INTRODUCTION

During Chinese President Xi Jinping's landmark visit to Vietnam in late 2023, both nations pledged to forge a “China-Vietnam Community with Shared Future”. As part of this, they signed an agreement to accelerate mutual learning and cooperation and to promote the “special role of party channels”. This initiative follows the agreement made during the late Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong's trip to Beijing in 2022 when both sides agreed to promote the 2021–25 Cadre Training Cooperation Plan between the two communist parties. Since China re-established its training programme for Vietnamese officials in 2007, there have been four occasions where altogether around 6,000 senior officials were sent to China by 2022. This shows remarkably close ties between the two regimes.

For CPV leaders, learning how to govern is essential for maintaining their regime. This has become even more important since the collapse of the communist Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union, which Vietnam had looked to as an example during the Cold War. China has since emerged as the most significant source of learning for Vietnam in its search for a new model. Like Vietnam, China has successfully maintained communist rule and promoted economic growth. As a rising global superpower, China has its unique development model, challenging the traditional liberal democratic model that has been dominant since the end of the Cold War. The cultural similarities and historical links between Vietnam and China make it a justifiable choice for Vietnam to look to China as a model for learning.

There has however been a paucity of in-depth studies on Vietnam's position as an active learner in its relationship with China. The Vietnam-China relationship is often viewed through the lens of great-power competition or contested maritime disputes. Due to a lack of understanding about how this learning process works, there are misconceptions that Vietnam has blindly followed China's lead or fully accepted China's worldview and submitted to Chinese influence. This is of significant concern, especially considering the complicated nature of the Vietnam-China relationship and the anti-China sentiments found among the Vietnamese people.

This article provides a nuanced examination of what Vietnam has—and has not—adopted from its northern neighbour. It also discusses the practical aspects of authoritarian learning and diffusion. While this latter concept is widely debated among academics and policymakers, there are few concrete explanations of how authoritarian diffusion actually occurs and what specific steps are involved.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

In the run-up to the Nahdlatul Ulama chairmanship election in 2021, Yahya Staquf wanted the Indonesian Muslim organization to continue helping raise the living standard of its community. At the same time, he wished for the organization to promote humanitarian Islam. Humanitarian Islam broadly refers to NU's efforts to promote peaceful coexistence among people of different faiths in the world, with a focus on rahmah (universal love and compassion). The main vehicles for promoting this vision on the global stage are North Carolina-registered non-governmental organizations (NGOs) Bayt ar-Rahmah and the Center for Shared Civilizational Values. These NGOs serve as “international hubs” with vast networks which facilitate the establishment of international social partnerships.

While the concept of Humanitarian Islam was officially launched in 2017, Yahya Staquf pursued this vision more actively only after he was elected NU chairman in 2021. Among others, the vision of Humanitarian Islam materialized through the Religion Twenty (R20) meeting. NU was the backbone for organizing this meeting on the sidelines of the G20 meeting held in Bali in 2022. At the meeting, religious leaders from both G20 member and non-member countries gathered in Bali to discuss how religion could be used to promote peace in the world. Nahdlatul Ulama has also been establishing partnerships with various Muslim and non-Muslim religious organizations as part of the Humanitarian Islam vision, including with the US-based African American Imam Warith Deen Muhammad (IWDM) community and the World Evangelical Alliance. NU continues to promote peace in Afghanistan.

While there has been some media coverage on Humanitarian Islam, scholarly works that address the topic of Humanitarian Islam have only just started to emerge. These include the edited volume by Rüdiger Lohlker and Katharina Ivanyi, Humanitarian Islam: Reflecting on an Islamic Concept, and a descriptive article by Murat Kaçer, both published in 2023. Our article on the prospects and challenges of promoting Humanitarian Islam fills a gap in the existing literature. On one level, it extends arguments put forth by Lohlker on pribumisasi Islam (indigenization of Islam) within Indonesia by showing how the vocabulary of indigeneity employed by NU finds synergy with organizations like the IWDM community in the US, which similarly positions itself as “indigenous” and “native”. Through drawing on original interview data with NU and IWDM leaders, this article sheds light on the type of partnerships that have and can occur as part of the Humanitarian Islam campaign. On another level, through analysing primary data—interviews, documents, and ethnographic work—our article demonstrates that the challenges NU faces are not just ideological as suggested by Kaçer but also practical.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

Introduction

Islamic finance in Thailand has been expanding since the establishment of the first Islamic Financial Institution (IFI), Pattani Islamic Saving Cooperative Limited, in 1987. This led to the establishment of an Islamic bank, Islamic sections in commercial banks, more than thirty Islamic cooperatives, Islamic asset management firms, Islamic insurance (takaful) companies, and informal social financial institutions. The literature on Islamic finance in Thailand has duly discussed the basic features of Islamic finance such as shariah-compliant contracts, service quality, acceptance of IFIs, and the use of Islamic finance among Muslim clients. Only recently have issues related to the performance and impact of Islamic finance on clients’ households been discussed.

Until now, scholars are at odds as to whether Islamic finance improves the lives of the Thai population (Muslims and non-Muslims) and adapts to a new set of banking rules and regulations. This chapter examines the impact of Islamic finance on a multicultural society such as Thailand. More specifically, it aims at identifying the forces behind the emergence of the Islamic finance industry, evaluating the current state of the industry, and scrutinizing Islamic finance's impact on society. How does Islamic finance operate in a non-Muslim country? Has there been a complete development plan that ensures that the Islamic finance industry benefits clients of different religious groups? It argues that the Thai government can address the gap of financial exclusion and at the same time ensure better coexistence of various religious groups in the country.

Muslims in Thailand and Their Socioeconomic Status

Thailand is a predominantly Buddhist country where religion shapes the country's political culture and people's worldview (Yusuf 2009). Muslims represent the largest religious minority group and can be found nationwide. The majority of Muslims live in the four southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun, and in general, they are found to be poor, undereducated and unemployed (Tawat 2013). The current southern conflict, which began in 2004, has worsened their socio-economic conditions; they rely on agriculture and unskilled low-paying jobs.

Scholars have proposed various theories about Islam's introduction to Thailand. One fact is that in 128 A.D.—several centuries before the founding of the Kingdom of Sukhothai—Arab and Persian Muslims were found active in the ports of the Tenasserim and the Isthmus of Kra, the first truly Thai kingdom (Forbes 1982).

Introduction

This chapter is presented in two parts. Part one is on the emergence of a halal lifestyle in Southeast Asia and beyond, whereas part two addresses halal-related developments in Malaysia. Halal as a concept and value category is an integral part of shariah and is not new. However, its more recent manifestations and growth into an industry are linked with the development of a certain lifestyle and culture among Muslims. Halal as a concept began with a focus on food and drinks but further developed to include clothes, cosmetics, recreation, housing, tourism, banking and finance, halal pharmaceuticals and medicine and even halal dating and matchmaking. However, not all aspects of the halal industry are expounded in the shariah textbooks. Questions, therefore, arose from time to time over doubtful matters and the role of ‘urf (social custom) and fatwa in determining such issues. Similar questions arose over the qualification of halal slaughterers, whether non-Muslims and women were qualified to carry out the halal slaughter, and whether machine slaughter, slaughtered meat imported from non-Muslim countries, electric stunning and so on, were shariah-compliant.

The twentieth-century reassertion of Muslim identity projected Islam as a comprehensive way of life and placed a fresh emphasis on the Islamic lifestyle and culture. Even Muslims who are not so pious in other respects still tend to observe certain aspects of this lifestyle, especially halal food, partly because dietary laws are usually observed from early childhood as part of the religious and family traditions. Halal, like the hijab, tends to be entrenched in the custom and culture of Muslim societies, hence is a part of their identity and lifestyle (Alatas 2022, pp. 39–40; Suzanna 2007, pp. 40–41; Kamali 2021, pp. 6–7).

An anti-halal movement also gained traction in the West as a negative response to these developments. Thus, in Europe, North America and Australia, campaigns against the Muslim presence revolved around visible signifiers such as women wearing the hijab, burqa or niqab, the building of mosques and minarets, halal certification and restaurants. The Italian cities of Genoa and Bergamo imposed bans on kebab shops in the name of safeguarding hygiene and culinary traditions. A scare campaign against halal food certification in Australia threatened various food suppliers with consumer boycotts saying that the fees they paid for halal certification were funding terrorism and campaigns to introduce shariah law in Australia. Other companies took the opportunity to cite their lack of halal certification as evidence of their national loyalty and preservation of Western values (Shakira 2015, pp. 85–86; Ruiz-Bejarano 2017, pp. 132–38).

Three Malay bachelors had a long day at work. They gathered at one of their colleagues’ workplaces and started their journey back to their house, by foot. Along the way, they discussed ways to reward themselves for the hard day's work. One suggested dining out, but the rest disagreed, preferring to cook. So, they stopped halfway and bought a live chicken from a Chinese seller by the roadside. This was how business was conducted in the 1950s in Singapore. “Two katis, so three ringgits!” said the seller. The three men agreed to share the purchase. They carried the living chicken all the way home. Upon arriving, they were greeted by a man called Nyong who was sweeping the compounds of the village. The man teased the bachelors, “So who would cook for you?” Despite being unmarried, the men replied that they were trained to cook, and requested Nyong to slaughter the chicken.

That was the opening scene of the movie Bujang Lapok, one of the wellknown P. Ramlee comedies. While the film shared the struggles of young bachelors in pre-independent Singapore, scenes like this also encapsulate the lifestyle before the Islamic resurgence movement in the 1970s. Imagine how different the three bachelors would behave today. They could drop by a supermarket, choose slaughtered chickens from the freezer, and they could choose which part of it rather than purchasing the whole chicken. Being good Muslims, they can verify its halalness by looking at the halal logo indicated on the packaging, without needing to pass it to another Muslim to slaughter the chicken. The identity of the chicken owner is also unknown as the chicken might have been slaughtered at the slaughterhouse.

While once it was not uncommon for Muslims to patronize halal poultry without halal certification (because it did not yet exist), it is now almost unthinkable. A halal certificate symbolizes that the meat at a given supermarket is permitted for consumption, while the meat without such certification is deemed prohibited. The meat would have undergone a thorough process to meet halal standards.

The halal industry in Southeast Asia has been growing since the 1980s. It is a by-product of the Islamic resurgence (some referred to this period as Islamic revivalism or dakwah movement) which swept across the region in the 1970s and 1980s, witnessing the importation of ideologies from the Middle East such as Salafi-Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia, Shi’ism's vilayete- faqeh inspired by the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the tarbiyah movement adapted from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Though competing with one another, these ideologies shared the common goal of establishing an Islamic socio-political order as an alternative to a Western order.

Introduction

This chapter addresses important issues relating to the halal certification of Islamic products within a thriving and expanding consumer market, including approximately two billion Muslims, accounting for 25 per cent of the world population. The discussion focuses on the fraudulent marketing of halal products in addition to several examples of disputed products that do not have a universal halal certification agreement among the Muslim ulama (religious scholars) in different parts of the world or even within the same nation. According to a global halal food market report: “The global halal food market size is expected to grow from $1,134.14 billion in 2021 to $1,290.35 billion in 2022 at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 13.8 per cent. The global halal foods market size is expected to grow to $2,228.63 billion in 2026 at a CAGR of 14.6 per cent” (The Business Research Company 2023). This figure applies only to food products, not halal hygienic, pharmaceutical, cosmetic products, and services.

Southeast Asia, with a large Muslim population, is one of the most important halal food markets. Halal products are sought and consumed by a majority of the Muslim population in this region of the world. One big issue is the circulation of non-halal food in the market. This issue is not limited to imported food from outside the nations but within several ASEAN countries that do not have halal certification licenses.

Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks (commonly known as 9/11) against the United States, Western nations, particularly the American public, have been increasingly curious about and frequently baffled by the politics, culture, and religious precepts of Islam. Islam and Muslims are discussed in the media regularly, scapegoated for failures in governmental policies such as immigration, and used by politicians as wedge issues to score cheap political points in election years. Information technology and the Internet opened the door to the commercialization of Islam. A new demand for halal consumer goods and services emerged where no demand previously existed, resulting in a wide range of halal products, from beach balls and cosmetics to bathing suits, toothbrushes and socks, to service industries like hospitals, banking and vacations marketed under the auspices of Islam, blessed by the watchful eyes of ayatollahs, ulama, and muftis. The commercialization of Islamic piety today often involves a certification process that is less about faith and more about the commercial business of generating profits. These profit-driven products exploit the rise of a new Islamic economic paradigm not specifically created with the objective of honouring religious practice and sentiment solely, but rather for business purposes. In these markets, some of these products are halal, while others are fraudulently labelled halal (Shirazi 2016).

Introduction

In the evolving landscape of Thai Muslim society, women entrepreneurs are employing innovative means to assert their identity and navigate the business world. Hasnah's statement above reflects how the hijab, a headscarf donned by Muslim women, serves as an important marker of religious identity, allowing Muslim women in Thailand to conduct business in the Muslim community successfully. This became particularly salient during the economic downturn following the COVID-19 pandemic. Notably, Phuket, a province that has been a prominent tourist destination since the 1980s, experienced high unemployment rates during the pandemic despite its popularity (Wannaphong 2013). In Thailand, the tourism sector ranks as the fifth highest source of income and thus constitutes a primary driver of the country's economy. Before the global declaration of the coronavirus pandemic, Phuket's economy relied mainly on the service sector (NESDC 2019). However, the pandemic wrought severe economic consequences across Thailand. Measures implemented by the government, including domestic and international travel restrictions, social distancing guidelines, and the temporary closure of small businesses, exacerbated the economic strain (Baum and Nguyen 2020).

In 2021, the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council (NESDC) examined the strategies which workers and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the tourism sector employed to adapt during the pandemic. Among those workers is Hasnah who operates a micro halal enterprise through a family-owned food stall. A key element of Hasnah's business approach involves using the hijab during operation hours. As a symbol of Muslim identity, the hijab assures customers that the food is halal and safe for Muslim consumption. This assurance is crucial given that food stalls selling basically to Muslims are not required to obtain halal certification.

In Thailand, the concept of “halal” has undergone a significant transformation, shifting from its fundamental religious roots to a system intertwined with capitalism, engaged in halal tourism and commercialization. Critics within the Muslim community point out that what was once a religious structure has been mobilized and manipulated by religious authorities. Regardless, the Thai government continues to support the Halal Standard Institute of Thailand, an exclusive statutory religious organization governed by the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand (CICOT).

Introduction

Tourism is a robust sector in developed economies, and governments collaborate with private enterprises to cater to foreign tourists’ needs. The meaning of tourism has also undergone significant changes for Singapore Muslims. In Islam, the movement of people from one place to another has always been part and parcel of community, cultural and religious life. Some of these travels are predicated on necessities, such as warfare (as refugees), migration (forced or voluntary) and religious obligations (such as the pilgrimage to Mecca). Muslims also travel for work and leisure (holidays). Examining how travel among Singapore Muslims has changed over the years is significant because it allows one to take stock of the impact of the Islamic resurgence movement of the 1980s, which scholars have identified as the reason for the attitudinal change of Muslims in Southeast Asia towards exclusivism or conservatism (Azhar 2014; Chandra 1987). Since the 1980s, Muslims (the majority of whom in Singapore are Malays) experienced improvements in their socio-economic life. The community's ascension into the Muslim middle and educated class corresponds to the changing appetite of needs, lifestyles, and requirements (Bourdieu 1984). The nexus between the expanding middle class and growing religiosity led to new demands and requirements, among others, for Islamic tourism or shariah-compliant travel.

Today, the haj (also called hajj) and umrah industry is the fastest-growing sector in the Malay-Muslim community. Based on the 2020 census, the Malay-Muslim community (also referred to as the Malays) makes up about 15 per cent of the 5.6 million Singapore population. The haj is the fifth pillar of Islam, and it is obligatory for Muslims to perform the haj ritual to Mecca once in their lifetime. This chapter examines the evolution of the haj and umrah from a religious obligation into a flourishing industry in Singapore. During the colonial period, the city-state earned the reputation of being the centre of the haj pilgrimage, where travel to Mecca from outside Arabia was only feasible by sea, and Singapore played the role of the haj port in Southeast Asia. Today, as the mode of transportation has changed from sea to air, Singapore no longer plays that role. Nevertheless, the privatization of haj has made the ritual a business opportunity.

Introduction

Since the emergence of Islamic revivalism in the Malay-Indonesian world in the 1970s, the region has witnessed various forms and intensities of Islamic politics and group interests. It is marked by the greater assertion of Islamic observances, practices and ideas, especially in the public sphere. In recent decades, the call for Islamic revivalism or Islamization has been noticeable in Malaysia and neighbouring Indonesia. The religious elite (ulama) in Brunei, Singapore, and Southern Thailand have also participated in such assertions to some extent.

In a nutshell, Islamization has evolved in two directions. The first involves a social process whereby Islamic values and practices have been gradually entrenched in Muslim societies, as a result of numerous factors at work. As a social process, it has shaped Muslim societies over an extended period, introducing new values and traditions, and affirming existing ones. On the other hand, the second direction is a conscious effort to Islamize the community, resulting in exclusivist orientations and anti-pluralist modes of thinking which are motivated by several factors. Both directions have resulted in greater compliance with the shariah. This would refer to adherence to general Islamic principles, or to specific observances which are stipulated by Muslim governing authorities.

Overall, the period of intense Islamization witnessed the persistent claim that “Islam is the panacea to all human predicaments”, that “Muslims need no other systems”, and that “all other systems are corrupt and unIslamic”. As these assertions became popular and were eventually normalized, those who critically scrutinized such claims were relegated to the background and dismissed as “liberal”. However, such assertions and trends warrant sociological and historical scrutiny, as they may have (un)intended consequences on a society characterized by religious, cultural and ethnic pluralism. These consequences may be cultural, religious or linguistic, and may affect inter-religious and inter-ethnic relations.

While many have focused on the rise of political Islam in the context of revivalist ideologies and orientations, few studies have scrutinized and assessed the impact of cultural and intellectual Islamism that has been articulated and growing within the Muslim community over the last five decades.