Introduction
On Saturday, October 7, 2023, Hamas, a Palestinian political and military movement considered a terrorist organization by the European Union, launched a massive and unprecedented attack against Israel from the Gaza Strip, which it has controlled since 2006: Operation Al Aqsa Deluge.
Through meticulous intelligence work, preparation, and training, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the movement, managed to thwart Israel’s extensive surveillance apparatus and introduce nearly 3,000 of its men into Israeli territory. The simultaneous attacks by these heavily armed fighters targeted military (military outposts on the outskirts of Gaza) and, more importantly, civilian (kibbutzim and nearby towns, music festival) targets, resulting in numerous casualties: 1,150 deaths, including 775 civilians.Footnote 1
The strategic surprise created by Hamas caught the Israeli state off guard, taking several hours to organize a response and regain control of the territories held by Palestinian terrorists, due to insufficient resources on the ground. In addition to the security forces in the sector who were killed in the early hours of the operation (308 soldiers and 57 policemen), some active soldiers were on leave on this Sabbath and religious holiday, while for several months, the army had been more mobilized in the West Bank where clashes with the Palestinian population are escalating.
For several hours, Hamas thus managed to control large swaths of Israeli territory bordering the Gaza Strip, allowing its members to organize the kidnapping of dozens of Israelis, mostly civilians, with – for the first time – a high proportion of women and children. In total, around 240 people were captured in a matter of hours.
An Unprecedented Attack
Hamas’ attack on October 7 is unprecedented in Israel’s history. Never before has an armed group belonging to a non-state organization penetrated Israeli territory so massively and for so long and carried out such acts. Except for its War of Independence (1948), Israel has always managed to shift the theater of operations outside its national territory: into Egypt during the Suez War (1956), then into the Sinai, West Bank, and Golan Heights during the Six-Day War (1967), and even during the surprise attack that was the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Arab armies penetrated territories occupied by Israel since 1967, but never entered Israeli territory.
Hamas’ attack is therefore unprecedented in every respect: its scale, its number of victims and hostages, the identity of the dead (mostly civilians, including women, the elderly, and children), and the atrocities committed (rape, torture, and decapitated and burned bodies). The fact that this occurred within Israeli territory, in supposedly inviolable places (secure rooms), plunges society into terror and revives the trauma of antisemitism persecution in Europe, against which the State of Israel, created following the Holocaust, was meant to be a bulwark.
Internally, a Tense Moment
Hamas’ attacks come at a time of very high political tensions in Israel, as the country has been undermined for several years by the rise of identity and cultural claims, reflecting the diversity of the Israeli society.Footnote 2 This explosion of the political field is exacerbated by an institutional and electoral systemFootnote 3 that prevents the emergence of a stable majority. Since 2019, the country has therefore experienced no less than five elections in just four yearsFootnote 4 (compared to one every four years usually), either due to a lack of majority or due to too short majorities or coalitions too disparate to hold over time.
Since 2022, however, a coalition seems to have emerged: that between the Israeli right-wing party (Likud) led by Benjamin Netanyahu and various religious and nationalist parties, which crystallize strong opposition due to their radicalism. However, this coalition has been pushing for institutional reform for several months, which, according to the opposition, threatens the democratic foundation of the state. For over a year, hundreds of thousands of people have been gathering every Saturday in Tel Aviv to oppose this project, which deeply divides society.
All these internal tensions have contributed to weakening the very heart of the Israeli security apparatus: Throughout 2023, more than 12,000 reservists have announced their refusal to serve voluntarily in the army, especially in elite units (commandos, intelligence, air force), supported by former senior officials of the Shin Bet (internal intelligence) (Bateman, Reference Bateman2023). Such was the situation in the months preceding the Hamas attack.
Internationally, a Crucial Moment
Beyond internal politics, the attacks on October 7 occurred at a crucial moment for Israeli diplomacy. At the end of 2020, Israel normalized its relations with several Arab countries (United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in September, Sudan in October, and Morocco in December) as part of the Abraham Accords, concluded under the auspices of the United States. Israel was thus reviving its normalization policy toward Arab countries, which had been at a standstill since the peace agreement with Jordan in 1996.
For several months, negotiations had been taking place behind the scenes for Saudi Arabia, a major oil power and a major Sunni Islamic site with the presence of the two holy sites (Medina and Mecca), to join the Abraham Accords. On October 4, 2023, three days before the Hamas attacks, an Israeli minister attended a conference organized by a United Nations (UN) agency in Riyadh, a visit that was unthinkable a few months earlier.
These diplomatic successes for Israel validate the strategy initiated by Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been in power almost uninterrupted since 2009.Footnote 5 It can be summarized as follows: militarily contain the security threat posed by certain Palestinian groups; politically obscure the Palestinian issue; and focus on the Iranian threat, deemed existential, and regional partnerships with Sunni powers.
The sudden return of the Palestinian issue on October 7 thus challenges Netanyahu’s strategy and undermines the entire Israeli foreign policy.
Communication as a Political Weapon
It was in this internal and international context that Israel launched its military response against the Gaza Strip on October 7. In the hours following the attacks, intense bombings targeted infrastructure presumed to belong to Hamas while the country declared a state of war with the recall of over 300,000 reservists, the largest mobilization ever launched by the state. Israeli authorities warned from the outset that the war would be long-lasting, intense, massive, and destructive with a dual objective: to destroy the operational, political, and military capabilities of Hamas in Gaza; and to bring the hostages back to Israel. There is another objective that has not been clearly stated but is evident: to restore Israel’s deterrent capacity vis-à-vis its regional competitors (Hezbollah and Iran). To achieve all these objectives, Israel must ensure it has the military, financial, and political means necessary. For this, the role of communication is fundamental, especially since Israeli authorities are aware of the fractures within their society, know they are being closely watched, and suffer from a degraded image among a portion of global public opinion due to their occupation policy in the West Bank. Therefore, to wage its war against Hamas, Israeli authorities must ensure two conditions at two different geographical levels: (1) internally, securing long-term support from the population, some of whom will go to the front line and risk their lives, while all will be more or less economically affected – a complex objective given the strong divisions and distrust toward the government in the country – and (2) internationally, obtaining diplomatic, financial, and/or military support from its traditional allies within the Western Bloc (Europe and the United States), and the most neutral or least hostile posture possible from partners within the Arab world, whose public opinions are particularly sensitive to the Palestinian cause.
The success of these objectives requires the implementation of an adapted communication strategy that can address them. And indeed, on October 8, the Israeli state deployed a large communication campaign. From afar, this all-encompassing communication strategy, on social networks, in the media, with political leaders, in French, English, and Arabic, may seem haphazard, opportunistic, and ill-suited. However, it has been finely crafted at the highest levels of the politico-military scale and is the result of several decades of doctrinal evolution within the state apparatus. It is coordinated and responds to specific and targeted political and strategic objectives. It is hybrid, as it is designed to reach different targets. It sometimes appears ineffective due to the unpopularity or ridicule it incites, but this does not mean it has not reached its target audience and thus its objectives. In nearly four months of conflict (October 7, 2023–January 27, 2024), Israel thus produced several complementary narratives, published countless informational materials, mobilized thousands of channels within its state apparatus, its civil society, and also in the Israeli and Jewish diaspora worldwide, as well as among its supporters within Arab societies. This chapter aims to understand the informational maneuvers deployed by the State of Israel in the context of its war against Hamas since October 7, but also, and above all, how and why they were implemented.
The first part explains how Israel’s informational and communication apparatus has been structured in recent decades and how the state has evolved its doctrine to face new challenges. It shows that the communication efforts of the Israeli army, initiated in the 1970s, struggled to lead to a coherent strategy and results until the advent of digital and social networks, which have radically changed the game. Without this, it is not possible to understand the scope and speed of the informational actions carried out by Israel immediately after the Hamas attacks.
The second part presents the political objectives sought by Israel and the narratives deployed to achieve them. These narratives are adapted to target audiences, whether they are intended for the Israeli public or for Western public opinion. Finally, Israel has adapted its communication strategy for Arabic-speaking populations, both in terms of content and channels, to reach its target audience.
Before October 7: Perfecting Israel’s Information System
In Israel, the Hebrew word Hasbara is generally used to designate the state’s communication strategy (Goodman, Reference Goodman2011, p. 22). The literal translation of this word means “explanation,”Footnote 6 but its use by Israel refers more to terms such as “justification” or even “propaganda” in its original sense (to persuade).
For half a century, Hasbara was the reference concept in Israel for thinking about the communication strategy that could be implemented by state institutions such as the government, ministries, embassies, the army, or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) affiliated to the state; in the framework of a very vertical communication.
However, Hasbara as a doctrine failed to adapt properly to the changing international context, the changing nature of Israel’s conflicts, and the transformation of the means of communication. This is why, from the 2000s onwards, two new, complementary concepts began to emerge within the state: “public diplomacy” and “psychological warfare.”
The Limited Successes and Failures of Hasbara
As a concept, Hasbara involves producing and disseminating a narrative to target audiences with the aim of influencing public opinion on a specific political issue related to Israel. Its aim is to win public support and legitimize Israel’s action and creation. But Hasbara’s effectiveness has produced little effect, except perhaps before the creation of Israel.
The Early Years: A Lack of Vision, Will, and Means
Paradoxically, it was before the creation of the State of Israel that Hasbara was at its strongest in the world on the part of the Zionist movement and its representatives, who were seeking the support of the Western powers with a view to creating a state in Palestine under British mandate. Once the state had been created, it invested little in its communications for reasons of means and priority: The country, which was supported by all the major powers, was more concerned with absorbing waves of immigrants, some of whom were Holocaust survivors, developing the Negev desert, and building egalitarian communities (kibbutz); all actions that required no justification for the Israeli authorities, since they seemed so just and moral to them.
The creation of a Hasbara Office within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, envisaged as early as 1948, did not materialize, and was not finally realized until the late 1960s, but within the Army Spokesman’s Unit (Dover Tsahal); a change which is not insignificant and shows the new preoccupations of the Israeli Hasbara. Indeed, Israel’s image changed radically with the Six-Day War (1967). The perception of a small state surrounded by threatening enemies collapsed after Israel’s lightning victory and conquest of vast territories. It was also at this time that many Arab and Muslim states were newly created as a result of the decolonization movement, intensifying international criticism of Israeli policy to such an extent that Israel decided to create a Ministry of Hasbara in 1974 (one year after the Yom Kippur War). Its main aim was to coordinate all the players involved in the state’s strategic communications. However, a year after its creation, the Ministry was abolished due to excessive competition and intense interministerial rivalry (Shai, Reference Shai2013, p. 116).
Hasbara’s Repeated Failures from the 1970s Onwards
The year 1975 was Israel’s first major diplomatic slap in the face on the world stage, when the UN General Assembly passed a resolution regarding Zionism as a form of racism (supported by seventy-two states, against thirty-five opposed and thirty-two abstaining; United Nations General Assembly, 1975). Unquestionably, this episode marked the failure of Israel’s communication policy, which had been unsuccessful at winning sufficient international support. It is also the origin of Israel’s mistrust of international bodies such as the UN: The Israeli authorities began to display a frank contempt for international criticism, which they consider to be biased.
At the same time, the nature of the conflicts in which Israel was engaged began to change in the 1980s, marking the end of conventional warfare between enemy armies. The outbreak of the First Intifada (1987–1993) pitted the Israeli army against the Palestinian population of the territories Israel had occupied since 1967 (West Bank and Gaza Strip). The information that Israel communicated to explain its actions in the territories was disrupted by the Palestinians, who maintain a close relationship with the foreign journalists who are on the ground, enabling them to tell their own story of the ongoing conflict. Israel’s communication strategy began to show its lack of effectiveness in the field, due to a lack of adaptability.
The same situation arose during Operation Grapes of Wrath (1996), which pitted the Israeli army against Hezbollah, a Shiite militia from southern Lebanon (Razoux, Reference Razoux2006). As a result, the government decided to create a National Hasbara Forum with the same objective as the ministry created two decades earlier; but this initiative met with the same end for the same reasons: Interministerial rivalry prevented concrete progress.
This lack of coordination would prove to be Israel’s undoing during the Second Intifada (2000–2005). The State of Israel, faced with an unprecedented wave of attacks on its soil, found that Palestinian actions were perceived as legitimate resistance to Israelis seen as oppressors. More importantly, the interaction between the Israeli army and the foreign media had changed radically. Foreign journalists were no longer content with reports and briefings from army spokesmen but went directly to officers in the field who had not been trained in communication skills; hence the incoherent and often contradictory messages (Eiland, Reference Eiland2010, pp. 27–37).
Acknowledged Ineffectiveness and a Failed Attempt to Change Doctrine
With the Intifada barely over, the Israeli army found itself in a new theater of operations, in southern Lebanon (2006). Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s well-crafted communications, and above all the ineffectiveness of the Israeli Hasbara, helped spread the idea that the conflict had been lost by the army, despite Israel’s military successes on the ground. Israeli communications were so chaotic that a special report was produced by the state comptroller in Israel. This pointed to the absence of a strong conceptual approach to Hasbara and a lack of institutional coordination, leading to the absence of clear guidelines issued by the government and the failure of Israel’s communication (State Comptroller of Israel, 2007).
To remedy the situation, a special commission was set up under the Prime Minister’s Office. To avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, it brought together all the parties involved in the subject: the National Information Board, the Ministerial Committee for National Security, various ministers, as well as the spokesman for the army, and the Police and Internal Intelligence (Shin Bet). However, despite a strong will, the players involved were unable to develop a more precise overall conceptual approach.
According to former Tsahal general Avi Benayahou, the Hasbara concept lacks the sophistication to change and refine the perception of reality (Benayahu, Reference Benayahu2012, pp. 4–9). One of the reasons for this failure is its temporality: Hasbara comes into play just after the fact (post factum), that is, once the action has taken place. However, in the age of digital communication, smartphones, and social networks, this approach of explaining and justifying facts is often useless. Today’s communication requires a complex complementarity between political and military activities and the manipulation of emotions to arouse empathy and support, regardless of the veracity of the facts.
Public Diplomacy and Cognitive Campaigning: Two Complementary Approaches to Hasbara
It was in the early 2000s that Israel realized its inefficiency and inability to transform Hasbara into an operational communication doctrine. The evolution of conflicts combined with the transformation of means of communication, in a strong desire for doctrinal renewal, led to the emergence of two other approaches that were to become fully integrated into Israel’s communication strategy: public diplomacy and the cognitive campaign or psychological warfare (discussed later in the chapter).
Public Diplomacy: The Revival of Communication
Public diplomacy emerged in the mid-2000s at the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which wished to renew the Hasbara approach that had shown its limitations. This new communication doctrine also came at a time when the means of communication were evolving rapidly, and traditional Hasbara channels seemed outdated.
Its objective is radically different: Public diplomacy must not be a post-factum communication, but on the contrary, a long-term policy, whose objective is no longer the dissemination of an Israeli narrative on the ongoing conflict, but a permanent dialogue with foreign and critical players, beyond security issues. It is conceived as a response to the increasingly palpable criticism in Israel and abroad of the very notion of Hasbara, which is translated by the pejorative term propaganda.
In 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs renamed its communications division Hasbara to Public Diplomacy with an evolving objective: no longer just to defend Israel’s legitimacy and policy abroad, but to present the Israeli narrative in all its diversity. In order to disseminate it more widely, a “digital diplomacy” department was created to promote Israeli narratives on all social platforms and in all languages (English, French, Spanish, Russian, Persian, and Arabic).
Another major difference is that, unlike Hasbara, which is conducted solely by state bodies, public diplomacy includes the participation and mobilization of public or para-public agencies, NGOs, opinion leaders and, more broadly, the whole of civil society, in Israel and beyond. Indeed, Israeli public diplomacy intends to rely on the Israeli and Jewish diasporas around the world to relay its messages.
The Various Concentric Circles of the System
At the heart of the system is the Army Spokesman’s Unit, which has been strengthened and supported by other state bodies. These include the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), responsible for communicating Israeli policy in the occupied territories; the Government Press Office and the National Information Directorate, which report to the Prime Minister’s Office; and, of course, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which can rely on its network of embassies and consulates to amplify the Israeli narrative abroad. These institutions form the first circle of actors in public diplomacy.
Next come pro-Israeli NGOs, which are not necessarily Israeli. Among the most active are American NGOs. These are the ones with the biggest budgets, influence, and resources. Some have been around for a long time, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the main American Jewish pro-Israeli lobby, or the American Jewish Committee (AJC).
Others have been created more recently, precisely to respond in their own way to the failures of Israeli communication and to fight against the intense boycott campaign of Israel initiated by the pro-Palestinian boycott movement BDS (Boycott Divestment Sanction). One of the most active is undoubtedly Stand with Israel, a Los Angeles-based NGO founded in 2001 by three Jewish Americans. With an annual budget in excess of $20 million and offices in eighteen different countries, this NGO carries out actions in favor of Israel in the digital field and on the ground, particularly on campuses. There are many others,Footnote 7 and most of them are now organized into networks to amplify their action. All these NGOs are thus, in one way or another, integrated and taken into account in Israel’s global communications system.
Finally, a third circle has been devised for individuals, opinion leaders or influential Israelis, or people with strong ties to Israel, who live outside Israel and are encouraged to improve Israel’s image and disseminate pro-Israeli narratives to their entourage abroad. To structure these individual initiatives, the Israeli government launched the Masbirim (“explanations”Footnote 8) project in 2010, which aimed to provide ready-to-use narratives on various topics concerning Israel. The initiative was not as successful as had been hoped, but it does demonstrate the willingness shown some fifteen years ago to integrate diaspora personalities, who will play an important role from October 7, 2023, onwards, as discussed later in the chapter.
Expanding the Scope of Psychological Warfare
Psychological warfare is not a new communications concept in Israel. It can be defined as the means of influencing enemy perceptions through the dissemination of false information or disinformation (Galili, Reference Galili2019, pp. 75–91). Given its nature, psychological warfare was mainly used on a confidential basis by the army’s intelligence units for enemy state agencies, and not integrated within the army’s communications services to produce mainstream narratives.
The Failed Beginnings of the Psychological Approach
Things changed with the Second Intifada (2000–2005), when Israel realized that Palestinians were making abundant use of this communication tactic, producing narratives and images for foreign journalists that amplified or distorted reality.Footnote 9
In 2005, the Center for Cognitive Operations was created. Its primary objective is to develop a doctrine and concepts for cognitive campaigns within the army in order to influence the perception, political position, and feelings and sentiments of a target audience. It is within this center that influence methods and various tools for evaluating the impact of campaigns are developed. These concepts were immediately put into practice the following year, with the war against Lebanon (2006). The challenge was to document the war “from the inside,” so as to accompany Israeli victories with a communications campaign tailored to reach the Israeli and Lebanese public. For example, the town of Bint Jbeil in Lebanon was chosen as a target by the Israeli army, which succeeded in occupying it; six years earlier, it was from this town that Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah had given a victorious speech after Israel’s withdrawal from the subject of Lebanon (2000). As part of a cognitive warfare operation, an Israeli colonel decided to hold a speech there after the capture of the town, in front of his soldiers, some of whom filmed and photographed with their own equipment, immortalizing the installation of an Israeli flag replacing that of Hezbollah. But, the doctrine of psychological warfare had not yet been fully integrated: The army spokesman decided not to broadcast the images, which were deemed too amateurish, leaving foreign journalists with no images of the event other than those eventually supplied by Hezbollah.
A first consequence to be drawn from this: Tsahal decided to reinforce its control over information from war zones by preventing the deployment of journalists, particularly foreign journalists, in contact with soldiers. But this strategy quickly backfired, as Tsahal found out during its next conflict: Operation Cast Lead in Gaza against Hamas, in December 2008–January 2009. Israel banned foreign journalists from entering the country, leaving them dependent on sources and correspondents in Gaza, some of whom were working under the control and threat of Hamas. As a result, foreign journalists found themselves inundated with images of Israeli attacks, while Israel, on the defensive, spent most of its communication time minimizing civilian casualties.
The publication of the GoldstoneFootnote 10 report in September 2009 was yet another political setback for Israel, as the document drew up a long list of accusations against the Israeli authorities (and, to a lesser extent, Hamas), accusing them of having committed acts that could constitute war crimes or even crimes against humanity. This shows that, despite the Israeli government’s manifest determination, its communication strategy, even when incorporating new concepts, is still faltering.
The Use of Social Networks
Even so, the army continues its mission and adapts to new means of communication. The early 2000s saw the development of the internet, social networks, and smartphones, revolutionizing the means of communication. In 2009, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Spokesman’s Unit opened its own Facebook page, Twitter (rebranded as X since July 2023) account, and YouTube channel to communicate information directly to internet users. A dedicated “new media” unit was created (Amsellem, Reference Amsellem2020).
The first effects were quickly felt. First, during the Gaza flotilla episode (May 2010).Footnote 11 In reaction to the incriminating images provided by the pro-Palestinian activists aboard the flotilla and widely relayed by the mainstream media, Tsahal decided to broadcast its own images just a few hours after the operation. This time, they showed militants armed with iron bars attacking the soldiers as soon as they arrived on the ship. The army had thus chosen to bypass the traditional media to give its perspective on the facts by broadcasting its own content; a procedure which was not common ten years ago and which paid off: international newsrooms were broadcasting the army’s images, which presented the pro-Palestinian militants as violent aggressors, faced with victimized soldiers.
With its new capabilities, Israel is breaking new ground in the digital field of warfare. During the Operation Pillar of Defense (November 2012), the IDF was the first army in the world to use Twitter to announce an imminent attack against an enemy actor on foreign soil. It was during this new conflict that psychological warfare was massively extended on social networks. It was possible to follow, minute by minute, the progress of Israel’s operations, testifying to its determination to impose its information content and combat its critics.
At the same time, and in order to wage psychological warfare, Israel was broadcasting on its networks videos of Palestinian rockets aimed at civilian targets in Israel; Hamas’ executions of Palestinians regarded as collaborators; and, in parallel, other content showing the army’s efforts to avoid civilian deaths. Each of these informational materials served a clear political purpose: to justify the Israeli attack, criminalize Hamas, and defend Israeli tactics on the ground. Noting the effects of its new communication, the IDF Spokesman’s Unit decided to create a unit dedicated to combat documentaries, to produce professional images directly from the battlefield.
Undoubtedly, Israel’s communication strategy was better. The Israeli authorities were able to produce and disseminate their narratives from their images, which were picked up massively on social networks and by foreign media. Psychological warfare worked this time, prompting Israel to strengthen this pole within its army: In 2018, a Department of Influence was created and placed under the control of the Operations Directorate, responsible for force deployment, reflecting a desire to integrate this aspect of Israel’s strategic communication at the very heart of its military operations.
Strong Digital Presence
The digital world is clearly a new theater of operations for Israeli communications. To maximize its influence, Tsahal does not hesitate to break with the reserve of other armies around the world, which are more circumspect when it comes to using social networks. Indeed, for some of its publications, the army seems to have adopted the language, codes, and vocabulary of social networks, sometimes even using ironic and sarcastic humor on sensitive subjects.Footnote 12 This surprising tone is, in fact, a clever strategy on the part of the “new media” unit to broaden its audience beyond its subscribers and detractors. This style of publication, which no other similar player takes on so frankly, is often widely relayed on social networks, precisely because they seem inappropriate – even if it means being criticized.
And it works. The Israeli army accumulates tens of millions of subscribers on various social networks (3.8 million on Facebook, nearly a million on YouTube), sometimes surpassing the US army’s account (on Twitter, e.g., with nearly 2.5 million subscribers); a considerable audience for a country of less than 9 million inhabitants, which also demonstrates the extent to which it is observed.
The advent of social networks radically changes the game for Israel. The traditional tools used by the Hasbara are not adapted to new needs and new ways of communicating. By the 2010s, Israel understood that its operations in the Palestinian territories were difficult to justify to an international audience. At the same time, groups and organizations hostile to Israel continued their work of delegitimization and virulent criticism, themselves producing biased information to broaden their audience via social networks. Where Hasbara used to campaign on university campuses and in international organizations, psychological warfare and public diplomacy are now being deployed more massively in the infosphere, with the aim of producing its own narrative to attack its adversaries head-on and disseminate its own version of the conflict, and more broadly, of Israeli society. All these doctrines have been put to the test in real-life conditions, during armed conflicts whose succession in recent years has required the Israeli authorities to be highly agile in measuring problems, evaluating successes and, finally, continually adapting. This experience proved invaluable for the vast campaign that the country launched on October 7.
Israel’s Communication from October 7 Onwards: An All-Out Strategy with Specific Objectives
Since the advent of social networks, the State of Israel has greatly evolved its doctrine in terms of strategic communication in order to anticipate, with the creation of a variety of narratives. To achieve this, the state has considerably increased its resources, both in terms of recruitment, with the creation of dedicated units or departments within the army or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in terms of distribution channels, since it is present on just about every major social media platform and in the main languages spoken. A whole ecosystem of public and para-public agencies is also functional to distribute varied and targeted information to different audiences.
From October 7 onwards, a new element was added to Israel’s communication strategy, particularly abroad: The Jewish and Israeli diasporas started massively acting as relays for Israeli narratives, so shocked were they by the nature of the attacks. Associations and influential figures mobilized their networks and expertise to relay and even produce information content.Footnote 13 The approach itself is not new, and indeed a number of associations and organizations around the world had set themselves the task of relaying this information; but the scale of the effort is totally unprecedented and has never before reached the level of commitment seen since October 7 among leading figures in the diaspora.
In the wake of the Hamas attacks, the Israeli government’s communications system will be able to deploy all its levers to achieve a number of political objectives aimed at target audiences that differ from one region to another. The number of initiatives, publications, information materials, and actions, both in the physical world and in the cyber field, has been so great that it is not possible to give an exhaustive presentation. Nevertheless, in order to understand them all, we have chosen to structure our approach around the “major informational actions” that bring together the bulk of these initiatives and meet two clear political objectives: raising public awareness and justifying the military response.
Raising Public Awareness
To raise international public awareness of the attacks of October 7, Israel will carry out four informational actions to produce and disseminate its narratives. For the Hebrew state, this communication has several sub-objectives: Internally, the aim is to unite and mobilize the country, whose unity has been weakened, while responding to the high expectations of the population following the attacks; internationally, the challenge is to raise public awareness of the unprecedented nature of the attacks to create a feeling of empathy and support. The ambitions are therefore immense, which explains the extensive resources deployed by the Israeli authorities and their relays around the world.
Intense Digital Campaign
On October 8, Israel launched an intense social networking campaign to raise awareness among Western public opinion. Through hundreds of publications, the Hebrew state hammered home several messages that helped to raise awareness among international public opinion. We have identified three main messages:
Hamas is equivalent to the Islamic State. Many of its publications are accompanied by the hashtag #hamasIsis or #hamasisIsis. The aim is to elicit the same rejection from Western opinion as the macabre acts of Islamic State fighters did a decade ago.
Hamas is the embodiment of Islamist terrorism, which will also target Western countries. Several visuals show armed men in tunnels under the Eiffel Tower or the Louvre Pyramid. The message is clear: Israel is the West’s outpost, and the fight it will wage against Hamas is part of a global struggle by Islamist terrorism against Western countries.
Hamas’ actions are a continuation of the antisemitism acts perpetrated by the Nazis. It can no longer be considered a political or even a terrorist organization. A number of publications have pointed out the anti-Jewish passages in the Hamas charter, while a telephone conversation between a terrorist on October 7 calling his parents to boast that he had killed “10 Jews” – not Israelis – with his own hands was broadcast. In this context, to support the Hamas project, which aims not at a two-state solution, but at “liberating Palestine from the river [Jordan] to the sea [Mediterranean],” is tantamount to supporting this antisemitism project.
The Means Deployed
To support these narratives, Israel chose, for the first time in such a rapid and massive way, to sponsor content, photos, or videos, to enable its messages to be pushed before viewing YouTube videos or directly into the newsfeeds of social network accounts (see Figure 7.1). Thus, all over the world, thousands (if not millions) of internet users found themselves with commercials warning of Hamas attacks. The commercials were also tailored to the target audience: For adults, violent, barely blurred images showed certain Hamas attacks, while before the YouTube videos for children under six (who couldn’t read) were broadcast, a message addressed to parents explained that dozens of Israeli minors had been killed or kidnapped, and that Israel would do whatever was necessary to get them back.
Figure 7.1 Screenshots from social media showing content promoted by Israel through purchased advertising space (“ads”) displayed on users’ accounts, before their video (YouTube) or in their newsfeed (X/Twitter).
Figure 7.1Long description
The screenshots reveal the following:
1. An advertisement displays the words, ceasefire, cease fire, cease fire, and notes that many people use this term without fully understanding its implications. The ad claims that a ceasefire would only enable Hamas, leading to more cycles of violence and terrorism. The instruction, watch, is provided, with a linked video below. The thumbnail shows military personnel stockpiling ammunition.
2. A screenshot of the advertisement on a user's X newsfeed, dated October 11, 2023, shows four photos of devastated buildings accompanied by a few lines of text. The text reads: They went from house to house. Burned people alive. Murdered entire families. Children. Babies. We will not be silent. May the memories of the victims of Kibbutz Beeri be a blessing. This advertisement has garnered 8.5 million views.
3. A YouTube ad titled, Hamas declared war against Israel. Against a dark background, the text reads: To protect our citizens against these barbaric terrorists.
4. A set of three ad video stills. The first still features a young man and woman smiling, with the text, Hamas, a vicious terrorist organization, murdered over 940 overlaid on their photos. The second still shows an older man speaking on C N N, accompanied by text that reads: She was either dead on the left side of the screen, and, Breaking News, C N N at site of deadly Hamas siege on Kibbutz, where 100 killed, below. The third still displays multiple rainbows with the text, by the Hamas terrorists, followed by ISIS within parentheses, overlaid on top.
A journalist (Galer Smith, S. [@sophiasgaler]) on X (previously Twitter) revealed that between October 7 and 19, 2023, eighty-eight different commercials were broadcast in some twenty countries, at a cost of over $7 million. France was by far the most targeted country, with spending estimated at €3.8 million, which would have resulted in almost 445 million screen impressions (number of times the ad was displayed on a screen); followed by Germany (€1.9 million for 231 million impressions). For the period from October 7 to November 6, Google’s advertising transparency center lists around 200 spots paid for by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interestingly, the same pro-Israeli content received relatively little sponsorship in the United States (around €50,000). Does this mean that Israel takes the support of the US government for granted, as does a large part of its public opinion? If this is the reasoning, it could be considered partly false, given the unprecedented mobilization for Gaza, particularly on American campuses. It would also mean that Israel considers Europe to be a politically uncertain partner, given the considerable financial efforts made by the major European powers.
This advertising campaign organized by Israel is just one part of Israel’s vast digital strategy on social networks. Indeed, since the 2010s, we have seen how the state has strengthened its resources to be more effective on social networks, with the recruitment of people dedicated to “new media” within the army or ministries.
Thus, the official accounts of the State of Israel, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Tsahal on the networks (7 million on TikTok; 215,000 on YouTube; 1.5 million on X; 1 million on Instagram; 890,000 on Facebook) accumulate several million subscribers and publish dozens of messages, photos, and videos to disseminate Israeli narratives, even if this is strongly criticized. Indeed, the comments on these publications regularly generate far more negative and pro-Palestinian comments, but this doesn’t stop Israel from continuing to publish in order to get its messages across.
David Sarangua, Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Digital Office, estimates that in the first month of the conflict (October 8–November 8, 2023), Israel had published over 2,500 messages in English on its networks, reaching over a billion people, thanks to innovative content and sponsored publications.
The Israeli authorities have also authorized the broadcast of interrogations of Palestinian terrorists arrested on October 7. In an exchange in Arabic with the Israelis who questioned them, the latter declared that their organization, in committing the acts of October 7, had behaved worse than the Islamic State and had the objective of killing civilians and raping women.
The state and its various entities are not the only players. Israeli society has also mobilized to produce original, viral content. Such is the case of the famous Israeli TV show, Eretz Nehederet (“A Wonderful Country”), a comedy program broadcast weekly for the past twenty years. Since October 7, comedians have been staging satirical episodes to denounce the use of civilians by Hamas and antisemitism acts by students on American campuses. These videos have been viewed millions of times on YouTube and relayed massively on social networks.
There’s plenty more content and narratives to criticize Hamas and its supporters, or the silence of certain international organizations in the wake of the attacks. We can’t list them all, but let’s end with the initiative of a rather art-oriented Israeli content creator, Hila Yerushalmi, who produced and broadcast a video on YouTube to denounce the silence of international organizations against the rape of Israeli women. Her content was then relayed by thousands of people as part of a social networking campaign entitled “Rape is not resistance.”
The Israeli Hostage Campaign
Another key aspect of Israel’s communications strategy was the vast campaign for the release of the hostages. Their exceptional numbers and profiles (very young children, women, and the elderly) created a shock in Israel and in the diasporas, which mobilized to demand their release.
Objective and Strategy
This mobilization was not specifically aimed at the Israeli government, whose war aims to secure their release. It was aimed, above all, at the Western world, to arouse emotion and solidarity with the families in their fight for the hostages’ release. One initiative proved particularly successful: the one originally organized by hostage families who wanted to appeal to the world and publicize the victims. Via WhatsApp groups, these families distributed posters with the photos and main details (including age) of all the hostages, framed by large, easily identifiable red stripes and accompanied by a message in English: “Bring them home.” Pages and accounts on social networks were created on October 10 with this name, and the hashtag of the same name was quoted in publications.
The initiative aroused a great deal of interest in Israel, where hundreds of volunteers were taking part in collage campaigns featuring photos of the hostages. It’s interesting to see how digital action produces real-world effects, as the files with the hostages’ photos circulated in various Signal, Telegram and WhatsApp groups, and were then printed and pasted on city walls. Very quickly, the group became structured, collected donations, and benefited from the support of professional figures such as David Meidan, a former Mossad officer who led the negotiations for the release of Israeli soldier Guilad Shalit (2006–2011).
International Relays
The campaign provoked a huge international response, particularly in Western countries, where a number of organizations and personalities, mostly from Jewish communities or the Israeli diaspora, were organizing poster campaigns in various public places or relaying the photos on their social networks. The National Council of Jewish Women in the United States was the first (October 19) to take up this initiative and organize collages in the United States; the Union des étudiants juifs did the same in Belgium, then in France.
Still within the Jewish community, and notably within associative networks, other initiatives accompanied the movement, with the creation of dedicated groups (“the October 7 collective”) and the organization of occasional actions beyond the collages (e.g., weekly gatherings). Various town councils in France relayed the campaign; in Nice, for example, the town council financed street billboards.
The element that certainly contributed most to the popularity of this campaign was the negative reaction of supporters of the Palestinian cause. Believing that these actions amounted to propaganda, or at least failed to shed light on the Palestinian victims of the conflict, dozens of people were filmed tearing down the posters, provoking widespread indignation and helping to amplify the campaign.
Aware of the communicative potential of this campaign for Israel’s image, the Israeli authorities are also investing time and resources to finance larger scale poster campaigns. We learned that the Israeli government had prepared a large-scale campaign to display photos of the hostages in the Netherlands a few days before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) hearings requested by South Africa, which accuses Israel of genocide in Gaza (January 2024). The official aim of the poster campaign was to “raise awareness of the need to free the hostages held captive by Hamas”; but the political maneuvering, given the timing and choice of location, is beyond doubt. However, a dozen poster companies in the Netherlands turned down the contract with the Israeli government, which nevertheless promised to organize several other awareness-raising campaigns in the country.
Field Visits
Israel’s other major communications initiative to raise public awareness of the October 7 attacks was the organization of visits to Israel, sometimes to the scene of the attack.
Traditional Channels and Channels of Communication
While the military response had already begun and the ground operation was being prepared, the State of Israel was organizing visits by foreign delegations who wished to express their solidarity or who had come to see what had happened. These visits were a crucial moment for Israel, as they could raise awareness among a very broad public.
Throughout the month of October, a number of leading political figures (the US president, the German chancellor, the British prime minister, the Italian prime minister, the Dutch prime minister, and the French president) came to Israel to meet politicians, hostage families, and victims. Other politicians (MPs, senators, mayors, presidents of opposition parties) have also visited Israel, and sometimes even the sites of the massacres. In a moment of palpable emotion, several leaders made political statements that met the expectations of the Israeli authorities, but also provoked criticism in their own countries. For example, during her visit to Israel on October 13, the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von Der Leyen, affirmed her unconditional support for Israel, which irritated some European countries concerned about the situation in Gaza. During his visit to Israel on October 24, President Emmanuel Macron spoke of mobilizing the international coalition against the Islamic State to combat Hamas, a statement that upset some 100 French diplomats, who denounced in an internal memo a risk to France’s position in the Arab world.
Beyond the political world, Israel also wanted to show the violence of the attacks to delegations of journalists, so that they too could relay what happened that day. Several of them were invited to visit the scene of the attack, while the army and rescue services were still working in some areas to recover bodies from burned-out houses and blood-covered rooms. Live broadcasts were organized from the scene, sometimes behind trucks filled with unidentified bodies. By mobilizing foreign journalists, Israel is enabling foreign newsrooms to produce and broadcast news content to raise global awareness of the scale of the destruction.
Digital Influence
Israel also mobilized social network influencers to communicate about the attacks. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized visits to the attacked kibbutz by a number of Israeli influencers, whose interests had absolutely nothing to do with politics; the aim was to enable the dissemination of images on various social platforms such as Instagram, X, or TikTok and to reach a wider audience not necessarily interested in political news. The two most talked-about influencers at the time, Maja Kravarusic and Alina Rabinovich, who specialize in fashion and cooking, published a number of images usually reserved for journalists.
Israel, through its Ministry for the Diaspora and the Fight against Antisemitism (The Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, 2023), explains that it has mobilized Israel’s biggest influencers (TV presenters, models, and actors with tens of millions of subscribers worldwide) for visits to the field to tell, document, broadcast, and bear witness to the October 7 attacks.
This strategy was not limited to Israel. Several French influencers, including one of the best-known, Magalie Berdah, visited Israel at the invitation of an Israeli rescue NGO (Zaka). Although this visit was made possible with the agreement of the Israeli army, it was nonetheless the initiative of a non-state actor, confirming the ability of the Israeli system to rely on relays other than its state institutions, in line with its doctrine of public diplomacy.
Another visit was far more strategic for Israel in terms of digital influence: that of Elon Musk, head of X, who visited a kibbutz near Gaza on November 27 in the presence of the Israeli prime minister. His visit to Israel is significant for several reasons: In addition to his position at X, he is one of the most followed personalities on this network (170 million subscribers), making him a particularly influential intermediary. He is also the head of StarLink, a company that provides internet connection to territories where none exists. However, at the end of October, Israel decided to cut off all internet connections to the Gaza Strip in order to hinder terrorist activity; Musk announced that he would deploy his satellite network to reestablish the connection to Gaza, which greatly concerned the Israeli Minister of Communications, Shlomo Karhi. After Musk’s visit, the same minister proudly announced that he had signed an agreement in principle with StarLink to deploy its satellite network in Gaza only with Israel’s agreement.
Since then, Elon Musk has been a strong supporter of Israel, proudly wearing a “Bring them home” necklace in the shape of a military identification tag, given to him by the mother of a hostage who showed him a video of her son being kidnapped by Hamas.
The Video of the October 7 Attacks
The final key element in Israel’s communication strategy was the broadcast, from October 23 onwards, of a forty-minute film, edited by the Israeli army from video recordings made at the time of the attack. These videos were recovered from several sources, both Israeli (security cameras, witnesses’ and victims’ telephones) and Palestinian (terrorists’ GoPro).
From Communication Object to Political Object
What’s most interesting about this video is not so much its content, most of which can be viewed on various Telegram channels, but the fact that it has become a political communication tool in its own right. Indeed, rather than broadcasting it widely, the Hebrew state chose to include extremely violent sequences (decapitation, execution at close range, violence against children, etc.) to show some of the atrocities perpetrated against its population. Out of respect for the victims and in order to comply with platform distribution rules, the Israeli authorities decided to target the film’s viewers. This decision lends political weight to the video, access to which becomes rare. Indeed, only a handful of people were invited to participate in these viewing sessions, which were usually supervised by an Israeli representative. The effect of scarcity immediately made it a political phenomenon in the media, where a handful of journalists recounted part of what they had seen, using words that amplified the phenomenon (“unbearable images,” “unspeakable horrors,” etc.).
The video was first shown in Israel, to a limited number of foreign journalists who were told that it was forbidden to film the screen; the only images they were allowed to shoot were those showing the journalists’ faces during the broadcast, some of whom were covering their eyes or leaving the room. From a purely communications point of view, these images of distraught journalists were perhaps more effective in achieving the desired effect than broadcasting the gruesome scenes themselves.
The same scenes occurred in other circles: in front of American senators, in the French National Assembly or Senate. The network of Israeli embassies around the world was also mobilized to broadcast the video to selected audiences within their walls. Although the exact list is not known, we do know that screenings of the film were held in Geneva, Berlin, Brussels, and Madrid, as well as in Latin America (Santiago de Chile) and at the UN.
Invited by the French Embassy in Israel, as part of a screening reserved for French researchers, we also viewed this video. Before doing so, we were asked to sign an undertaking – later given to embassy staff – to not film the scenes out of respect for the victims. More interestingly, the document recalled the political objective of this viewing: The video aims to show and prove the atrocities of the October 7 attacks, at a time when voices were being raised around the world to contest their veracity.
Another interesting element: The text submitted explained that Israel’s aim was precisely to target opinion leaders, influential people in political, media, and intellectual circles, so that they could bear witness to what they had seen. In a quick exchange with embassy staff, we learned that screenings had been carried out in Russia and China; we didn’t get any precise answers about the Arab world, where Holocaust denial is most widespread.
International Relays
As with these other campaigns, the Hebrew state was also able to mobilize the Israeli and Jewish diaspora around the world to relay the video. The most emblematic case is that of Israeli actress Gal Gadot. Famous around the world for playing the iconic Wonder Woman character, now based in the United States where she is pursuing her career, Gal Gadot gathers tens of millions of followers on her various social networks (over 100 million on the Instagram platform alone). Sensitized by the attacks of October 7, she managed to get a copy of the video from the Tsahal spokesperson, so that it could be shown at her home to a private circle of personalities from the American film industry.
A few days later, renowned American film director Steven Spielberg announced an initiative to collect video testimonies from survivors of the October 7 event. In France, it was host and producer Arthur who produced and broadcast on CNews a report on these events (“Supernova–massacre at the rave party”) at the end of December 2023. More than a simple assembly of previously published images, this report features previously unpublished content, obtained directly from Israelis present at the scene or from videos of the assailants; all elements that suggest this report could not have been made without authorizations or direct contacts with the Israeli authorities.
As you can see, Israel has succeeded in using filmed scenes of the massacres to create an object of political communication, relayed by its network of embassies abroad and by various players in the diaspora.
Justifying the Military Response
In addition to the various awareness campaigns organized by Israel, the authorities have also organized a dedicated communication campaign to justify and defend its military response. Here, we have identified two main mechanisms implemented mainly by the army, which has absolute control over communications in the military arena.
Here too, the objectives are twofold: to assure the Israeli population that the sacrifice they are making is necessary and worthwhile; and at the same time, to provide proof to the world that Israel is deploying proportionate force to achieve its war aims, while protecting Palestinian civilians as far as possible.
The Army Spokesman’s Press Briefing
Ever since the early days of the conflict, Israelis have been waiting for a live television report on the security situation in the country. Initially scheduled to last just a few minutes, this press briefing had expanded to become a full-fledged press conference, lasting between 20 and 30 minutes. Occasionally, journalists were invited to take the floor to question the spokesman, who presented a whole range of visual representations (maps, satellite images, sound recordings, and videos) to explain current operations and demonstrate Israel’s ability to destroy the threat posed by Hamas.
Explaining the War
The content of this daily news item has evolved with the conflict: Initially confined to the domestic situation, it now presents the situation on all the fronts on which Israel is engaged (West Bank, the North, Syria, Yemen, etc.). Its news content will then be picked up and commented on by all the media in the country, enabling the army’s narrative to spread to the whole of Israeli society and beyond. An English version is also available to enable international newsrooms to directly retrieve information produced by the army. This is a classic Hasbara system: Information is produced and distributed directly by the military authorities to journalists, who then pick it up and distribute it.
On the domestic front, this appointment is a political success, thanks in particular to the stature and personality of the spokesperson, Daniel Hagari, a former commander of the IDF’s most prestigious unit, the Shayetet 13, the elite commandos renowned for carrying out perilous and secret actions in enemy territory. According to a poll carried out five weeks after the start of the conflict, almost three-quarters of Israelis (73.7 percent) consider Daniel Hagari to be the most reliable source of information on the conflict, an interesting figure given that only 4 percent put Prime Minister Netanyahu in first place (Bagno, Reference Bagno2023). Despite the political crisis and Benjamin Netanyahu’s low popularity, Israelis still have confidence in the army and therefore in the state in this war.
Showing Success
The second strong expectation Israelis have of their leaders is their ability to secure the release of the hostages. To achieve this, the Israeli government’s strategy has been to intensify its attacks on Hamas in order to corner it and force it to negotiate a truce in exchange for the release of hostages. This position was not easy to maintain in the face of public opinion, which was very strongly committed to and mobilized for the release of the hostages. Various informational maneuvers by Hamas were aimed precisely at increasing the pressure on Israeli civil society via the hostages, so that it would demand a ceasefire from its government.Footnote 14
The release of around a hundred hostages under an agreement concluded at the end of October between Israel and Hamas via Qatar was seen as a victory for the Israeli government, justifying its military strategy. The state’s communication apparatus therefore used and staged these releases, producing videos and images in which the symbols of the state were omnipresent: Once freed, the families were photographed in front of a large Israeli flag, surrounded by sympathetic soldiers. The images made the rounds on social networks and in the Israeli media.
Videos from the Field
To justify the war, the Hebrew state was not content with producing information from a command center or hospitals in Israel; it organized the production of informational material directly from the combat zones to justify the army’s action.
Live Warfare: Images from the Field
To ensure control of the war news, the army completely closed the Gaza territory to the foreign press; only Al Jazeera, which has correspondents on the spot and is fully established in the territory, could continue to broadcast its own images. The aim is not to make ongoing operations opaque, but, on the contrary, to be able to broadcast information produced and/or controlled by the Israeli army.
The two main producers of content are the Israeli army and foreign journalists authorized to film in areas designated by Tsahal. To be effective, the army deployed troops from the Spokesman’s Unit to film and photograph war scenes. At the same time, several soldiers were equipped with front-facing cameras to capture first-person footage of battle scenes; some of these videos were then retrieved and posted on the army’s various social networks. Finally, reports from occupied areas will be produced entirely by the army, which takes every step to make this production as professional as possible (cameras, no smartphones, drones for large fields, microphones, etc.). The spokesperson, Daniel Hagari, was on hand to show, camera in hand, the Hamas tunnels under Palestinian hospitals.
All these means and devices are aimed at documenting the war and putting across several messages to justify Israel’s action and denounce Hamas’ actions. The main Israeli narrative aims to criminalize Hamas, not just for its actions against Israel but for its attitude that dangerously exposes Gaza’s civilian population. To this end, Israel provides images from the field showing weapon caches, tunnel entrances, and rocket launchers installed directly in schools, mosques, or hospitals. In its videos, Israel also shows how the equipment of international organizations benefits (intentionally or not) Hamas, with the presence of United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)Footnote 15 or Red Cross stamped equipment in the terrorists’ caches in the tunnels.
The other aim of these communications operations from the field is also psychological warfare. Israel wants to show its competitors that it is winning the war, that defections and arrests of militants are multiplying, and ultimately that Hamas is completely losing control of the territory. Videos of dozens of Palestinians posing as Hamas members are posted on the networks, with some accusing their leaders of betraying them.
Finally, there’s another source of information from the field that Israel exploited to its advantage: films produced by Hamas fighters themselves who, in a reverse psychological campaign, film their surprise attacks on Israeli tanks or soldiers. On social networks, images from these films are extracted and broadcast by Israel to show that Hamas fighters are purposely dressed as civilians to deceive soldiers and expose real civilians.
Protecting Palestinian Civilians
The other aim of these images from the field is to show that Israel is making considerable efforts to protect the civilian population of Gaza, and that its war is directed exclusively against Hamas. This communication work is not so important for the Israeli population, which is more concerned about the hostages and soldiers involved. On the other hand, it is of vital importance to international leaders, both in the West and among Israel’s Arab partners. Their position of support or moderate criticism of Israel would be more difficult to maintain in the eyes of public opinion if these states did not have guarantees and material proof that Israel is implementing a policy aimed at minimizing civilian casualties and protecting the Palestinian population as much as possible.
To this end, Israel produces a whole series of elements to justify itself: leaflets thrown from an airplane, audio clips of telephone calls advising inhabitants to leave, organization of population movements via secure corridors, resumption of humanitarian truck deliveries, and so on. In addition to protecting civilians, the army is also keen to show how it is helping the population by distributing food and water. All these actions will be relayed on social networks by the army’s official accounts, then by Israel’s entire digital ecosystem.
Conclusion
During this new war, Israel demonstrated it had learned from its previous communication mistakes in past conflicts. Indeed, we can see that the Israeli communication apparatus has been working at full speed, deploying numerous strategies to reach very different target audiences.
This chapter focuses on Israeli actions, all of which have been deployed for Israel and the world, mainly in English-language versions. However, given the nature of the conflict, the historical relationship between Israel and the Arab world, and recent political agreements with a number of Muslim countries (the Abraham Agreement), Israel has also deployed a specific communications strategy aimed at the Arab world. It goes beyond the major Arab media, most of which are believed to deliver a biased discourse according to the Israeli government; this is particularly true of the Qatari channel Al Jazeera, long known for its almost absolute support of the Palestinian cause. Israel’s efforts have not focused specifically on producing content dedicated to the Arab world – although this has been done too – but more on adapting the way this content was broadcast and presented.
Since October 7, and perhaps for the first time in decades, Israel had an urgent need to get its narratives across to wage its war against Hamas. It had to mobilize its deeply divided society around a widely criticized government and, at the same time, provide sufficiently convincing elements for Tsahal to be able to carry out its response with the support (or silence) of its allies and partners.
Was Israel’s communication strategy effective? It all depends on whose objectives. According to a study carried out in mid-December 2023 and broadcast by an Israeli channel, the overwhelming majority of publications on social networks and articles in the major international media concerning the war against Hamas were unfavorable to the Hebrew state. Of the nearly 2 million publications that received at least 500 likes, shares, and comments, 83 percent were against the Hebrew state, compared with 9 percent in support of Israel. So, if Israel had set itself the goal of convincing the majority of internet users of the merits of its military action, the answer is clearly “no.”
But the effectiveness of a communications strategy must be assessed in relation to the political objectives that have been defined. And the question is whether this unpopularity on the internet and the hundreds of pro-Gaza demonstrations around the world have prevented Israel from taking action on the ground and led the government to lose the support of its population.
On the contrary, what has been observed since October 7 is that, thanks to its communications campaigns, Israel has succeeded in massively rallying its population, which, despite its losses, continues to strongly support the military action, and in creating a wave of solidarity on the part of all Western countries. This situation has had very concrete political consequences: military and economic support from the United States, which has released a special envelope of $14 billion and dispatched an imposing naval air fleet to the region; political support from European leaders, despite criticism and calls for restraint in the face of the death toll in Gaza. As for the Arab countries, many of which were planning to break their normal ties with Israel, none have done so to date. Better still, Israel can count on certain influential members of these countries to relay its narratives.
In the months following October 7, we can therefore consider that the political objectives of Israel’s strategic communication have been achieved. However, as the conflict is taking hold, the effects of this communication strategy could have been challenged by further geopolitical developments, including digital influence campaigns launched by other major players in the conflict such as Qatar. But since then, Israel’s political objectives appear to have evolved as well. The prime minister can rely on a decline in the pro-Palestinian mobilization worldwide, while the return of Donald Trump to power in the United States ensure him strengthened support.
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