In the early treatise Ennead V.9, Plotinus discusses whether the arts are there in the intelligible realm, and concludes that they are at least partly. The chapter’s first part discusses a number of questions that arise. What is exactly the principle of division for which arts or which parts of an art are in the intelligible realm? What is the status of the arts in the intelligible world? Are there Platonic Forms of the arts? In a later treatise, V.8., Plotinus argues that rather than imitating sensible objects, some artists concerned with producing beautiful sensible objects imitate the intelligible paradigm of beauty. Emilsson discusses this claim, which seems a clear deviation from the account of mimetic art in Plato’s Republic. In the latter half of the chapter, Emilsson addresses Plotinus’ demythologisation of Plato’s Timaeus. Plotinus replaces the Demiurge of the Timaeus with the universal intellect and the World-Soul, which do not deliberate. However, Plotinus does not reject entirely any craftsman model, for he appeals to performance arts, which do not involve deliberation, in explaining how natural processes flow from higher principles. Emilsson then discusses what sort of conception of the arts lies behind this view.

These two chapters form a conceptual unity. Their aim is, first, to present and, then, to compare the concepts of technê (art, craft, discipline, expertise) used, respectively, by the Stoics and the Epicureans in different philosophical domains – notably, in cosmology, epistemology and ethics. The main issues to be discussed include the definition of a technê; the criteria determining a technê, the importance of rules and method, the role of experience and practice, the structure of every technê in so far as it is directed towards a goal, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the transmissibility of different sorts of technai and the common assumption that the technai are beneficial for life. Moreover, Tsouna argues that the notions of technê occurring in Stoic and Epicurean texts differ, and she explains how they differ. She suggests that one reason for that fact is that these two schools react in different ways to Plato’s rationalism about technê. On the one hand, the Stoics’ creative appropriation of Plato leads them to formulate a principally rationalistic notion of technê, which is manifest, for example, in their cosmological creationism (cf. the notion of technikon pur), the epistemological distinction between first-order technai and the epistêmê of the wise man, and their ethical conception of the art of living. On the other hand, the Epicureans react to the Platonic heritage in a more negative way and appear to modify their views about technê accordingly. Vis-à-vis the Stoics, they exhibit greater flexibility regarding the criteria of ‘technicity’ and attribute more value to common experience than many Stoics do. Their physical theory precludes any idea of divine craftsmanship. As for Epicurean epistemology and ethics, both involve uses of technê consistent with Epicurean empiricism and the ethical view that pleasure or the absence of pain is the supreme good.

The Introduction sets the scene by addressing first the problems involved with translating the term technê and related issues with circumscribing the Greek concept. The social context of craft and craftsmen is briefly discussed. Criteria for technê are outlined, with the importance of the Hippocratic writings for Plato and Aristotle highlighted. The central role of technê as a model of knowledge is introduced, and its applications to a range of disciplines, including ethics, politics and cosmology.

This chapter discusses the use of technê to characterize the creator god in Plato’s Timaeus. Timaeus explains how a divine craftsman, the Demiurge, made the whole cosmos as a living being. He created the heavenly bodies, but left the creation of human and other mortal beings to these ‘lesser’ gods. But if the Demiurge was the best of all craftsmen, seeking to make the finest cosmos possible, why did he not make the mortal beings too? Having outlined Plato’s conception of craft, Johansen explains how this problem, which he calls the ‘technodicy’, arises for Timaeus, contrasting it with the classical theodicy. The Demiurge’s creation is limited by his craft. Timaeus therefore assigns another craft to the lesser gods to produce mortal beings. However, even this craft prevents the lesser gods from directly producing non-human animals, and so the problem is reiterated. The issue is sought to be resolved by making humans themselves responsible for their own reincarnation as lower animals. Timaeus’ position is comparable to the view in Laws X: the lesser gods, consistent with their role as craftsmen, have overall responsibility for the organization of lower kinds of living being, without causing any particular beings to belong to particular kinds.

In the course of discussing the nature of justice in the first book of the Republic, a number of claims are made concerning the nature of technê and what it is to be skilful or to have an ability. Nawar shows how three of these claims, which do significant conceptual work in both Plato and Aristotle, can be explained and defended. The first claim, by Socrates, concerns the ‘two-way’ nature of certain skills. For instance, the person who is skilful at hitting is not only proficient at hitting well, but also proficient at avoiding being hit. The second claim, by Thrasymachus, is that the practitioner of a technê is, in a certain way, infallible and cannot fail to bring about what they intend. The third claim, made by Socrates, is that technai are not value-neutral, but rather are directed at the good of their object. Namar examines these claims, clarifies them, and attempts to explain them (so far as possible). Furthermore, he shows that these claims play an important role in Aristotle’s thought and examines how Aristotle aims to incorporate or adapt these claims in his own discussion of the modal and teleological aspects of skills and rational capacities.

How far is it possible to reconstruct the content of the ‘art of citizenship’ (politikê technê) professed by Protagoras in the dialogue Protagoras? Some commentators have claimed that Protagoras’ statements about the technê are incoherent. Examining this claim, Hussey argues that, while Protagoras can be defended on the charge of incoherence, his exposition of the nature and content of the technê he professes to possess and teach is radically incomplete in several ways. The question then arises whether the Theaetetus can be used to fill in the gaps that Protagoras of the Protagoras left for good practical reasons. If Protagoras’ remarks on truth and wisdom and the ‘changing of perceptions’ in the Theaetetus are taken in a pragmatist way, they imply a conception of a ‘technê of citizenship’ that is capable of improving/transforming human nature, and creating a public political consensus and a stable democratic society. There are many illuminating parallels to be drawn throughout, between the claims of Plato’s Protagoras for his ‘political art’ and the description of the medical art given in the pseudo-Hippocratic essay On Ancient Medicine. (It is assumed, but not argued, that Plato’s Protagoras is a substantially faithful portrait of the historical Protagoras.)

The conclusion sums up the work, indicating the core elements shared by (Hellenic) theories of daimonification along with (Jewish and Christian) theories of angelification. One common element is the link of virtue (ethical transformation) with physical and cognitive transformation. It is this persistent link that allows ancient theories of posthuman transformation to serve as correctives for current Transhumanist visions of posthuman enhancement. Transhumanists often speak of cognitive and physical improvements with no robust reflection on ethical or moral improvement. Posthuman enhancement must never be defined apart from morality, but in terms of it. Morality cannot simply be programmed from without, nor can it be governed by the overall value of personal autonomy.

Philo of Alexandria (about 20 BCE–50 CE) applied the logic of Platonic daimonification to the Jewish lawgiver Moses. Philo is important for three reasons: he did theoretical work identifying angels, daimones, and pure human souls. He also discussed why an angelic soul such as the pre-incarnate Moses would arrive on earth in flesh. Finally, Philo’s depiction of Moses as a living law in complete control of his emotions reinforced the ethical emphasis of the tradition. Philo's portrayal of Moses as a king descended from heaven best resembles the thought of the Hermetic Kore Kosmou.

One of Plato’s successors, Xenocrates (395–314 BCE), envisioned the human soul as daimonic after death but still subject to fluctuating emotions. He proposed a kind of purgatory in the region below the moon. Daimones who became pure from negative affections traveled from moon to sun to become daimonic minds, ideas more fully developed by Plutarch, Apuleius of Madauros (about 124–190 CE), and Maximus of Tyre (about 180 CE).