The year 2019 was potentially the most important one in Malaysia's political history since the creation of the Federation in 1963. While the historic change in government which ended the sixty-year reign of the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition government the previous year was indeed momentous, the transition of power would have far less meaning if the promises of broader national transformation are not fulfilled by the new Pakatan Harapan (PH) government led by former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad. PH's 194-page Buku Harapan (“book of hope”) manifesto included sixty pledges, from reforming the Anti-Corruption Commission to ensuring “transparency and robustness of our election system”, along with promises to “abolish oppressive laws” and “enhance the transparency and integrity of the budget and budgeting process”. Other bold promises included the “decentralisation of power to Sabah and Sarawak”, “making government schools the best choice for its people” and for Malaysia to “lead efforts to resolve the Rohingya and Palestine crises.”

It would be easy, then, to highlight the various unfulfilled promises of the manifesto in order to determine 2019 as an abject disappointment for the fledgling PH government. Indeed, it has become a well-worn path for many analysts to measure the new government against its manifesto pledges, especially after the first hundred days of the PH administration and the one-year anniversary of its electoral victory. The slow pace of reform is not only limited to the political sector. The economy remains buffeted by stock outflows and a weak ringgit as global funds signalled their concerns about the lack of reforms. Elina Noor has written that while Malaysia “faced myriad challenges” in terms of foreign and security policies, “not much is likely to change” under Mahathir's “new Malaysia”. There has also been no major reform of education at any level, no progress on promises of decentralization, and only limited attempts to address the issues relating to the Orang Asli (indigenous peoples). Many Malaysians have thus become despondent when discussing national politics in 2019, including those who were initially part of the reform process themselves. Opinion polls throughout the year from the Merdeka Centre (Figure 1) reflect the growing public disappointment with the PH government. In the face of these criticisms, senior PH politicians have spent much of the year defending their track record.

According to the Constitution of Myanmar, a general election is to be held every five years in order to elect parliamentarians to the two legislative chambers, the lower house (Pyithu Hluttaw, or house of representative) and the upper house (Amyotha Hluttaw, or house of nationalities). Twenty-five per cent of the seats in both houses are reserved for military-appointed representatives. After parliamentary elections, the lower and upper houses will sit together in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Assembly of the Union) to serve as an electoral college for the presidential election.

The coming general election in 2020 will be an important milestone for Myanmar. The elections in 2010 brought about the “Myanmar Spring” under President Thein Sein, while the 2015 elections witnessed Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) coming to power. The 2015 general election marked the very first peaceful transfer of power from one elected government to another since the country gained independence from the British in 1948. The year 2015 was also the first time Aung San Suu Kyi and her party were able to form the government since winning the election in 1990.

In the three years since assuming power, the NLD government has introduced reforms of the economy, banking and finance; implemented a crackdown on corruption; and initiated the 21st Century Panglong Conference, a new peace process aimed at settling the country's various ethnic insurgencies. However, these efforts have been overshadowed by an economic slowdown, the Rohingya crisis and a lack of progress in the peace process. In particular, the failure of the reforms to translate into tangible benefits at the grass-roots level has led many people to feel that the NLD government has under-delivered on expectations.

The upcoming general election in 2020 will be the first electoral test for the NLD government. It will also be a judgement of Aung San Suu Kyi's leadership and legacy. Meanwhile, the opposition parties in Myanmar have sought to capitalize on voter dissatisfaction with the NLD's performance in government. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which lost power in the 2015 elections, has been reorganizing itself and replacing its old generation of party leaders, including former President Thein Sein.

On 29 December 2018, Prime Minister Hun Sen presided over the inauguration of the Win-Win Monument, constructed on the outskirts of Phnom Penh to commemorate the end of civil war in Cambodia some twenty years ago when the Khmer Rouge was finally defeated in 1998. Achieving total peace is a source of pride for Prime Minister Hun Sen, signalling his triumph over the neoliberal global order, especially since even the United Nations (UN) failed in this task, despite the mission's expensive price tag. The ceremony was also a testimony to the pre-eminence of the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) following the dissolution of the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) and the party's comprehensive victory in the 2018 general elections that transformed Cambodia into a de facto one-party state. In many ways, Prime Minister Hun Sen and the CPP have reasons to be proud of Cambodia's achievements. The economy continued to expand sustainably at a rate of around seven per cent, elevating Cambodia to one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Its international geopolitical position has also been strengthened with the political and economic support of China. However, despite these successes, the CPP faces challenges to its legitimacy, both on the international and domestic fronts, as it embarks on further power consolidation. This chapter analyses the CPP's successes and challenges in 2019 in the domains of politics, economics and foreign affairs. The first section will discuss the domestic political developments surrounding Sam Rainsy's attempt to return from self-imposed exile and the reactions of the Cambodian government. The second section will address economic developments in 2019 as well as possible future trends. The third section will discuss Cambodia's external relations, particularly Western concerns over its recent democratic regression and its bilateral relations with China and Vietnam.

Politics

The CPP's electoral victories since the UN-organized elections in 1993 have occurred largely because of the divisions within the opposition camp. The merger between the Sam Rainsy Party and the Human Rights Party into the CNRP had initially posed an electoral challenge to the CPP, as evidenced by the former's strong performance in both rural and urban areas in the 2013 general election and the 2017 local elections.

What happened in Thailand throughout 2019 was different from anything that had gone before in contemporary Thai politics. Prior to the March general election there were many questions. Was the election going to happen, and, if it was, what were the results going to be? The process leading up to the election was also intriguing. On the one hand, there were many new political parties. On the other hand, politicians faced many challenges and constraints caused by the promilitary constitution introduced in 2017.

The result of the election was even more startling. It saw the decline of the urban middle-class Democrats, the oldest party in Thailand, as well as the rural mass-based Pheu Thai, the latest incarnation of Thaksin-inspired parties, which had won every election this century. The election also witnessed the emergence of the “new kids in town”: Future Forward and Palang Pracharat. The latter was a pro-military party that recruited from the ranks of existing politicians with existing patronage networks. Palang Pracharat nominated General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the leader of the 2014 coup and head of the junta, as its choice of prime minister. Even though Palang Pracharat was only the second-largest party in parliament, Prayut was still voted by a joint sitting of the House of Representatives and the military-appointed Senate to be the prime minister. Palang Pracharat also managed to form a coalition government of nineteen political parties to hold a slim parliamentary majority of 254 out of 500 seats, confronting an opposition bloc of seven political parties with 246 parliamentary seats. Given the economic downturn, strained relations with Western democracies, and the rise of a popular opposition in the form of Future Forward, the government was expected to be vulnerable and short-lived. But, after more than half a year, the pro-junta government has successfully maintained its upper hand, taming its medium- and small-sized coalition partners and suppressing the opposition. There have so far been no robust challenges to the pro-military government.

Peculiar Pre-election Conditions

In the decade following the 1992 democratic transition, Thailand was considered one of the most democratic countries in Southeast Asia. The subsequent campaign for reform led to the 1997 constitution, one of the most democratic in Thai political history. After this came two overwhelming electoral victories of Thai Rak Thai (“Thai Love Thai”), a new party led by Thaksin Shinawatra that was popular among the rural poor.

The decline of America's relative strategic and economic power is reflected in adjustments to its global policy and strategy. This has in fact been apparent since the Obama administration's unwillingness to become involved in the Syrian conflict, and its calls for “burden sharing” and more partnerships. The tendency towards retrenchment has continued under the Trump administration, with officials seeking to review foreign involvement with the question “What is in it for us?” and seeking ways out of the conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan as the country tries to focus on the Indo-Pacific region.

American primacy after World War II was a historical anomaly brought about by very special circumstances of the post-war world. For many years before World War II the United States relied on a balance-of-power strategy to secure its interests in Asia, often in a multipolar geopolitical setting. This is the likely direction for the future. It is not clear yet what form a balance-of-power strategy will take in the Indo-Pacific. Alliances, partnerships and “burden sharing” will be important elements.

This chapter first addresses the big change in US foreign policy—in particular, policy towards China—during the Trump administration. It describes the mood in US policy circles as well as in the wider foreign policy community towards China and President Trump's role, which is not always in tandem with that of the relevant bureaucracies and Congress. It then goes on to examine the policy towards Southeast Asia, the region's importance to US interests, the current US “influence deficiency” in Southeast Asia and the prospects of the United States augmenting its influence and standing. Finally, there is a section making some concluding observations.

The New Turn in US Foreign Policy

A new phase in US foreign policy has begun, propelled mainly by three factors. First, the hubris and overreach during the immediate post–Cold War period, correctly seen in hindsight as a “unipolar moment”, led to wasteful and costly wars in the Middle East. Second, domestic policy failures to cope with the negative effects of globalization resulted in significant damage to US manufacturing industries and sections of the white working class. The global financial crisis of 2008–9 only accentuated the economic distress.

Since it came to power in March 2016 after winning in a 2015 election landslide, 2019 has perhaps been the most problematic year thus far for Myanmar's National League for Democracy (NLD) government. The long-standing Rakhine issue, the initiation of a parliamentary constitutional reform process, and early election fever are some of the key developments to have dominated Myanmar's political attention in 2019. These high-level political events, mainly involving the executive and legislative branches, were accompanied by growing public distrust in the judiciary and the police. All these factors posed challenges for Myanmar in 2019, with considerable implications on the country's domestic and international fronts. Economically, Myanmar was working quite well, though some challenges remain.

The Rakhine Problem: Domestic and International Aspects

The Dual Rakhine Problem

Until early 2019, the “Rakhine problem”, both within and outside Myanmar, was almost exclusively Rohingya-centric. Before the eruption of inter-communal violence in Rakhine State in 2012, the problem had not been envisaged as a Rakhine problem. The issue was merely referred to as the “Rohingya problem”, “conundrum” or “crisis”. After the 1990s, the Rohingya problem was framed internationally as an insurmountable crisis of forced migration and statelessness. Following the first and second Rohingya mass exoduses in 1978 and 1991–92, the Rohingya problem was respectively constructed by the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government (1974–88) and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) government (1988–97) as a colossal problem of (illegal) colonial migration, armed insurgency, and secession.

The dominant issue among Rakhine affairs remained the Rohingya problem, even after the outbreak of inter-communal violent and non-violent conflicts between Rohingya/non-Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists from 2012 onwards, the emergence of a Rohingya “insurgency” led by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) from 2016 onwards, and the third Rohingya mass exodus from August 2017 onwards. These new problems have added two more layers to the Rohingya problem. First is the internal displacement of more than 100,000 Muslims in camps in Rakhine state. Second is a new protracted refugee situation that saw 909,000 Rohingyas being stranded in camps in Bangladesh as of March 2019, after about 745,000 Rohingyas fled following the Myanmar military's “clearance operation” in response to the ARSA attacks in August 2017.

While the year saw some venting of concern at official corruption in the National Assembly, remarkable in itself, it is rent-seeking activities that define the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) party-state. A market economy operating under a Leninist system, events in 2019 did not detract from the general trajectory of a state hell-bent on prioritizing major projects such as hydro-electricity generating dams and the Chinese-built railroad, moving heaven and earth on the Mekong River, whatever the social and ecological consequences locally or downstream. But the practice of issuing licences and concessions for casinos and/ or agribusiness ventures also creates market distortions. Drought, disease and human dislocation stemming from mega projects or disasters (as with the 2018 dam collapse in Attapeu Province), land alienation and compensation issues all came to national and/or international attention during the year. Various serious human rights cases, including disappearances, suggest the longevity of the Lao PDR authoritarian developmental model, one that brooks no domestic challenge or even external scrutiny.

Governance

Typically, draft laws and amendments to laws are discussed at monthly sessions of the nation's National Assembly, which is invariably chaired by the prime minister. Notably, at the 7th Ordinary Session of the Assembly's 8th legislature held in Vientiane on 23–24 July in the presence of National Assembly president Mrs Pany Yathortou, Lao PDR president Bounnhang Vorachit, and other party and government leaders, Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith called for the sectors responsible to shoulder more responsibility in finding solutions to six pressing issues that were seen as affecting socio-economic development. The first major issue was an outbreak of dengue fever, which had claimed 37 lives and saw at least 16,690 people falling sick. The second topic was an epidemic of African swine fever. Third on the list was the infestation of sweetcorn crops by a plague of caterpillars in Xayaboury Province, which had destroyed 30 per cent of 35,000 hectares of the crop. The fourth issue concerned persistent drought, which resulted in low river levels and affected rice and other crops. The fifth matter of concern was the fluctuating exchange rate, the falling value of the national currency, the kip, and the depletion of foreign-exchange reserves, seen as driving up commodity import prices and hindering economic growth. The sixth issue related to posts on social media by members of the public commenting negatively on state administration and management.

It was generally a busy year for Brunei Darussalam in 2019 as it continued to focus on developmental issues while experiencing peace and political stability. Recurring concerns for the economy and administration surfaced periodically in line with fresh assessments towards the one major national goal—Wawasan 2035 (Brunei Vision 2035). Except for intense but short-lived global attention on its syariah system of jurisprudence, Brunei's domestic affairs were not of much concern for foreign observers. The effects of the preceding years’ reduced income from the country's hydrocarbon exports were still felt by the domestic economy, although global prices for oil had moderately improved in early 2019. Any increase in prices for the period under study was only speculative given the uncertainty of global economic trends. Increasing down-stream hydrocarbon activities provided diversification, while improved productive capacities in agriculture and agroindustry were sought. The recurring national concerns had familiar undertones—except that relevant policymakers appeared more committed to advancing the social and economic development of the state—with frequent admonishment from the Head of State and Government, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah.

Managing the State

As a small state, Brunei is politically and economically manageable in accordance with the stated priorities embodied in its philosophy of Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB; Malay Islamic Monarchy) and Vision 2035, which promotes socio-economic developmental goals. At an average growth rate of 3 per cent, the 2018 population was 442,400, a bane for large-scale economic activities. However, guided by the twin pillars of Vision 2035 and the UN Agenda for Sustainable Development 2030, the policymakers are mindful of the directions that uphold the national aspirations of growth amidst austerity in providing a satisfactory quality of life for Bruneians. The annual economic growth rate is of concern. In his speech on the occasion of the New Year 2019, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah expected better economic growth for the year. However, he reminded his subjects that they had to “march forward … with full spirit and determination” and not be plagued with “lazy syndrome”. He urged them to be “a more proactive and productive society” in light of the economic challenges faced by Brunei.

On 17 April 2019, elections were held across Indonesia, the third-largest democracy in the world. The 2019 elections were significant as the first-ever simultaneous presidential and legislative elections in the nation's history, all held within the same day. The complexity of the 2019 elections meant that effective communication strategies were more vital than ever in reaching out to electoral constituents. Social media, which has become an integral part of everyday social and economic life in the nation, is a natural channel to publicize political visions and missions and to galvanize support for parties and candidates.

As a digital commons, however, social media is inevitably weaponized as well. Concerns over the “dark side” of social media in the form of disinformation (popularly called “hoax”, referring to the general phenomenon of falsehoods) received outsized attention throughout the campaigning period of the 2019 elections. The low barrier to entry and ease of sharing user-generated content means that social media is more easily used for all kinds of purposes, including negative ones. Aksi Bela Islam 212 (the 2 December 2016 Defend Islam Action), combined with intense political mudslinging in past elections, resulted in “hoax” becoming a term that means division to many Indonesians, potentially tearing apart the young democracy.

This chapter examines how social media interplayed with electoral politics in Indonesia's 2019 elections. The first part of the paper outlines the role of social media in the nation's past elections. Social media has been weaponized for use in political smear campaigns since its introduction on to the nation's political landscape in 2012. Aksi Bela Islam 212 gave rise to fears that hoaxes could further split the nation and affect subsequent elections. Combined with worldwide events such as the 2016 US presidential election, it changed Indonesia's understanding of the so-called “fake news” phenomenon. The second part of the paper discusses how the notion of hoax was central to campaign discourses in the 2019 elections. Social media was the dominant means, although not the only one, by which hoaxes were disseminated.

Social Media and Political Contestation in Past Indonesian Elections

Indonesia is nicknamed the “Social Media Nation”. In terms of numbers, active social media users comprise 48 per cent of the country's total population. Indonesian netizens on average spend three hours and twenty-six minutes on social media.

On his seventy-fifth birthday, on 14 April 2019, Nguyen Phu Trong visited the southern province of Kien Giang, a practice he had adopted since being re-elected as secretary general of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) in 2016. This time it did not go well; it was rumoured that Trong suffered a stroke, and he was subjected to a lengthy hospital stay. He appeared fragile during his first public appearance a month later, and in June he had to delegate National Assembly (NA) chairwoman Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan to visit China on his behalf. There was only limited coverage of these events in the tightly controlled Vietnamese media, as they tried to downplay the significance of Trong's deteriorating health.

In 2021 the VCP will hold its 13th National Congress, at which Trong—who will be seventy-seven by then—is expected to step down. However, this is only a high possibility, not a certainty. When re-elected in 2016, Trong hinted that he would retire in the middle of his term to make room for younger leaders. In the two years following his re-election, however, he consolidated power to become the most powerful figure in Vietnamese politics in decades. The sudden health incident will have likely put an end to any wish of his to remain in power for longer. What is more important however is whether Trong's illness has any implications for Vietnamese succession politics. As the head of both the party and the state, Trong's preference will weigh heavily in the candidate selection process for the hot seat in 2021. The tradition in Vietnamese politics is for party elders to have strong opinions over who will assume their posts (or even who should step down). The rise and fall of Secretary General Le Kha Phieu vividly illustrated that. Phieu was promoted to the party's supreme position in 1997 when he gained the support of both Le Duc Anh and Do Muoi after a long tug of war between two camps. He was nevertheless dethroned four years later when the party elders opposed his re-election.

Tran Quoc Vuong, the executive secretary of the party's Secretariat—the fourth most powerful member of the party—was considered Trong's right-hand man and his favoured candidate for the top post.

The twenty-two chapters in Southeast Asian Affairs 2020 again highlight the dynamism and diversity of the eleven countries covered and Southeast Asia as a region. Events ranged from the tragic deaths from overwork and poor conditions of many election workers in Indonesia during the national elections to the release on social media of a rap song supporting former Malaysian prime minister Najib Razak, the first leader of UMNO to lose a parliamentary election.

Six overarching themes each feature in many of the twenty-two chapters, and no chapter is devoid of all six. Two of these themes are global in nature, two relate to major powers outside of Southeast Asia, and two are domestic in nature. The enduring and definitive nature of these themes is underlined by the fact that many of them feature heavily in previous volumes of Southeast Asian Affairs, including those like major power competition and transitions in political leadership that have been constant themes since the first volume was published almost a half century ago. Others, like environmental degradation and the political ramifications of social media, are distinctly modern.

Environmental Degradation

In the thematic chapter for Malaysia, Serina Rahman looks at the ambitious environmental policy agenda of the Pakatan Harapan government and the political challenges it faces. Global pressure particularly from the European Union on the Malaysian palm oil industry, a major source of Malaysian exports, has led to a defensive response from Kuala Lumpur in contrast to the proactive position the government has taken against the export of trash to Malaysia from advanced Western economies. The Pakatan Harapan government has taken a regional lead in trying to address some of the causes and consequences of environmental degradation. Will others follow?

Social Media Politics

The thematic chapter for Indonesia by Jennifer Yang Hui looks at the use and influence of social media in the 2019 elections in the largest country of Southeast Asia. In Indonesia, social media is now the predominant channel of political communication between politicians and voters and supporters of politicians and voters. A large industry of social media political communication has arisen that is changing the conduct of election campaigns fundamentally. In the 2014 and 2019 presidential campaigns, black propaganda against political opponents has proven to be widespread even if its effectiveness is questionable.

The year 2019 was publicly labelled an election year in Indonesia, as mammoth elections were conducted, accompanied by a media and social media frenzy that absorbed the attention of the country's citizens. The year was also a milestone from which to look back on and reflect upon the first term of President Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi), as well as to look forward to his second five-year term. In April 2019 more than 140 million citizens went to the ballot box to elect their president and vice-president, 575 members of the House of Representatives, 2,000 provincial representatives for 33 provinces, and 17,610 district and city representatives in more than 500 city and district councils. The total number of candidates running for legislative election was 245,000. The presidential election in 2019 was the fourth election after the New Order era, while the parliamentary election was the twelfth in Indonesian history. With an expenditure of more than 25 trillion rupiah (US$1.78 million), this year's elections also led to the death of 144 election ad-hoc committee members due to overwork, fatigue and stress. More than 7,385,500 personnel were distributed across 809,500 polling stations. These figures demonstrate how electoral democracy has become institutionalized in the country.

Yet, democracy in Indonesia is not perfect. A successful electoral process does not directly result in “substantial democracy”, which emphasizes the guarantee of civil liberties, freedom of expression, protection for minority groups, as well as social and economic rights. It is with respect to the substantive aspects of democracy that many observers and pundits on Indonesian politics have expressed worries about the “stagnation”, “regression”, “illiberal turn”, and “decline” of democracy in the country, with reasons that will be explored in the sections that follow. Such observers are concerned that after two decades Indonesia has entered another version of the New Order regime, one marked by ignorance of basic human rights and which neglects the political rights of minority groups, all for the ambition of economic development. A more empathetic view though suggests that Indonesia is a young democratic country and that it will need time to nurture a vibrant democracy beyond formal elections.

This chapter provides an overarching view of macroeconomic trends in Southeast Asia in 2019.

The current state of the regional economies is first assessed. In general, the regional economies had to face a troubled global environment but demonstrated an encouraging degree of resilience in doing so.

The cyclical prospects are then considered. Two key factors will drive the outlook for next year. The first is how the global economy pans out—especially whether an improvement in the trade picture allows a recovery in business confidence and capital spending. A second factor is the impact of supportive monetary and fiscal policies.

Finally, a review of developments this year that shaped key drivers of the secular regional outlook is conducted. Four key drivers are identified and are likely to be supportive of an improved growth outlook in the medium term—infrastructure spending, synergies from economic integration initiatives, production relocation out of China and an improved business ecosystem.

Section 1: Recent Trends in the Regional Economies

Two contrasting themes characterized economic developments in Southeast Asia in 2019—growing challenges and a surprising degree of resilience. The regional economies had to contend with a turbulent global environment in 2019. Global demand for Asian exports was subdued, depressing economic growth and commodity prices in a region that remains heavily trade-dependent. Nevertheless, the region demonstrated a degree of resilience: economic growth continued, albeit modestly, while external stability was maintained. This relatively benign outcome was partly the payoff to the improved capacity for policy response in the region—and it builds a good base for future economic performance.

A confluence of disturbances hurt the global economy in 2019. Global economic activity began to weaken from around the middle of 2018 onwards and the decline persisted through 2019. As a result, global economic growth eased, from 3.8 per cent in 2017 to 3.6 per cent in 2018 and then to an estimated 3.0 per cent in 2019 according to the International Monetary Fund (Figure 1). In parallel, the world economy saw a pronounced slowing in export demand (Figure 2). Not surprisingly, the World Trade Organization (WTO) became more cautious about world trade prospects.

Back in 1974, renowned writer Ursula Le Guin won the Hugo Award for Best Short Story for “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas”. Omelas was a peaceful, prosperous and blissful city. However, every child in the city, as a rite of passage, is made aware that their utopia depends on one child being locked and tortured in a basement. While the author frames the ending of the story in terms of those few who cannot stomach it and thus walk away from Omelas, a more instructive aspect is the part of those who did not—the ones who, no matter how begrudgingly, made the conscious decision to accept the price of paradise.

Halfway into his term, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, with his concomitant strongman approach to “get things done in the wake of democratic dysfunction”, continues to enjoy a “very good” approval rating from as much as 78 per cent of the population. While it is lower than the 86 per cent rating he held in 2016, it is still exceptionally high compared to those of other post- 1986 Philippine presidents. Duterte's popularity notably endures despite delays in infrastructure projects, a widely criticized rapprochement with China, doubt about the credibility of the Philippine National Police over the “ninja cops” issue, brewing unrest from farmers arising from competition with rice imports following the passage of the Rice Tariffication Law, and growing international criticism over the country's human rights record as evidenced by the so-called Iceland resolution in the United Nations Human Rights Council last June. During this year's midterm election, which was seen as a referendum on Duterte's illiberal approach to politics, the opposition failed to gain a single seat in the Senate. One writer despaired that the elections proved that “the Philippines just became more authoritarian, thanks to the people”.

This chapter joins the chorus of other reviews that have described the Philippine political trajectory as heading towards greater illiberalism and the centralization of power with the executive, which undermines the integrity of democratic politics as a modus vivendi. However, as a way forward it also takes stock of Duterte's broader policy agenda, in addition to his governance style and its corrosive impact on democratic institutions, which many writers have emphasized.