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The conclusion chapter sums up the contribution of Hamas’s intelligence to the organization’s activities associated with its struggle against Israel. It details the strengths and weaknesses of the organization’s efforts to gather intelligence on Israel, counter Israeli intelligence activity, and assess Israel’s intentions and capabilities. This chapter also examines lessons from the case study of Hamas that may be applied to a general understanding of intelligence warfare by VNSAs.
Chapter 8 evaluates the argument that ruling monarchs are more effective than other types of autocrats at avoiding blame through delegation. It does so by drawing on cross-national data from around the world in addition to more specific comparisons of monarchies and republics in the Middle East. First, the chapter establishes that ruling monarchs tend to share power more credibly than presidential autocrats both in the Middle East and beyond, and it shows that this difference is recognized by people living in these regimes. Next, the chapter draws on an original survey experiment administered in Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia, in addition to data on constitutions, to demonstrate that monarchs benefit from reduced expectations that they will govern and be held responsible for policy outcomes. These expectations imply that delegation by ruling monarchs will be more in line with how the public expects responsibility to function in the political system. The chapter concludes by tracing patterns of opposition during the Arab Spring and analyzing cross-national protest data to show that monarchs are less likely than other dictators to be targeted by mass opposition when the public is dissatisfied, suggesting their advantages in avoiding blame contribute to their resiliency.
In early Islamic Egypt, “Arab-style” Greek (and later Coptic) letters employing religiously neutral monotheistic formularies were sent in the name of Muslim officials to Christian administrators. By analyzing old and new evidence of Egyptian Christians using this epistolary template, this paper argues that in the first decades of Arab rule, probably only a few beneficiaries of the new regime employed the “Arab-style” prescript in their letters written to other Christians to demonstrate their close connection to the new government and thus their social standing. Later, however, the “Arab-style” prescript became commonplace in communication between Christians and Muslims and among Christians only in everyday life. Thus, the religiously neutral template created by the conquerors for official top–down communication became a mechanism for facilitating not only the smooth functioning of administrative structures, but also, in the long run, the social cohesion of Christians and Muslims.
In this chapter, a corpus of letters extracted from Imami Shiʿi hadith reports is analyzed to provide an overview of the system of imamic epistolary communications between imam and community members in Imami Shiʿism of the ninth century CE. The mechanisms by which letters reached the community are analyzed, including the mediation of agents (wakīl) of the imams. In particular, circular letters are looked at as illustrative of the ways in which the imam attempted to reach sections of his community beyond specific individuals, and the ways that these illuminate the distinctive aspects of Shiʿi community organization. The letters analyzed here indicate the existence of a relatively complex organizational web in the Imami Shiʿi community, whose efficacy was greatly dependent upon the trustworthiness of the individuals representing the claims of the imam to the constituencies in which they were embedded.
This study explores a cluster of six letters preserved in the Cairo Geniza written by a Jewish father from Alexandria in the first half of the thirteenth century. The writer’s son ran away from home, abandoned the family shop and overall behaved in a way unbecoming for a young middle-class Jewish man. This study uses this little-studied cluster of documents to examine the ties that bound a young Jewish man to his family and community, including exchange of letters, economic considerations, familial bonds and religious expectations. The father’s letters offer a case study for approaching social ties and cultural expectations as dynamic and ongoing work performed by specific agents. The letters are useful for recovering an urban middle-class conception of masculinity prevalent in the medieval Islamic world that emphasized belonging to social networks and required men to uphold their responsibilities to those dependent upon them.
In Byzantine and early Islamic Egypt, stratiōtai, symmachoi (arab. simāmika), apostolai, boukellarioi or beredarioi took over the function of messengers, collectors or guardians of the transport of taxes. This paper analyses the socio‐economic role of these intermediaries in the tax system of the early Islamic Empire and discusses a possible development from mere carriers to more independent players within this mechanism. At the beginning of Islamic rule, taxes in Egypt had been forwarded by armed messengers, possibly remnants of the Byzantine soldiers who safeguarded private estates. By the beginning of the eighth century we see more autonomous individuals who needed to be kept in check. Even though these agents may have only been small cogs in a larger machinery, they were functionally necessary for the effective operation of the entire economic, social and political system.
The chapter analyzes Hamas’s use of intelligence to conduct successful operations against Israel. The combination of intelligence gathering and clandestine activities, as described in the previous chapters, led to several high-quality operations against Israel. For example, in an attack in 2006, Hamas successfully abducted IDF soldier Gilad Shalit and was able to keep him hidden for years, despite Israel’s efforts to find and rescue him in the tiny Gaza Strip. In addition, Hamas created a “bank” of targets through its intelligence-gathering efforts. This structured list of vulnerable quality targets was used to focus rocket attacks against Israel and find locations for suicide attacks.
This introduction poses the central thesis of this volume: that the early Islamic empire was tied together by networks of social dependency that can be tracked through the linguistic and material traces of interconnectivity in our sources. It is suggested that the particular relationships that emerge from the granular case studies in this volume can illuminate the constituent parts of the early Islamic empire as a whole. Studies link material and textual sources, and in particular focus on the language and rhetoric used by sources to describe relations and interactions, and what they show of the modes, expressions and conditions that governed communication and interaction. It is suggested that empires are not ruled by top–down force alone, but that legitimacy and stability are created in various ways, both top–down and bottom–up.
Chapter 5 provides evidence that power sharing in Jordan is effective at shifting the public’s attributions and protecting the monarchy’s popular support. First, the chapter draws on interviews with opposition activists to show that even these sophisticated political elites frequently do not perceive the king to be most at fault for their grievances. Second, it utilizes survey data to demonstrate that Jordanians perceive institutions like the cabinet and parliament to be important contributors to policy decisions in Jordan and that such attitudes are correlated with higher support for the monarchy. Third, the chapter reports results from a novel Facebook advertising experiment that is used to estimate public approval of the Jordanian monarchy relative to the prime minister and parliament. The experiment indicates that the king is more popular than these other institutions, and it suggests that the king’s popularity is less likely to be affected by unpopular policy decisions like substantial tax increases.
A large number of Arabic decrees (ar. sijill, manšūr or marsūm) from the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk periods have been preserved in Christian, Jewish and Muslim caches. Besides original pieces, dozens of documents that are now lost have survived through copies made in chancery manuals. Although S. M. Stern and more recently Marina Rustow have sought to find continuities between the Fatimid decrees and their Abbasid forerunners, so far there is very little concrete evidence and, above all, no identified decree for the Abbasid period. In this article, Naïm Vanthieghem argues, as both suspected, that this genre indeed had forerunners in the Abbasid period, of which five have survived. Besides a study of their formulary, structure and script, the article tries to reconstruct how they worked and were used and how far this genre spread out through the Empire.
Chapter 6 continues the Jordan case study by providing an important assessment of the theory’s expectations over time. Drawing on archival documents, internet search data, elite interviews, and secondary sources, the chapter shows that Jordan’s kings have shared power more credibly when they have more reasons to be concerned about popular discontent. Furthermore, it also demonstrates that Jordanians have responded to these changes as the theory expects, becoming more likely to blame the king for their grievances when the monarchy controls the decision-making process more directly, and less likely to blame the king when he delegates more credibly to other political elites. Not only do these findings demonstrate the theory’s utility for explaining changes in authoritarian decision-making over time, but they also help to account for alternative explanations to the argument, such as the possibility that the Jordanian monarchy benefits from traditional legitimacy that protects its reputation from popular anger.
This chapter explores two major anthropological ties: sharing food and contracting marriage in the Syrian-Orthodox church and the early Islamic community in the first Islamic century. To consolidate their authority over pagan and Christian Arabs, both early Syrian-Orthodox bishops and proto-Muslim authorities such as the readers of the Qurʾan (qurrāʾ) had to build religious communities. Miaphysite clerics attempted to separate those who were undoubtedly Christians from those who were uncertain. Banning interfaith social bonds among laypeople through canonical rulings proved to be the most effective legal method to confine them to their specific communal church. It seems that Muslim scholars also sought to delimit their own community (umma) by prohibiting their followers from engaging in the same social relations: through restrictions on food and marriage but not here relations with all Christians, as the Qurʾan permits these, but especially with the liminal category of “Christian Arabs.” To prevent the risk of diluting their umma, Muslim scholars, in turn, developed the same argument as Syriac scholars: that (Christian) Arabs were (crypto-)pagans.
Governor of the Marwanid period in Iraq for fourteen years, Khālid b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Qasrī was dismissed from his office in 120/738. The narratives of his downfall – the reasons for his dismissal as well as his killing — are found in the Abbasid historiography about him. Next to these narratives, a letter that the caliph Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik addressed to him in 119/736–37 can be found in two different sources. This contribution offers a study of this letter and its transmission. It investigates the relationship between the letter and the most developed narratives about Khālid. Unpacking these relationships allows us to look beyond them and provide insights into Khālid’s removal. Finally, this paper looks at this correspondence as an expression of the writing of power and explores how it helps us better understand the ties that bind a caliph and his subordinate.
The care crisis intersects with economic, social, and refugee crises, necessitating focused attention to bolster care infrastructure and address the multifaceted challenges. Women bear a disproportionate burden of unpaid domestic work, exacerbating gender inequalities in labor markets and education. This paper applies the International Labour Organization–UN Women (2021) policy tool to Turkish data, estimating coverage gaps in education and healthcare, associated costs, and employment generation potential in the care sectors and related sectors. We identify a coverage gap in education affecting 5.8 million children. The required investment to address this gap is estimated at 2.28 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). In all, 303,000 healthcare workers are needed, requiring an investment of 1.23 percent of GDP. These investments have the potential to generate 1.740 million direct and 152,000 indirect jobs. This would result in a substantial 6.7 percent increase in total employment. Considering the current gender composition, women are expected to fill 65 percent of these jobs, leading to a 14 percent improvement in female employment. Incorporating 3.7 million Syrian refugees, Turkey’s investment cost rises to 3.74 percent of GDP, creating 1.878 million new direct jobs – an 8 percent boost over the non-inclusive scenario. Prioritizing public investments in care services promises to promote gender equality, human development, and inclusive economic growth.