At the heart of this chapter lies the following question: how can the fact that lawful behaviour can be enforced be explained against the background of Kant’s moral philosophy? I argue that without grounding Right in morality we cannot even understand coercion as a normative problem. The reason is that for Kant coercion becomes problematic only vis-à-vis persons, because they – being ends in themselves – can legitimately claim not to be coerced (1). This does not mean, however, that coercion is completely inadmissible according to Kant. For by defining equal, relational freedom as a sphere of non-domination, the law also defines a sphere in which coercion is permissible because it is morally unproblematic and requires no justification (2). Tracing back coercion to the limits of autonomy, however, does not only explain why coercive force is ‘deducible’ from moral autonomy (and the Categorical Imperative as its principle). Even more, this requires us to reconsider whether Kant can consistently argue against the external enforceability of internal perfect duties (e.g. the prohibition of suicide) (3).

Chapter 4 charts a biography of Kant’s printed authorial name, ‘I. Kant’, so as to disclose its ethical function in late eighteenth-century Germany. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s and Roger Chartier’s studies of the materialities of authorship, I consider uses of the authorial name at the rhetorical level of Kant’s 1785 essay alongside its textual and typographical displacements, both within and outside the May 1785 issue of the Berlinische Monatsschrift, and during and beyond the author’s lifetime. In so tracing the anthumous and posthumous movements of ‘I. Kant’, I clarify the authorial name’s role in implementing an ethical author-function that Kant understood to be responsive to the demands of enlightenment practice. I contend that Kant not only recognised the importance of printed authorial names to the enactment of authorial responsibility but further so deployed his own authorial name as to hold himself and others accountable for the print publications that contributed to the public discourse in his time. I argue that this ethically and socially concerned author-function in the German Enlightenment discloses the limits of copyright’s proprietary understanding of authorship and its material constitution.

This chapter discusses the idea that being ‘in transition’ towards a juridical condition impacts or shapes our duties and rights from a Kantian perspective. It analyses the implications of treating juridical duties as if they were duties of virtue, in the absence of or under imperfect juridical institutions. It argues that this introduces a problem for Kant’s account of ethical and legal obligations because respecting the dignity of those to whom a juridical duty is owed requires treating their claims as a matter of right instead of ethics. It also criticizes the way in which Kant’s theory of acquired rights in the state of nature has been reinterpreted as a theory of ‘provisionality’. Recent Kant scholarship has highlighted the ability of Kant’s legal-political theory to guide us through messy political developments in the manner of non-ideal theory. The chapter will object that the way Kant connects provisional rights and permissive laws has little to do with non-ideal theory, and follows instead from Kant’s apagogical argument for acquired rights in the state of nature.

Until the COVID-19 pandemic, a working style in Japan that emphasized teamwork was predominant, and telework was not widespread. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a majority of companies had no choice but to introduce telework. Telework, where individual workers operate independently rather than collectively, was an entirely new way of working for many Japanese individuals. To make telework function efficiently, a re-evaluation of Japan's traditional employment system, where job descriptions are not specified in employment contracts and individuals agree only to become members of a company, became necessary. While it was previously considered an obligation for workers to comply with employers’ transfer orders involving relocation, telework has introduced a new option of handling such orders without physically relocating. In this way, telework has the potential to be a game-changer in Japan's traditional employment system. However, there are diverse legal issues that need to be resolved when introducing telework.

This chapter explores the emergence of Inter-Asian Law (IAL) through the lens of multilayered investment agreements. It argues that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-centered regime has driven the normative evolution of IAL, which has diverged from Western approaches rooted in the Washington Consensus. The study examines how Asian countries are developing their own legal models, reducing dependence on American and European rules, and strengthening Asia’s influence in shaping international law. Focusing on investment law, the chapter highlights the pragmatic incrementalism of ASEAN and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in legal approaches. It analyzes the development of investment issues across three waves of global regionalism, as well as the evolving investment frameworks of the Asia-Pacific. Hence, the research demonstrates how IAL reflects Asian approaches to global governance and offers alternatives to conventional Western-dominated models for developing countries.

This book begins by foregrounding that the material form of Kant’s 1785 essay could be analysed to critique the myth of proprietary authorship that presently prevails across copyright regimes. After reviewing four faces of Kant in authorship and copyright studies, I advance a medial rethinking of Kant by drawing on the intersecting traditions of book history, media theory and literary studies. In particular, Gérard Genette’s poetics informs my paratextual reading of Kant’s 1785 essay to uncover the historical and medial-material conditions of literary production.

If Kant’s Doctrine of Right is an integral part of his moral philosophy and thus the categorical imperative is the basis of his Universal Law of Right, then this Law of Right must be derived from the Universal Law of Morals due to the provisions of Kant’s concept of Right. This chapter shows how this works in the framework of the natural law tradition.

The use of the different terms “miscarriages of justice,” “wrongful convictions,” “innocence” and “exoneration” in different countries is examined. The book’s research methodologies are explained. A comparative law methodology is used to highlight similarities and differences in different jurisdictions. Many of the immediate causes, such as mistaken eyewitness identification, false confessions and false forensic evidence, are basically similar. At the same time, remedies, including what is remedied, and some structural factors, such as prejudice and discrimination, often differ. A legal process methodology is used to examine the different contributions that courts, the executive and legislatures can make to the creation, prevention and remedying of miscarriages of justice. A historical approach is used to illustrate the longstanding role of racism and prejudice and to explore whether wrongful conviction reforms are a means of legitimating unjust systems. The normative values at stake in miscarriages of justice are outlined with a focus on equality and fair trial rights, including the presumption of innocence. The issue of balancing the risks of wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals is discussed. Finally, a detailed outline of subsequent chapters is provided.

Research on Kant’s legal philosophy has flourished in recent years. This applies both to exegetical research on Kant and to practical philosophy, which pursues normative theorizing in Kant’s wake. In view of this enormous interest in Kant’s legal philosophy, there is surprisingly still no unified discussion of the fundamental questions of his legal thought. There are two reasons for this: on the one hand, there are contributions to the debate that tend to concentrate on Kant’s legal philosophy or his moral philosophy and thus sometimes fail to take the ‘other side’ sufficiently into account. On the other hand, there is a methodological divergence between more exegetical approaches coming from the history of philosophy and more analytical approaches trying to give a ‘Kantian’ answer to philosophical problems of law and morality. It is therefore not surprising that there is, first, a need for a philosophical-historical account of the relationship between law and morality in Kant; and secondly, there is a need to clarify the related problem of which path normative theorizing based on Kant can or must take today. This volume takes up these two desiderata in contributions that address these questions from systematic and exegetical perspectives. It provides a comprehensive treatment of law and morality in Kant and also sheds new light on Kant’s practical philosophy more broadly.

The scholarly discussion of Kant’s republicanism focuses heavily on his ‘negative’ conception of freedom: independence or not being subject to another master. What has received much less attention is Kant’s ‘positive’ conception of freedom: being subject to one’s own legislation. This chapter argues that Kant’s positive conception of external freedom plays a crucial role in his Doctrine of Right: external freedom in the negative sense (mutual independence) requires and is realized by freedom in the positive sense (joint self-legislation). After first discussing the ‘innate right to freedom’, it is shown that, on Kant’s account, this fundamental right is realized fully only when external freedom is realized in both senses and in all three spheres of public right. Any satisfactory account of Kant’s republican theory must complement the focus on independence with an emphasis on citizenship and joint self-legislation.