The author considers whether the Commonwealth can enact “manner and form” legislation, especially provisions enabling the House of Representatives to enact laws which are the subject of a deadlock between the Houses, and legislation entrenching civil liberties. He argues that the legislative power of the Commonwealth has the same properties as that of the United Kingdom Parliament, which can impose “manner and form” limitations on itself; parliamentary supremacy is procedurally self-embracing. Hence, the Commonwealth Parliament can do likewise, except in so far as the Commonwealth Constitution provides to the contrary. The Constitution does prevent Parliament requiring legislation to be enacted by specified majorities in Parliament, or substituting a new legislature for the present Parliament. But the Commonwealth Parliament can enact provisions requiring legislation to be enacted in a specified form, and can establish an additional legislature for the enactment of legislation, including appropriation laws. Such legislation may be enacted pursuant to the procedure in section 57 of the Constitution, and could provide a method of avoiding a Supply crisis like that of 1975.