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S. Rajaratnam, one of Singapore’s core founding fathers and its first Foreign Minister, was a man of ideas, ideals and action. In engaging prose, Irene Ng, bestselling author of the first volume of Rajaratnam’s biography, The Singapore Lion, reveals - as never before - how Rajaratnam changed the course of his country’s history, often by the sheer force of his ideas and will. The second volume, The Lion’s Roar, begins with his struggles during Singapore’s traumatic years in Malaysia from 1963 to 1965. Informed by decades of research, numerous interviews, and access to Mr Rajaratnam’s private and government papers, the book gives new insight into his personality and priorities as he was confronted with Singapore’s sudden independence, which left the island exposed to all the calamities of a vulnerable state.
S. Rajaratnam was one of the most significant and influential founding fathers of modern Singapore. This first volume of Irene Ng’s biography of Rajaratnam gives unparalleled insight into his early life and influences. The riveting story spans his birth in 1915 to Singapore’s independence as part of Malaysia in 1963, arguably the most formative years in his life and also for the nation on the cusp of independence. It traces his family roots in Ceylon and Malaya, his political awakening in London during the Second World War, and his transformation into a crusading journalist and feisty politician in Singapore.
This article draws from a database of asset-level emissions to identify key methane-emitting coal, oil and gas facilities in Southeast Asia while taking stock of the methane commitments of their owners. Coal mines account for around a third of fossil fuel methane emissions globally, but in Southeast Asia they make up more than half of tracked fossil fuel methane emissions. Over half of emissions from the coal mining subsector is traced to its top ten emitters, mostly in East Kalimantan, Indonesia; while some coal mines in North Vietnam have high emissions intensities. Though the global discourse on fossil methane focuses on oil and gas, coal mine methane remains crucial for Southeast Asia due to the region's lack of decisive coal phaseout plans. As countries begin to tackle coal emissions at the power generation stage, a gap still remains when it comes to coal mining emissions. Methane monitoring and abatement actions are urgently needed for coal mines that will continue to operate, as well as those slated for closure. More clarity is needed on how private sector commitments in the oil and gas sector will translate to action under complex and changing ownership arrangements. These gaps and uncertainties in methane abatement are ripe opportunities for closer partnership in the region, including within the private sector.
Since the Islamic resurgence hit Southeast Asia in the 1980s, Muslim societies now have greater aspirations for adhering to the Shariah, the body of laws meant to govern Muslims' day-to-day lives. At the institutional level, the desire for this compliance manifested in the establishment of various institutions such as Islamic banking and financial programmes. At the personal and societal levels, there are increasing demands for the provision of halal-certified goods and services, most commonly in the food and beverage industry. However, increasingly, compliance to the Shariah is no longer limited to laws or ensuring that food and beverages are halal, but has become an entire lifestyle. The rise of the Muslim middle class in Southeast Asia has catalysed this preference. Muslim consumers now demand that products in other industries, such as fashion, sports, tourism, medicine and personal hygiene, should also be Shariah-compliant and even reminiscent of the time in which Prophet Muhammad lived. This book analyses the various social, economic, and political forces that have contributed to such trends across many countries in Southeast Asia. In identifying these trends and the forces that shape them, it discusses the potential consequences of such a lifestyle on society, specifically in entrenching various forms of stratification.
The Duterte administration (2016-2022) marked the return of an authoritarian style of rule in the Philippines. It was also accompanied by an economic recovery that was better than many expected, at least until the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Both during and following the Duterte period, the country was buffeted by a series of internal and external shocks that called into question the state's legal and social policy contract with its citizens.
This period of 'contesting the Philippines' was an intense, normative and practical struggle to shape (or reshape) some of the Philippines' most critical institutions: the Constitution, the presidency, the Supreme Court and the rule of law, the free press, regional autonomy and independent regulatory institutions. These developments energized many domestic policy actors: technocrats, the business sector, civil society organizations, the police and the military, armed groups and religious leaders across the spectrum of Filipino politics. This volume considers some key sites of contestation between and among domestic policy actors, including the executive, during this eventful period for political and legal institutions in the Philippines.
Indonesia has become a majority urban society. Despite the classic images of rice fields, volcanoes and rural life we often associate with the country, now almost 60 per cent of Indonesia's people live in cities, towns, suburbs, gated communities and other urban areas. Urbanisation has brought with it a familiar range of problems, including some of the worst traffic jams and air pollution in the world, housing scarcity, periodic flooding and dramatic land subsidence. These problems pose massive challenges to Indonesian governments as they try to provide clean water, public transport, housing, garbage disposal and other services to urban dwellers. Governing Urban Indonesia brings together scholars and practitioners with diverse backgrounds to examine how urbanisation is remaking Indonesia, and how governments are responding. It focuses on how varied political patterns are shaping urban governance, enabling some cities to pioneer improved service delivery and better public amenities for their citizens, while others stagnate. And it brings to bear multiple perspectives on how historical legacies, changing residential patterns, social inequality and myriad other factors are combining to produce a new social and political landscape across urban Indonesia.
Chinese firms have become global leaders in the electrification, networking and intelligentization of vehicles. They are globally dominant in minerals extraction and processing and battery production for electric vehicles (EVs) and are becoming internationally competitive in the enabling microelectronics, components and systems. This report covers the role of Chinese firms in Southeast Asia across five segments of the EV supply chain, namely minerals extraction and processing; battery manufacturing, energy storage and charging; original equipment manufacturer (OEM) production of complete vehicles; microelectronics design and manufacturing; and research and development activities. The report focuses on Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. These are the five ASEAN economies where activities relevant to EV production are concentrated and where Chinese firms are involved in the supply chain. The report concludes with policy considerations for ASEAN governments. EVs and connected vehicles have become a new front in the technology contest and political tensions between China and the US, with other big players like the European Union now also moving towards measures to shield their automotive sector markets and companies. As 'technology-taker' economies at the forefront of climate change, the nations of Southeast Asia have much at stake in informed choices about this supply chain. They can benefit from participation in the evolving automotive sector without committing to one side, despite continued escalation in the global technology and trade war.
'This is one of the most comprehensive studies of contemporary Thai politics seen through the careers of Thai military leaders since 1932 up until now. It is of vital importance if one is to understand present-day Thai politics.' Kullada Kesboonchoo-Mead, Chulalongkorn University (retired) and author of 'The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism'.
'This is a long-awaited book discussing systematically the political system in Vietnam: why has the present political regime continued for such a long period, and what are the resources of legitimacy concerning the communist rule. The book also covers the recent development in the political scene, including the anti-corruption campaign and the frequent changes in the top leadership.' Shiraishi Masaya, Emeritus Professor, Waseda University, Former Chairman, Japan Society for Vietnamese Studies.
The People's Justice Party (PKR) may in many ways be synonymous with its larger-than-life leader, Anwar Ibrahim, who, although only president for six of the party's twenty-five years, has always been its de facto leader and adviser. However, PKR is much more than only about Anwar, and this paper traces the evolution of the party independently of Anwar as a person. PKR's evolution can be broken down into four main periods: 1998-2004 (formative), 2005-13 (golden era), 2014-18 (all-in for power), and 2019-22 (lessons on restraints). From 1998 to 2022, PKR tended to adopt a big-tent approach (internally and externally), ideological synthesis to find a middle ground, and a loose organization led by a charismatic personality at the top and self-organization at the grassroots. PKR was born out of a major crisis when Anwar, then deputy prime minister, was sacked in 1998 and subsequently jailed twice in the following two decades. For the most part, the party operated with its figurehead in jail, thus learning how to rely on coalition strengths, working with civil society, mass movements, and political parties to survive and win power.
The post-election Unity Government with Anwar Ibrahim as the tenth prime minister marks PKR's first 'real' governing experience, and this would not have been possible without PKR's core identity operating in full gear.
Whenever the Islamist party PAS comes to power in Terengganu, its political agenda has been to combine populist-type development programmes with the wish to turn Terengganu into a shariah-compliant state. Terengganu's state budget is however heavily dependent on the federal government, to the tune of 80-90 per cent. This hinders the state government's policymaking and implementation, especially when the federal government is controlled by its political opponents.
This article argues that the politics of development play a more central role in determining the durability of the PAS state government in Terengganu than it does in neighbouring Kelantan. PAS cannot simply carry out its Islamic agenda without being complemented by tangible economic progress if it aspires to govern beyond a single term; PAS's loss in the 2004 election after being in power for one term is a prime example of this dynamic. One reason that the current PAS state government managed to get re-elected in 2022 was the unimpeded flow of oil royalty payments into state coffers since 2018, which allowed the state government to fulfil its campaign promises; PAS's inclusion in the Perikatan Nasional federal government in 2020 further improved the state government's financial standing.
The key for the PAS state government to rule beyond the current term is its ability to negotiate the tense federal-state relationship, develop other sources of revenue, and find ways to claim credit for economic progress, in addition to burnishing its Islamic governing credentials by making Terengganu a shariah-compliant state.
ASEAN and Japan share a robust and multifaceted partnership that has evolved over five decades, and that is grounded in mutual respect, trust and shared values. The establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2023 further solidifies their commitment to advancing cooperation in traditional areas while expanding into emerging domains such as digital transformation and sustainability. In the security domain, Japan has consistently prioritized ASEAN's centrality in the regional order, even as it aligns with the United States and participates in frameworks like the Quad. Initiatives such as the Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation (JASMINE) and the Overseas Security Assistance (OSA) framework demonstrate Japan's evolving approach, transitioning from traditional capacity-building to a broader focus on enhancing maritime security, conducting joint exercises, and providing non-offensive defence equipment to ASEAN countries. The partnership's new emphasis on 'co-creation' marks a transformative shift through public and private sector collaboration to address pressing socio-economic challenges. By fostering innovation and co-developing solutions in areas like green energy, digital trade, and healthcare, the co-creation model underscores ASEAN and Japan's shared commitment to inclusive and sustainable development. Looking ahead, the ASEAN-Japan partnership is well-positioned to navigate the complexities of an evolving geopolitical landscape. By harnessing Japan's expertise in advanced technology, infrastructure development, and healthcare systems to address ASEAN's evolving priorities, and by leveraging on Japan's role as a stabilizing force amid intensifying major power rivalries, this partnership will become pivotal to the fostering of long-term regional stability, resilience, and inclusive growth.
Malaysia has traditionally adopted an intensive automotive industrialization model and created its own vehicles under national brands. The national car project started with Proton in 1983, and the national motorcycle project with Modenas in 1995. While policies and scholarship have focused on national car projects, the two-wheeler sector has stood in their shadow. Modenas witnessed early growth and remains a popular brand after Yamaha and Honda; it has however failed to hit export targets, owing to limited technology transfer and the inability to scale. Recently, there has been renewed interest in the two-wheeler sector, focusing on phasing out combustion motorcycles in favour of electric two-wheelers (E2Ws). Still nascent, Malaysia's electric two-wheeler (E2W) sector appears to prioritize an extensive model of assembly and distribution rather than the protection of home-grown brands. Still in its infancy, E2W adoption rates remain low at under 1 per cent, albeit there has been high year-over-year growth since 2022. Interviews with E2W manufacturers, regulators, dealers, and consumers reveal challenges beyond common issues like price, range, charging time, maximum speed, absence of servicing infrastructure and a second-hand market. Notably, Malaysia lacks a suitable product for Malaysian roads and lifestyle due to insufficient institutional support for Research and Development (R&D) and talent matching. With aspirations to be an E2Ws regional manufacturing hub, the government and businesses should step up on public education to bridge the information gap, rethink the R&D support model for the electric vehicle industry, and develop clarity surrounding what a 'Made in Malaysia' motorcycle entails.
Since the Sheraton Move in 2020 which led to the fall of the Malaysian government, many state governments in the federation have held their elections separately from the central government. This has resulted in a dynamic political situation in which coalitions have been formed in different ways at different times in different states. At present, there are seven states ruled by the Pakatan Harapan - Barisan Nasional (PHBN) grand coalition, while four states are under the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition. States have increasingly demanded greater political and policy autonomy over the last few years, particularly in the area of fiscal revenue-sharing between the federal and state governments. Progress has been most forthcoming for issues related to the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, and the federal government's newly set-up Malaysia Agreement 1963 Implementation Action Council has been meeting regularly. Contentious state-federal issues remain for states apart from Sabah and Sarawak, to which the federal government has not seriously responded. Limited space exists for formal state-federal negotiations that can result in firm decisions.
Sabah will be holding its state election in 2025, followed by Sarawak and Malacca in 2026. Pressure will continue to build up as these timelines draw near, and the federal government will need to identify better federal-state negotiation platforms than are currently available.
Vietnam's foreign policy towards China and the United States (US) involves a delicate process of reconciling and balancing competing perceptions, goals and interests within the country. This leads to foreign policy decisions that may respectively lean towards either China or the US, depending on specific circumstances and issues, while trying to maintain an overall equilibrium between the two powers. Vietnam's foreign policy adopts the paradigm of 'cooperation' and 'struggle' in its relations with major powers, and defines 'national security' as encompassing both national sovereignty and regime security. Given the common ideology and imperative of preserving political control of their respective communist parties, China may be a critical partner for Vietnam in terms of regime security but is often an 'object of struggle' on national sovereignty. On the other hand, the US is Vietnam's partner in the South China Sea but an 'object of struggle' when it comes to regime security.
The Vietnamese public's favourable sentiments towards the US, contrasted with their distrust towards China, pose a challenge for the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in mobilizing public opinion to bolster its legitimacy while preventing any potential threat to its political authority.
Vietnam has thus far benefited from the US-China rivalry but it faces substantial challenges ahead, including heightened vulnerabilities to an assertive China in the South China Sea and Lower Mekong, potential trade tensions if Donald Trump is re-elected as US president, and risks in balancing its ideological ties with Beijing while maintaining its strategic alignment with the US.
When Malaysia was formed in 1963, the Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah were granted special provisions under the Malaysian Agreement 1963 (MA63) to safeguard their autonomy. However, centralization measures pursued by the federal government over time have eroded these rights, particularly pertaining to education, development spending and revenue sharing. Despite being on the same island and sharing a history distinct from Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak and Sabah have evolved very differently in asserting their autonomy. Sarawak has managed to attain a greater degree of self-government, while Sabah has been more influenced by priorities pursued by Peninsular Malaysia. These varying outcomes are due to three differences between the two states: distinct historical developments in the run-up to independence; varying degrees of political control attained by the parties in power; and different priorities pursued by state leaders.
This 'Trends in Southeast Asia' explores the different political trajectories of Sarawak and Sabah through a structured comparison of the two states across these three aspects. Sarawak's combination of sub-nationalism, dominant state-level coalition, and astute political leadership has enabled the state to push the boundaries much further than its neighbour. The downfall of the erstwhile-dominant Barisan Nasional coalition has increased the room for manoeuvre of Borneo-based groupings, heralding a new power relationship between West and East Malaysia. Sarawak is well-poised to push for further privileges and prerogatives. Should it want to push for more autonomy and resources, Sabah will need to emulate key aspects of its neighbour's strategy.
Sustainable development is present everywhere in Vietnam. This book analyses the sustainable development narrative and its use by different actors in Vietnam. It examines how narratives are used to establish environmental rule in the socialist state. By focusing on NGOs and their positions in the Vietnamese context, the book illustrates how different actors use the Sustainable Development narrative to navigate power relations with the authoritarian state and the international donors, and how the narrative differs from theory to the actual practices on the ground. The book will be of interest to scholars of Vietnam who wish to understand development and state-society relations in environmental governance. It is an important read for development practitioners.
Since the normalization of relations in 1991, Vietnam and China, two of the five remaining communist regimes, have established a robust framework for mutual learning and cooperation. This collaboration has primarily centred around party governance and cadre training. Vietnam has actively studied and adopted elements of China's successful model, which combines economic reform with strict political control. This approach has allowed Vietnam to maintain communist rule in the face of increasing global pressure for democratic reforms. The process of learning from China involves two key dynamics: desirability versus capability, and effectiveness versus appropriateness. While Vietnam desires to achieve the same level of effectiveness as China in certain policy areas, it has been cautious in fully replicating the Chinese model, and shown consideration for its appropriateness to Vietnam's unique circumstances and for China's underlying motivations. Vietnam has adopted a mixed approach to learning from China, incorporating direct emulation, selective adaptation and drawing inspiration from China's experiences. One notable example of this is the ongoing anti-corruption efforts of both regimes, which share some similarities but also have distinct differences. The learning relationship between Vietnam and China is not without its challenges. Historical animosities, maritime disputes and anti-China sentiment all play a role in shaping this partnership. As a result, Vietnam has had to employ innovative tactics to adapt Chinese lessons to fit its own circumstances.
The rapid development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies has been nothing less of awe-inspiring. Policymakers are put in a bind as debates over how the deployment of these AI systems is to be managed - with good governance and ethical considerations in mind, and without stifling innovation. ASEAN's response has been the formulation of the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics, or the ASEAN AI Guide. This Guide serves more as a 'practical guide' for organizations involved in the development and deployment of AI for commercial and non-military or dual-use applications, as opposed to a policy playbook for governments. Though voluntary in application, it does have some positive attributes including laying out the groundwork for regionwide discussions around AI governance and ethics issues, promoting human involvement in AI system management and having an ecosystem approach to policy.
For the ASEAN AI Guide to translate into actionable outcomes, some public policy areas warrant additional consideration. Firstly, some focus will need to be redirected to ex-post regulations, such as legal recourse for AI-generated Intellectual Property (IP) infringement. Furthermore, how new technologies and human capital can be leveraged to better manage potential ill-effects of AI system deployment should be given more focus, along with keeping tabs on psychological changes among different segments of society with greater AI system usage. Lastly, the ASEAN AI Guide should be used as a basis for greater regional engagement in this integral area.
Since the start of Operation 1027, Myanmar's resistance groups have gained control over large parts of key overland trade routes and a number of important border crossings, fundamentally changing the realities in the control of border trade. Despite these losses, the State Administration Council (SAC) retains control-of-trade-related institutions that are vital for accessing an international trading system characterized by state-to-state interactions - giving them significant influence over trade even if they do not control trade routes and border crossings.
International precedents from territories such as Palestine, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia show that non-state actors face significant challenges engaging in trade, and are vulnerable to frequent changes in trading arrangements. Perhaps the most important factor shaping trade in these territories is the state of their relationship with either the state of which they are nominally a part, or a neighbouring state. Thailand allows small-scale trade and limited movement of people through 'checkpoints for border trade', which exist outside the formal system and are unilaterally established by Thailand. These checkpoints represent an alternative opportunity to reshape border trade.
If Myanmar's resistance hopes to transform trade from a revenue source to a meaningful strength, their prospects are best if they collaborate and develop a status-neutral plan (e.g., not requiring diplomatic recognition nor denying recognition to the SAC) for trading arrangements with neighbours, and enhance dialogue with them about this plan.