The right to freedom of thought is not explicitly mentioned in the German Basic Law. This chapter examines whether and how freedom of thought might be implicitly protected in the Basic Law (GG), focusing on the right to freedom of belief, conscience and religion (Article 4 GG), the right to freedom of expression and information (Article 5 GG), the right to human dignity (Article 1(1) GG) and the general right of personality (Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 1(1) GG). Freedom of thought is sometimes mentioned in the literature in connection with freedom of belief, conscience and religion and freedom of expression and information as a necessary precondition for the formation of convictions and opinions. Inner freedom is an inherent aspect of human dignity, but only extreme forms of interference with the inner freedom of the person constitute a violation of this right. The general right of personality protects the prerequisites of personal freedom and self-determination and therefore could provide the most comprehensive protection for a person’s inner freedom. It is therefore argued that while freedom of thought is within the scope of protection of these four rights, it can be rooted in the general right of personality in particular.

Although section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms specifies the fundamental freedoms of ‘thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication’, only freedom of expression has been developed by the courts. These forgotten freedoms include freedom of thought. This chapter demonstrates how Canada’s own constitutional text and history supports a new recognition of freedom of thought that would overcome a recent history of forgetting this constitutional freedom. Canada’s own constitutional case law, read creatively, contains the seeds of a framework for freedom of thought, with upcoming potential to put arguments before the courts in cases where significant litigation efforts will be made. This chapter sets how the Canadian Charter protects specific elements of the right which are mental privacy, mental liberty and mental autonomy. The contemporary debate within the present international discussion generates an intellectual atmosphere and comparative case law that can support a remembering of the forgotten freedom of thought.

Liberty of thought is the first liberty that the Preamble to the Constitution of India aims to secure. Yet, one finds no mention of ‘thought’ as one of the protected freedoms under Part III of the Constitution, which safeguards fundamental rights. This chapter takes the first steps to address this riddle and locating the normative foundations for the right. It argues that while the Preambular ideal itself is insufficient to confer a substantive right, its role in judicial interpretation, along with the interrelationship between fundamental rights, provides a robust normative foundation for the right to freedom of thought in India. Specifically, the chapter discusses the development of the right to mental privacy in the context of brain-reading in Selvi, and later in Puttaswamy. The right to (mental) privacy read into dignity by the Supreme Court of India already takes steps towards constructing a forum internum, and on the other hand, the challenge of the vulnerability of the legal subject becomes evident in the context of the right to freedom of conscience. Regarding the absolute nature of the right, this chapter argues that only as a Preambular ideal is the liberty of thought absolute within the Indian legal framework.

France has been at the forefront of the philosophical reflection on freedom of thought, along with the related freedoms of opinion and of conscience. Today, freedom of thought is constitutionally protected under French law as affirmed in Article 11 which makes the ‘free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man’. However, freedom of thought has received limited attention in French legal scholarship and is seldom considered as a standalone and influential factor in legal disputes, some even suggesting that France may be falling behind other democratic states in terms of the effective affirmation and protection of freedom of conscience in particular. The aim of this chapter is to elucidate how the right to freedom of thought finds expression in French positive law, as well as how it has been used distinctively and practically by the courts, if at all. Following a concise examination of the underlying concept, this chapter considers the legal foundations of freedom of thought and its implementation within the judicial system, with particular focus on the Constitutional Council.

Article 19 of the Constitution of Japan, which states, “Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be violated,” guarantees freedom of thought, a historically significant right due to its absence in the previous 1889 Imperial Constitution and subsequent suppression of ideologies like communism and anti-imperialism. Post-Second World War reforms led to its explicit inclusion in the 1946 Constitution. Although there are not many lawsuits regarding whether government acts or statutes violate this right is into question, the Japanese Supreme Court (SCJ) has said something about the right. The SCJ has ruled that it primarily protects a person’s world vision or life view but does not cover all mental activities. The SCJ has identified both direct (e.g., compulsion to hold or confess specific thoughts) and indirect restrictions (e.g., a compulsion to school teachers to stand up and sing the national anthem at school ceremonies such as entrance and graduation), with some restrictions deemed constitutional if justified. In this sense, Freedom of thought is not absolute in Japan. The SCJ also addresses the balance of interests in private relations, acknowledging the indirect effect of constitutional rights.

The right to freedom of thought in Africa is governed by three frameworks. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not explicitly recognise this right but includes freedom of conscience and religion in Article 8. This provision covers both forum internum (absolute freedom of conscience) and forum externum (free practice of religion, subject to limitations). However, the African Commission and the African Court often conflate these rights, resulting in limited case law. Some cases suggest a broad interpretation of Article 8 to include various beliefs, implying freedom of thought, supported by related rights like freedom of expression. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child explicitly includes freedom of thought in Article 9, but its scope is unclear due to the lack of case law. This inclusion supports the extension of this right into adulthood under Article 8 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ensuring individuals retain their freedom of thought beyond childhood. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa does not explicitly mention freedom of thought, but this right can be inferred from the rights to free development of personality and participation in political and decision-making processes.

This chapter considers how the right to freedom of thought should be viewed in circumstances of injustice. Specifically, we discuss whether the right not to reveal thoughts, the right not to be punished for thoughts, or the right not to have thoughts impermissibly altered, should ever be overridden. Examples include whether histories of genocide can justify surveillance of antisemitic or racist attitudes, whether access to thoughts may be helpful in proving intent to discriminate, and whether internet privacy protections should yield in the face of uses of social media in ways that further structural injustice. The chapter concludes that defences of freedom of thought as an ideal may be less convincing in situations of significant injustice or threats of violence.

Digital technologies provide powerful new tools for covert influence strategies. The concept of ‘online manipulation’ has been used to describe a range of different practices, ranging from disinformation campaigns to targeted advertising and dark patterns. There is an emerging view in human rights scholarship that some of these practices may violate our right to freedom of thought. In this chapter, we argue that covert online influences undermine mental autonomy, and that the latter is protected by the right to freedom of thought. We propose that manipulative online practices interfere with freedom of thought when they affect one’s mental autonomy in a sufficiently global manner. We lay out a framework to establish when this threshold is reached, asking whether (1) the attempted influence or its originator was hidden, (2) the targeted person fell within a vulnerable category of individuals, or there existed an information or power asymmetry, (3) the attempted influence targeted a type of thought reaching a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance, or mental processes linked with core aspects of external autonomy; and (4) eventually considering the frequency and duration of the attempted influence.

This chapter examines freedom of thought in Colombia. No Constitution of Colombia has stipulated the right to freedom of thought since the country’s independence. However, its existence is currently undisputed in the Colombian legal system due to the Constitutional Court jurisprudence. Since 1997, the Court has defined this freedom as a stand-alone forum internum right and has delineated its content and attributes. However, case-law references to this right have been mainly rhetorical for at least three reasons. First, scepticism about its practical utility given that thoughts have been considered impossible to access. Second, cases related to the right to freedom of thought usually involve interests that also fall under the protective remit of other rights, which are directly stipulated by the Constitution. Third, the Court’s characterization of the relation and differences between the right to freedom of thought and other rights (i.e., freedom of expression and freedom of conscience) is inconsistent, complex, as well as conceptually and practically unclear. We do think it is necessary for the Colombian legal system to make advancements on the conceptual and normative independence of freedom of thought to reinforce the protection of the forum internum.

In recent discussions on the right to freedom of thought (RFoT) it has been emphasised that for an adequate understanding, development, and application of the right, one should consider how the RFoT relates to or complements other rights, such as the right to mental privacy, mental integrity and the freedom of expression. In this chapter, we examine the interrelationship between the RFoT and the protection of mental privacy and mental integrity. Considering the case of employing emerging neurotechnology in criminal justice, we explore how the absolute protection offered by the RFoT relates to the qualified protection of mental privacy and mental integrity offered by the right to respect for private life. We argue that, depending on the interpretation of these rights, they have the potential to overlap, which raises the need to develop a legal mechanism to distinguish absolute from qualified protection of mental privacy and mental integrity. We suggest three general factors that could be relevant in this regard: (1) the mental effects of an interference and the method of inducing them, (2) the victim’s vulnerability, and (3) the context of a mental interference.

This chapter explores the right to freedom of thought in Türkiye, focusing on its legal foundations and historical context from the early twentieth-century’s Kemalist reforms to the present day. It examines how Türkiye’s transition from the Ottoman Empire to a modern Republic has shaped its legal protections and political responses to dissent, religion, and political plurality. Highlighting the ongoing tension between constitutional secularism and the rise of Islamist-influenced politics, the chapter reveals how these dynamics continue to shape and restrict freedoms of thought and expression in modern Türkiye. Despite early constitutional recognition of freedom of thought, practical implementation has often been constrained by state control over media, legal and judicial nuances, and societal norms. The chapter concludes by emphasizing the need for stronger legal safeguards and democratic principles to genuinely protect the right to freedom of thought in Türkiye.

Although Vietnam’s current 2013 Constitution does not recognize a specific right to freedom of thought, it does recognize the constituent rights of freedom of thought, including freedom of religion and belief, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association and freedom of peaceful assembly. Since Doi Moi (1986), the implementation of these freedoms has been much improved, but there are still many obstacles and limitations. These include strict control over media, restrictions on political dissent, and limitations on the activities of religious groups. The main reason for these limitations is the Communist Party’s concern that the exercise of these rights will lead to political instability and the changing of the socialist regime in Vietnam today. Vietnam is continuing to integrate more deeply into the world, and this is one of the main driving forces promoting freedom of thought in this country. However, in the short term, there will not be any significant changes because there have been no signs of the Communist Party of Vietnam relaxing civil liberties. Despite this, there is still room for freedom of thought, and it is crucial to advocate for its promotion. The journey towards promoting freedom of thought in Vietnam is undoubtedly a long-term one. It necessitates the active participation and coordination of numerous stakeholders, who must approach the task with patience, persistence, and flexibility.

The right to freedom of thought is protected under Section 11 of the Constitution of Mauritius. It is a fundamental right which at first glance can be read as a qualified right, that is, one which can be limited under certain circumstances as long as the restrictions are lawful, proportionate and reasonably justified in a democratic society. This chapter will provide an overview of the Mauritian legal system followed by an outline of the constitutional protection of civil and political rights in Mauritius. The discussion will then turn to a normative analysis of the right to freedom of thought in Mauritius, with consideration of how it should be construed as an absolute right instead of a qualified right. The chapter will then review the limitation test for qualified rights under the Constitution. Finally, there will be an examination of the few cases relating specifically to freedom of thought. The whole discussion will shed light on how there is in the Mauritian context a poor and declining understanding of the fundamental processes that afford protection for constitutional rights generally and protection for the right to freedom of thought specifically.

In the late 1940s, Chinese diplomats skillfully highlighted complementary aspects of Chinese philosophy to align with Western human rights concepts during the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. By emphasizing compatible cultural elements and ignoring inconsistencies, they successfully integrated Chinese cultural values into international human rights norms. This achievement was made possible by the diplomats’ education in both Chinese and Western traditions and the Chiang Kai-shek government’s preoccupation with the civil war, which allowed diplomats more autonomy. Despite this success, Confucian thought declined after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and the Chinese Constitution does not explicitly mention freedom of thought, listing guiding ideologies that serve mainly as political declarations rather than practical legal principles. In contemporary Chinese court cases, the main theoretical issues around freedom of speech involve determining the boundaries of expression and whether statements constitute legal wrongs. With the development of social media and technologies, the line between public and private life has blurred. Chinese courts have touched upon the question of which ideas deserve legal protection, particularly in religious cases, but this question remains inadequately addressed and warrants continued research.

The abstract notion of freedom of thought, dating back at least to Roman times, has transmutated into a tangible legal right with its incorporation in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. This chapter traces the genesis of the right through evolving formulations in the drafts of the Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It also presents the few pertinent remarks on the right by notable figures such as Charles Malik and René Cassin as documented primarily in the Summary Records of the Commission on Human Rights between 1947 and 1949. An in-depth analysis of the travaux préparatoires yields ten significant findings for an understanding of the freedom. The analysis reaffirms some established facets of the right such as its unique twofold structure, and sheds light on hitherto unexplored facts such as the specific relation between thought, conscience, and religion. It further identifies unresolved questions and offers perspectives for contemporary interpretations of the freedom.