This chapter focuses on presocratic thinkers living in Magna Graecia (Sicily and southern Italy) in the sixth and fifth centuries bce. The main theme is the unity of opposites (a form of antithesis), treated in various ways by these thinkers, and the economic, political and mystic influences on their treatments. Parmenides’ radical separation between the one and plurality (or the paths of truth and opinion) reflects the contrast between possession of money and its circulation. This is informed by Parmenides’ aristocratic outlook; his account of the two paths is also modelled on mystic initiation. The Pythagoreans and Empedokles both adopt a more inclusive framework that embraces opposites within an overall unity, symbolising both the possession and circulation of money and a broad political structure. The Pythagorean cosmos, conceived in terms of fire, harmony and order or calculation, accommodates both poles in their table of opposites. Empedokles’ cosmic cycle includes the opposed subjectivities (with political connotations) of love and strife, while reincarnation accommodates divergent and opposed states of selfhood within an overall wholeness. Unity of opposites is framed by these thinkers in terms of the (introjected) inner self and (projected) cosmos, matching the wholeness offered by mystic initiation.

In this chapter, the focus shifts from literature and philosophy to visual art, in the Near East (Mesopotamia and surrounding area) and Greece in the eighth to the sixth century bce. The approach centres on correlating the ideas of aggregation and antithesis with recurrent visual patterns and with underlying socio-political factors. In Near Eastern art in this period, aggregation predominates, though with some scope for antithesis. This pattern is similar to Homeric epic; however, Near Eastern patterns (by contrast with Homeric ones) reflect the dominance of kingly power, expressed in accumulation or in subordination. Lions are taken as a salient example: the Near Eastern king either overcomes the lion’s violence or exercises lion-like power. The lion-motif is also sometimes adopted in Archaic Greek art but incorporated in structural groups that do not express kingly power; similarly, in Homer, the lion-motif appears without stress on unitary kingly power. In Greek vase-painting of the Eighth-Seventh Century (the Geometric period), exemplified by a series of artefacts, we also find a predominance of aggregation, though with some antithesis. However, neither of these Greek patterns express unitary, kingly power; and the antithetical patterns especially reflect interactions within the family or local group.

Homer’s epics constitute a combination of aggregation and antithesis. The most obvious expression of aggregation is the Catalogue of Greeks and Trojans in Iliad 2, which has Near Eastern parallels. This is combined with antithetical (balanced) duels between pairs of warriors. The shield of Achilles (Iliad 18) presents a series of human activities, sometimes in paired form, that suggest symmetrical oppositions (e.g. between war and peace, town and country), though these are introduced in aggregative, list-like language. The shield as a whole edges towards comprehensiveness of a kind we can associate with the emerging polis. The shield of Achilles can be compared with contemporary Phoenician bowls which also convey, in visual form, the combination of aggregation and antithesis. However, the different form of the epic, including extended and structured narrative, gives scope for less bounded forms of antithesis. One such example is the meeting of Achilles with Priam in Iliad 25, replacing extreme violence with peaceful reconciliation. Another, very striking, example is the meeting in battle of former guest-friends Diomedes and Glaukos in Iliad 6 and exchange of armour, gold for bronze. The second incident combines verbal antithesis with a transaction that prefigures commercial exchange.

Antithesis in the form of the unity of opposites appears to a limited extent in the early mythic cosmogonies. However, this theme emerges much more strongly in subsequent presocratic thought. This phenomenon was analysed closely by Geoffrey Lloyd without being explained; here, presocratic speculation on the cosmos is explained as ‘cosmisation’, that is, interpretation shaped by a combination of political and economic factors alongside mystery cult. Anaximander’s idea of the universe as apeiron (‘unlimited’) is interpreted as a projection of the qualities of money, reflecting the emerging process of monetisation. Anaximander’s characterisation of the interchange of different elements within the unlimited in terms of ‘order’ and ‘retribution’ reflects both monetisation and emerging political structures. Similar factors underlie Herakleitos’ sustained focus on antithesis in the sense of the unity of opposites. Herakleitos’ universe is one of continuity within constant change, unity within interchange, expressed as fire or logos (‘reason’ or ‘calculation’). This worldview reflects the expanding influence of commercial exchange that underpins the emergence of a unified polis. It also reflects the paradoxical combination of unity and opposites within mystery cult, which is formulated in ritual language and gestures couched as antithetical dyads.

This chapter defines the terms used throughout the book to analyse prevalent patterns in literature, thought and visual art in Ancient Greece (eighth to fourth centuries bce) and corelate them with the contemporary economic and political situation. Aggregation is defined as a paratactic sequence or assemblage of otherwise unrelated items. Antithesis is defined as the symmetrical representation of opposites. Antithesis is subdivided into antagonistic or peaceful, balanced or unbalanced, focused or unfocused. These are the central terms for this book. A further category, of less importance for this purpose, is asymmetrical opposition, which is subdivided into antagonistic and balanced or antagonistic and unbalanced or non-antagonistic.

Fifth-century Greek tragedy and visual art centres on interaction between people, including antithetical relations, reflecting a society shaped by monetised exchange and commerce. Platonic metaphysics is focused on unchanging being, placing supreme value on the possession of money and devaluing or excluding exchange and interaction. Although dialogues such as the Phaedo contain the idea of the unity of opposites, and binary opposites such as body and soul, Platonic metaphysics aims at the negation of opposites, and thus of antithesis. The contrast between being and seeming emerges in fifth-century tragedy and philosophy, but it is given much greater prominence by Plato and is linked with the theory of Forms. One of the Platonic accounts of the relationship between Forms and particulars is in terms of original (Form) and copy or image (particulars). Plato is the first to offer a theorization of the idea of the image (in the Sophist) and to define the idea of mere image (not reality). Plato’s treatment of the being-seeming relation, like the theory of Forms generally, expresses the reification of the value of money, treated as the basis of possession, excluding exchange.

This chapter discusses the increasing presence of antithesis, rather than aggregation, in fifth-century Greek historiography, tragedy and vase-painting. In certain key incidents and in narrative patterns in Herodotus and Attic tragedy, we find antithesis in the form of the unity of opposites and the reversal of an apparently stable situation. This reflects the influence of mystic initiation, Pythagorean thinking (in the case of Aeschylus), and, in a broader sense, the emergence of the polis, in which social oppositions are contained within a political unit. In fifth-century Attic vase-painting and sculptural groups, there is also a progressive shift from aggregation to antithesis, paralleling the pattern found in the newly emerging genres of historiography and tragedy. This too reflects the increasing prevalence of monetary exchange and interactions within the unified framework of the polis.

In Book III of the Plato’s Laws, we are told that under the ancient constitution of Athenian, citizens ‘lived in willing servitude’ to the city’s laws and to its officers (archontes). How are we to understand the servitude (douleia) invoked in this slogan, and what are we to make of the qualification of the servitude as willing (hekontes, ethelontes)? Against those who suggest that Plato here construes willing servitude as a kind of freedom, I argue that the slogan is intended to emphasize the ways in which the ancient Athenians were unfree. Plato uses it to promote, as a political ideal, acceptance of the limitations on freedom that are the inevitable concomitant of political rule.