This chapter of the handbook suggests some lessons from moral psychology for ethics and metaethics. The authors note that empirical research on a wide range of topics, including moral character, happiness and well-being, free will and moral responsibility, and moral judgment, has had a profound influence on recent philosophical theorizing about the foundations of morality. In their chapter they focus on one issue of particular importance: the reliability and trustworthiness of moral judgment. They critically assess three lines of argument that threaten to undermine epistemic confidence in our moral judgments, namely process debunking arguments, arguments from disagreement, and arguments from irrelevant influences. Though the jury is still out on how successful these arguments are, there is little question that they have potentially profound implications both for moral epistemology and philosophical methodology. Perhaps the most important lesson for ethics and metaethics to be drawn from moral psychology, then, may be that future progress in moral philosophy is likely to depend on philosophers and psychologists working together, rather than in isolation from one another.

This chapter of the handbook discusses the moral dimensions of political attitudes and behavior. The authors argue that a person’s political views – both at the level of political ideology as a whole and views on specific matters of economic and social policy – are profoundly shaped by their beliefs about right and wrong. These political views in turn drive people’s political behavior, not just at the ballot box or on the campaign trail, but in the community more generally. One downside of the way in which moral convictions fuel political attitudes and behavior is that they tend to interfere with productive communication across partisan divides, fueling a kind of animosity that stifles cooperation and compromise. Divergence in people’s moral convictions, then, leads inexorably to political polarization and gridlock. To address this problem, the authors discuss a number of potentially promising interventions, some of which target individuals’ attitudes (e.g., promoting empathy, reducing negative stereotypes), and others that aim at improving the quality of interpersonal relationships (e.g., increasing contact, fostering dialogue across political divides).

This chapter of the handbook examines the foundational role of norms in moral psychology, a topic that has long garnered cross-disciplinary interest from philosophy to biology, from anthropology to computer science. The authors touch briefly on the debates over potentially different types of norm (e.g., conventional, social, moral, legal) and maintain that social and moral norms, in particular, are difficult to separate unless one adopts a specific theoretical position. The authors’ treatment centers on a core feature of most or all social and moral norms: that people, in complying or not complying with norms, are sensitive to other community members’ norm-relevant beliefs and attitudes. By recognizing this sensitivity, scientists can, first, gain a better scientific understanding of norm inference, the complex processes by which people learn which norms apply to a given setting and how strong the norms are; and second, they can better diagnose whether (and how strongly) a given norm exists in a community. All these insights pave the way for potential interventions on people’s beliefs about the community’s norms, which are easier to change than individual moral convictions.

This chapter of the handbook introduces readers to the field of moral psychology as a whole and provides them with a guide to the volume. The authors delineate the landscape of morality in terms of five phenomena extensively studied by moral psychologists: moral behavior, moral judgments, moral sanctions, moral emotions, and moral communication, all against a background of moral standards. They then provide brief overviews of research on a few topics not assigned a dedicated chapter in the book (e.g., the moral psychology of artificial intelligence, free will, and moral responsibility), noting several other topics not treated in depth (e.g., the neuroscience of morality, links between moral and economic behavior, moral learning). In the last section of the chapter, the authors summarize each of the contributed chapters in the book.

This chapter of the handbook presents a large body of evidence suggesting that, within the first year of life, infants hold both expectations about and preferences for morally good versus bad protagonists. The authors show that, across different methods, infants distinguish between morally significant acts of helping and hindering as well as between acting fairly and unfairly; they prefer the morally good actions and the morally good protagonists; and they expect others to prefer the morally good protagonists as well. Going beyond a mere valence difference, these expectations vary systematically in response to critical factors, such as the victim’s state of need, in-group/out-group membership, and an actor’s intentions. Many of the findings appear in infants 8–12 months of age, some as early as 3 months of age. Many questions remain, such as how consistent the findings are across experimenters and populations; whether the violated norm is truly moral or only a social expectation; or to what extent earliest learning guides these expectations and preferences. But overall, the evidence for budding moral distinctions in early infancy is highly compelling and provocative.

This chapter of the handbook highlights that, for successful social living, humans’ capacity to be prosocial had to surpass their capacity for selfish and harmful behavior. The authors provide an overview of the scientific study of prosocial capacities, with a focus on experimental research. Summarizing extensive work in laboratory paradigms of behavioral economics and social psychology, the authors document a strong human tendency toward behaving prosocially. They then briefly examine the phylogenetic and developmental origins of behaving prosocially and its different motives, such as reputational concerns and caring for others, as well as emotions that facilitate prosocial behavior, such as empathy or guilt. The authors also summarize insights from cognitive neuroscience on the brain networks that undergird prosocial behavior. They close with a call for more naturalistic experimental paradigms and the consideration of temporal dynamics of prosocial behavior.

This chapter of the handbook proposes a developmental ethics, an organic moral theory grounded in (1) humanity’s deep evolutionary history, (2) the malleability of the child’s neurobiological structures that undergird moral functioning, and (3) the influence of cultural practices on neurobiological development. The chapter addresses the following questions: What kind of creature are we? What qualities do we need to live a full life? What kinds of capacities make each a proper member of the species? What influences our development? Answers center around perhaps the most critical influence on human development, our species’ evolved nest. In humanity’s ancestral context, nestedness is a lifelong experience with particular import in early life. Moral virtue emerges from holistically coordinated physiological, psychological, spiritual systems oriented toward holistic communal harmony, social attunement, receptivity, and interpersonal flexibility. Understanding how the evolved nest scaffolds biopsychosocial and moral development reveals why antisocial behavior is so pervasive in modern Western culture – and it provides a baseline for redesigning society to promote prosociality.

This chapter of the handbook asks whether, and in what ways, emotions can be designated as “moral”. Several emotions have been shown to be associated with moral judgments or moral behaviors. But more than association must be shown if we label some emotions characteristically moral. The author guides the reader through a voluminous literature and applies two criteria to test the moral credentials of emotions. The first criterion is whether the emotion is significantly elicited by moral stimuli; the second is whether it has significant community-benefiting consequences. This second criterion, less often used in past analyses, tries to capture the fact that moral norms, judgments, and decisions are all intended to benefit the community, so moral emotions should too. From this analysis, the author concludes that anger clearly meets the criteria, contempt and disgust less so. Guilt passes easily, and shame fares better than some may expect. Among the positive candidates, compassion and empathy both meet the criteria but are somewhat difficult to separate. Finally, elevation and awe have numerous prosocial consequences, but awe is rarely triggered by moral stimuli.

This chapter of the handbook tackles the question of how first-person moral judgments and moral behavior are conceptually linked. The authors frame their discussion in terms of a philosophical puzzle known as “Hume’s Problem.” The puzzle arises from the conjunction of three ideas: Humeanism, the idea that beliefs alone do not suffice to motivate action; internalism, the idea that moral judgments are intrinsically motivating; and cognitivism, the idea that moral judgments are beliefs. These three ideas are jointly inconsistent, so at least one of them must be false. But which one? The authors focus their attention on two possible solutions to the puzzle: the externalist solution, which denies that moral judgments are intrinsically motivating (rescinding internalism); and the noncognitivist solution, which denies that moral judgments are beliefs (rescinding cognitivism). Based on the psychological and neuropsychological evidence bearing on these proposals, however, it appears that neither of these solutions to Hume’s Problem has solid empirical support.

This chapter of the handbook discusses the role of mind perception in the categorization of individuals as moral agents and moral patients. Moral agents are defined as individuals that can commit morally wrong actions; moral patients are defined as individuals that can be morally wronged. It is generally agreed that the attribution of moral agency and moral patiency is linked to the attribution of mental capacities and traits. The chapter surveys a variety of models of mind perception, some of which focus on the representation of mental capacities, some of which focus on the representation of mental traits. The dominant model of mind perception in moral psychology is the experience-agency model, which divides the space of mindedness into experiential capacities like sentience and self-awareness, and agentic capacities like deliberative reasoning and self-control. Reviewing the empirical literature on moral categorization, the author argues that neither the experience-agency model nor any of the major alternatives to it captures all the factors to which everyday attributions of moral agency and moral patiency are sensitive.

This chapter of the handbook tackles a frequently discussed topic in moral psychology: moral dilemmas. The authors offer a normative characterization of moral dilemmas as a situation in which every available course of action involves a difficult moral trade-off and it is morally appropriate for the agent to feel conflicted about the choices available. The authors then explore different empirical accounts of why some moral trade-offs are experienced as difficult or impossible to resolve. Among the most influential of these accounts is dual-process theory, which traces the experience of moral dilemmas to a conflict between a value backed by automatic emotional processes and a value backed by reflection. The authors argue against the dual-process account, and review empirical research bearing on the psychological mechanisms underpinning a person’s experience and resolution of moral dilemmas, as well as the phenomenon of “moral residue.” They argue that further empirical work is needed to understand how people weigh competing values against one another and that such understanding requires expanding the range of moral dilemmas to include cases beyond those targeted in recent research.

This chapter of the handbook compares the major moral sanctioning behaviors of blame and punishment from two perspectives: their cultural history and their underlying psychology. The author draws a dividing line between two phases of human evolution – before and after human settlement – and proposes that, before that watershed, moral sanctions were informal, nonhierarchical, and often mild, akin to today’s acts of moral blame among intimates. Soon after settlement, hierarchies emerged, in which punishment took hold as a new form of sanctioning, typically exacted by those higher up in the hierarchy, and eventually by institutions of punishment. The author reviews the empirical evidence on the cognitive and social processes underlying each of these sanctioning tools and proposes that their distinct cultural histories are reflected in their psychological properties we can observe today. Whereas blame is, on the whole, flexible, effective, and cognitively sophisticated, punishment is often more damaging, less effective, and can easily be abused – as in past and modern forms of institutional punishment.

This chapter of the handbook reviews empirical research on moral character, which has only recently attained a prominent role in psychology, in contrast to long traditions in ethics and education. A person’s moral character comprises their dispositions to think, feel, and act morally, and these dispositions are cross-situationally and temporally fairly consistent. Against a long-standing belief in psychology that the personality disposition of warmth most strongly influences people’s impressions of one another, the evidence suggests that moral character occupies this central position. Moral character exerts its influence on impressions quite independently of other personality traits, and it features prominently in people’s representations of their own personality as well. Moral character is also a central element in a person’s perceived identity – who the person is perceived to be “deep down.” The authors close by charting some of the features from which people infer another’s moral character, including their actions but also, critically, their mental states such as their goals and intentions.