We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The events leading up to the sixth double dissolution of the Commonwealth Parliament on 2 June 1987 and the subsequent abandonment of the Australia Card Bill 1986 highlight the difficulties any Federal Government faces when negotiating the passage of controversial legislation through a hostile Senate.
In the light of the legislative history of the Australia Card Bill, I propose to discuss the requirement of “identical bills” in s 57 of the Constitution, the amendments which ajoint sitting may consider and finally, the disallowance of regulations by the Senate with reference to s 57.
Several recent cases in Australia have raised once again the recurrent historical problem of marriages of convenience. A “marriage of convenience”, or “sham marriage”, or “limited purpose marriage” occurs when a man and a woman enter a full status legal marriage and yet at that time one or both of them do not intend to fulfil some or all of the important legal and social duties culturally expected of a normal marriage. That is, although the parties consent to the ceremony or commencement of the marriage, they do not fully consent to its cultural and legal functions. Examples include marriages where at the time of the ceremony one or both parties have reservations about sexual intercourse, cohabitation, procreation, or intend to marry solely or predominantly for the purposes of satisfying immigration or emigration laws, acquiring money, Tertiary Education Assistance Scheme grants or minimising taxation.
Probably the most basic contemporary controversy over the interpretation of the Australian Constitution is that between the methodologies of originalism (or intentionalism) and progressivism. According to the first, the fundamental task of the Courts (and especially the High Court) usually is regarded as being to interpret the Constitution so as to give effect to the intentions of those who framed it at the great Conventions of the 1890s, commonly referred to as 'the Founding Fathers' or (as here) 'the Founders'. Progressivists, on the other hand, believe that a search for historical intention is at best incidental in the process of constitutional interpretation, and that the Court should construe the Constitution so as to bring it into accord with modern needs and exigencies. Between the two sides in this fiercely contested debate stretches a vast chasm both of theoretical approach and rhetoric. A third approach, literalism, despite a hallowed history in Australian constitutional law and its routine deployment in virtually all important cases concerning federal legislative power, today largely is overshadowed in the minds of constitutional lawyers by the fascinations of its two rivals.
This is the sixth in the annual Menzies Lecture Series. This lecture was delivered at the Australian National University in October 1990.
The allocation of war powers between the President and Congress under the Constitution of the United States and the problems that have flowed therefrom for two centuries, are subjects perhaps too remote to inflict upon an Australian audience. Nevertheless, I do so, mindful that the vast nuclear capability of my country, as well as its present deployment of significant forces on land and sea in much of a shrunken world, make decisions of war and peace by the United States a matter of some concern for those living beyond its geographic boundaries, and throughout this planet.
We examine the generalizability of single-topic studies, focusing on how often their confidence intervals capture the typical treatment effect from a larger population of possible studies. We show that the confidence intervals from these single-topic studies capture the typical effect from a population of topics at well below the nominal rate. For a plausible scenario, the confidence interval from a single-topic study might only be half as wide as an interval that captures the typical effect at the nominal rate. We highlight three important conclusions. First, we emphasize that researchers and readers must take care when generalizing the inferences from single-topic studies to a larger population of possible studies. Second, we demonstrate the critical importance of similarity across topics in drawing inferences and encourage researchers to consider designs that explicitly estimate and leverage similarity. Third, we emphasize that, despite their limitations, single-topic experiments have some important advantages.
From the time of the Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac 1, c 3 ('Statute of Monopolies’), the flexible concept of a ‘manner of manufacture’ was understood to involve some form of limitation which was expressed in the statute as being ‘mischievous to the State … or hurt of trade, or generallie inconvenient'. Years of judicial consideration resulted in various classes of subject matter being carved out as unpatentable. Apart from non-contentious material such as discoveries, ideas and principles of nature, these classes included methods of medical treatment for humans, horticultural and agricultural methods, computer programs, presentations of information, plans and business schemes. The classes were relatively clear by 1959 when the High Court in National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents was asked to judge the patentability of an invention in an excluded class, namely a horticultural method. The trouble was that there were no consistent rationales to justify the excluded classes and to distinguish patentable from non-patentable subject matter.
This article reports on the use of enforceable undertakings by the Australian employment standards enforcement agency, the Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO), and its predecessor, the Workplace Ombudsman. Enforceable undertakings are used by the FWO as an alternative enforcement tool to court litigation in relation to breaches of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), which regulates wages, working hours and other minimum employment conditions. Proponents of enforceable undertakings argue that they deliver value to regulatory agencies as a responsive alternative to traditional, punitive enforcement action. On the other hand, critics have raised concerns about the accountability and effectiveness of this enforcement tool. The authors provide a critical analysis of the FWO's use of enforceable undertakings, including consideration of the decision-making process, content, monitoring and enforcement of undertakings. The analysis is based on a review of all enforceable undertakings concluded in the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2012, as well as qualitative interviews with approximately 60 inspectors, managers and lawyers of the FWO, and a number of specialist workplace relations lawyers. The article reveals that the FWO has made limited but promising use of enforceable undertakings in the review period. Through deployment of enforceable undertakings, the FWO has demonstrated that it has a mix of regulatory approaches available to it that are consistent with the key principles of responsive regulation. The number of enforceable undertakings accepted by the FWO, however, remains fairly limited. We set out a number of ways in which the regulator may maximise the utilisation of enforceable undertakings, and more fully realise the regulatory benefits of this particular compliance tool.
The power of the Commonwealth Parliament to authorise involuntary detention (that is, detention without the consent of the detainee) by the executive government has fallen for consideration by the High Court in a series of recent cases. The Court has also examined the circumstances in which courts may make orders for detention. The aim of this article is to discuss some of the issues which have arisen in these cases, including those over which there has been apparent disagreement between the Justices of the High Court. It argues for a conceptually coherent approach to detention, which favours substance over form while giving effect to the strict separation of judicial power from legislative and executive power required by the Commonwealth Constitution.
International arbitration is an important area of federal jurisdiction and federal legislative competence, and has attracted significant policy attention in Australia. This paper undertakes a study of pro-arbitration judicial policy in recent arbitration-related Australian case law which touches upon the continuing applicability of the controversial 1999 Eisenwerk decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal. Against this pro-arbitration judicial policy context, this paper reviews five Eisenwerk-related cases handed down between 2010 and 2012. It concludes that despite pro-arbitration judicial policy being embedded as a requirement of reasoning in decisions under the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), there is mixed evidence of such policy in the cases surveyed. This paper concludes that the extent to which this policy is evidenced largely corresponds with the degree to which contemporary decisions have departed from Eisenwerk.