This chapter considers the presentation of virtue and happiness in the Meditations and asks how far this matches the distinctive features of Stoic thinking on these topics. The main topics considered are (1) the virtue–indifferents distinction, (2) the presentation of the virtues as forming groups or as unified in some way, (3) the virtue-happiness relationship and the idea of happiness as ‘the life according to nature’, meaning according to human or universal nature (or both). Overall, it is suggested that, although Marcus’s focus in the work is on the contribution of these ideas to his overall project of ethical self-improvement, his presentation largely reflects the ideas and connections between them that we find in the standard ancient accounts of Stoic ethics.

In this chapter, I attempt to trace the influence of the Stoic tradition on Marcus Aurelius by focusing on his approach to impressions, material flux, and fate. The primary suggestion is that the influence of earlier Stoicism is best interpreted within the framework of how Marcus develops a normative response to the external world. It is within this context of getting to grips with fluctuating, alienating, and disturbing appearances that we should seek to locate his reception of the Stoic theories of the cognitive impression, material flux, and the philosophical life, more broadly. Such an emphasis on inculcating a reliable response in the soul to the outside world also helps to explain a much-discussed feature of the Meditations, namely the unusual incorporation of Epicurean atomism within the work. I also push back on recent claims that there is evidence of a flirtation with Platonism evident in this text. Marcus was an innovative interpreter of his tradition with a particular focus on psychological stability, but, for all that, he was also a thoroughgoing Stoic.

This chapter explores Marcus’ concept of the soul and its main cognitive parts (hēgemonikon, nous, dianoia, daimon) and their relevance for the construction of a concept of the self that is closely interwoven with Stoic self-care. It also investigates Platonic influence on Marcus’ concept of the mind and its relation with the body. Selfhood, understood as an entity referring to itself, unfolds around the hēgemonikon and, to a lesser extent, the dianoia. Self-reference by cognitive acts is limited to the logical soul. These three rational elements are subordinated to the ‘I’ (or psychagogic subject) and serve as objects of its psychagogic self-(trans)formation, thereby construing its selfhood. The perfect starting point for mental self-transformation in Marcus is hypolēpsis ‘assumption’, a single mental act, similar to Epictetus’ prohairesis ‘choice’, to which Marcus’ concept of mental selfhood is heavily indebted. Platonising rhetoric supports the delineation and detachment of the soul’s rational part (esp. nous) from external entities and subordinate mental phenomena but offers no evidence for a dualist psychology or metaphysical concept of the mind. Instead, Marcus’ concepts of mind and body abide by Stoic orthodoxy and its materialist monism.

This chapter sets Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations in the wider historical context of the emperor’s life and reign. It considers his family, upbringing, and route to the imperial purple, as well as his principal philosophical and intellectual influences. Marcus’ attitudes to proper imperial conduct are explored through his description of his adoptive father Antoninus Pius. Special attention is paid to comparing and contrasting Marcus’ own views in the Meditations with other ancient sources, particularly his correspondence with his tutor Fronto and later accounts by Cassius Dio and the Historia Augusta.

The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius is consistently one of the best-selling philosophy books among the general public. Over the years, it has also attracted a number of famous admirers, from the Prussian king Frederick the Great to US president Bill Clinton.1 It continues to attract large numbers of new readers, drawn to its reflections on life and death. Despite this, it is not the sort of text read much by professional philosophers or even, until recently, taken especially seriously by specialists in ancient philosophy. It is a highly personal, easily accessible, yet deceptively simple work.

On the face of it, what we find are a series of notebook jottings, reminders that Marcus has written to himself, comments on events that have happened to him, reflections on his own mortality, and a few quotations from things that he has been reading. There is little in the way of structure and a good deal of repetition.

Marcus’ Meditations have been the object of special attention for their literary form, structure, and style as well as for the function and destination that the author ascribed to them. Since they lack a precise plan and present some formal characteristics, the most important of which are the use of the second person, i.e. self-reference, conciseness, and repetitiveness, most scholars have concluded that the work was intended only for the emperor’s reading and use. This chapter provides, after an overview of the scholarly trends that have promoted such an exegesis of the form and function of the Meditations, a reconstruction of the relationship between formal elements and philosophical content follows and a terminological analysis of a sample of the text, concluding with a proposal to revise the widespread belief that the Meditations were conceived by the author only for his own education and spiritual improvement.

Cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) is the leading evidence-based form of modern psychotherapy. Albert Ellis and Aaron T. Beck, the two main pioneers of CBT, both described Stoicism as the main philosophical inspiration for their respective approaches. The idea of a Stoic psychotherapy isn’t new, and indeed the ancient Stoics referred to their philosophy as a type of therapy (therapeia) for the psyche. This chapter focuses on the ways in which concepts and practices described in the Meditations resemble those of modern psychotherapists, and indeed the direct influence of Marcus and other Stoics upon them. Marcus’ remarks about the Stoic therapy of anger provide an example of a specific application.

The relationship between Marcus’ views of natural philosophy and his ethical commitments has long been a vexed issue. This chapter aims first to clarify what Marcus’ own views on physics were, relying only on the contents of the Meditations, and only then to ask how these views relate to those of earlier Stoics and to consider whether Marcus’ position was a good one for him to hold. It becomes clear that Marcus regards nature, which is for him identical with god, as directly setting some important norms for human beings, most importantly because of the thorough integration of humans into the providential and teleological order of the cosmos. Marcus’ understanding of the natural world includes his conception of human nature as naturally social, which entails other important norms for human behaviour. Humans are, for Marcus, integrated ‘vertically’ with the cosmic order and ‘horizontally’ with other human beings; these integrations structure a great deal of Marcus’ ethical theory. But natural philosophy is far from being the only source of norms for Marcus; reflection on his relationships with other people and on the workings of his own mind also have impact and, as I suggest, may even lead him to views which conflict with the materialist determinism of most earlier Stoics.

Marcus Aurelius addresses himself as sociable by nature, as someone made to belong to a political community, and as a citizen of the cosmos. The good life for him consists in obeying the gods and cooperating with his fellow citizens in service of the common interest. His fellow citizens are all beings endowed with reason, and as a human he cares for all other people, whoever they may be. The Meditations demonstrate detailed knowledge and agreement with the conceptual foundations of Stoic cosmopolitanism, but specific approaches can be identified. Marcus underscores the organismic and egalitarian nature of the cosmic community and often gives a functional account of his status as a part of the cosmos, while at the same time also suggesting a hierarchical account of degrees of sociability. His rule as emperor he conceives as a personal challenge to live up to the model of his predecessor, Antoninus Pius, also sharing the latter’s conservativism and traditionalism. Marcus’ Stoicism is more apparent in his quest for sincere and truly loving sociability, a striving that finds its limits in the aversion and disappointment Marcus often seems to experience with regard to those around him.

Marcus Aurelius acknowledges his debt to the Stoic tradition of emotions and endorses both the analysis of emotions as value judgements, the ideal of apatheia, i.e. the eradication of ‘passions’, and the promotion of ‘good feelings’. By emotions, he means all kinds of emotional reactions to everything that reaches us from the outside, i.e. pleasure and pain as well as anger, love, fear, etc. Every impression being twofold (what the object is and of what value it is to us), Marcus develops a strategy to eradicate the second judgement. But there is a positive side to the reshaping of desire and aversion, a joy resulting from the gifts of nature and the fulfilment of our human relations. Such emotions are reserved for the Sage in ancient Stoicism, but they become more accessible to Marcus, who does not reject any emotion from human life but values the appropriate ones.