In a federal system there is a constant need to resolve problems created by conflicting provisions of laws enacted by. the federal legislature and those enacted by a state or provincial legislature. In the case of a unitary system it is merely the question of a later statute conflicting with an earlier statute enacted by the same legislature, and in such an instance, the conflict is resolved by regarding the earlier law as having been impliedly repealed by the later law.

In the Australian federal system the conflict is resolved by resorting to the express provisions of s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution, which reads as follows:

When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.

Section 8(4)(f) of the Estate Duty Assessment Act 1914–1974 (Cth) subjects to the charge for federal estate duty certain categories of proceeds of life assurance policies. It has proved to be the most litigated provision in the Act. In this article Professor Lindgren examines the anomalies and uncertainty which characterize the section. He suggests that the comparable provisions in the death duty legislation of the States are to be preferred and concludes that the federal provision should be amended along certain lines.

conscious that the current International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (International Conference) is taking place at a time when the intolerable suffering of civilians and other victims of armed conflict demands a strong recommitment to our common humanity,

The recent High Court case on the Corporations Act and the reliance therein by the majority on ‘history’ to support their reading of s 51(xx) raises the question of what were prevailing community attitudes to uniform national legislation on corporations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Whilst the views of the delegates to the Conventions and the views of the justices in the High Court in the Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead have been selectively dusted off and resuscitated by the majority justices in the Corporations Act case the broader spectrum of opinion in relation to such matters, both at the time of federation and subsequently, is less well known. Nevertheless such views are also important in arriving at a proper understanding of the meaning of placitum (xx) of s 51.

From the time a Federal Court was first proposed, questions about its jurisdiction, and its relationship with state courts have dominated discussion. While it is not proposed to review this extensive literature in detail, it is apposite to draw on some insights from an article by Sir Garfield Barwick published in 1964 at an early stage of this debate. First, it was suggested that the matters in which a Federal Court should have jurisdiction be in some way special. This special element could, it was said, consist of either a distinctive and separate body of law, a desire for uniformity in the interpretation of Commonwealth law, or the character of a party involved in a matter (eg the Commonwealth or a State). Secondly, and of major importance to the present consideration of the exclusive jurisdiction of Federal Courts, Barwick stated:

Studies of colonialism often associate indirect colonial rule with continuity of the precolonial institutions. Yet, we know less about how colonialism affected the distribution of power between precolonial domestic elites within nominally continuous institutions. We argue that colonial authorities will redistribute power toward elites that are the most congruent with the colonizer’s objectives. We test our theory on the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. Using an original dataset on members of the Egyptian parliament and a difference-in-differences empirical strategy, we show that the colonial authorities shifted parliamentary representation toward the (congruent) landed elite and away from the (oppositional) rural middle class. This shift was greater in cotton-producing provinces which were more exposed to colonial economic interest. Our results demonstrate that the colonial redistribution of power within precolonial institutions can reengineer the social-structural fabric of colonized societies.

The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘ADJR Act’) provides for judicial review based on decisions ‘to which this Act applies’. Persons aggrieved by ‘a decision to which this Act applies’, conduct engaged in for the purpose of making a decision to which this Act applies, or a failure to make a decision to which this Act applies are able to apply to the Federal Court for an order for review. ‘[D]ecision to which this Act applies’ is defined as a ‘decision of an administrative character, made … under an enactment’. Other similar statutory schemes providing for judicial review also rely on showing that there was or will be a decision made ‘under an enactment’. The High Court decision in Griffith University v Tang is the most recent to consider the meaning of this phrase.

Actuator faults in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can have significant and potentially adverse effects on their safety and performance, highlighting the critical importance of fault diagnosis in UAV design. Ensuring the reliability of these systems in various applications often requires the use of advanced diagnostic algorithms. Artificial intelligence methods, such as deep learning and machine learning techniques, enable fault diagnosis through sample-based learning without the need for prior knowledge of fault mechanisms or physics-based models. However, UAV fault datasets are typically small due to stringent safety standards, which presents challenges for achieving high-performance fault diagnosis. To address this, deep reinforcement learning (DRL) algorithms offer a unique advantage by combining deep learning’s automatic feature extraction with reinforcement learning’s interactive learning approach, improving both learning capabilities and robustness. In this study, we propose and evaluate two DRL-based fault diagnosis models, which demonstrate remarkable accuracy in fault diagnosis, consistently exceeding $99{\rm{\% }}$. Notably, under small sample scenarios, the proposed models significantly outperform traditional classifiers such as decision trees, support vector machines, and multilayer perceptron neural networks. These findings suggest that the integration of DRL enhances fault diagnosis performance, particularly in data-limited environments.

Australia will, I believe, ratify the convention and afterwards this Parliament will pass the necessary legislation to show other countries that we join in universal condemnation of the horror [of genocide].

This article advances a new legal theory of the corporation—the “dual view” theory of the corporation. The theory states that the corporation must be explained in two different ways. First, the corporation must be explained internally to the law, as a legal category which acts as a trigger for the application of a set of legal rules. This “inner view” of the corporation says much about the function of the category within the legal system, but very little about why this category was designed to operate in this way. The inner view cannot explain the functions fulfilled by the category in the external world. To gain knowledge of the latter, one must adopt a second view-point, the “outer view”. The corporation must be explained as a legal artefact which facilitates the coordination of social action, whether this be in the economic system, the political system or indeed smaller systems of interaction such as the family.

The competition principles set out in the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) are based on an economic model of perfectly competitive markets responding to the market and producing only the goods and services required in the market. However, effective competition together with good market information may create a disincentive to markets innovating (market failure) because new developments may be rapidly copied without the recovery of the innovation's development costs (a free ride). According to this model, a patent under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) compensates for the disincentive to innovate and justifies a limited period of exclusive rights during which the innovator may exclude others in order to recover the development costs (confounding the free riders) and contribute to beneficial innovation by investing in new developments (with the added benefit of disclosure of the innovation). Patents are therefore generally assumed to produce overall economic benefit while at the same time having minimal social costs. The social costs are higher prices, restricted outputs, subsidised foreign inventors and the administrative costs of the patenting scheme.

Obruchevodid petalodonts are rare small chondrichthyans known from nearly complete to partial skeletons from the Upper Mississippian (Serpukhovian) Bear Gulch Limestone of central Montana and isolated teeth from the Upper Mississippian Bangor Limestone of northern Alabama. New records of obruchevodid petalodonts are presented here from the Middle Mississippian (Viséan) Joppa Member of the Ste. Genevieve Formation at Mammoth Cave National Park, Kentucky. Obruchevodids are here represented by multiple teeth of a new taxon, Clavusodens mcginnisi n. gen. n. sp., and a single tooth referred to ?Netsepoye sp. Clavusodens mcginnisi n. gen. n. sp. is characterized by teeth with pointed mesiodistal and lingual margins and more robust chisel-like cusps on the anterolateral and distolateral teeth. The suggestion that obruchevodid petalodonts evolved to inhabit complex reef-like environments and other nearshore habitats with a feeding ecology analogous to extant triggerfish is explored and discussed.

UUID: http://zoobank.org/0955c37a-c458-4a4d-89c4-01d6915adeca

The author considers whether the Commonwealth can enact “manner and form” legislation, especially provisions enabling the House of Representatives to enact laws which are the subject of a deadlock between the Houses, and legislation entrenching civil liberties. He argues that the legislative power of the Commonwealth has the same properties as that of the United Kingdom Parliament, which can impose “manner and form” limitations on itself; parliamentary supremacy is procedurally self-embracing. Hence, the Commonwealth Parliament can do likewise, except in so far as the Commonwealth Constitution provides to the contrary. The Constitution does prevent Parliament requiring legislation to be enacted by specified majorities in Parliament, or substituting a new legislature for the present Parliament. But the Commonwealth Parliament can enact provisions requiring legislation to be enacted in a specified form, and can establish an additional legislature for the enactment of legislation, including appropriation laws. Such legislation may be enacted pursuant to the procedure in section 57 of the Constitution, and could provide a method of avoiding a Supply crisis like that of 1975.

Imagine a Westminster common law jurisdiction without a bill of rights. As things stand at present, all important social policy decisions in this jurisdiction, including decisions about how rights are to be balanced against one another and against overall community welfare claims, rest with the elected legislature and executive. Not everyone in this jurisdiction is happy with this arrangement, however. There are some politicians who are not averse to joining the world-wide trend by adopting some sort of bill of rights. A handful of them in fact, mostly from the main left of centre political party, are positively keen on the idea. They see the post-Second World War Americanisation of constitutional law, with its emphasis on formalising the role and place of human rights in a legal instrument the judges oversee, as an unambiguously good thing. They would like an entrenched, justiciable model.