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This book gives a brief account of how social and economic changes have an impact on the Singapore education system, bearing in mind that education and national development are closely related. Besides providing a short history of education in Singapore, the book discusses how the New Education System(NES) was implemented, public response to streaming, and the impact of the NES on educational wastage and attainments.
The past decade has witnessed rapid development in ASEAN-China relations. Both sides now have more in common than before, though differences still exist. ASEAN and China have established a promising strategic partnership ensuring peace, stability, co-operation as well as prosperity for the region.New challenges will, however, continue to emerge to test the resolve of the partnership. This book examines some of the areas of convergence and divergence and the possible trajectories of the development of ASEAN-China relations.
"For observers outside of Southeast Asia, this book opens up a world of conflicts, rivalries, and reconciliations that is terra incognita. It is easy to assume that all is well under the consensual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) umbrella. These expert authors detail the sometimes stormy and often tense bilateral relationships in the region. In doing so they delineate the profound contribution that ASEAN has made to regional security and cooperation, but at the same time they show the limits of multilateralism as a mode of conflict resolution. Etel Solingen's introductory essay provides an extensive analytical vocabulary for regional politics, and the other authors have fascinating stories to tell about the interrelationships of Southeast Asia's states since 1975."- Brantly Womack, Hugh S. & Winifred B. Cumming Memorial Professor of International Affairs, University of Virginia"The international relations of Southeast Asia has been so dominated by academic studies focusing on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations that 'everyday interstate politics' has been eclipsed. This volume by N. Ganesan and Ramses Amer redresses this neglect. International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism includes nine empirically rich case studies focused on the management of persistent bilateral tensions involving eight of the region's states. This collection will appeal to a wide audience of students, academics, and regional security specialists due to the diversity and expertise of its contributors and its up-to-date analysis."- Carlyle A. Thayer, Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra"The volume edited by Ganesan and Amer is a welcome departure from the academic theoretical focus on the regionalist enterprise of ASEAN. As the aspirational goal of an ASEAN community becomes increasingly elusive - if not illusory - this book explains in real policy terms the challenge to the political efficacy of ASEAN's multilateral fora, constrained as they are by consensus, non-interference, and fiercely defended state sovereignty. In detailed and sharply etched studies of the key bilateral interests and issues at the state level, the authors demonstrate that rather than recourse to the multilateral diplomatic platform represented by ASEAN, the preferred national mechanisms for the critical areas of cooperation and conflict will continue to be bilateral and the practices of traditional statecraft."- Donald E. Weatherbee, Russell Distinguished Professor Emeritus, University of South Carolina
Energy efficiency has become one of the most important aspects in the global energy outlook today. The depletion of fossil fuels as energy resources and global warming make it imperative for us to consider energy efficiency policies and measures as an important priority for policy-makers and every responsible global citizen.Japan has been a leading country in the area of energy efficiency. Since the 1970s when the oil crisis hit, Japan, which depends almost wholly on imported energy supplies from abroad, has been conducting various efforts on energy conservation and diversification of energy sources. As a result, Japan has achieved the lowest primary energy consumption per GDP in the world. Asian countries should learn from Japan’s success in this area, especially since their economic growth is predicted to be one of the primary drivers for growth in global energy demand.The chapters in this book are based on presentations on Japan’s energy efficiency and conservation at ISEAS Energy Forums.
In the early 1990s, Singapore, the Malaysian state of Johor, and the Riau Islands in Indonesia sought to leverage their proximity, differing factor endowments, and good logistics connections to market themselves as an integrated unit. Beyond national-level support in all three countries, the initiative had the support of state and provincial leaders in Johor and Riau, respectively.Now, however, the situation is markedly different. The Malaysian government and its Johorean equivalent have invested considerable resources in encouraging closer integration with Singapore. For its part, the Indonesian central government has been promoting special economic zones and export-oriented activities. However, the provincial government of the Riau Islands has turned away from export-oriented industrialization, preferring instead to promote cultural sub-nationalism and traditional economic activities such as fishing and small-scale farming. This development is counter-intuitive. Traditional fiscal federalism theory argues that decentralization encourages competition between provinces for investment, jobs, and growth. While Indonesia has undergone one of the world's most far-reaching decentralization reforms, Malaysia has pursued a consistent centralization campaign at the expense of state governments. Thus, we would expect the Riau Islands' entrepreneurial drive to be unleashed, and Johor's to be smothered. However, Johor's drive for capital is undiminished, while the Riau Islands' pursuit of investment has dissipated. This monograph will explore the reasons for this paradox.'This book provides a path-breaking analysis of how Johor and the Riau Islands have competed with each other for FDI from Singapore in the electronics sector. It sheds light on how the institutional and incentive structures facing these regions have encouraged or discouraged policy innovation and dynamism. The rigorous analysis of financial and investment data in this book provides a convincing challenge to the conventional wisdom that proximity and cost differentials inevitably lead to closer economic integration.' - Professor Shujiro Urata, Waseda University
Singapore's economy has been growing at a tepid pace since 2012 due to a modest performance of the US economy, uncertainties surrounding the European Union (EU), weak growth in the East Asian region, particularly with China's structural economic slowdown and, a general slowdown in global trade. During 2011–16, Singapore's real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average rate of 3.8 per cent per annum, compared to an average of 7.3 per cent during 2002–7 (Singapore Department of Statistics 2017a). The lackluster output is matched by an unemployment rate of around 2 per cent during 2011–16 (Singapore Department of Statistics 2017b). It has been estimated that the economy will grow at a rate of 1–3 per cent in 2016 (Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore 2017).
It is during this time of restrained economic outlook that Singapore is also undergoing a structural adjustment. In 2010, the city-state embarked on a ten-year programme to boost its productivity growth to 2 to 3 per cent per annum, from around 1 per cent during the 2000s (Economic Strategies Committee 2010). The target was to be achieved by curbing the growth of low-skilled foreign labour supply, encouraging capital deepening and increasing automation. Programmes were put in place to help the local workforce to develop new skills according to new growth areas. While the manufacturing sector had undergone restructuring several times in past decades, it was the first time the entire economy was subject to such a process. Since then, this strive for transformation has been a challenge for domestic-oriented businesses, particularly those in the services sector, which are trying hard to lower their dependence on foreign labour and re-position themselves by investing in technology and talent (Menon 2015).
A further policy boost came in February 2017, when Singapore released the Committee on the Future Economy (CFE) Report that laid down seven strategies to secure the city-state's economic success over the longer term.
Indonesia's services sector is relatively small at 42 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), compared to an ASEAN average of 47.3 per cent and a world average of 68.3 per cent in 2014. The share of services to GDP increased marginally from 40.6 per cent in 2011 to 42 per cent in 2014. Services trade as a share of total trade is also relatively low at about 6.4 per cent in 2014 compared to the world average of 13 per cent. Furthermore, compared to the manufacturing sector, policies governing the services sector are relatively more restrictive, as for example in the case of Indonesia's foreign direct investment (FDI) policy.
The logistics sector is no exception to the above pattern in Indonesia's services performance. The contribution and performance of this sector is below that of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. The World Bank's Logistics Performance Index (LPI) indicated that Indonesia's logistics performance ranked the 63rd out of 160 countries, while Singapore ranked the 5th, Malaysia the 32nd and Thailand the 45th (World Bank 2016).
Given its current performance, improving the logistics sector's efficiency is among the main priorities of the current government. The immediate challenge for Indonesia is to make the sector more efficient so that logistics cost can be reduced, remove barriers to entry as well as to improve the quality of logistics infrastructure. The logistics cost for international and domestic freight in Indonesia in relatively high compared to its peers in the region. World Bank (2012) reported the typical charge for a forty-foot dry container or a semi-trailer (total freight including agent fees and other charges) in 2012 was only US$178 in Singapore while it costs around US$415 in Indonesia. Therefore, the logistics costs for exporting and importing in Indonesia are more expensive than a neighbouring high labour cost country like Singapore.
Domestic logistics cost in Indonesia, especially inter-island, is also higher than international export–import costs. The cost of sending a 100-kilogram package from Jakarta to Tanjung Pinang, in Kepulauan Riau Province of Indonesia, using Jalur Nugraha Ekakurir's (JNE) cheapest service is IDR2.5 million (about US$260).
ASEAN turns fifty this year. And there is cause for celebration. For a group of countries that are so economically, politically and culturally varied, it has achieved much over the five decades. To appreciate the strides made by this regional grouping one has to explore ASEAN's economic journey from modest goals of a preferential trade agreement (PTA) in the 1970s through the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in the 1990s, the AEC Blueprint 2015 (AEC 2015) and AEC Blueprint 2025 (AEC 2025).
The ASEAN story reflects the grouping's step-by-step confidence building approach towards integration. This served the members well, allowing for domestic adjustments even as it deepened its regional commitments, moving from voluntary liberalization under the PTA, through the rules-based ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) and services liberalization under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), and laying the foundation for an integrated investment region through the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA). The latter three agreements are core to both the AEC 2015 and AEC 2025 as the region looks to deepening economic integration not just among the ASEAN Member States (AMS) but also with its Dialogue Partners.
ASEAN has been successful in the removal of tariffs for intra-ASEAN trade in goods; done significant work on services liberalization; and has managed some measure of streamlining of investment rules. Much work has also been done on Mutual Recognition Agreements and Standards and Conformance.
Even as ASEAN revels in its achievement, much more needs to be done. Key to ASEAN economic integration is trade facilitation. Meaningful market access for both goods and services requires that ASEAN move forward with work on Non-Tariff Measures, domestic regulations as well as continued infrastructure and human capital development. These measures are outlined in the AEC Blueprint 2025, which has the following features: (i) A Highly Integrated and Cohesive Economy; (ii) A Competitive, Innovative, and Dynamic ASEAN; (iii) An ASEAN with Enhanced Connectivity and Deeper Sectoral Cooperation; (iv) A Resilient, Inclusive, People-Oriented, and People-Centered ASEAN; and (v) A Global ASEAN.
After a few decades of self-imposed economic isolation under the Burmese Socialist Programme Party, Myanmar began to embark upon a gradual and staggered journey to reintegrate with the global economy in the 1990s. In 2011, the government under President U Thein Sein introduced a series of liberalization measures in selected sectors. The recent transition from semi-military to democratic government and the concomitant removal of the US sanctions presented a strategic window to further facilitate Myanmar's integration into the regional and global economy. Myanmar also chaired the 2014 ASEAN Summit and was granted observer status in the 2014 G20 Summit.
Although successive governments have stressed the critical and central role of the development of infrastructure in Myanmar's economic development, the logistics sector has yet to receive dedicated policy attention. This chapter draws attention to the role of the logistics sector in overcoming some of more critical challenges in the formation of positive linkages between Myanmar's economy and the global value chains (GVCs). Facilitating foreign direct investment (FDI) in logistics infrastructure and services is a critical link for domestic enterprises to participate in GVCs. It will also help to create productivity gains through the use of new technology and generate positive spillovers through linkages with local service providers. In this chapter, we discuss two interlocking layers of challenges, namely, governance of FDI and governance of the services and logistic sector in Myanmar's development strategy.
The chapter examines various issues of agency in the governance of the services sector and posits that agency issue at the national level, manifests itself as an issue of coordination given the vast differences in information and incentives amongst multiple principals (focal agencies) and agents (implementing agencies) in terms of negotiation and implementation of agreements. However, at the local level, “thinness” of the presence of government agencies in regulating and monitoring economic activities at the border leads to limited agency of the state in the governance of the services and logistics sectors. Second, it is important to induce inflows of FDI into the logistic sector in the broader context of regulatory and institutional reforms in order to create an enabling ecosystem for logistics in Myanmar.
Since the Doi Moi in 1986, Vietnam has been progressively opening up its services sector. In recent years, it has made significant efforts to liberalize the sector by participating in various trade agreements, including bilateral, and multilateral agreements related to trade in service, namely GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services), AFAS (ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services), different ASEAN+1 FTAs and recently the EU–Vietnam FTA (EVFTA) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. In line with its commitments, Vietnam has reviewed, revised and issued numerous legislative regulations and policies towards a freer flow of services. Consequently, the regulatory framework related to the services sector in Vietnam has become more transparent and open to foreign suppliers, enabling them to have better access to its domestic services market.
However, the ease of doing business in Vietnam remains at a relatively low ranking — the 90th among 189 countries (World Bank 2016), partly because the services-related policies are still relatively restrictive towards foreign direct investment (FDI). Therefore, there is a need for Vietnam to evaluate its challenges in services liberalization, especially in the aspect of commercial presence (i.e. mode 3), by examining the impediments to FDI inflows in services so as to enable Vietnam to benefit from ASEAN's initiatives to liberalize services.
This chapter analyses the development and contribution of the services sector to Vietnam's economy. It also discusses services trade liberalization under AFAS and GATS along with the domestic FDI policies in the services sector. The logistic sector was selected as a case study for a deeper analysis of Vietnam's services liberalization. Based on these economy-wide and sector-specific discussions, the chapter will identify key challenges facing Vietnam in attracting FDI into the services sector. The chapter concludes with policy recommendations for Vietnam as well as for ASEAN.
A frequent question raised in discussions on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) is the impact of liberalization in services on inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Policymakers are concerned if liberalization has encouraged FDI inflows while researchers are keen to test the same relationship. Likewise, the public is curious as to whether FTAs are as useful as touted. Yet the relationship between liberalization and inflows of FDI is not as straightforward for services as in the case of manufacturing. This is because the services sector is frequently highly regulated due to information asymmetries between producers and consumers. Domestic regulations therefore play an important role in protecting domestic consumers but these regulations can at the same time hinder the entry of both domestic and foreign service providers. While liberalization is important, it is not sufficient and any attempt at investigating the impact of liberalization on inflows of FDI has to take into consideration the FDI enabling environment in a country.
Given this, we are motivated to undertake a study that can illuminate the academics, policymakers and businesses on liberalization issues in the services sector for the ten member countries in ASEAN. We decided to focus on FDI liberalization in services as commercial presence is considered as the most important mode of trade in services. Given the heterogeneity of the services sector, we chose to focus on the logistics industry as a case study as the industry plays a key role in the movement of goods, services and people across ASEAN.
The main objective of this book is, thus, to compare international and domestic policy measures for attracting FDI and its impact on inflows of FDI in the services sector in the ten ASEAN member countries. This has implications for ASEAN's economic cooperation, in general, and for the logistics sector integration, in particular.
Over the last two decades, inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Cambodia has increased significantly, due to its relatively liberal investment law and pace of services liberalization, including the logistics sector. Liberalization of the services sector started soon after the country's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2004 through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and later in 2007 through the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS). The services sector, accounting for 42.3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2015, plays a critical role in socio-economic development through job creation and productivity improvement. Within it, logistics is regarded as a strategic sector for national and regional connectivity, socio-economic development, and poverty reduction.
This chapter reviews Cambodia's economic development and FDI climate, along with its efforts in services liberalization. The chapter also looks at the liberalization initiatives in logistics services and the current state of logistics development and connectivity in Cambodia. Investment in logistics, especially in infrastructure, and enhancing regional connectivity is one of the key areas of national development as it can help to improve the country's economic performance and competitiveness by reducing transactions cost, improving broad investment climate, and promoting international trade.
Investment Climate
As a small economy, Cambodia has been performing well in the last two decades in terms of sustaining high economic performance and reducing poverty significantly. It has achieved a high average growth rate of 7.9 per cent from 2000 to 2015, thus making it one of the fastest growing economies in ASEAN. The poverty rate has reduced from more than 53.2 per cent in 2004 to 13.5 per cent in 2014. Per capita income has increased from US$417 in 2004 to US$1,215 in 2015, making Cambodia a lower middle-income country, according to the classification by the World Bank Group. Cambodia aims to become an upper middle-income country by 2030 and a high-income country by 2050, if it can sustain an annual growth rate of around 7 per cent.
In the last two decades, the services sector has gained increasing importance in terms of its contribution to a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment. Its share in total GDP for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries has grown from 70 per cent in mid-1990s to 75 per cent more recently, while its share for the countries in East Asia and Pacific has moved up from 37 per cent to 48 per cent over the same period. It further accounts for about 70 and 47 per cent respectively of total employment in the OECD countries and East Asia and Pacific region respectively (World Bank 2016).
The increasing importance of the services sector is driven by production fragmentation or outsourcing activities. While production fragmentation entails goods to be produced in multiple countries, outsourcing happens when multinational corporations (MNCs) focus on functions that they have comparative advantage while other functions are subcontracted to other firms. The resulting spatial or functional fragmentation is connected through service links such as transportation, ICT, distribution services, financial intermediation services and others (Jones and Kierzkowski 2005). Consequently, the competitiveness of manufacturing firms in an increasingly globalized world is determined to a large extent by the cost effectiveness and reliability of these service links.
In turn, the changing nature of manufacturing production has led to an increasing importance of trade in services as opposed to the earlier significance of trade in goods (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008). Trade in services now accounts for more than a fifth of global trade volumes (Saez et al. 2015). For the past two decades, trade in services has grown faster than merchandise trade, reaching over US$9 trillion for the first time in 2013 and constituting 11.9 per cent of the world GDP (UNESCAP 2015). It has also increased in recent years vis-àvis trade in goods as the latter has been affected by the slowdown in growth in the developed world after the global financial crisis while economic recovery is retarded by the crash in commodity and oil prices in 2015.
Lao PDR is known as one of the poorest countries in ASEAN. In recent years, the economy has performed well. In 2015, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased by about 6.7 per cent, implying that Lao PDR is one of the top ten world's fastest growing economy (ADB 2016). This growth is a result of exports in energy, mostly in mining and electricity, which is due to an increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in these sectors, given its high return. FDI inflows to Laos rose remarkably, with more than 80 per cent in 2012–15 compared with 2009–11 (UNESCAP 2015). It is worth noting that FDI is a major source of investment that supports the growth of the economy.
It is a well-accepted fact that FDI has both positive and negative impact on an economy. For an open economy, higher FDI flows may contribute positively to GDP growth. Alternatively, at the sectoral level, higher investment, particularly in the mining sector, may lead to declining economic growth when both energy and mining sectors have reached a saturation level. It is difficult to keep up economic growth by only depending on these sectors. This implies that countries that focus on natural resources only may face an economic slump eventually. However, in Lao PDR, services sector value added as percentage of GDP is growing faster than the industrial and agricultural sectors’ growth rates since 2013 (ADB 2016). Thus, the services sector is likely to be an alternative source of growth for the economy.
Lao PDR is a latecomer in services sector liberalization in ASEAN. The country opened up to FDI in 1988, but significant investment inflows only occurred after the early 2000s. In recent years, Lao PDR has achieved steady economic growth, mainly fuelled by large FDI inflows and exports of natural resources. Of the total accumulated FDI stock during 1989–2015, services sector was ranked fourth, after electricity, mining and agricultural sectors (IPD 2016a). Vietnam, Thailand and China are the three key investors in Lao PDR.