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This chapter complements Chapter 13 of Government Accountability: Australian Administrative Law, third edition. The cases extracted in this chapter illustrate the operation of limits on power that can be discerned from the statute conferring the power: misconceiving the nature or scope of the power, jurisdictional facts (both objective and subjective), procedural error, improper delegation, and mandatory and prohibited considerations. The cases in this chapter are worth studying both for their exposition of legal principles, and for the application of those principles to the facts. O’Reilly v Commissioners of the State Bank of Victoria, for example, is not only the leading Australian case on improper delegation, but also an excellent example of the reasoning process used to determine whether delegation is permissible in a particular situation. With one exception, the cases in this chapter are decisions of the High Court of Australia. The exception is Liversidge v Anderson – which is included because Lord Atkin’s dissenting judgment is one of the most celebrated administrative law judgments.
Describes the rationale for, and approach to, regulation of payments systems. Considers the interchange fee regulation, and scope for competition between card and interbank systems
In this chapter, we devise a set of Feynman rules to describe matrix elements of processes involving spin-1/2 fermions. The rules are developed for two-component fermions and are then applied to tree-level decay and scattering processes and the fermion self-energy functions in the one-loop approximation.
Describes the rationale for, and approach to, regulation of the electricity industry. Considers the effects of decarbonisation policies and restructuring policies on wholesale and retail competition
Describes the rationale for, and approach to, regulation of the gas industry. Considers the effects of restructuring policies on security of supply and prices, and new hydrogen networks
In this chapter, we present example Feynman diagrammatic calculations of supersymmetric decay and scattering processes, employing the two-component fermion techniques developed in . We present the first calculations in some detail to get the reader acquainted with the technical details.
In this chapter, we present example one-loop Feynman diagrammatic calculations in the Standard Model and MSSM, employing the two-component fermion techniques developed in Chapter 2.
Despite the inherent beauty of supersymmetric field theories, we know that supersymmetry cannot be an exact symmetry of Nature. The observed spectrum of fundamental particles does not consist of mass-degenerate supermultiplets. Hence, supersymmetry must be broken. In this chapter, we shall discuss how supersymmetry (SUSY) breaking can arise.
Examines different forms of price regulation, including rate of return regulation, incentive regulation (such as price cap regulation), yardstick competition and earnings sharing mechanisms
This chapter complements Chapter 10 of Government Accountability: Australian Administrative Law, third edition. The supervisory role of the courts is powerful and constitutionally entrenched. However, any system that enables one arm of government to supervise the actions of another requires a certain level of restraint to balance the separate powers appropriately. The exclusions built into the statutory judicial review schemes and the focus in common law and constitutional judicial review cases upon jurisdictional error impose limitations on the scope of judicial review. This chapter considers further limits on judicial review, specifically justiciability, standing, and attempts by parliament to impose statutory limits.