alongby Chinese investment in natural resource extraction in Cambodia with aview to preventing the fallouts of such investment in the future.

Introduction

If China has been “going global” since the early 2000s, it has gone regional for far longer. China's Cold War-era influence in Southeast Asia prior to the 1980s is well documented, after which both foreign and domestic difficulties led to a period of relative withdrawal. Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, however, China's foreign policy toward its southern neighbours has increasingly re-embraced its outwardly engaged version of “peaceful coexistence”, as first articulated in the 1950s. Seeking both regional political stability and, perhaps more pointedly, access to natural resources for its own ongoing economic development, China's leaders are widely understood to see Southeast Asia as a strategic sphere of influence. In such a context, they have looked to development cooperation as a core mode of regional engagement for much of the last two decades.

As a key locale of this strategy, Cambodia receives close attention from Beijing, given its pivotal position in the region. Since 1996, the relationship between Phnom Penh and Beijing has deepened.

This paper analyses the "Second Agricultural Revolution" in Burma, especially its growth pattern and causes. Its aim is to develop policy criteria which, it is hoped, would lift Burmese agriculture out of its present stagnation. Productivity analysis, regression analysis, and production functions are applied to determine the preference pattern of technologies.

Summary

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

Summary

Introduction

Johor, more than any other Malaysian state, and Singapore enjoy a unique familiarity that has been nurtured by geographical proximity and historic ties. Thousands of Johor residents, many of whom are Malaysians from other parts of the country, make the daily trip across the Causeway to work or study in the island republic.

There were approximately 1.3 million foreign workers in Singapore as of June 2017. It has been estimated that between 450,000 and 500,000 Malaysians are working in various sectors in Singapore, including the approximately 120,000 Malaysian workers who commute daily from Johor. The two-way traffic averages 400,000 daily, even reaching 430,000 during festive periods, making the Singapore–Johor border one of the busiest in the world.

The strong Singapore dollar also encourages thousands of Singaporeans to travel to Johor for shopping and food, thus providing a boost to the local economy. There are about 5,000 Singaporean families who have set up home in Johor. These are either retirees who prefer a slower pace of life or adults working in Singapore who have made the trade-off between affordable landed property and the daily cross-border commutes. Cheaper houses, cars, petrol and favourable terms under the Malaysia My Second Home Programme have also made Johor more attractive to foreigners.

Johor's economy has been predicted to do well in the near future. With a GDP of RM104.4 billion, Johor is expected to become Malaysia's second largest state economy in a few years, relegating Sarawak, which has a GDP of RM108.7 billion, to third place. Selangor, with a GDP of RM251.5 billion occupies the top slot. Since 2011, Johor's economy has grown at a faster rate than Malaysia's as a whole, except for 2013 when their rates mirrored each other. In 2016, Johor's 5.7 per cent growth rate was higher than those of Malaysia's other twelve states.8 Much of Johor's growth is due to cheaper properties and goods compared to Singapore, as well as the Iskandar Malaysia development project that is expected to cover 2,200 sq. km when completed in 2025. One of the spillover effects of Iskandar Malaysia is the construction sector's strong growth of 24 per cent in 2016.

Summary

Introduction

Malaysia will hold its 14th general election before August 2018. Though it is not a foregone conclusion, few analysts expect an outcome different from the prior 13 general elections held since independence in 1957: a victory by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and its Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition. UMNO's unbroken electoral dominance has several reasons. Many stem from the country's exemplary developmental performance under the helm of UMNO, with Malaysia having enjoyed relative social stability, seen substantial improvements in the living conditions of its citizens, and joined the ranks of upper middle-income economies. Yet Malaysia's electoral process has also played a central role, as it is manipulated in ways that confer fundamental advantages to the BN.

This paper acts as a primer on elections in Malaysia by providing a systematic assessment of how the electoral process is strategically manipulated to secure the political dominance of UMNO and its coalition partners. It is divided into four parts. The first provides a brief overview of Malaysia's institutional structure and electoral history. The second brings Malaysia's electoral process into comparative perspective using recent data from the Electoral Integrity Project (Norris and Grömping 2017a). By these and other measures, Malaysia manipulates its electoral system more significantly than other countries with comparable levels of development and institutionalization. This has strong implications for our understanding of Malaysia's domestic politics; it also illustrates the importance of Malaysia as a case in the growing body of research on electoral integrity. The third section uses a theoretical framework from Birch (2011) to provide a structured overview of manipulations in each phase of Malaysia's electoral process. The pre-election period is the most significant, as extensive institutional bias creates a fundamentally uneven playing field for political competition by inhibiting challengers and shaping the preferences of voters towards the BN. The final section briefly discusses the range of costs entailed by the electoral manipulations. These are both direct in nature, for example, inefficient budgetary allocations and resultant fiscal burdens, as well as indirect, including disillusionment and subsequent disengagement with the political system among a substantial portion of the electorate.

Ultimately, these costs impede Malaysia's efforts to attain higher levels of development.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Introduction

According to data from the United Nations, Indonesia now has the fifteenth largest diaspora population in the world. With various estimates placing the number of overseas Indonesians at up to 8 million people worldwide, the Indonesian diaspora has enormous economic, social, and political potentials for Indonesia that have largely remained untapped. However, in recent times, the Indonesian government has displayed greater recognition towards the contribution and specific needs of the country's diaspora.

Indeed, members of Indonesia's overseas communities have more actively organized themselves in the last few years through lobby groups such as the Indonesian Diaspora Network (IDN) spearheaded by Dr Dino Patti Djalal, former Indonesian Ambassador to the United States and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Overseas community groups like IDN have demanded greater recognition of their national belonging from the government, regardless of whether they are still Indonesian citizens or not. As well as recognition, these expatriates are also lobbying for legislative changes that would allow them to maintain both material and emotional attachments in Indonesia, such as land ownership, business interests, and the ability to vote in elections.

In response, the government has promised to review the dual citizenship law, and has in the meantime proposed other diaspora-specific initiatives designed to strengthen ties between overseas Indonesians and the “homeland”. Indeed, the Indonesian government seems to have begun to realize the importance of mobilizing its overseas diaspora to advance its national interests. Here, Indonesia has much to learn from countries such as China and India that have successfully utilized their diaspora networks as economic, cultural, and political mediators in advancing their respective state agendas.

In this article, I examine recent issues and developments in Indonesian diaspora activism, including the progress of long-standing requests such as changes to the dual citizenship law. I then discuss some of the ways in which the Indonesian government may harness the potential of its diaspora in the future, especially since overseas Indonesians are now wealthier, more mobile, and better connected than ever before. I argue that the case study of the Indonesian state's growing relationship with its diaspora can enrich our understanding of how Southeast Asian countries are cultivating better and more beneficial relationships with their diaspora communities.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Thailand's intransigent political crisis and polarization, marked by two military coups d’état and debilitating mass demonstrations since 2006, has been recognized as the orchestrated work of the anti-democratic alliance of the old powers against the rise of electoral politics. The alliance is conceptualized as “the network monarchy” by Duncan McCargo (2005), the “parallel state” by Paul Chambers (2015), and “the deep state” by Eugénie Mérieau (2016). Despite their differences in some aspects, these authors agree that the monarchy is the bedrock of the alliance while the military is its least popular component, especially after the violent crackdown of the popular uprising in May 1992 by the military government led by General Suchinda Khraprayun (7 April – 24 May 1992). The military's legitimacy comes from the claim that it is the major defender of the three pillars of Thailand — Nation, Religion and Monarchy. It lost much of its popularity following the May 1992 crackdown, however, and it had been perceived to have retreated to its barracks (Surachart 1998, p. 17). In other words, only putsches and military governments came to be considered political intervention on its part.

Eugénie Mérieau (2016) noted the significance of the ideological apparatus of the deep state, her works tended to focus though on the role of the Constitutional Court, the apparent tip of this deep state. A study of the Thai military's civil affairs programmes, however, holds better potential for improving our understanding of the phenomenon.

Despite warnings from Suchit Bunbongkarn (1987, p. 53) and Surachart Bamrungsuk (1998, pp. 76–77) about the military's involvement in civil affairs projects at the end of the counter-insurgency period, there has been no serious study on the matter. The Thai military's civil affairs programmes, especially in the post-counter-insurgency period, have drawn little attention from scholars, and studies of the Thai armed forces tend to focus on internal factionalism; conflict between elected civilian governments and military leaders; networks of cliques and classes; and personal ties between military leaders and the palace (Chambers and Napisa 2016; Surachart 1998, 2016; Yoshifumi 2008). At the same time, it is well known that since the toppling of the absolute monarchy in 1932, the Thai military has never restricted itself to an exclusively military role.

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Index

2 - Mixed Motivations, Mixed Blessings: Strategies and Motivations for Chinese Energy and Mineral Investments in Southeast Asia

Summary

8 - The High Cost of Effective Sovereignty: Chinese Resource Access in Cambodia

Summary

Growth Pattern of Burmese Agriculture

Foreword

Summary

Frontmatter

The 2017 Johor Survey: Selected Findings

Summary

Malaysia's Electoral Process: The Methods and Costs of Perpetuating UMNO Rule

Summary

Frontmatter

The 2017 Johor Survey: Selected Findings

Summary

Malaysia's Electoral Process: The Methods and Costs of Perpetuating UMNO Rule

Summary

Foreword

Summary

Harnessing the Potential of the Indonesian Diaspora

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The Central Role of Thailand's Internal Security Operations Command in the Post-Counter-insurgency Period

Summary

Harnessing the Potential of the Indonesian Diaspora

Summary

Frontmatter

The Central Role of Thailand's Internal Security Operations Command in the Post-Counter-insurgency Period

Summary

Frontmatter

Foreword

Summary

Foreword

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Growth Pattern of Burmese Agriculture

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