INTRODUCTION

In July 2019, the Malaysian Parliament passed a constitutional amendment to lower the voting age from 21 to 18 years. Known as Undi18, this legal reform symbolized the recognition of the youth's voice in shaping the nation's future (Azril 2019). This amendment, which also included automatic voter registration, was met with resounding bipartisan support, passing with a rare unanimous endorsement.

Undi18 was a long-awaited opportunity for political empowerment and active citizenship among the young. A resurgence of youth-led activism (Karunungan 2021) saw young Malaysians becoming more vocal and engaged in political discourse, with various youth-led movements and NGOs leading awareness campaigns to educate young voters about their rights and the importance of informed voting (Loheswar 2021; Weiss 2022). This upsurge in political awareness also led to increased scrutiny and expectations from political parties, who were prompted to address the concerns of this new voter demographic. The parties soon felt compelled to recalibrate their strategies and manifestos to appeal to younger voters, especially via social media (The Star, 7 August 2023).

This energetic participation by Malaysian youths may have ushered in a new era of political engagement and reform, though it is not certain in what shape or form.

Youth-led activism in Malaysia dates from the early years of the nation. The 1960s through to the 1980s marked a significant period of youth activism. University students became highly involved in protests that targeted prevailing social and political issues, with movements such as the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, ABIM) playing a prominent role. Other campus organizations that integrated Islamic principles with modern governance and social welfare were the Islamic Republic and Darul Arqam, while Jamaat Tabligh was involved in grassroots religious rejuvenation through personal outreach and communal religious activities (Zainah 1987). In addition to student youth movements, some Islamic revivalism in Malaysia partly resulted from dakwah (Islamic missionary) activities that sought to rekindle Islamic identity and piety among Malaysian youths outside of academic settings. In a similar vein, the conservative turn among Malay youths today stems from activities outside of university campuses.

In the late 1990s, the Reformasi movement surged, bolstered by a substantial contribution from the youth. This period was characterized by a vigorous outcry against corruption and a strong push for political reforms. Despite government suppression, Malaysian civil society rose as a pivotal force in socio-political activism thanks in no small part to initiatives such as Bersih, which campaigned for free and fair elections. The 2010s saw the continuation of this trend, with the political engagement of Malaysian youths diversifying and intensifying, especially during the premiership of Najib Razak which saw increasing awareness of corruption issues. Youth activists leveraged various platforms, including social media, to champion their initiatives—a notable example being the Undi18 movement.

INTRODUCTION

Since Operation 1027, Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs) and other armed groups have made significant territorial gains. They now control most of Myanmar's key border trade posts and overland trade routes. This includes Myawaddy, which has traditionally been Myanmar's second largest border trade post and the largest on the Thai-Myanmar border.

They also control Chin Shwe Haw, Myanmar's third-largest border trade crossing before the coup and the second-largest on the Myanmar-China border, after Muse. Resistance groups also control significant parts of the Mandalay-Muse, Mandalay-Chin Shwe Haw, and Myawaddy-Yangon corridors. They also control significant territory—especially along the country's international borders—where people depend on and regularly engage in local cross-border trade.

However, despite controlling territory and trade routes, Myanmar's resistance faces an uphill battle in turning conflict victories into trade-related gains that enhance their legitimacy and aid their people. Internationally, non-state groups struggle to access and benefit from the formal trading system, which is designed around states and governed by state-to-state and multilateral agreements. In Myanmar, the State Administration Council (SAC) continues to control the state institutions that facilitate formal trade, even as it loses physical control over trade routes and border crossings. As such, non-state groups generally do not have the option to facilitate formal, legal trade. This has numerous implications, including negatively affecting the livelihoods of people living in their territories, who face higher costs for logistics—including facilitation fees and limits on market access. This can hinder the development of long-run competitiveness, and also shape factors such as migration and even the direction of conflict. In short, the inability to access formal trade is a significant and durable drag on development.

International precedents show that non-state actors have limited success accessing the international trading system. Case studies show the potential and limitations of non-state actors developing their own trade-related institutions. These suggest that there are possible avenues that Myanmar's resistance actors could pursue in order to build up their traderelated influence. There are also clear incentives for neighbours—especially Thailand—to consider trade-related engagement with resistance actors. If Myanmar's resistance can find ways to diminish the benefits the SAC enjoys by controlling the institutions of trade, it could help them further erode the military's access to revenues while also benefitting people living in some resistance-controlled areas.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

Keywords: 2022 elections; Duterte; Marcos Jr.; electoral reform; COMELEC

Introduction: The Reform Momentum and Missed Opportunities

Elections in the Philippines are free but not necessarily fair or competitive. The rising number of dynastic families in Congress and across different positions in local government has led to categorizations of “obese”, “fat”, and “thin” dynasties. The rising cost of election campaigns favours incumbents with access to the patronage that flows from national political elites down to significant local political players. In the 2022 elections, the ad campaign spending of individual candidates in mainstream media amounted to PHP 1 billion within forty-five days of the ninety-day campaign period. Election, originally meant to provide a change in leadership, is a continuity tool in the Philippines.

Political families have such a grip on the Philippine political landscape that the country volleys from democracy-good governance nostalgia to authoritarian nostalgia. In 2010 with the election of Benigno Simeon “Noynoy” Aquino III (PNoy) to the presidency, the public pined for good governance, especially after the death of democracy icon Corazon Aquino. Filipino voters in 2010 successfully catapulted a reluctant presidential candidate Noynoy Aquino to Malacañang riding on the coattails of the passing of his democracy icon mother. The election of PNoy raised hopes that reforms, especially in the political and electoral arena, would accelerate. In 2022 with the election of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., there was authoritarian nostalgia for the authoritarian leadership of Marcos Sr. It was a triumphant return to Malacañang of the namesake of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.

Keywords: social media; disinformation; fact-checking; tsek.ph; 2022 Elections

Introduction

On his 78th birthday on 28 March 2023, the former president Rodrigo Duterte received a fawning compliment from his successor, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. “Happy birthday to you, Mr. President. I now understand why sometimes, you would cuss when you were still president”, said Marcos, the namesake and son of a former dictator.

Many newspapers and partisan blog sites reported the greeting felicitously, as if never wanting to pass off the chance of driving traffic to their websites through feel-good news or turning Marcos's inadequacies to his gain. However, the online news site Rappler offered a context for Duterte's aggressive speech habit, which defined his six-year term as president and whose politics portends a Marcos comeback. I argue that Duterte's playbook of hate speech and disinformation left the country's democratic traditions frayed and made it easy for Marcos's historical revisionism—about his father's martial law, dictatorship, and plunder—to mislead voters in the May 2022 elections. Thanks to Duterte's endorsement of Marcos's authoritarian rule, Marcos Jr. was elected president on a disinformation platform seeking to rehabilitate the legacy of his father who was ousted by the 1986 People Power uprising.

Keywords: South China Sea; Duterte; foreign policy; pivot to China; information campaigns

Introduction

Based on current values from the World Bank, the Philippines’ total population is estimated at 113 million as of 2021. Of this number, 85 million are Internet users at the start of 2023, 84 million of whom use social media. These numbers reveal that a vast percentage of the population is active on social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, and spend an average of more than three hours online daily. Facebook alone has about 80 million users in the Philippines, making it the platform of choice for communication, information, and commerce. Social media use in the Philippines has been so pervasive that it became a mobilizing factor in the last two national elections. In fact, President Rodrigo Duterte relied heavily on social media to magnify his strongman stance during the 2016 elections. He declared in a press conference, “I will ask the Navy to bring me to the nearest point in [the] South China Sea that is tolerable to them, and I will ride a jet ski. I will carry a flag, and when I reach [the] Spratlys, I will erect the Filipino flag. I will tell [China], suntukan o barilan (fistfight or gunfight)?” Running on a platform of purging the country of illegal drugs and criminality, he also vowed to solve these perennial problems within six months of his holding office. When the United States and other Western countries criticized his war on drugs, he called President Barack Obama a “son of a whore” for raising human rights concerns with him. Meanwhile, the 2022 elections that led to the victory of Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., the son of the former dictator and his namesake, tapped into TikTok, YouTube, and messaging apps like Facebook Messenger and Viber.

Keywords: migration governance, institutional reproduction, crisis, critical junctures, Philippines labour migration

Introduction

The Philippines has long been regarded as one of the major sources of migrants across the globe. In 1997, the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) estimated the number of Filipinos residing and working abroad at 6,974,065 in 193 countries, and in 2007, there were 7,754,263 Filipinos overseas or almost 9 per cent of the total Filipino population. This aggregate which includes permanent, temporary, and irregular migrants, and sea-based workers consistently increased to 10,238,614 in 2013. Consequently, the Philippines has become one of the most significant origin countries. In the World Migration Reports of the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) from 2000 to 2022, the Philippines was placed between 4th and 9th in the largest sources of migrants in the world. It has also been positioned as a major remittancerecipient country together with China, India, and Mexico (ibid.). The Philippines has continuously been the recipient of one of the largest shares of remittance from US$5.4 billion in 1995 to US$13.7 billion in 2005 and US$29.8 billion in 2015. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the remittances received by the Philippines peaked at US$33.47 billion. In 2020, both the personal remittances and cash remittances had a slight drop to US$33.19 billion from US$33.47 billion and to US$29.90 billion from US$30.13 billion, respectively (ibid.). There was a small dip in the remittance inflow between January and October 2020 at –0.9 per cent compared to the same period in 2019. However, in 2021 and 2022, personal remittances peaked again at US$34.89 billion and US$36.13 billion.