EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • In late February 2020, the Mahathir Mohamad-led Pakatan Harapan (Harapan, or Pact of Hope) government ended abruptly. Amidst ensuing confusion, Muhyiddin Yassin led defecting Harapan Members of Parliament, joined by UMNO and PAS, in an ad hoc Perikatan Nasional (PN, or National Alliance) coalition to form a “backdoor government”.

• • The PN protagonists cast themselves as a “Malay-Muslim front” for preserving Malay dominance. Yet they unwittingly exposed the parlous state of their “Malay politics”, as shown by an absence of “Malay unity”, strongly contested claims to represent the Malays, intense party factionalism, and subverted leadership transitions.

• • The parlousness of Malay politics emerged from the failure of the Malay political class to meet many challenges between 1997 and 2018. As the New Economic Policy and Vision 2020 political orders shed their combined twenty-five-year hegemony, Malay politics could not recover its declining popular support and legitimacy, or craft a fresh, broadly supported settlement.

• • The present is an unsettled conjuncture: the old order is passing while Harapan's experimental regime has been subverted. Yet Malay politics is unable to reform or tackle current issues authoritatively. Instead Malay politics has turned inwards and precipitated a disorder of the political system.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

INTRODUCTION

In contemporary diplomacy, the governments are not the sole actors in bilateral ties; the business sector and people to people contacts are indispensable to the process. Where Indonesia and China are concerned, much progress has been demonstrated in the managing of relations over the last seventy years.

Beijing perceives Indonesia as a resource-rich nation with considerable regional clout. On the other hand, Jakarta considers China an economic juggernaut with global and regional power which offers plenty of opportunities for cooperation. Beijing is aiming for collaboration that benefits its strategic interests. It is now the leading player in the steel industry. This also means that it is the world's largest stainless steel producer and top importer of nickel ore. Meanwhile, Indonesia has the world's largest reserves of nickel, a key component in stainless steel. In August 2020, China's nickel ore import from Indonesia surged 26.5 per cent year-on-year. This mutual interest does not however necessarily lead to smooth cooperation. The COVID-19 pandemic and the Indonesian people's reservations about China presented obstructions.

In the Natuna waters, shortly, before the identification of the first case of the coronavirus by Chinese authorities in Wuhan, both countries were involved in a stand-off following the violation of the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by Chinese fishing vessels escorted by the Chinese Coast Guard. This unfortunate incident deepened grassroots perception of China as a hegemonic power that threatens the territorial rights of Indonesia.

During the pandemic, however, both countries have been standing shoulder-to-shoulder in battling the novel coronavirus. The cooperation in this area involves many stakeholders ranging from the government to the business sector to people-to-people contacts. It remains to be seen if this close cooperation in the fight against the coronavirus—which has become both governments’ priorities—will foster better bilateral ties in the long term.

On 29 August 2020, Median, a Jakarta-based survey institution published a study demonstrating the that Indonesian people see China as the biggest threat (31.5 per cent), followed by the US (10.8 per cent) and Malaysia (4.3 per cent).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • The 70th anniversary of Sino-Indonesia bilateral relations is marked by issues alongside the coronavirus pandemic, such as medical cooperation, the import of Chinese workers, and confrontation in the Natuna waters.

• • Since the first case of coronavirus was identified in Wuhan in late December 2019, Indonesia has been generously assisting China in coping with the pandemic. In return, when the outbreak occurred in Indonesia, China also rendered support to its strategic partner.

• • The collaboration occurred at government-to-government (G-to-G) level (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence), business-to-business (B-to-B) level (state-owned companies and private companies), and people-to-people (P-to-P) level (ethnic Chinese associations, philanthropic institution). However, both Indonesia and China have not optimized on the P-to-P or grassroots interaction.

• • China's “vaccine diplomacy” is not unconditional, and Beijing may use its vaccine donations to advance its regional agenda, particularly on sensitive issues such as its claims in the South China Sea.

• • The import of Chinese workers into certain Indonesian regions has met with local opposition. This has been resolved with the central and the regional governments reaching an understanding that the Chinese projects will eventually benefit the local economy.

• • In the Natuna waters, Jakarta shows a shift in tone from confrontation (during Jokowi's first term) to moderation. Although Chinese fishing vessels are likely to continue fishing there, the Jokowi administration is likely to deliver business-as-usual responses in order to maintain cordial relations with China while not compromising on its own territorial claims.

• • Overall, bilateral relations on the G-to-G level are amicable and even facilitate B-to-B contacts. However, on the P-to-P level, Indonesians remain suspicious of China. Both governments need to make the common Indonesians key beneficiaries of bilateral cooperation, for example, by providing reliable vaccines to them.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • In his second term (2019–24), President Joko Widodo remains committed in combating radicalism. Anti-radicalism measures such as the banning of radical organization Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), anti-radicalism policies at schools and universities and the deradicalization of terrorists have been expanded to include the Indonesian civil service that currently employs over 4.2 million people across the archipelago.

• • In November 2019, a joint decree was signed by eleven government and state institutions to formalize the new anti-radicalism policy.

• • This paper argues that some challenges arose during the process of implementing the policy including the lack of cooperation from Personnel Development Officers (PPK) in imposing disciplinary actions recommended by the task force.

• • The spread of COVID-19 further impedes policy coordination and has hampered efforts to effectively implement the policy.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

INTRODUCTION

The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) traces its history to 1951, when it was set up by a group of religious scholars many of whom were from the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Since its establishment, the party has developed a rich history both in government and in opposition. In Malay-majority states such as Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah, PAS has a strong support base. Indeed, they are currently the lead party in these states’ administration, with a comfortable majority in the legislative assemblies. In Kelantan and Terengganu, PAS can rule without the need for support from any other party. Additionally, as part of a coalition, PAS also has experience in governing richer and more cosmopolitan states such as Penang and Selangor.

At the federal level today, PAS has eighteen MPs with unquestioned loyalty to the party. There is virtually no popular discussion about the possibility of any PAS MP crossing over to another party. In 2019, PAS formed a partnership with UMNO under the banner of Muafakat Nasional. It then agreed to join the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition with eleven other parties, to form a new government following the resignation of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in February 2020. The support of PAS MPs was instrumental in the downfall of the Pakatan Harapan (PH) government and the formation of the PN government. And their continued participation in the government is crucial, for without them the government would fall.

The approach taken in this study is to explain the subject by using PAS’ own views to justify and explain its actions and strategies. The aim is not to assess or judge the party, but to capture and document its stance in a coherent fashion. Since there has been so much movement in Malaysian politics of late, it is important to keep in mind that this study covers the period up to the end of September 2020 only.

The next section provides a brief background of the party. The essay will then explore some of the major decisions made by the party in recent years, focusing in depth on its attitude towards political partnerships with other parties. PAS’ participation in both Muafakat Nasional and PN will be discussed.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

INTRODUCTION

Tackling religious extremism continues to be a priority for President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) during his second term which began in October 2019. Within a month of his return to the presidency, eleven state and government bodies issued a joint decree to curb radicalism among civil servants (see Table 1 for the list of institutions). The joint decree is the latest anti-radicalism policy implemented by the Joko Widodo administration following the banning of pan-Islamist and Muslim fundamentalist group, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), in 2017 through presidential regulation in lieu of the 2013 Law on Mass Organization. The government argued that HTI was banned mainly because the organization had failed to play a positive role in supporting national objectives. Activities conducted by the group were also seen to go against Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution and had caused clashes between communities. This threatened security and order and potentially endangered the unity of the Indonesian state (Bambang Prasetyo 2019, p. 259).

This set of anti-radicalism policies ultimately seek to fulfil the President's aspiration to enhance pluralism in Indonesia based on Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity). This aspiration was proclaimed in Joko Widodo's campaign when he was running for the 2014 presidential election. His campaign platform, known as Nawacita, consisted of nine areas of development that Joko Widodo would realize if elected as president. His aspiration for a plural Indonesia has continued into his second term, under another political platform titled Indonesia Maju (Indonesia Moving Forward).

This article examines the part of President Joko Widodo's anti-radicalism policy that targets Indonesian civil servants. It outlines the process and progress in implementing the policy, sheds light on challenges in policy-implementation and evaluates the effectiveness of the policy. This article argues that the Joko Widodo administration has been facing a daunting task in implementing the policy. The implementation has lost momentum due to the COVID-19 pandemic that altered the government's priorities and subsequently reduced the morale of the joint task force.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) is no stranger to coalition politics. It has a long history of working with others, both in government and in opposition. Up until 2018, it used the framework of tahaluf siyasi as the guide to forming coalitions.

• • Under the pretext of tahaluf siyasi or political coalition, PAS joined the Barisan Nasional (BN) government in 1974. It was also a key player in the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU), Barisan Alternatif (BA) and Pakatan Rakyat (PR) opposition coalitions.

• • But in the lead up to GE14, PAS decided to form the Gagasan Sejahtera coalition with much smaller parties—Berjasa and Ikatan. It dominated this coalition and the two partners were largely insignificant.

• • After GE14, PAS decided to partner with UMNO in Muafakat Nasional, under the pretext of a new strategy called ta’awun siyasi or political cooperation. This is a looser partnership arrangement, in which the partners are not strictly bound to each other.

• • The formation of Muafakat Nasional is a historic development, as it brings together the two biggest and oldest Malay political parties for the time in an exclusive manner. Bersatu joined the pact in 2020, making Muafakat Nasional the biggest Malay political force in Malaysia today.

• • PAS sees its role as a unifier of the Muslim ummah, holding and keeping the peace between UMNO and Bersatu. For PAS, creating Malay Muslim unity is not just an effective political strategy but also a religious obligation.