^{page 167 note 1} This term, derived from the proviso to s. 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (U.K.), refers to legislation stipulating the manner or form in which future legislation dealing with the stipulated subject must be enacted.

² see Commonwealth Constitution ss. 80, 92, 99, 116, 117. Cf. s. 127 (repealed in 1967).

³ E.g. Evans, , “New Directions in Australian Race Relations Law” (1974) 48 A.L.J. 479, 479-481Google Scholar; Castles, , “Human Rights, the Common Law and Australia's International Obligations” (1978) Justice No. 7, 52Google Scholar; Scarman, , English Law—The New Dimension (1974) 14-21Google Scholar; Scarman, Lord, “Fundamental Rights: The British Scene” (1978) 78 Columbia Law Review 1575, 1585-1586CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lord Scarman, 396 H.L. Deb. 1346, 1347 (1978); Wilberforce, Lord, “The Need for a Constitution in the United Kingdom” (1979) 14 Israel Law Review 269. Cf.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Hailsham, Lord, The Dilemma of Democracy (1978) 132, 140, 172, 174, 228-229.Google Scholar

⁴ Especially the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966, which Australia has ratified (effective 1969): Aust. T.S. 1975 No. 40; the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights 1966, which Australia has ratified (effective 1976): Aust. T.S. 1976 No. 5; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (effective 1976), which Australia ratified in 1980. See Castles, supra n. 3; Castles, , “The Ratification of International Conventions and Covenants” (1969) Justice No. 2, 1.Google Scholar

⁵ E.g. the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (Queensland Discriminatory Laws) Act 1975 (Cth); the Racial Discrimination Act 1976 (S.A.); the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (S.A.); the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.); the Equal Opportunity Act 1977 (Vic.).

⁶ Implementing the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966: Aust. T.S. 1975 No. 40.

⁷ Greater protection would have been afforded by the Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth) which sought to implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and which lapsed when Parliament was prorogued on 14 February 1974 and was not subsequently reintroduced. See Crommelin, and Evans, , “Explorations and Adventures with Commonwealth Powers” in Evans (ed.), Labor and the Constitution 1972-1975 (1977) 24, 47.Google Scholar See also the Human Rights Commission Bill 1980 (Cth).

⁸ It is widely acknowledged that a Parliament cannot deprive future Parliaments of the power to legislate on certain subjects. This has been held to be so regarding the Commonwealth: Wenn v. Attorney-General for Victoria (1948) 77 C.L.R. 84, 107 per Latham C.J.; the United Kingdom: Vauxhall Estates Ltd v. Liverpool Corporation [1932] 1 K.B. 733, 743, 746; the States: South Australia v. The Commonwealth (1942) 65 C.L.R. 373, 416 per Latham C.J.; Mccawley v. R. [1920] A.C. 691; Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Ltd v. Attorney-General (Qld) [1976] Qd.R. 231, 236, 239; ex parte Pennington (1875) 13 S.C.R. (L.) 305, 316; Friedmann, , “Trethowan's Case, Parliamentary Sovereignty, and the Limits of Legal Change” (1950) 24 A.L.J. 103, 104.Google Scholar See also Winterton, , “The British Grundnorm: Parliamentary Supremacy Re-examined” (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 591, 611-613.Google Scholar

⁹ Campbell, , “Pros and Cons of Bills of Rights in Australia” (1970) Justice No. 3, 1, 7, 10.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Cl. 5 of the Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth) provides:

“(2) Subject to sub-section (3), any provision of a law of Australia or of a Territory, whether passed or made before, on or after the commencing day, that is inconsistent with a provision of this Act does not, to the extent of the inconsistency, have any force or effect.

(3) Sub-section (2) does not apply in relation to a provision of a law if an Act expressly declares that the provision shall operate notwithstanding this Act.”

¹¹ Official Record of Debates of the Australian Constitutional Convention (Hobart, 1976) 98.

¹² Id. 106-107.

¹³ Official Record of Debates of the Australian Constitutional Convention (Perth, 1978) 133.

¹⁴ Johnston, “Schizophrenic Sovereignty in the Federal Houses of Parliament. A Study in Constitutional Disjunction” (unpublished paper presented at a Centre for Independent Studies Conference on Constitutional Theory and Australian Practice, University of Sydney, 23 November 1979) 4-5 (to be published in proceedings of the Conference ed. by Haakonssen).

¹⁵ Id. 7.

¹⁶ Id. 12.

¹⁷ Id. 7, 12.

¹⁸ Id. 11, 12.

¹⁹ See the present writer's comment on Johnston's paper, supra n. 14.

²⁰ The Parliament Act 1911 (U.K.) s. 1; the Constitution Act 1902 (N.S.W.) s. 5A. Cf. the Commonwealth Constitutions. 57.

²¹ This is a major function of provisions requiring legislation impinging on protected civil liberties to do so expressly. See the Bill of Rights 1960 (Can.) s. 2; the Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth) cl. 5(2) and (3). See also Campbell, supra n. 9.

²² Of course, neither the United Kingdom Parliament nor the Australian legislatures can entrench provisions in any way other than “manner and form” legislation, supra n. 8.

²³ The Bill of Rights 1960 (Can.) s. 2. Cf. the Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth) cl. 5(2) and (3); Bill of Rights Bill 1976 (U.K.) cl. 3 (introduced by Lord Wade), in House of Lords, Report of the Select Committee on a Bill of Rights (H.L. 176) 1978, 41 (hereinafter Report of the Select Committee). Draft Bill of Rights cl. 9, in Wallington, and McBride, , Civil Liberties and a Bill of Rights (1976) 114.Google Scholar Contrast Bill of Rights Bill 1979 (U.K.) cl. 3 (introduced by Lord Wade) in Wade, , “A Bill for Rights for the United Kingdom” (1980) 61 The Parliamentarian 65, 70.Google Scholar

²⁴ Hailsham, supra n. 3, 174. Report of the Select Committee, supra n. 23, para. 16; Rippengal, Memorandum on the Question of Entrenchment, in House of Lords, Minutes of Evidence taken before The Select Committee on a Bill of Rights (H.L. 81) 1977, 2, para. 6 (hereinafter Minutes of Evidence); Zander, Minutes of Evidence, id. 312-313; Wallington and McBride, supra n. 23, 85.

²⁵ E.g. The Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe [1965] A.C. 172; the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic.) s. 18(2) (see McDonald v. Cain [1953] V.L.R. 411); the Constitution Act 1889-1979 (W.A.) s. 73(2); the Electoral Act 1956 (N.Z.) s. 189(2) (a) (see Aikman, , “Parliament” in Robson (ed.), New Zealand. The Development of its Laws and Constitution (2nd ed., 1967) 66-67)Google Scholar; the Scotland Act 1978 (U.K.) s. 66 (this Act was repealed by the Scotland Act 1978 (Repeal) Order 1979 (No. 928) made under the Scotland Act 1978 (U.K.) s. 85(3)).

²⁶ E.g. the Constitution Act 1902 (N.S.W.) ss. 5B (upheld in Clayton v. Heffron (1960) 105 C.L.R. 214), 7A (upheld in Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan [1932] A.C. 526), 7B, 24A; the Constitution Act 1934 (S.A.) s. 88: the Constitution Act 1889-1979 (W.A.) s. 73(2); the Constitution Act 1867-1978 (Qld) s. 53; the Electoral Act 1956 (N.Z.) s. 189(2)(b); the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 (U.K.) s. 1. Cf. the Commonwealth Constitution s. 128.

²⁷ E.g. the Statute of Westminster 1931 (U.K.) s. 4; the West Indies Act 1967 (U.K.) s. 3(1). On the former provision see Winterton, supra n. 8, 602-603; Hanks, , “Re-Defining the Sovereign: Current Attitudes to Section 4 of the Statute of Westminster” (1968) 42 A.L.J. 286, 288-293;Google Scholar Bistricic v. Rokov (1976) 135 C.L.R. 552, 561 per Jacobs J. (cf. Murphy J., 565-567; and China Ocean Shipping Co. v. South Australia (1979) 27 A.L.R. 1, 50-53 per Murphy J. dissenting); Copyright Owners Reproduction Society Ltd v. E.M.I: (Autralia) Pty Ltd (1958) 100 C.L.R. 597, 604, 625; contra, Wynes, , Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia (5th ed. 1976) 545-546Google Scholar. On the latter section see Alexis, , “The Classical Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty As a Current Issue in West Indian Law” (1977) 1 Guyana Law Journal 41, 50.Google Scholar

²⁸ E.g. Harris v. Minister of the Interior [1952] (2) S.A. 428 (A.D.), sub nom. Harris v. Donges [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1245; the European Communities Act 1972 (U.K.) s. 2(4).

²⁹ E.g. the Constitution Act 1902 (N.S.W.) s. 5B(l). Cf. the Commonwealth Constitution s. 57.

³⁰ E.g. the Constitution Act 1902 (N.S.W.) s. 5A; the Parliament Act 1911 (U.K.) ss. 1 and 2, as amended by the Parliament Act 1949 (U.K.) s. 1. On the latter provision see Winterton, supra n. 8, 607. Professor Hood Phillips does not regard the Parliament Act 1911 as “manner and form” legislation; in his opinion it merely delegates legislative power: , Hood Phillips, and Jackson, , Constitutional and Administrative Law (6th ed. 1978) 89, 143.Google Scholar He regards the Parliament Act 1949 (U.K.) as invalid because the delegate (the House of Commons and the Crown) exceeded the powers delegated to them by the Parliament Act 1911 (U.K.): id. 89-90, 143. Cf. Clayton v. Heffron (1960) 105 C.L.R. 214.

³¹ E.g. the Constitution Act 1902 (N.S.W.) ss. 7A(l)(b), 7B(l), 24A(5); the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic.) s. 18(2)(b); the Constitution Act 1934 (S.A.) s. 88(1); the Constitution Act 1889-1979 (W.A.) s. 73(2)(e); the Constitution Act 1867-1978 (Qld) s. 53(1). Cf. the Statute of Westminster 1931 (U.K.) s. 4 (see Winterton, supra n. 8, 603).

³² Cf. the Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth) cl. 5(2).

³³ Cf. the Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth) cl. 5(2) and (3).

³⁴ Western Australia v. The Commonwealth (1975) 134 C.L.R. 201, 217. In Cormack v. Cope (1974) 131 C.L.R. 432, 456 Barwick C.J. called a bicameral system of Parliament “the basic concept of the Constitution”.

³⁵ Dr Wynes appears to believe that the Commonwealth could not establish an alternative legislature (supra n. 27, 127-128), but his reasoning is not based on considerations peculiar to the Commonwealth Constitution, and he seems to hold the same view regarding the powers of the United Kingdom Parliament: id. 546; (1957) 31 A.L.J. 250, 251, 252. See also the apparently contradictory remarks in Nicholas, , The Australian Constitution (2nd ed. 1952) 84-85.Google Scholar

³⁶ E.g. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Official Liquidator of E.O. Farley Ltd (1940) 63 C.L.R. 278, 304 per Dixon J.

³⁷ The Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co. Pty Ltd v. Dignan (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73, 114; The Commonwealth v. Kreglinger & Fernau Ltd (1926) 37 C.L.R. 393, 413; The Commonwealth v. The Colonial Combing, Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd (1922) 31 C.L.R. 421, 446-447; Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. The Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129, 147; Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1977) 139 C.L.R. 54, 87; McGraw-Hinds (Aust.) Pty Ltd v. Smith (1979) 24 A.L.R. 175, 198.

³⁸ New South Wales v. The Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337, 373, 379, 498; Victoria v. The Commonwealth (1975) 134 C.L.R. 338, 405; Johnson v. Kent (1975) 132 C.L.R. 164, 169, 174; Barton v. The Commonwealth (1974) 131 C.L.R. 477, 498; In re Richard Foreman & Sons Pty Ltd, Uther v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1947) 74 C.L.R. 508, 531.

³⁹ See s. 49. See generally ss. 1, 35, 51, 53-56.

⁴⁰ Cf. the suggestion by Forster J. that the Northern Territory Legislative Council did not possess inquisitorial functions because the United Kingdom Parliament had not committed this function to the Commonwealth Parliament, so that the latter could not have passed it on to the Northern Territory Legislative Council (nor did it intend to): Attorney-General for the Commonwealth v. MacFarlane (1971) 18 F.L.R. 150, 157. The analysis of Forster J. is highly questionable: see Campbell, , “Parliament and the Executive” in Zines (ed.), Commentaries on the Australian Constitution (1977) 88, 94-98.Google Scholar

⁴¹ (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73.

⁴² Id. 117-118 (emphasis added).

⁴³ Id. 101-102 (emphasis added); quoted in Attorney-General for Australia v. R. (Boilermakers' case) [1957] A.C. 288, 321. R. v. Kirby; ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 C.L.R. 254, 276; Dixon, , “The Law and the Constitution” (1935) 51 L.Q.R. 590, 606Google Scholar; Dixon, , Jesting Pilate (1965) 52.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ E.g. Cobb v. Kropp [1967] 1 A.C. 141; Powell v. Apollo Candle Co. Ltd (1885) 10 App. Cas. 282. Cf. Hodge v. R. (1883) 9 App. Cas. 117.

⁴⁵ E.g. Mccawley v. R. [1920] A.C. 691; Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan (1931) 44 C.L.R. 394, 426-427. Cf. Dixon, , “The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation” (1957) 31 A.L.J. 240Google Scholar; Dixon, , Jesting Pilate (1965) 203.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See Wallington and McBride, supra n. 23, 86, for the interesting suggestion that the Law Lords might issue a Practice Statement, as they did in 1966 on the question of precedent in the House of Lords: [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234. But see Rippengal's critical comment on this suggestion: Minutes of Evidence, supra n. 24, 4, para. 12.

⁴⁷ Hart, , The Concept of Law (1961) 92, 97-107, 145, 245-246.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Dicey, , Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed. 1959) 39-40.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Hart, supra n. 47, 146.

⁵⁰ E.g. Wade, H.W.R., “The Basis of Legal Sovereignty” [1955] Cambridge Law Journal 172, 190Google Scholar; Hood Phillips, supra n. 30, 84, 91 (but cf. id., 55-56); E. C. S. Wade, Introduction to Dicey, supra n. 48, lxxv; Wynes (1957) 31 A.L.J. 251, 252.

⁵¹ Dicey, supra n. 48, 68-69 n. 1; Hood Phillips and Jackson, supra n. 30, 91. See generally Winterton, supra n. 8, 600-604.

⁵² H. W. R. Wade, supra n. 50, 196. But see Wade, H. W. R., Constitutional Fundamentals (1980) 37-39Google Scholar, 40 suggesting a new judicial oath as the solution to the problem of entrenchment.

⁵³ See references supra n. 50 and infra n. 87; Winterton, supra n. 8, 616.

⁵⁴ See Hood Phillips and Jackson, supra n. 30, 89; H. W.R. Wade, supra n. 50, 193-194; H. W. R. Wade, supra n. 52, 27-28.

⁵⁵ E.g. Diplock, Lord, “The Common Market and the Common Law” (1972) 6 The Law Teacher 3, 6-8CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hood Phillips and Jackson, supra n. 30, 74, 95.

⁵⁶ E. C. S. Wade, supra n. 50, lxiv, lxxxviii; British Coal Corporation v. R. [1935] A.C. 500, 520; Latham (1957) 31 A.L.J. 253. But see references supra n. 27; Blackburn v. Attorney-General [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1037, 1040 per Lord Denning M.R., “Freedom once given cannot be taken away”; Ndlwana v. Hofmeyr, N.O. [1937] A.D. 229, 237 per Stratford A.C.J., “Freedom once conferred cannot be revoked”. (This case was not followed in Harris v. Minister of the Interior [1952] (2) S.A. 428, 472, but this dictum was unaffected thereby.)

⁵⁷ Mirfield, , “Can the House of Lords Lawfully be Abolished?” (1979) 95 L.Q.R. 36.Google Scholar Contra Winterton, , “Is the House of Lords Immortal?” (1979) 95 L.Q.R. 386Google Scholar; Hood Phillips and Jackson, supra n. 30, 56.

⁵⁸ [1952] (2) S.A. 428 (A.D.), sub. nom. Harris v. Donges [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1245.

⁵⁹ E.g. The Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe [1965] A.C. 172; Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan (1931) 44 C.L.R. 394, 426 per Dixon J.

⁶⁰ Hart, supra n. 47, 146.

⁶¹ E.g. Winterton, supra n. 8, 604-607; Smith, de, Constitutional and Administrative Law (3rd ed. 1977) 87-90Google Scholar; Jennings, , The Law and the Constitution (5th ed. 1959) 152-153, 160-161Google Scholar; Mitchell, , Constitutional Law (2nd ed. 1968) 78-82Google Scholar; Dixon, , “The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation” (1957) 31 A.L.J. 240, 244Google Scholar; Dixon, , Jesting Pilate (1965) 211Google Scholar; Marshall, , Constitutional Theory (1971) 53Google Scholar; Heuston, , Essays in Constitutional Law (2nd ed. 1964) 23-31Google Scholar; Wade, E. C. S. and Phillips, , Constitutional and Administrative Law (9th ed. by Bradley, 1977) 74Google Scholar; Derham, (1957) 31 A.L.J. 248. See also Aikman, supra n. 25, 40, 66-69; Northey, , “The New Zealand Constitution” in Northey (ed.), The A.G. Davis Essays in Law (1965) 149, 168, 170, discussing the rule of parliamentary supremacy in New Zealand.Google Scholar

⁶² A dictum of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in British Railways Board v. Pickin [1974] A.C. 765, 790 is not to the contrary; he was referring only to the justiciability of the “internal procedures” of Parliament, such as Standing Orders, not to “manner and form” legislation. For an example of the difficulties which the orthodox interpretation of parliamentary supremacy could cause, see Mirfield, supra n. 57; Winterton, supra n. 57, 387-389.

⁶³ European Communities Act 1972 (U.K.) s. 3(1).

⁶⁴ Costa v. E.N.E.L. [1964] C.M.L.R. 425, 456; re Export Tax on Art Treasures (No. 2) [1972] C.M.L.R. 699, 708. See also Siskina v. Distos Compania Naviera S.A. [1979] A.C. 210, 262 per Lord Hailsham (Lord Simon and Lord Russell concurring); Shields v. E. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1408, 1415 per Lord Denning M.R.; Macarthys Ltd v. Smith [1980] 2 C.M.L.R. 217, 218.

⁶⁵ Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr & Vorratsstelle fiir Getreide & Futtermittel [1972] C.M.L.R. 255, 283.

⁶⁶ Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA (No. 2) [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 201 (hereinafter cited as Simmenthal).

⁶⁷ Id. 283.

⁶⁸ Id. 284 (emphasis added).

⁶⁹ Emphasis added.

⁷⁰ Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant: see Pearce, , Statutory Inter pretation in Australia (1914) 94-95.Google Scholar

⁷¹ For the possible situations of inconsistency between Community law and national law, see Wade and Phillips, supra n. 61, 129-130. The view stated in the text supra may need qualification in regard to the fourth situation discussed by Wade and Phillips: “Conflict between a post-accession statute and a later E.E.C. regulation”. S. 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 (U.K.) does not expressly confer on directly applicable Community law the status of a statute, as s. 2(4) appears to do in regard to statutory instruments made pursuant to s. 2(2). Nevertheless it is submitted that the combination of s. 2(1) and (4) may be regarded as a “Henry VIII clause”, with the result that a Community regulation may override an earlier post-accession statute. This was indeed the view of the House of Lords' Select Committee on a Bill of Rights: Report of the Select Committee, supra n. 23, para. 18. Cf. regarding s. 2(2) and (4), Wade, H. W. R., Administrative Law (4th ed. 1977) 701Google Scholar; de Smith, supra n. 61, 328 n. 28; Hood Phillips and Jackson, supra n. 30, 96; Report of the Select Committee, ibid. But if the statute clearly intended to restrict the direct application of Community law—either in general, or a particular provision of it (a very unlikely event)—on the orthodox interpretation of parliamentary supremacy, it must prevail: see Wade and Phillips, supra n. 61, 130. See also Trindade, , “Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Primacy of European Community Law” (1972) 35 Modern Law Review 375, 397.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷² Lord Mackenzie Stuart has cautioned not to “overdramatise the situation”, and suggests that a political, rather than a legal, solution would be found: The European Communities and the Rule of Law (1977) 16.

⁷³ Simmenthal, supra n. 66.

⁷⁴ Phillips, Hood, “Has the 'Incoming Tide' Reached the Palace of Westminster?” (1979) 95 L.Q.R. 167, 169, 171Google Scholar; Hood Phillips and Jackson, supra n. 30, 76-77, 99; Phillips, Hood, “High Tide in the Strand? Post-1972 Acts and Community Law” (1980) 96 L.Q.R. 31, 33Google Scholar; Trindade, supra n. 71, passim; Wade and Phillips, supra n. 61, 129-130; Lord Diplock, Minutes of Evidence, supra n. 24, 95. It is possible however that a court would hold that by s. 2 of the European Communities Act 1972 (U.K.) Parliament had abdicated its “sovereignty” over matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Community. But see Trindade, id. 388.

⁷⁵ Winterton, supra n. 8, 614-615.

⁷⁶ This is, indeed, suggested by the language of the European Court in Simmenthal, quoted supra in the text accompanying n. 67, which appears to adopt a “covering the field” concept close to that employed by the High Court regarding s. 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution. Cf. Clyde Engineering Co. Ltd v. Cowburn (1926) 37 C.L.R. 466, 489; ex parte McLean (1930) 43 C.L.R. 472, 483. See Freeman, , “The Division of Powers Between the European Communities and the Member States” (1977) 30 Current Legal Problems 159CrossRefGoogle Scholar for a discussion of the question (familiar to Australian constitutional lawyers) whether Community powers are concurrent or exclusive.

⁷⁷ Jaconelli, , “Constitutional Review and Section 2(4) of the European Communities Act 1972” (1979) 28 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁸ [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1037, 1040-1041, 1041.

⁷⁹ See especially re an absence in Ireland [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 5 (National Insurance Commissioner (U.K.) ), discussed in Freestone, , “The Supremacy of Community Law in National Courts” (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 220, 223CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Warner, , “The Relationship Between European Community Law and the National Laws of Member States” (1977) 93 L.Q.R. 349, 366Google Scholar n. 29. For other decisions of the National Insurance Commissioner (U.K.) see Freestone, id. 223, n. 25.

⁸⁰ Hood Phillips, supra n. 74, 95 L.Q.R. 167, 169-170, and Hood Phillips and Jackson, supra n. 30, 91, 103.

⁸¹ Shields v. E. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1408, 1414-1415; Macarthys Ltd v. Smith [1979] 3 All E.R. 325, 329; Macarthys Ltd v. Smith [1980] 2 C.M.L.R. 217, 218. See also Siskina v. Distos Compania Naviera S.A. [1979] A.C. 210, 262; Lord Hailsham, supra n. 3, 137; Macarthys Ltd v. Smith [1979] 3 All E.R. 325, 335-336 per Cumming-Bruce L.J.; Macarthys Ltd v. Smith [1980] 2 C.M.L.R. 217, 219-220.

⁸² “[O]nce a Bill is passed by Parliament and becomes a Statute, that will dispose of all this discussion about the Treaty. These courts will then have to abide by the Statute without regard to the Treaty at all”: Felixstowe Dock & Railway Co. v. British Transport Docks Board [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 655, 664-665. Moreover, in H.P. Bulmer Ltd v. J. Bollinger S.A. [1974] Ch. 401, 418 and Application des Gaz S.A. v. Falks Veritas Ltd [1974] Ch. 381, 393, Lord Denning M.R. characterised the Treaty of Rome as merely “equal in force to any statute”. (For a critical comment on these dicta, see Warner, supra n. 79, 365.) See also Macarthys Ltd v. Smith [1980] 2 C.M.L.R. 217, 219 per Lord Denning M.R. A more recent dictum illustrating the supremacy of Community law is ambiguous and cannot be regarded as a clear assertion that it would prevail over contrary later legislation. In Shields' case, supra n. 81, 1415, Lord Denning M.R. said: “Suppose that ... Parliament ... were to pass a statute inconsistent with article 119 [of the Treaty of Rome, which provides that: 'Each member state shall ... ensure ... that men and women [shall] receive equal pay for equal work.']: as, for instance, if the Equal Pay Act 1970 gave a right to equal pay only to unmarried women. I should have thought that a married woman could bring an action in the High Court to enforce the right to equal pay given to her by article 119”. In this illustration, the statute and the treaty would be “inconsistent” only on a “covering the field” test, but not directly inconsistent, unless the Act provided that married women should not receive equal pay; it is unclear in which sense Lord Denning M.R. meant “gave a right ... only”. Cf. Colvin v. Bradley Bros Pty Ltd (1943) 68 C.L.R. 151, and see generally Murray-Jones, , “The Tests for Inconsistency Under Section 109 of the Constitution” (1979) 10 F.L. Rev. 25Google Scholar. See also the article by Rumble, supra p. 40.

Subsequently, Lord Denning M.R. stated that British courts should apply legislation inconsistent with Community law if Parliament departed from the latter intentionally and expressly: Macarthys Ltd v. Smith [1979] 3 All E.R. 325, 329. See also id. 334 per Lawton L.J.

⁸³ Lord Mackenzie Stuart, supra n. 72, 17; Warner, supra n. 79, 365. Cf. Scarman (1974), supra n. 3, 27, 81 ff. and “Law and Administration: A Change in Relationship” (1972) 50 Public Administration 253, 255-258. Contra, Lord Diplock, Minutes of Evidence, supra n. 24, 95; Hood Phillips, supra n. 74, 95 L.Q.R. 167, 171.

⁸⁴ Winterton, supra n. 8, 616-617.

⁸⁵ See generally Jaconelli, Enacting a Bill of Rights: The Legal Problems (1980); Report of the Select Committee, supra n. 23; Minutes of Evidence, supra n. 24; 396 H.L. Deb. 1301-1397 (1978); Wallington and McBride, supra n. 23 passim; Hood Phillips and Jackson, supra n. 30, 446-451; Wade and Phillips, supra n. 61, 540-543; Anderson, Liberty, Law and Justice (1978) 53-54; Zander, , A Bill of Rights? (2nd ed. 1979).Google Scholar Contra, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, , “Do we Need a Bill of Rights?” (1976) 39 Modern Law Review 121CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Griffith, , “The Political Constitution” (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 1, 12 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸⁶ Scarman (1974), supra n. 3, 18.

⁸⁷ Report of the Select Committee, supra n. 23, paras 14, 23; Minutes of Evidence, supra n. 24, 4-10 paras 14 ff. per Mr Rippengal, 91, 94 per Lord Diplock, 277 per Professor Hood Phillips, 364, 367-368 per Lord Scarman; Hood Phillips and Jackson, supra n. 30, 447.

⁸⁸ Hood Phillips and Jackson, id. 450; Lord Scarman, “Fundamental Rights: The British Scene”, supra n. 3, 1585. Cf. the discussion in the New Zealand Parliament on enacting s. 189 of the Electoral Act 1956 (N.Z.): Aikman, supra n. 25, 66-67.

⁸⁹ Dicey, supra n. 48, 39-40, 69n; Winterton, supra n. 8, 600-604.

⁹⁰ Scarman (1974), supra n. 3, 27, 70, 74-77, 81-82; Hood Phillips and Jackson, supra n. 30, 91, 447; Phillips, Hood, Reform of the Constitution (1970) 156-157Google Scholar; Minutes of Evidence, supra n. 24, 277 per Professor Hood Phillips, 364 per Lord Scarman.

⁹¹ Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan (1931) 44 C.L.R. 394, 442 per McTiernan J., dissenting; Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Ltd v. Attorney-General (Qld) [1976] Qd.R. 231,236 perWanstall S.P.J.; Friedmann, supra n. 8, 104; de Smith, supra n. 61, 90; Winterton, supra n. 8, 605; Lumb, , The Constitutions of the Australian States (4th ed. 1977) 112.Google Scholar

⁹² Hailsham, supra n. 3, 174; Report of the Select Committee, supra n. 23, para. 16; Rippengal, “Memorandum on The Question of Entrenchment” in Minutes of Evidence, supra n. 24, 2, para. 6; Zander in Minutes of Evidence, id. 312-313; Wallington and McBride, supra n. 23, 85-86, 114; Wade and Phillips, supra n. 61, 543. Cf. the Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth) cl. 5(2) and (3).

⁹³ E.g. Lord Salmon, quoted by Lord Wilberforce, supra n. 3, 269.

⁹⁴ Lord Wilberforce, id. 277-285; Lord Hailsham, supra n. 3, 174, 227-228; Scarman (1974), supra n. 3, 15-21, 69; Lord Scarman, “Fundamental Rights: The British Scene”, supra n. 3, 1586. See Lord Denning's Lord Fletcher Lecture (10 December 1979) noted in The Times 12 December 1979, 2. The Law Lords who participated in the House of Lords debate on the Report of the Select Committee on a Bill of Rights were divided on the question whether to approve Lord Wade's Bill, incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 into British law. Lords Scarman, Salmon and Hailsham of St. Marylebone voted in favour, and Lords Diplock, Morris of Borth-y-Gest and Elwyn-Jones L.C. voted against. See 396 H.L. Deb. 1301 ff. (29 November 1978). See also 402 H.L. Deb. 999 ff. (8 November 1979).

⁹⁵ E.g. Lord Scarman, “Fundamental Rights: The British Scene”, supra n. 3, 1585: “under the existing constitution it is not possible to entrench ... a Bill of Rights against amendment or repeal by a bare majority in Parliament ... “. See also supra n. 87.

⁹⁶ Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan (1931) 44 C.L.R. 394, affirmed [1932] AC. 526.

⁹⁷ Harris v. Minister of the Interior [1952] (2) S.A. 428 (AD.).

⁹⁸ The Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe [1965] A.C. 172.

⁹⁹ R. v. Drybones [1970] S.C.R. 282. But see text accompanying nn. 28-30 infra p. 185.

^{page 182 note 1} Supra n. 3, 274-275. See also Lord Hailsham, supra n. 3, 171.

² The British North America Act 1867 (U.K.) (hereinafter cited as “B.N.A. Act”).

³ E.g. Tarnopolsky, , The Canadian Bill of Rights (2nd rev. ed. 1975) 104-105, 112, 141CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hogg, , Constitutional Law of Canada (1977) 201-202.Google Scholar

⁴ R. v. Drybones [1970] S.C.R. 282, (hereinafter Drybones) discussed infra p. 184. Professor Conklin is “sceptical of the success of classifying the [Canadian Bill of Rights] as a 'manner and form' requirement”: Conklin, , “Pickin and its Applicability to Canada” (1975) 25 University of Toronto Law Journal 193, 206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ E.g. supra n. 3 p. 183.

⁶ Although the B.N.A. Acts. 91(1) would appear to include “form” legislation, the Supreme Court has not regarded the Canadian Bill of Rights 1960 as a constitutional amendment: Attorney-General of Canada v. Lavell [1974] S.C.R. 1349, 1358. See Tarnopolsky, supra n. 3, p. 183, 152.

⁷ B.N.A. Act s. 91(1); Hogg, supra n. 3, p. 183, 202. But see re Authority of Parliament in Relation to the Upper House [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54.

⁸ See the Commonwealth Constitution s. 128.

⁹ S. 17 provides: “There shall be one Parliament for Canada, consisting of the Queen, the Senate, and the House of Commons.”

¹⁰ The Commonwealth Constitution s. 1: “The legislative power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Parliament, which shall consist of the Queen, a Senate, and a House of Representatives ... “. See also text accompanying nn. 93-15 infra pp. 193-196.

¹¹ Emphasis added. The Canadian Bill of Rights applies “only to matters corning within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada”: Canadian Bill of Rights 1960 s. 5(3).

¹² [1970] S.C.R. 282.

¹³ The Indian Act (Can.) s. 94(b).

¹⁴ [1970] S.C.R. 282, 297, 298.

¹⁵ Fauteux, Martland, Judson, Hall and Spence JJ. Cartwright C.J., Abbott and Pigeon JJ. dissented.

¹⁶ [1970] S.C.R. 282, 294 (emphasis added). See also Attorney-General of Canada v. Lavell [1974] S.C.R. 1349, 1382 per Laskin, Hall and Spence JJ. dissenting.

¹⁷ E.g. Attorney-General of Canada v. Lavell [1974] S.C.R. 1349.

¹⁸ Supra n. 70.

¹⁹ The Canadian Bill of Rights s. 5(2) provides: “The expression 'law of Canada' in Part I [which includes s. 2] means an Act of the Parliament of Canada enacted before or after the coming into force of this Act ... “ (emphasis added). Indeed s. 2 itself implies this; earlier legislation could hardly be expected to provide that it should “operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights”: see Brandt, Comment (1977) 55 Canadian Bar Review 705, 714.

²⁰ Miller and Cockriell v. R. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680, 686 per Laskin C.J., Spence and Dickson JJ.; Attorney-General of Canada v. Lavell [1974] S.C.R. 1349, 1388, 1389. See also Brandt, id. 714-716; Hogg, supra n. 3 p. 183, 438.

²¹ [1970] S.C.R. 282, 294-295.

²² Id. 297, 298; see Tarnopolsky, supra n. 3 p. 183, 140-141; Hogg, supra n. 3 p. 183, 437, n. 22. Cf. Jaconelli, supra n. 77, 68-69 for a note on allegedly similar decisions of European courts.

²³ Hogg, ibid. Cf. Butler v. Attorney-General for Victoria (1961) 106 C.L.R. 268.

²⁴ Tarnopolsky, supra n. 3 p. 183, 112. But see Hogg, id. 438.

²⁵ Hogg, ibid.

²⁶ Cf. the much clearer provisions in the Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth) cl. 5(2) and (3); cl. 9 of the Draft Bill of Rights in Wallington and McBride, supra n. 23 p. 171, 114; and cl. 3 of the Bill of Rights Bill 1976 (U.K.).

²⁷ Cf. Curr v. R. [1972] S.C.R. 889, 899 per Laskin, Abbott, Hall, Spence and Pigeon JJ.

²⁸ Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, Minutes of Evidence, supra n. 24 p. 171, 16-17, 22, 25. Cf. Tarnopolsky, supra n. 3 p. 183, 142.

²⁹ Emphasis added. Contrast the comment on this phrase by Pigeon J., dissenting, in Drybones [1970] S.C.R. 282, 304.

³⁰ Nevertheless, some have seen Drybones as inconsistent with traditional notions of parliamentary supremacy, at least if applied to legislation enacted after the Bill of Rights. Abbott J., for instance, has lamented that “the Canadian Bill of Rights has substantially affected the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament. Like any other statute it can of course be repealed or amended, or a particular law declared to be applicable notwithstanding the provisions of the Bill. In form the supremacy of Parliament is maintained but in practice I think that it has been substantially curtailed. In my opinion that result is undesirable, but that is a matter for consideration by Parliament not the courts”: Attorney-General of Canada v. Lavell [1974] S.C.R. 1349, 1374 per Abbott J., dissenting. (Emphasis added.) ct. the view that cl. 3 of the Bill of Rights Bill 1976 (U.K.) could not effectively enable the Bill of Rights Act to prevail over subsequent inconsistent legislation: see Report of the Select Committee, supra n. 23 p. 171, paras 17 and 23 (see also paras 21 and 38); Mr Rippengal, Minutes of Evidence, supra n. 24 p. 171, 2-3 (paras 7-11). But see contra, id. 16-17, 22 (Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone) 169, 170 (Mr Wallington).

³¹ The B.N.A. Act s. 91(1), and supra nn. 6, 7 p. 183.

³² Cf. Wade and Phillips, supra n. 61, 543; Wallington and McBride, supra n. 23 p. 171, 86, 114.

³³ See the comments of H.W.R. Wade, supra n. 50, 175-176; Hood Phillips and Jackson, supra n. 30 p. 172, 83 and E. C. S. Wade in Dicey, supra n. 48, xlix.

³⁴ (1939) 62 C.L.R. 603.

³⁵ Emphasis added.

³⁶ (1939) 62 C.L.R. 603, 618 per Latham C.J., 623 per Starke J., 625 per Dixon J., 636 per McTiernan J. Strictly speaking, the question before the Court was whether the South-Eastern Drainage Act was a law “respecting the Constitution, Powers, and Procedure” of the legislature, not whether the Real Property Act s. 6 was. The High Court's analysis was erroneous because it cannot be assumed that an Act of the kind referred to in s. 6 would have the same character as s. 6 itself. See Campbell, , “Comment on State Government Agreements” (1977) 1 Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Journal 53, 54.Google Scholar

³⁷ (1939) 62 C.L.R. 603, 625 per Dixon J., 636 per McTiernan J. Contra, id. 634 per Evatt J.

³⁸ Id. 618, 623, 628, 636.

³⁹ Id. 633.

⁴⁰ Evatt J.'s emphasis.

⁴¹ Evatt J. referred to [1934] 1 K.B. 590, 597.

⁴² (1939) 62 C.L.R. 603, 633-634 (emphasis added). Evatt J. did not refer specifically to s. 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, but his remark (634) that Trethowan's case was irrelevant must be taken to mean that, like the other judges, he considered s. 5 inapplicable here.

⁴³ Indeed, Latham C.J. characterised s. 6 as one purporting to “prescribe the contents of an Act which the legislature has power to pass” (1939) 62 C.L.R. 603, 618 (emphasis added) in which case s. 6 would not be a “manner and form” provision at all.

⁴⁴ Thus, Latham C.J. merely said that “[i]t is recognized as a general principle of English constitutional law that one parliament cannot bind its successors ... “: (1939) 62 C.L.R. 603, 617. See also Campbell, supra n. 36 p. 186, 54-55.

⁴⁵ [1934] 1 K.B. 590 (C.A.).

⁴⁶ Id. 595-596 per Scrutton L.J. Talbot J. concurred, although, like Avory J. in Vauxhall Estates Ltd v. Liverpool Corporation [1932] 1 K.B. 733, 743, he thought thats. 7(1) was not intended to apply to future legislation: [1934] 1 K.B. 590, 598.

⁴⁷ Vauxhall Estates Ltd v. Liverpool Corporation [1932] 1 K.B. 733.

⁴⁸ Ellen Street Estates Ltd v. Minister of Health [1934] 1 K.B. 590, 591. See also Vauxhall Estates Ltd v. Liverpool Corporation [1932] 1 K.B. 733, 745.

⁴⁹ See also id. [1932] 1 K.B. 733, 746 per Humphreys J.

⁵⁰ Ellen Street Estates Ltd v. Minister of Health [1934] 1 K.B. 590, 591. Emphasis added. Talbot J. concurred.

⁵¹ Wade and Phillips, supra n. 61, 66.

⁵² Jennings, supra n. 61, 163.

⁵³ Heuston, supra n. 61, 27; Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, Minutes of Evidence, supra n. 24 p. 171, 16.

⁵⁴ Mitchell, supra n. 61, 76-77; Auburn, , “Trends in Comparative Constitutional Law” (1972) 35 Modern Law Review 129, 133CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jennings, supra n. 61, 163. But cf. the significance given to the dictum of Maugham L.J. by the followers of the orthodox interpretation of parliamentary supremacy: see H. W. R. Wade, supra n. 50 p. 175, 175-176; Hood Phillips and Jackson, supra n. 30 p. 172, 83; E. C. S. Wade, supra n. 50 p. 175, xlix; Rippengal, Minutes of Evidence, supra n. 24 p. 171, 3, 5 (paras 8-11, 15), criticised by Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, id. 16.

⁵⁵ Statute of Westminster 1931 (U.K.) ss. 2(1 ), 7(1).

⁵⁶ Id. ss. 2(1), 8; Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Cth) s. 3.

⁵⁷ But cf. Statute of Westminster 1931 (U.K.) s. 7(2) extending s. 2 to the Canadian Provinces.

⁵⁸ Defined by the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (U.K.) s. 1; the Australian States are included.

⁵⁹ Emphasis added.

⁶⁰ Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan [1932] A.C. 526 (P.C.); Taylor v. Attorney-General of Queensland (1917) 23 C.L.R. 457; Clayton v. Heffron (1960) 105 C.L.R. 214, 258-259, 262 per Fullagar J., 275 per Menzies J.; Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Ltd v. Attorney-General (Qld) [1976] Qd.R. 231, 248-249 per Hoare J., dissenting; McDonald v. Cain [1953] V.L.R. 411, 419, 426,435.

⁶¹ See generally Lumb, supra n. 91, 109-112; Lumb, “Fundamental Law and the Processes of Constitutional Change in Australia” (1978) 9 F.L. Rev. 148, 171-174, 180; Campbell, supra n. 36 p. 186, 54-55. Cf. Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan (1931) 44 C.L.R. 394,419 per Rich J.

⁶² (1960) 105 C.L.R. 214, 250-252 per Dixon C.J., McTiernan, Taylor and Windeyer JJ., Kitto J. concurring 265, 272-273 per Menzies J. But see id., 258 per Fullagar J.

⁶³ The Constitution Act 1902 (N.S.W.) s. 5.

⁶⁴ His Honour held that the Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Pty Limited Agreement Act 1957 (Qld) s. 4 did fall within s. 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (U.K.): Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Ltd v. Attorney-General (Qld) [1976] Qd.R. 231, 248.

⁶⁵ [1965] A.C. 172.

⁶⁶ [1920] A.C. 691.

⁶⁷ Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Ltd v. Attorney-General (Qld) [1976) Qd.R. 231, 247 per Hoare J., dissenting.

⁶⁸ “The Legislature was endowed with constituent as well as ordinary legislative power”: Clayton v. Heffron (1960) 105 C.L.R. 214, 251 per Dixon C.J., McTiernan, Taylor and Windeyer JJ., Kitto J. concurring 265; Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan (1931) 44 C.L.R. 394, 420 per Rich J., 422-423 per Starke J., 428-431, 433 per Dixon J., 443 per McTiernan J., affirmed [1932] A.C. 526; Mccawley v. R. [1920] A.C. 691; McDonald v. Cain [1953] V.L.R. 411, 433. For possible limits on State constituent power, see Lumb, supra n. 61 p. 189, 177-179, and supra n. 91, 111; Gill v. State Planning Authority (1979) 20 S.A.S.R. 580, 589 (a questionable obiter dictum).

⁶⁹ Commonwealth Constitution s. 128.

⁷⁰ See also the Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth) cl. 5(2) and (3).

⁷¹ Commonwealth Constitution s. 51(xxxix).

⁷² E.g., Victoria v. Commonwealth (the A.A.P. case) (1975) 134 C.L.R. 338, 413-414 per Jacobs J.

⁷³ On the modern characterisation doctrine, see Seamen's Union of Australia v. Utah Development Co. (1978) 22 A.L.R. 291, 316 per Mason J.; Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth (1976) 136 C.L.R. 1, 22 per Mason J.; Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth (1947) 74 C.L.R. 31, 79 per Dixon J., adopted in Fairfax v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 C.L.R. 1, 13 per Kitto J.

⁷⁴ Section 128 provides: “This Constitution shall not be altered except in the following manner:—.”

⁷⁵ Commonwealth Constitution s. 1.

⁷⁶ For examples of such provisions, see supra n. 25 p. 171.

⁷⁷ Lumb, and Ryan, , The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia Annotated (2nd ed. 1977) 49, 59.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Cf. Commonwealth Constitution s. 128 paras 1 and 2 which require absolute majorities.

⁷⁹ Wynes, supra n. 27 p. 171, 128.

⁸⁰ For examples of such provisions, see supra n. 26 p. 171.

⁸¹ For examples of such provisions, see supra n. 27 p. 171.

⁸² E.g., the South Africa Act 1909 (U.K.) ss. 35(1) and 152, requiring a joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament: see Harris v. Minister of the Interior, [1952] (2) S.A. 428 (A.D.) sub nom. Harris v. Donges [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1245.

⁸³ See also Commonwealth Constitution ss. 58-60, entrenching the legislative role of the Crown. Cf. In re the Initiative and Referendum Act [1919] A.C. 935, 944 (P.C.).

⁸⁴ Giris Pty Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1969) 119 C.L.R. 365, 373 per Barwick C.J.; The Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co. Pty Ltd v. Dignan (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73, 121 per Evatt J.; ex parte Walsh & Johnson, In re Yates (1925) 37 C.L.R. 36, 83, 107 per Isaacs J. See also In re the Initiative and Referendum Act [1919] A.C. 935, 945 (P.C.). Cf. the position under State constitutional law: Cobb & Co. Ltd v. Kropp [1967] 1 A.C. 141, 155, 157 (P.C.), adopting R. v. Burah (1878) 3 App. Cas. 889, 905 (P.C.); Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Ltd v. Attorney-General (Qld) [1976] Qd.R. 231, 236-237.

⁸⁵ Western Australia v. Commonwealth (1975) 134 C.L.R. 201, 217. See also Cormack v. Cope (1974) 131 C.L.R. 432, 456 per Barwick C.J.

⁸⁶ E.g., the Constitution Act 1902 (N.S.W.) s. 5B(l). Cf. Commonwealth Constitution s. 57.

⁸⁷ E.g., the Constitution Act 1902 (N.S.W.) s. 5A; the Parliament Act 1911 (U.K.) ss. 1 and 2, as amended by the Parliament Act 1949 (U.K.) s. 1.

⁸⁸ Pearce, Delegated Legislation in Australia and New Zealand (1977) ch. 22.

⁸⁹ Id. ch. 25; Smith, de, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed. 1973) 264-265Google Scholar; Allen, , Law and Orders (3rd ed. 1965) 177-181CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Whitmore, , Principles of Australian Administrative Law (5th ed. 1980) 92-95.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Cf. “Henry VIII clauses”: see generally H. W. R. Wade, supra n. 71 p. 178, 700-701, Allen, id. 170-172, Pearce, supra n. 88 p. 193, paras 12-15.

⁹¹ Cf. Professor Hood Phillips' argument that the Parliament Act 1949 (U.K.) is not an “Act of Parliament” because the legislature constituted pursuant to the Parliament Act 1911 (U.K.) s. 2 had no power to enact it: Hood Phillips and Jackson, supra n. 30 p. 172, 89-90, 143; Hood Phillips, supra n. 90 p. 181, 91-92.

⁹² Pearce, supra n. 88 p. 193, ch. 24.

⁹³ Commonwealth Constitution s. 1.

⁹⁴ Baxter v. Ah Way (1909) 8 C.L.R. 626; Roche v. Kronheimer (1921) 29 C.L.R. 329; Huddart Parker Ltd v. Commonwealth (1931) 44 C.L.R. 492, 506, 512, 518; The Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co. Pty Ltd v. Dignan (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73 (hereinafter cited as Dignan's case); Radio Corporation Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth (1938) 59 C.L.R. 170; Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1, 256-257; Esmonds Motors Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth (1970) 120 C.L.R. 463, 476-478; Commonwealth v. Carkazis (1978) 23 A.C.T.R. 5, 10; Golden-Brown v. Hunt (1972) 19 F.L.R. 438, 441-442.

⁹⁵ See cases cited supra n. 84 p. 192.

⁹⁶ Dignan's case (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73, 102 per Dixon J., 118 per Evatt J.; Attorney-General for Australia v. R. [1957] A.C. 288, 315 (P.C.) (hereinafter cited as Boilermakers' case).

⁹⁷ For comment on the importance of the institution of responsible government for parliamentary supervision of delegated legislation, see Dignan's case (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73, 114, 120 per Evatt J.; Radio Corporation Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth (1938) 59 C.L.R. 170, 184 per Latham C.J.; Boilermakers' case [1957] A.C. 288, 315.

⁹⁸ Dignan's case (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73, 118-119 per Evatt J. With respect, Dr Pearce's doubts on this point (Pearce, supra n. 88 p. 193 para. 505) seem unwarranted, especially in view of this dictum of Evatt J. See also Giris Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth (1969) 119 C.L.R. 365; R. v. Federal Court of Bankruptcy, ex parte Lowenstein (1938) 59 C.L.R. 556, 565 per Latham C.J.; Dignan's case (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73, 84 per Gavan Duffy C.J. and Starke J.

⁹⁹ E.g., the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth), Part III. But query whether this Act should be regarded merely as one delegating legislative power; it is better described as one establishing a new legislature.

^{page 194 note 1} Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1, 256-257 per Fullagar J.; Giris Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth (1969) 119 C.L.R. 365, 373 per Barwick C.J. But the separation of powers doctrine may impose some outer limit to Parliament's power; in Giris Pty Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1969) 119 C.L.R. 365, 379 Kitto J. said (obiter): “If [the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936-1965 (Cth) s. 99A(2)] had the effect of setting the Commissioner free, in choosing between s. 99A and s. 99, to do what he thought fit within the limits of the powers of the Parliament, possibly it should be held invalid as an attempt to invest an officer of the executive government with part of the legislative power of the Commonwealth.” (Emphasis added.) Menzies J. made a somewhat similar comment (also obiter): “It is true that at some point in a process of parliamentary abnegation, such as the Act reveals in s. 99A and other sections, the shifting of responsibility from Parliament to the Commissioner would require consideration of the constitutionality of the delegation but I cannot deny validity to s. 99A on the ground that it is unconstitutional for Parliament to give to the Commissioner the power to determine that, in a particular case, it would be unreasonable to apply the section”: id. 381. (Emphasis added.) It should be noted that Menzies J. did not indicate whether the delegation would face limitations based on the separation of powers doctrine or the need for a valid characterisation. Windeyer J. was content to observe, enigmatically, that s. 99A was “very close to the boundary”: id. 385. He did not specify the boundary he was referring to.

² See supra n. 1 p. 194; Dignan's case (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73, 101 per Dixon J., 119-121 per Evatt J.; Wishart v. Fraser (1941) 64 C.L.R. 470, 488 per McTiernan J.; Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1, 257 per Fullagar J. Cf. Gill v. State Planning Authority (1979) 20 S.A.S.R. 580, 589 (a questionable obiter dictum).

³ That the Commonwealth may not, usually, “single out”, or discriminate against, the States. For attempts (unconvincing) to base this limitation on the characterisation doctrine, see Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth (1947) 74 C.L.R. 31, 61-62 per Latham C.J., 99-100 per Williams J.; Victoria v. Commonwealth (1971) 122 C.L.R. 353, 372-374, 382-383 per Barwick C.J., Owen J. concurring. The other justices in both cases rejected this approach.

⁴ But see Giris Pty Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1969) 119 C.L.R. 365, 379 per Kitto J.

⁵ See the dicta cited in text accompanying nn. 7, 8, 10, 11 infra.

⁶ (1921) 29 C.L.R. 329.

⁷ (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73, 101.

⁸ Id. 119-121.

⁹ Id. 119.

¹⁰ Id. 120 (emphasis added). Fullagar J. suggested a similar fate for an Act giving a power “to make regulations with respect to bankruptcy”, not given in aid of specific parliamentary legislation: Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1, 257.

¹¹ Wishart v. Fraser (1941) 64 C.L.R. 470, 488. McTieman J. cited Dignan's case (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73, 101.

¹² (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73, 121. Dixon J., concurring id. 103-104. See also cases cited supra n. 73 p. 191.

¹³ Sawer, , “The Separation of Powers in Australian Federalism” (1961) 35 A.L.J. 177, 186.Google Scholar

¹⁴ (1969) 119 C.L.R. 365, 379, quoted supra n. 1 p. 194.

¹⁵ See Dignan's case (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73, 101-102 per Dixon J., 119, 121 per Evatt J.; Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1, 256-257 per Fullagar J.; Giris Pty Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1969) 119 C.L.R. 365, 373 per Barwick C.J. However, in Dignan's case the High Court did not go so far as to declare the separation of powers doctrine irrelevant to the definition of limits to the Commonwealth Parliament's power to delegate legislative power. Thus, Dixon J., who believed the constitutional framework to be based on the separation of powers (46 C.L.R. 73, 96-98, 101) wrote: “Nor does it mean that the distribution of powers can supply no considerations of weight affecting the validity of an Act creating a legislative authority” (id. 101); and even Evatt J., who held that the separation of powers doctrine was embodied only loosely in the Constitution (id. 114-118), observed that “[t]he fact that the grant of power is made to the Executive Government rather than to an authority which is not responsible to Parliament, may be a circumstance which assists the validity of the legislation. The further removed the law-making authority is from continuous contact with Parliament, the less likely is it that the law will be a law with respect to any of the subject matters ... in secs. 51 and 52 of the Constitution”: id. 120 (emphasis added). It has been suggested that the Boilermakers' case [1957] A.C. 288, necessitates a reconsideration of Dignan's case. See Sawer, supra n. 13 p. 196, 183-187, and comments by Menhennitt, (1961) 35 A.L.J. 190, and Benjafield, ibid. With respect, this writer would argue, with Sir Kenneth Bailey, id 195, that the Privy Council expressly refrained from questioning Dignan's case ([1957] A.C. 288, 315, 320-321) which, therefore, does not require reconsideration. See also Wynes, (1961) 35 A.L.J. 195.

¹⁶ See the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth), Part III.

¹⁷ Cf. In re the Initiative and Referendum Act [1919) A.C. 935, 944 discussed in Hogg, supra n. 3 p. 183, 218-219, 220-221.

¹⁸ See U.S. Constitution Art. I§7(2) and (3). The latter provides: “Every order, resolution or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary ... shall be presented to the President ... “: Art. I§7(3). But even this provision has not ensured that every resolution (with legislative effect) passed by both Houses is submitted to the President for his approval. See, e.g., discussion of the “legislative veto” in McGowan, “Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power” (1977) 77 Columbia Law Review 1119, 1133-1162; Fisher, , The Constitution Between Friends (1978) 99-108CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stewart, , “Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto” (1976) 13 Harvard Journal on Legislation 593Google Scholar; Tribe, , American Constitutional Law (1978) 161-163Google Scholar, and 1979 Supplement, 17; Corwin, , The Constitution and What It Means Today (14th ed. 1978,) 37Google Scholar; Henry, , “The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits” (1979) 16 Harvard Journal on Legislation 735, 742-751.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Contrast s. 7(1) Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth): “Every proposed law passed by the Legislative Assembly shall be presented to the Administrator for assent.”

²⁰ Commonwealth Constitution s. 58 para. 1.

²¹ Commonwealth Constitution ss. 58 para. 2 and 59 certainly do not appear to contemplate it.

²² Presumably, Commonwealth Constitution s. 53 para. 5 prevents the Senate having greater power than the House of Representatives; except as provided in s. 53, their powers are equal.

²³ This was noted by Sir John Kerr in his “Detailed Statement of Decisions” of 11 November 1975 in “The Fourth Double Dissolution, 11th November, 1975” (1975) 49 A.L.J. 645, 648.

²⁴ This phrase occurs in Commonwealth Constitution ss. 53 para. 2 and 54; for its meaning, see Odgers, , Australian Senate Practice (5th ed. 1976) 374-388Google Scholar; Lumb and Ryan, supra n. 77 p. 191, 206.

²⁵ The phrase “the ordinary annual services of the Government” is not sufficiently explicit to require money for such items to be appropriated for no more than one year at a time. See Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (1901) 670. Cf. the much more explicit language of Art. I§8(12) of the United States Constitution: “... but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.”

²⁶ See supra p. 192, D. Alternative Legislature.

²⁷ Commonwealth Constitution ss. 81, 96.

²⁸ See Clark, Inglis, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law (2nd ed. 1905) 45.Google Scholar The restrictive interpretation given s. 51(xxxix) in Attorney-General for Commonwealth v. The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd [1914] A.C. 237, 256 has not prevailed: see Sawer, , Cases on the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (3rd ed. 1964) 532-533Google Scholar. See, e.g. Victoria v. Commonwealth (hereinafter cited as the A.A.P. case) (1975) 134 C.L.R. 338, 413-415 per Jacobs J.

²⁹ A.A.P. case (1975) 134 C.L.R. 338, 353, 371; Attorney-General for Victoria (ex rel. Dale) v. Commonwealth (hereinafter cited as the Pharmaceutical Benefits case) (1945) 71 C.L.R. 237, 251.

³⁰ A.A.P. case, id. 353 per Barwick C.J.; Pharmaceutical Benefits case, id. 271 per Dixon J.

³¹ Pharmaceutical Benefits case, id. 250 per Latham C.J.; A.A.P. case, id. 371 per Gibbs J., 386 per Stephen J., 392 per Mason J., 411 per Jacobs J.

³² A.A.P. case, id. 360, 404, 422; Pharmaceutical Benefits case, id. 253. See also A.A.P. case, id. 338, 375.

³³ For the interpretation of this phrase in s. 81, see A.A.P. case, id. passim and Pharmaceutical Benefits case, id. passim.

³⁴ A.A.P. case, id. 421.

³⁵ Pharmaceutical Benefits case (1945) 71 C.L.R. 237, 253; A.A.P. case, id. 421.

³⁶ Commonwealth Constitution s. 53 para. 1.

³⁷ Id. ss. 53 para. 1 and 56.

³⁸ Id. s. 53 para. 2.

³⁹ Id. s. 53 para. 4.

⁴⁰ Id. s. 53 para. 5.

⁴¹ See also the discussion infra p. 201 on the meaning of “proposed laws” in Commonwealth Constitutions. 53.

⁴² Proposed Jaws imposing taxation are treated by Commonwealth Constitution s. 53 in the same way as proposed laws appropriating moneys for the ordinary annual services of the Government.

⁴³ Victoria v. Commonwealth (the P.M.A. case) (1975) 134 C.L.R. 81, 121; cf. 143 per Gibbs J., 185 per Mason J.

⁴⁴ Id. 121, 143, 168, 185; Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan (1931) 44 C.L.R. 394, 420. This was also the view of Sir John Kerr in his statements of 11 November 1975 (supra n. 23 p. 198, 646-648), and Barwick C.J. in his letter of 10 November 1975 to Sir John Kerr (id. 648-649).

⁴⁵ I.e. enactment pursuant to s. 57 of the Commonwealth Constitution.

⁴⁶ Or cl. 5(2) and (3) Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth).

⁴⁷ R. v. Drybones [1970] S.C.R. 282.