Contrary to conventional wisdom, external freedom is ambiguous in Kant’s Rechtslehre. On the one hand, external freedom can refer to freedom in the external use of choice. On the other, external freedom can refer to the kind of independence encoded in our one innate right. Recognizing the ambiguity allows us not only to see the truth in the various and incompatible ways in which commentators have understood external freedom, but also to see more clearly external freedom’s relationship to autonomy (or internal freedom). In turn, better understanding the relationship between internal and external freedom sheds light on the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and his moral philosophy, which are often (and wrongly) assumed to be discontinuous.

Despite initial hopes that advances in information technology would spread and deepen democracy around the world, new platforms for communicating have instead provided opportunities for the weakening of democracy. Social media, website hosting, messaging apps, and related technologies provide easy and cheap ways for micro-actors such as individuals and small groups (in addition to more traditional state and non-state actors) to wield soft power for antidemocratic purposes. This chapter probes how the malign version of soft power works by attracting targets through flows of information that seduce and trick audiences with mis- and disinformation as well as with divisive and hateful messaging.  Focusing on malign soft power and how it is wielded through control of information flows (content, velocity, and access) provides a framework for assessing how cyber-enabled antidemocratic efforts take form and how new actors emerge.

This chapter imposes the structure of a walking tour of Berlin’s memorial art onto the text, continuing to stage moments of individual viewing of art. My argument about the material practices of taking responsibility for restitution is turned into a grounded methodology: a shoe-on-the-footpath mode of writing. Beginning in Bebelplatz, I visit recent responses to the past as they are represented in memorial art in different areas of Berlin, including the national Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe. I visit Schöneberg where the Places of Remembrance memorial consists of signs of law from the NS regime mounted in the streetscape. I also analyse Gunter Demnig’s Stumbling-stones, which are small memorial stones set into the footpath. This chapter is a plaidoyer for paying attention to the way we craft and take responsibility for our legal landscapes through our conduct – our movement and posture – resulting from our interaction with the street and its objects.

This chapter shifts the focus to the European Union, where effectiveness-driven arguments, including some based on failure, have been pivotal in promoting regional integration. The chapter discusses both early landmark decisions of the European Court of Justice and the role of political failure arguments in driving the Court’s expansive approach and the concept of systemic deficits in European Union law, as well as the Solange jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court. It positions these doctrines within the functionalist interpretive framework of European Union Law. While not all of these examples strictly involve failure-based reasoning, they illustrate both the opportunities and risks of the functionalist approach to legal interpretation long dominant in EU law.

The advancement of technology has significantly altered the characteristics of remote work in general, and cross-border remote work in particular presenting complex regulatory challenges. These challenges, with their linkage to a large set of work arrangements and locations, involve among other matters coordinating the relationship between labor law and social security legislation. An increasing number of remote workers are now able to provide services across borders, to markets and countries where they or their employers have no physical connection. As there are more employment regulations to choose from, this increases the possibility for the employer to exploit lower labor standards in other countries and avoid responsibilities towards their workers. Analysis of the literature and jurisprudence in different cases shows that new interpretations of the place of work are brought forward with the view to better protect cross-border remote workers, both in Private International Law and in Labor Law, considering the increasingly virtual nature of the workplace. However, the principle of territoriality remains a strong argument in the hands of higher courts to limit evolution in that direction.

The foundational claim of Kant’s political philosophy is that we each have an innate right to external freedom. But what is external freedom? This chapter contrasts normative and descriptive characterizations of this concept. Arthur Ripstein uses a normative characterization of external freedom in his reconstruction of Kant’s argument for the state, while Kyla Ebels-Duggan uses a descriptive characterization of external freedom in her reconstruction of the same argument. The chapter sets aside the interpretative question of which of these readings is more faithful to Kant and instead focuses on showing how Kant’s argument for the state faces significant problems on either interpretation. But rather than taking these problems to show that Kantian political philosophy is doomed, it is argued that a normative characterization of external freedom can be the basis of a compelling argument for the state, one that draws on some of the key insights in Kant’s political philosophy while departing from his own argument in important respects.

Thus far, we have largely considered technologies that are capable of changing persons’ mental states. However, today, a range of technologies are also being developed that can gain insight into the mental realms of others. One example is the measurement of brain activity, which has enabled researchers to make inferences about individual mental states and faculties. In particular, fMRI and EEG can measure brain activity in a way that allows for inferences about what a person remembers, recognises, thinks or feels. EEG has been used, for example, to identify concealed memories about a criminal offence; and fMRI has been used to reveal sexual orientation, political ideology or a person’s craving for cocaine. Recently, various research groups used neurotechnology together with emerging forms of artificial intelligence (AI) to decode mental content from brain activity, with some interesting first results. According to Brownsword, with the development of these kinds of “brain-reading” technologies, “researchers have a window into the brains and, possibly, into a deeper understanding of the mental lives of their participants”.

Chapter 1 begins by exploring the historical and philosophical grounds for justifying institutional intervention in cases of governance failures. It examines how liberal democracies typically grapple with government failures, and argues that existing tools and mechanisms come with some limitations, making a prima facie case for allowing interventions in some cases of failure. The chapter then distinguishes arguments from failure from arguments about implied powers or emergency measures. Each of these arguments shares important features with arguments from failure, but they are not the same. Arguments from failure should therefore be considered as a concept of public law of their own. This raises the question of when and under what conditions such arguments might be legitimate as a matter of comparative constitutional theory.

Chapter 1 reconstructs the contexts of mass digitisation and the Kantian copyright debate in which Kant’s 1785 essay is to be reread. First, I consider the Google Books project as an emblematic case for our urgent need to rethink authorship, copyright and their profound co-evolution with media technologies. Then, I review the recent debate surrounding the utilitarian-proprietary approach to copyright and its limits as suggested by three readers of Kant’s 1785 essay. After that, I propose an alternative media-theoretical way of looking at a printed book, one that focuses on the paratexts of Kant’s 1785 essay to illuminate the medial dimension of literary production and the limits of proprietary authorship. My contention is that although the three Kantian copyright scholars have demonstrated the power of Kant’s essay and its concept of the book as communicative act to reshape our understanding of authorship and copyright, they have also underestimated the material dimension of the text that affords the production of its meaning. A more adequate understanding of Kant’s text and how it could illuminate the present digital transformation of authorship and copyright would require that we attend closely to its medial-materialities.

This chapter challenges simplistic narratives of global corporate governance convergence by examining the complex reality of corporate governance in Asia. We introduce “faux convergence,” where jurisdictions adopt Anglo-American governance forms while adapting their function for local needs. Through analyzing independent directors, derivative actions, and stewardship codes across Asia, we show how surface-level similarities mask diverse practical implementations. Inter-Asian comparisons reveal local factors shaping governance that East–West comparisons might miss. By examining how Asian jurisdictions adapt similar governance mechanisms, we gain insights into the relationship between legal transplants and jurisdiction-specific practices in corporate law and governance. The faux convergence framework and inter-Asian comparative approach advance our understanding beyond simplistic convergence theories toward more nuanced, contextual perspectives that better reflect corporate governance in a globalized-yet-regionalized world. This research demonstrates the importance of careful, contextual analysis in comparative corporate law and governance, with inter-Asian comparison providing a valuable analytical tool.

Building on Chapter 1, Chapter 2 delves into the normative dimensions of arguments from failure. It asks when these arguments can be justified in constitutional democracies in light of key principles such as the rule of law, the separation of powers, democracy and, sometimes, federalism. The chapter shows that while arguments from failure often clash with such principles at first glance, a deeper dive into constitutional theory reveals room for exceptions. In particular recent scholarship on the separation of powers and democratic experimentalism provides resources to defend what would otherwise be illegal interventions in some cases of failure. Yet at least some of this literature risks opening up these exceptions too broadly. In light of this, the chapter argues that arguments from failure should be treated as an important public law doctrine but remain ’safe, legal and rare’, and formulates conditions for interventions in cases of failure to be legitimate.

The key question posed by this volume’s Introduction is: What happens when Western law is no longer the default referent for legal modernity? This question has implications for such fields as comparative law, international law, and law and technology. “Inter-Asian Law” points to an emerging field of comparative and international law that explores the legal interactions – historical and contemporary – between and among Asian jurisdictions. These interactions – through diverse actors, intermediaries, processes, and methods – may lead to several important formations including legal transplantation, law and development, multilateralism and trade blocks, global value chains, transnational orders, judicial networks, legal educational exchange, and digital integration, to name a few. After providing definitions for core terms, the Introduction provides an analytical framework that guides the subsequent chapters including types and methods of interactions, actors and intermediaries, and effects, consequences, and conflicts. A description of the organization of the book follows.

On October 7, 2023, Israel experienced an unprecedented attack on its soil by Hamas, a Palestinian group that has controlled the Gaza Strip since 2006. In the hours that followed, the Israeli government warned that the response would be brutal and prolonged to annihilate Hamas’ military capabilities and recover the numerous hostages taken.