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Describes the rationale for economic regulators and discusses the historical development of these institutions . Also discusses co-regulatory arrangements and the question of regulatory oversight
Supersymmetry can be given a geometric interpretation using superspace, a manifold obtained by adding four fermionic coordinates to the usual bosonic spacetime coordinates . Points in superspace are labeled by coordinates
This chapter complements Chapter 3 in Government Accountability: Australian Administrative Law, third edition, which investigates the various classes of executive power, both statutory and non-statutory. The vast majority of executive power is conferred by statute. The extracts emphasise the importance of statutory interpretation when establishing the scope of express and implied powers. The final two extracts consider prerogative power.
Discusses the regulatory principles for access pricing and for regulating multi-sided markets. Considers how access pricing affects investment, and the merits of vertical and horizontal separation
Discusses alternatives to traditional economic regulation, including competition for the market, contestability, state ownership, reliance on competition law, deregulation and negotiated agreements
Sets out principles for the regulation of the natural monopolistic (core network) activities of an industry, including marginal cost, average cost, peak load and Ramsey pricing
This chapter complements Chapter 9 of Government Accountability: Australian Administrative Law, third edition. It introduces the concepts of statutory appeal on questions of law, statutory construction, and judicial review. The sources set out the framework for judicial review at state and Commonwealth level. The sources consider the foundations of the courts’ jurisdiction to review the decision-making processes of inferior courts and the executive government, and the concepts of jurisdictional error and error of law on the face of the record.
This chapter complements Chapter 4 of Government Accountability: Australian Administrative Law, third edition. The chapter contains several case extracts on the issue of judicial review of delegated legislation. However, judicial review cases provide only a small part of the picture of the practical and substantive issues surrounding delegated legislation. The other material in this chapter fills in the picture. An extract from the Australian Law Reform Commission’s report, Traditional Rights and Freedoms, highlights the problems with over¬reliance on delegated, rather than primary, legislation. A case study of delegated legislation being disallowed has been included to show how the process of parliamentary scrutiny works.
This chapter complements Chapter 15 of Government Accountability: Australian Administrative Law, third edition. If an applicant is entitled to judicial review and successfully argues one or more grounds, what is the outcome? When judicial review is successful, the government action or decision that has been challenged will have been found to be unlawful. The sources in this chapter consider the consequences that flow from that finding, and the remedies that may be available.
In this chapter we will describe the construction of supersymmetric Lagrangians. Our aim is to arrive at a recipe that will allow us to write down the allowed interactions and mass terms of a general supersymmetric theory, so that later we can apply the results to the special case of the MSSM. However, we will not use the superfield language in this chapter, which is often more elegant and efficient for many purposes, but requires a more specialized machinery and might seem rather cabalistic at first.
Describes the rationale for, and approach to, regulation of the telecommunications industry. Considers the effects of restructuring policies, net neutraility, and investment in next-generation networks
This chapter complements Chapter 7 of Government Accountability: Australia Administrative Law, third edition. An important point is that merits review is a creature of statute. The availability of merits review, the authority responsible for conducting review, the nature of review, the process to be followed and the remedies available in a given case can only be determined by careful examination of the relevant statutory provisions. For this reason, this chapter is not a collection of canonical authorities on merits review; few, if any, such authorities exist. The first two sections of this chapter provide government perspectives on the need for, aims of, and potential drawbacks of, merits review. The third section consists of two case studies of merits review. These cases are chosen to show how a merits review application might proceed; how merits review arguments are constructed; and the possible outcomes of merits review.
In , we have found a general recipe for constructing Lagrangians for softly broken supersymmetric theories. We are now ready to apply these general results to the MSSM. The particle content for the MSSM was described in . In this chapter we will complete the model by specifying the superpotential and the soft supersymmetry-breaking terms.