This chapter focuses on the challenges and experiences of caregiving in dementia, emphasizing the importance of protecting caregiver health and well-being. It discusses effective communication strategies, provides a list of useful web-based educational resources for caregivers, and explores direct and indirect caregiver support interventions. The chapter highlights the need for better support and resources for caregivers, including access to respite care and palliative care services. It also provides strategies for healthcare providers to better engage and support caregivers. Overall, the chapter emphasizes the need to prioritize caregiver health and well-being in dementia care to improve outcomes for both caregivers and individuals with dementia.

In this chapter I offer an account of Arnauld’s ontological commitments, specifically of his dual dualisms: a substance-mode ontology and a mind-body substance dualism. According to the former, only substances and their modes exist, while according to the latter only two types of finite substances exist - namely, minds and bodies. I also consider Arnauld’s early objections to Descartes’s argument for substance dualism from the Sixth Meditation, often called the ‘real distinction argument,’ especially Arnauld’s objections concerning Descartes’s use of the conceivability-possibility principle. After considering Descartes’s replies, I then consider Arnauld’s seeming endorsement of the real distinction argument in some of his later texts.

In this chapter, the chronological and geographical distribution of the probate inventories under examination are addressed, and they are classified as to key variables, like the occupation of the deceased, their gender, and the reason for production of the inventory. Some of this information – particularly the reason for the making of the lists – will be used to assess the existence of biases of wealth and age. The argument of this chapter is that Valencian inventories overcome most of the problems that have been identified for their quantitative use in other countries. As far as the late medieval period is concerned, Valencian lists of goods provide, in terms of their abundance, exhaustiveness, and precision, some of the best sets of inventories for Europe as a whole.

The manipulation of risk and uncertainty by decision makers who are more or less rational and are experiencing more or less fear offers a first cut of the crisis (section 1). A second cut enriches the individual-level analysis by attending to organizational malfunctioning as a potential cause of inadvertent nuclear war. In this analysis political agency is widely dispersed across many layers of the American and Russian militaries (section 2). A symposium on nuclear politics refers briefly to “very innovative” work on nuclear issues without engaging with work in science and technology studies (STS) (section 3). Exemplifying large world thinking, it does away with dualities such as rational and irrational, politics and technology, risk and uncertainty. It integrates human agency, organizational functioning and malfunctioning, and politics across all levels. And embedding the observer fully in a world that does not exist “out there,” it acknowledges the importance of the risk-uncertainty conundrum. In the politics of the crisis, its meaning for different actors, and its effect on shaping the complementarity of risk and uncertainty language matters hugely (section 4). The analysis of nuclear politics has shaped profoundly a widely accepted rational model of war (section 5). And the conclusion illustrates the evolution of a crazy nuclear politics (section 6).

Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) hold one-third of the world’s biodiversity, yet climate change and deforestation threaten this vital ecological powerhouse. Despite the urgency, nature-based solutions (NBS) receive a fraction of global climate finance, while billions flow into environmentally harmful subsidies.

This chapter explores how philanthropy can help bridge the gap and reshape conservation finance by funding high-impact, scalable solutions that protect ecosystems, empower communities, and drive economic transformation. Through case studies of leading philanthropic initiatives – Arapyaú Institute in Brazil, Moisés Bertoni Foundation in Paraguay, and Grupo Argos in Colombia – it demonstrates how strategic investments in forest restoration, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable land use can accelerate climate mitigation and adaptation.

This chapter considers how Australians have looked to South America for what they might become while Argentinians looked to Australia for what Argentina could become. It traces William Lane’s failed utopic colonies in Paraguay in the 1890s and, following her participation in one of them, Mary Gilmore’s engagement with and promotion of Latin American culture to other Australian writers. It considers Latin American migration to Australia, particularly in the late twentieth century. It discusses the role of little magazines, small presses and radio shows in encouraging poetry by Latin American migrants. It analyses their sense of marginalisation to mainstream Australian literary culture, and shifts towards decentring Australia in both writers’ transcultural movements and framings by anthologies. Lastly, the chapter examines recent encounters with Latin America by Australian-born poets and discusses competing framings of the South, including by writers such as J. M. Coetzee and John Mateer.

A singularity condition is elaborated. It is discussed how perception can anchor or ground singular judgments. Without a link to perception, there would not be any knowledge of individual objects, since mere concepts cannot secure reference. This fact is also reflected in language. For ‘This F’ in a singular judgment ‘This F is G’ about the perceived scene cannot be divorced from an intuition of that scene. The use of demonstratives like “This” and “That” for direct reference are supplemented with non-conceptual content that comes from outer intuition, with in-built spatial orientation. By way of intuition and attention, there is mental demonstration of particulars, which may or may not be accompanied by overt demonstrations as well, like pointing gestures. Thus, the perceived scene is contained within a demonstrative space, as outlined by all possible embodied orientations of the perceiver in some fixed location or other. Intuition cuts in a perspectival manner from such a demonstrative space, and attention cuts even more finely.

The composite nature of perceptions is examined further in terms of mereological structure. Manifolds of outer intuition are stretched out in a space that both differentiates between an object and its exact duplicate and underlies fine discriminations ad indefinitum of a single object’s manifold. However, there is also a unity of space that runs through all spaces contained in it. Since space is a form of perception, there is therefore also a unity that runs through all nested perceptual manifolds. For this to be possible, space has to be a special kind of whole, namely, what Kant calls a totum analyticum, i.e., a whole whose parts depend on it, rather than vice versa, i.e., not a totum syntheticum. It is argued that a particular mereological structure of space is a precondition for the organization of manifolds of perception. Another precondition is what Kant calls “affinity,” i.e., that perceived particulars – including tropes – can be represented in ways that are associable with each other. In neither case is the unity due to a combinatorial synthesis. In empirical cognition, such a synthesis can only trace out an order of a perceptual manifold that is already there.

This chapter considers the empire- and nation-building capacities of the long poem in the nineteenth and early to mid twentieth centuries, including epics by R. H. Horne, Will X. Redman and Rex Ingamells. It then analyses revisions of the epic in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries, including examples that undo settler monumentality, explore other cultural narratives or make use of other media such as film. It discusses the popularity of the verse novel, observing its beginnings in the World War I writing of C. J. Dennis. It considers the renaissance of the verse novel in the late twentieth century, examining how its cross-genre form was often able to accommodate transgressive desires. The rising popularity of young adult verse novels is also detailed. The chapter traces the emergence of non-fiction long poetry, viewing it through the sub-categories of documentary, history and biography. It then discusses Indigenous long poems and recent experimental long poems, including ones that explore visual, conceptual and digital possibilities.

It is argued that intuitions are saturated, whereas concepts are unsaturated. Intuitions have no gaps in them and cannot receive more intuitive content. Kant’s correspondence with J. S. Beck is brought in to substantiate that this was indeed Kant’s view. While intuitions represent perspectivally and under various limitations, one perception of x does not represent x more determinately than another perception of x. Because of their relational character, intuitions are in a way as “specific” as they can be, even if they can be “illuminated” further through perspectival transformations. After all, there cannot be successor intuitions that are more detailed or that cover more territory without other intuitive content being lost. What is thought through a concept, by contrast, cannot merely be illuminated, or clarified. Rather, to a concept of x, more conceptual content can always be added, so that a more determinate or specific concept of x is formed, in accordance with a more detailed or finer description of a perceived scene, or a target object in such a scene.

The book’s final chapter turns to questions of spolia and converted buildings. Its discussion reorients conventional approaches to these debated topics by exploring architectural reuse through the lens of lived experience. Focusing on evidence for original doorways blocked in later phases of a building’s occupation at a series of repurposed sites, a case is made for studying conspicuous traces of a building’s former use as a window into social and somatic modes of temporality not captured by official commemorative inscriptions or building histories.

Arnauld was primarily a theologian who engaged philosophical questions most often at the service of a theological goal. It is thus not surprising that some of his most sophisticated and interesting philosophical work concerns questions related to his conception of God. In the next four chapters, I defend a novel interpretation of Arnauld’s conception of God that I call a ‘partially hidden’ conception of God. Arnauld’s account of God is a subtle amalgam of two other conceptions of God: the Cartesian account of God on the one hand and the Jansenist Dieu caché (or hidden God) account on the other. Arnauld’s account of God is principled, grounded in his method, and consistent from text to text. While it may seem that Arnauld makes use of different conceptions of God in different texts to suit his dialectical purposes, I think this appearance is a consequence of failing to appreciate the novelty and subtlety of his view.