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This chapter examines influential legislative remedies: the 1907 creation of the Court of Criminal Appeal, the 1995 creation of the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) and the 2024 legislation to annul and compensate miscarriages of justice caused by the Post Office’s faulty computer system. The Court of Appeal’s restrictive approach to overturning convictions and admitting new evidence is critiqued. The role of wrongful convictions in abolishing the death penalty is examined. The CCRC’s performance, including some of its failures and underfunding, is assessed. The migration of similar institutions to Scotland, Norway, New Zealand and Canada is also examined. Failed attempts in 2006 to limit appeals to innocence and successful attempts in 2014 to require it for compensation are critically assessed. The tension between the Innocence Network of the United Kingdom’s (INUK) focus on innocence and the legal system’s focus on the safety of convictions is analysed in light of INUK’s demise and future evolution of innocence organisations. Finally, the Post Office Scandal and the implications of enacting legislation to depart from ordinary methods of correcting and compensating miscarriages of justice are assessed.
This chapter discusses the contested place of the Declaration of Independence in black political thought. As a document that provided a rationale for American independence, the Declaration of Independence in its own way also provided one for black political equality in the United States. This tension between intention and interpretation has made the Declaration stubbornly immune from attack by black intellectuals, politicians, and movement leaders. With rare exception, the Declaration has been attacked mostly for its exclusivity, not its content or core ethos. Even Critical Race Theory’s (CRT) modest dissent from the Declaration has been limited in its ability to transform the persistence of black support for it, making arguments for CRT’s abandonment of America’s founding principles ring hollow. Instead, the history of black political thought from Frederick Douglass to W. E. B. Du Bois to Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, stands squarely on the side of the Declaration’s essential truths, while admonishing America’s enduring failure to live up to them.
This chapter situates classical education in late antique Gaul in its historical context, positioning the work within the current scholarly debates, and building on recent scholarship on late antique Gaul. Arranged thematically, Chapter 2 considers key developments in the political and military relationships between the western Roman empire, Gallo-Romans and barbarian groups, the prospects and prosperity of Gallo-Roman aristocrats, the increasing dominance of the Church and bishops in daily life, and the vitality and continuity of Gallo-Roman cities. It considers the conditions necessary for classical education to thrive and function and discusses how the structures that fostered education were affected by the political, military, religious, and cultural transformations of fifth-century Gaul.
“Manners” alternates between the portrayal of self-reliant “gentlemen” like Montaigne, Socrates, and El Cid, who are “original and commanding” and “fashion,” an imitative “hall of the Past” where “virtue [has] gone to seed.” But near the end of the essay he turns away from forms of aristocratic morality by introducing two new heroes: a woman, “the Persian Lilla,” who reconciles “all heterogeneous persons into one society”; and then “Osman,” a poor beggar at the gates of the Shah who is a “great heart … so sunny and hospitable in the centre of the country,” and whose wealth lies in his ability to “harbor” madness without sharing it. The introduction of Lilla and Osman late in “Manners” raises the question of how they align with its other heroes. Are they part of a turn or contrary tendency showing up late in the essay, or a deeper exploration of forms of virtue – especially love – already introduced?
This chapter provides, we believe, for the apogee of what we think will form the base for success of the quantum physics–like applications. Readers are invited in this chapter to carefully study the two-slit interference experiment with agents (and the agent two-preference interference) for a variety of real potential functions.
A framing case study discusses Uruguay’s attempt to limit cigarette sales by foreign firms. Then the chapter provides an overview of international investment law. The chapter discusses: (1) how states have historically protected foreign investment using international law, including major concepts and the evolution of investment institutions; (2) major foreign investor rights under contemporary investment law, including rules for expropriation, treatment standards, performance requirements, and legal remedies; and (3) how states seek to balance the protection of foreign investment against their own state authority in areas like maintaining public order and safety, preserving national security, and protecting the environment and labor.
After briefly indicating in the first section how the project for this book arose and its connection with a companion work on assertion and speech acts, the Introduction articulates two fundamental assumptions of the views I’ll be advancing, which are shared by the companion work. A first assumption is that kinds like fiction and assertion have at their core a ‘natural’ kind; a second assumption is that philosophical theories like the ones advanced here have to a good extent a fictive character, which I understand by analogy with the interpretation of fiction, as that undertaking will be explained in the account on offer here. Sections ii and iii will develop these ideas. Section iv provides a brief account of the structure of the book, the topics it will cover, and how it might be read.
‘Remote work’ and ‘telework’, which used to be regarded as exceptional subcategories of labor engagement, became the norm for white collar workers during the pandemic. Recent years have seen the advent of hybrid labor arrangements, where work is directly or indirectly provided through apps or similar pieces of software and other technological innovations. The overarching work digitization phenomenon is defined by increasing delocalisation and fragmentation of workplaces, and by algorithmic management. Even work typically performed on-site includes nowadays elements of delocalization. This chapter revisits our understanding of ‘teleworking’ and examines the appropriateness of existing collective labor law institutions to address the needs and particular conditions of workers engaged in digitized hybrid work. It considers that a solution may lie with the extension of the scope and focus of the rights to collective organization and action, and with a re-evaluation of their substantive content. The chapter seeks solutions in worker empowerment through the redeployment of collective labor rights and institutions. The chapter also briefly touches upon illustrative case studies that provide glimpses into possible avenues of traditional and alternative collective action tactics. The relevant current EU framework is used to contextualize the discussion.
In this chapter, I contrast the account of fictionality presented in the previous chapter with Walton’s, whose work was decisive in shaping it. In recent work, he gives up his account of the fictionality of p in a fictional work in terms of prescriptions to imagine emanating from it. He offers examples that allegedly show that a prescription to imagine p in a given work of fiction is not sufficient for the fictionality of p in that work. Both in support and in further elaboration of the constitutive-norms speech-act variation on Walton’s account that was presented in the previous chapter, I critically discuss his objections here. In addition to answering his concerns and developing the account further, this chapter provides additional abductive support for its explanatory virtues vis-à-vis both Walton’s account and Gricean speech-act proposals.
Karl Schafer develops an account of reason in its theoretical use and argues that a proper appreciation of the end of reason puts one in a position to see that, while Kant rejects the rationalist claim that we can know or cognize the unconditioned, he nonetheless accepts that we are rationally committed to a form of doctrinal belief in the bare existence of something unconditioned. Kant thus takes reason’s interest in systematic comprehension to commit us, even from the perspective of theoretical reason (albeit only on “subjectively sufficient” grounds), to a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason – specifically, the proposition that every finite, conditioned thing is ultimately grounded in something unconditioned.
While most programmes in neuroscience are understandably built around imparting foundational knowledge of cell biology, neurons, networks and physiology, there is less attention paid to critical perspectives on methods. This book addresses this gap by covering a broad array of topics, including the philosophy of science, challenges of terminology and language, reductionism and social aspects of science, to challenge claims to explanation and understanding in neuroscience. Using examples from dominant areas of neuroscience research alongside novel material from systems that are less often presented, it promotes the general need of scientists (and non-scientists) to think critically. Chapters also explore translations between neuroscience and technology, artificial intelligence, education and criminology. Featuring accessible material alongside further resources for deeper study, this work serves as an essential resource for undergraduate and graduate courses in psychology, neuroscience and biological sciences, while also supporting researchers in exploring philosophical and methodological challenges in contemporary research.
This chapter introduces the central ideas in Darwin’s Expression, poses the main interpretive questions that scholars have raised, and outlines my answers to those questions. Why does Darwin analyze expressions in terms of heritable habits, recalling Lamarck’s debunked theory of evolution, when his own theory of natural selection provides a superior alternative? My answer is that Darwin embraces Hartley’s associationist theory of mind, which posits habit as the basis of thought. I claim that multiple puzzling features of Expression are resolved once we view Darwin as an associationist philosopher.
This chapter takes as its starting point a comparison of the trajectories of two women from different generations and different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Both were to a considerable degree ‘self-made’ women, and one question raised by their narratives is how is marriage relevant to their success? The stories that these women tell are replete with ethical judgements and reflections on their own and their parents’ marriages as well as those about others. The apparently tangential significance of marriage in these stories is suggestive. Seemingly, a necessary part of a normative life course even in an unconventional scenario, marriage here takes forms that are at once accepted and also ‘transgressive’. Both women had married foreign husbands; in one case, this ended in divorce; in the other, what seemed a successful partnership endured. We see how marriage allows the expansion of convention but, paradoxically, also reinforces social norms. Indeed, at the boundaries of difference and what is acceptable, marriage has the capacity to be re-enfolded into what is normative through its conventionality. In this way, it holds a promise of transformation for individuals and families, and for wider communities and nations.
Chapter 3 introduces a new genre of fiction, the Wales novel. Wales novels were set in the Principality, featured Welsh heroines and heroes, and cast Wales as simultaneously the morally and culturally pure cradle of imperial Britishness and, paradoxically, as Britain’s first and final colony. In them, the country becomes the proposed space for experimentation with new methods of colonial discipline and extraction and the site of a proposed recolonization of the British heartland that promised to reinvigorate and purify the Empire as a whole. These fictions, written or satirized by all of the decade’s most famous novelists, were among the best-selling and most critically celebrated works of the period. The chapter concludes with an investigation of the critical reception and generic influence of the Wales novel in the late 1780s, spotlighting several exceptionally interesting deviations from the rapidly consolidating hallmarks of the genre.