In Britain the Attorney-General is free from Cabinet control in deciding whether or not to initiate prosecutions or to terminate criminal proceedings. This article discusses the question whether the British rule applies in Australia. It examines the Mercantile Bank case (Victoria, 1893), the termination by federal authorities of the proceedings against John Brown in 1929, and evidence provided by federal Cabinet minutes before 1946. It seems that the British rule was not established in Australia before World War II. If Australian Attorneys-General are now regarded as exercising an independent authority, this is probably a case of importing a British convention after it had evolved in the United Kingdom. When the federal Attorney-General, Mr Ellicott, resigned in 1977, both he and the Prime Minister stated that Cabinet should not interfere with decisions to start or discontinue criminal proceedings. It would, however, be premature to regard this as a firmly established convention and it is clear that there were grave differences between Mr Ellicott and his colleagues as to some practical implications of the rule.

In the latter half of 1979 the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea delivered judgment in two cases in which it was called upon to decide a number of issues of fundamental significance to the interpretation of that country’s Constitution. In the course of this litigation, several of the Justices of the Court became embroiled in confrontation with the Government. The potential for such conflict had been foreseen by the makers of the Constitution, who took the view that conflict would be ameliorated if the Court adopted an autochthonous interpretation based on the social philosophy of the Constitution and on its legislative history. This article surveys the legal issues raised in these cases and evaluates the modes of interpretation employed by the Court by contrasting an “absolutist” with a “purposive” mode, with the latter expressing the intention of the Constitution’s makers. It concludes that for the most part the Court adopted the absolutist mode, and that thereby the autochthonous nature of the Constitution has been undermined.

Recently, attention has been drawn to the proliferation in Australia of statutory authorities, which appear to be, to some extent, independent of government control. The Australian Constitution requires responsible government, and this article attempts to determine the extent to which the Constitution permits the establishment of statutory authorities outside the traditional organisational structure of ministerial departments of state, and to what extent such authorities may be independent of ministerial and parliamentary control. On the assumption that responsible government requires some measure of accountability of all parts of the executive government of the Commonwealth, the article examines the extent to which statutory authorities are accountable in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, and also whether any other areas of law, especially administrative law, may provide some measure of accountability of statutory authorities.

Although some concept of a “market” is inherent in all systems of competition law, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) is striking in that it expressly makes liability under most of its substantive sections (sections 45, 46, 47, 49 and 50, but not section 48) depend in one way or another on the identification of a market or markets in which competition has been injured by the impugned conduct. This is because at the time when the Trade Practices Act 1974 came to be drafted, the concepts of market definition and market control had evolved to a high level in other jurisdictions, particularly in the United States.

Now, however, after five years’ experience with market definition under the 1974 Act, the Australian doctrine should have its own contribution to make. It should be rewarding, therefore, to attempt to state the principles that have so far emerged, in light also of cases and writings in the major overseas antitrust systems, those of the European Common Market and the United States. Since market definition often determines the outcome of suits or applications under the Trade Practices Act, these principles have practical as well as conceptual importance.

The author considers whether the Commonwealth can enact “manner and form” legislation, especially provisions enabling the House of Representatives to enact laws which are the subject of a deadlock between the Houses, and legislation entrenching civil liberties. He argues that the legislative power of the Commonwealth has the same properties as that of the United Kingdom Parliament, which can impose “manner and form” limitations on itself; parliamentary supremacy is procedurally self-embracing. Hence, the Commonwealth Parliament can do likewise, except in so far as the Commonwealth Constitution provides to the contrary. The Constitution does prevent Parliament requiring legislation to be enacted by specified majorities in Parliament, or substituting a new legislature for the present Parliament. But the Commonwealth Parliament can enact provisions requiring legislation to be enacted in a specified form, and can establish an additional legislature for the enactment of legislation, including appropriation laws. Such legislation may be enacted pursuant to the procedure in section 57 of the Constitution, and could provide a method of avoiding a Supply crisis like that of 1975.

Economic and technological developments suggest that the Commonwealth will again be pressed to consider the enactment of a scheme to guarantee universally either a minimum income or a job opportunity. In this article, Mr Arup examines the debate over the efficacy of the two guarantees, concentrating upon their structural problems and operational difficulties as these result from doubts about constitutional power. He concludes that support for either guarantee lies in a combination of heads of constitutional power.

In a recent article in this Review Mr Murray-Jones considered the state of the law of inconsistency. Mr Rumble takes issue with some of Mr Murray-Jones' propositions and, in particular, with his interpretation of some of the leading High Court judgments.

Some of the most troubling statements about inconsistency that have emanated from the High Court have been related to the problem of persons who commit both Commonwealth and State offences. This article considers how the provisions of the Crimes Act, the Acts Interpretation Act, the Judiciary Act and the Commonwealth Prisoners Act interact in such circumstances.

The article also offers an analysis of the nature of inconsistency. The basic proposition of the analysis is that, no matter how many different guidelines are developed to indicate the presence of inconsistency, ultimately there is only one category of inconsistency.

The inclusion in legislation of a discretionary power to be exercised by a member of the bureaucracy is nowadays commonplace. Such a discretion is usually open-ended and the basis on which it is to be exercised is spelled out in only the most general terms. To enable the discretionary power to be exercised consistently and in accordance with the intentions of the government, it is customary to find a policy being adopted relating to the manner of exercise of the discretion. This article is concerned with the attitude adopted by courts and tribunals when reviewing governmental action based on a policy relating to a discretion. It will be seen that the courts have moderated an original approach that disapproved of the reliance by decision-makers on policy rulings. Tribunals, on the other hand, and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in particular, will be shown to have rejected constraints that may have been thought to have been placed upon them by governmental policy statements.

Taxation law — Principles of interpretation of tax Acts — Form and substance — Partnerships — Change in ownership — Disposals other than in the ordinary course of business — Election by partnership to value trading stock at cost price — Dividend stripping — Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) — Ss. 36, 36A

Administrative law — Environmental law — Standing to sue — Corporation — Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals Act) 1974 (Cth) — Violation of public right — Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council

Custody — Parents equally suitable custodians — Is there a presumption that a young girl should be left in the custody of her mother — Position and role of appellate court in custody proceedings — Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) — Ss. 43(c), 64(1)(a), (2)

Several recent cases in Australia have raised once again the recurrent historical problem of marriages of convenience. A “marriage of convenience”, or “sham marriage”, or “limited purpose marriage” occurs when a man and a woman enter a full status legal marriage and yet at that time one or both of them do not intend to fulfil some or all of the important legal and social duties culturally expected of a normal marriage. That is, although the parties consent to the ceremony or commencement of the marriage, they do not fully consent to its cultural and legal functions. Examples include marriages where at the time of the ceremony one or both parties have reservations about sexual intercourse, cohabitation, procreation, or intend to marry solely or predominantly for the purposes of satisfying immigration or emigration laws, acquiring money, Tertiary Education Assistance Scheme grants or minimising taxation.

Constitutional law—Applicability of Imperial law in Australia—Whether Merchant Shipping Act 1894-1900 (U.K.) extends to South Australia—Whether U.K. Act applies to the Crown of its own force or by virtue of Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) — Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (U.K.) Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act 1900 (U.K.) — Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Administrative law — Administrative Appeals Tribunal — Function of Tribunal in relation to ministerial policy — Application of ministerial policy — Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

This article will examine the divergence between law and practice in criminal investigation by police and consider the degree to which it may contribute to an imbalance between the interests of the individual and the public interest in the efficient detection and investigation of crime. It will be argued that the imprecision of the existing law and the failure by the legislature to accord new, tightlydefined, specific-purpose powers to the police have made a major contribution to the pressure on police to misuse existing (and often more intrusive) powers or to exercise de facto powers not authorised by law. It is contended that this pressure often arises from a desire by police to find a more practical means of attaining agreed community objectives than that provided by the artificial standards of the existing law. A strong case can therefore be advanced in favour of refurbishing police powers to accord (more closely) with present conditions, while at the same time strengthening the safeguards cast around those powers. This article will argue that case.