The Constitution of Zambia protects freedom of thought is one of the two components of freedom of conscience, with the other component being freedom of religion or belief. This chapter considers the extent to which the letter of the law comports with the spirit of the law. The analysis suggests that the letter of the law hardly comports with the spirit of the law. First, the letter of the law appears to wrongly conflate three distinct types of freedom insofar as it portrays freedom of conscience is ‘an umbrella freedom’ and freedom of thought and freedom of religion or belief as specific components thereof. Second, the letter of the law does not appear to comport with the spirit of the law insofar as it suggests that it protects a person from being hindered in the enjoyment of his/her freedom of thought or freedom of conscience only where the hindrance occurs without one’s own consent. Third, the letter of the law does not appear to comport with the spirit of the law insofar as it suggests that the state can impose restrictions on, and derogate from, freedom of thought and freedom of conscience. The chapter culminates in a call for reform.

While research on the right to freedom of thought (FOT), as such, is already scarce, this chapter targets the European regional human rights framework in particular, attempting to fill the existing gap in research and literature. It aims to offer an exploratory analysis of the right to FOT through the prism of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and related jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Specifically, this chapter inquires whether the right to FOT can indeed be considered a right with independent value in the context of the ECHR, or whether it must rather be understood as an ancillary right, subordinate to and dependent on related ECHR rights (in a similar fashion as Article 14). In exploring this, a distinction must be drawn between the theoretical set-up of FOT in the ECHR and the drafters’ intention compared to how the ECtHR’s interpretation and application shaped the right in practice. By focusing on the question of its nature within the ECHR this chapter aims to stimulate further engagement with this under-researched right.

The Human Rights Act incorporates Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights guaranteeing the right to freedom of thought. Yet, in the absence of any guidance from the European Court of Human Rights and in line with the UK’s legal traditions, the right is protected in a piecemeal fashion akin to liberty and non-interference rather than the positive obligatory rights-based approach. As such, this chapter considers whether the right to freedom of thought exists in the common law. Finding that it does exist but that there is no certainty on its content, scope, or application, it is argued that this does not prevent the courts from determining the right under the common law. Attention is given to legal jurists and philosophers, as well as certain historical developments, which have influenced the UK’s development and protection of the right. The right to freedom of thought, like speech, is the liberty to speak truth to power, to dissent, and to organise an alternative form of governance. Contemporary legislation appears to acknowledge the forum internum (the inner realm of the mind) as a subject necessitating protection, albeit, not under the label of human rights.

Judges often speak of “freedom of thought” as a liberty central to American constitutional jurisprudence. But why does thought need protection even when it remains unexpressed in speech and hidden? This chapter explores two possible answers. One is that understanding a principle of freedom of thought explains why speech is strongly shielded by the First Amendment of the US Constitution: Our thought, judges and scholars stress, is central to how we define ourselves and speech is the key means of conveying thought and shaping it. Yet a right to freedom of thought might also stand on its own. The Court’s 1969 decision in Stanley v. Georgia provides two possible accounts of how it might do so. The first reaffirms and modestly expands the long-standing principle that officials may not target and punish us solely because of our thoughts. The second reading of Stanley goes further: It protects us not only against state action aimed at controlling thought but also that which interferes with certain environments or resources that allow us to shape our thought. This second account, the chapter explains, is more suited than the first to address certain challenges raised by emerging neurotechnologies.

This chapter explores the status of freedom of thought in Malaysia. It begins with a consideration of certain definitional issues surrounding freedom of thought and it provides a brief overview of the Malaysian legal system. As there is no explicit right to freedom of thought in Malaysia, this chapter considers the limited utility of international human rights treaties in protecting freedom of thought within the Malaysian context and the inherent difficulties in using qualified constitutional provisions on freedom of religion and freedom of expression to safeguard the absolute right to freedom of thought. It also considers the impact of various restrictive legislation upon the right to freedom of thought. The chapter concludes with the pessimistic view that freedom of thought is insufficiently protected within the Malaysian jurisdiction.

The right to freedom of thought occupies a dubious position in Brazil. It completely lacks explicit constitutional or legal protection, despite a strong implicit recognition through derivative freedoms like expression, press and privacy. This research addresses this paradox, examining constitutional and legal frameworks, scholarly jurisprudence, significant court cases, and international treaties to delineate Freedom of Thought’s status in Brazil. It also considers recent legislative initiatives and the challenges that regulating misinformation poses for the right. The findings indicate that the right to Freedom of Thought functions as a vital juris-philosophical criterion in Brazil, underpinning various fundamental rights and playing a key role in the Supreme Court’s legal hermeneutics. Nevertheless, the absence of explicit protection leads to several limitations in its safeguard. First, it lacks a clear definition of its content and a precise delimitation of what it entails. It is also not acknowledged as a standalone right, being often conflated with other rights. Finally, its legal interpretation fluctuates with Brazil’s unstable case law. Remarkably, the internal dimension of Freedom of Thought remains largely unprotected and overlooked. The research underscores the need for explicit constitutional amendments and clearer legislative definitions to safeguard the right comprehensively, ensuring consistent legal recognition and protection in Brazil.

The rapid development in neurotechnology raises significant human rights concerns. A normative analysis of this emerging technology’s ability to interfere with individual’s mental processes, highlights the lack of a clear human rights framework protecting the human mind. In this chapter, we will outline the interplay between neurotechnology and the right to freedom of thought, as well as the plea for new neurorights. First, we will examine how neurotechnology interferes with people’s mental sphere, and how this may put human rights – and the right to freedom of thought in particular – at risk. Second, we analyse how the international community addresses the disruptive impact of neurotechnology and which role the freedom of thought is attributed in these efforts. Third, we explore the impact on this freedom, its capacity to address the challenges emanating from neurotechnology, and how it may be reconceptualised to serve as an effective safeguard. Finally, we offer general remarks on the necessity of new neurorights and explore the current positions of various international and supranational institutions on this issue.

As interdisciplinary work inquires into the scope and content of the right to freedom of thought, we confront two crucial questions; for the purposes of this legal right, what should qualify as thought and what makes thought free? This chapter draws upon philosophical and psychological literature to suggest answers to these questions. First, we argue that thought does not only occur in a forum internum inside our heads. We propose that the right to freedom of thought should recognise and protect two types of what we call forum externum thought. Type 1 is ‘extended thought’. This occurs when we extend our mind using features of our body or environment, such as diary use and internet search (under certain circumstances). Type 2 is ‘thoughtspeech’. This occurs when we speak with others to think aloud together. We propose Type 1 and Type 2 forum externum thought should receive absolute protection only when they are employed for the purposes of self-government and truth-seeking respectively. We then turn to the question of what makes thought free. Here we focus on how the ‘trust and glue’ criteria for the extended mind can inform our consideration of what should count as impermissible alteration of extended thought. We conclude by pointing to the need for future transdisciplinary work to support the development of this right.

This chapter introduces the reader to the handbook with a particular focus on the methodology employed by contributors to the book. Drawing on the various contributions, the chapter presents a brief comparative overview of the right to freedom of thought before offering some reflections on the scope of the right.

This chapter analyses the right to freedom of thought in the Chilean legal order, considering its various juristic dimensions. Though historically rooted in the nation’s foundational charters, it remains ambiguously defined within its legal system, primarily interpreted through the lenses of freedom of conscience and expression. This chapter argues that whilst the right to freedom of thought has not yet been explicitly enshrined in the Chilean Constitution, it has been implicitly incorporated through international human rights treaties; however, due to recent technological advances, a pressing re-evaluation has arisen. The 2021 Constitutional Reform Act innovatively protected brain activities by resorting to the right to mental integrity, introducing a paradigm shift in juridical safeguarding of cognitive freedoms. This development, however, presents new conceptual and systematic challenges. The chapter focuses on the historical evolution of the right to freedom of thought, judicial interpretations, and scholarly perspectives, mainly concentrating on the emerging category of ‘neurorights’. It examines the implications of the 2021 constitutional amendment and argues for a more precise recognition and theoretical development of the right in response to neurotechnological progress. The analysis underscores the necessity of unambiguously defining cognitive freedoms and freedom of thought to provide adequate legal protections in an era of rapid technological change.

The right to freedom of thought is guaranteed by Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, yet current jurisprudence interprets the right as a mere dimension of freedom of expression, also protected by Article 13. Contemporary neurotechnology research presents the possibility for human thoughts to be tracked, recorded, analysed and predicted. This applies pressure upon the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ current understanding of the right to freedom of thought. This chapter examines how Article 13 has been interpreted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights at different stages of its jurisprudence. It then argues for an evolution in the interpretation of Article 13 whereby the right to freedom of thought is understood as a distinct right, separate from freedom of expression.

Focusing on the right to FoT in the digital age, this chapter sheds light on the societal dimensions of FoT by drawing on the broader and relational concept of thought. It discusses the societal dimensions in light of the four attributes of the right to FoT – the right not to reveal our thoughts; not to be punished for our thoughts; not to have our thoughts manipulated; and, the state duty to create an enabling environment for the fulfilment of the right. The societal dimensions of FoT are justified based on the necessity to nurture the emergence of a critical, reflective, self-determined and democratic society and for the realisation of social harmony.