Since 1974, two out of every five constitutions (40.3%) were prepared via processes that included public consultation. The reasons for adopting these participatory mechanisms, however, are largely unexplored. I argue that public consultation is a tool for elite contestation of power. Introducing an original dataset of public consultations in constitution-making processes from 1974–2021 (n = 300), I find that in democracies, factional majorities and newcomer elites use public consultation to legitimate a break from the status quo. In autocracies, governing coalitions that depend on performance and enjoy greater party institutionalization push for public consultation to preserve favorable power-sharing arrangements.

Why would authoritarian rulers allow for an independent judiciary that could constrain their power? This study extends the insurance theory of judicial independence to autocratic contexts, arguing that when leaders perceive a higher risk of losing office, they become more likely to tolerate or create independent courts as a safeguard against potential post-exit reprisals. Using a novel two-stage analytical approach, I construct a hazard rate for each country year from the Geddes et al. (2014) autocratic regime dataset, based on factors directly observable to autocratic leaders. This hazard rate serves as a proxy for perceived risk of losing power. My findings provide robust evidence that higher perceived risk is significantly associated with greater judicial independence in autocratic regimes, even when controlling for economic development, regime longevity, and court age. This research offers crucial insights into autocratic governance, demonstrating that promoting judicial independence can be a calculated strategy for regime survival rather than merely a democratic concession.

The article at hand introduces a comprehensive foundational database on the Czech Constitutional Court spanning from its inception in 1993 to 2023. The database includes metadata on all decisions, full-text corpus, and additional background data on judges and law clerks, filling a gap in high-quality datasets for empirical legal research in the Central and Eastern European regions. As one of the first comprehensive court databases in the CEE region, it has the potential to catalyze similar research efforts and contribute to methodologically rigorous empirical legal research in a region of increasing European significance.

How might constitution-makers write “transformative constitutions”? Scholars and policymakers have looked to constitutional design as a mechanism for societal change, for example, promoting democracy, equality, and social rights. In these efforts, accountability has most often been limited to government actors. Yet, constitution-makers are increasingly introducing the “horizontal” application of rights, a potent tool for transformation whereby private actors also gain constitutional rights obligations. We argue that a key predictive element in introducing this mechanism is a meeting of the minds in constitution-making processes, where interests and mutual commitments from a broad cross-section of society are expressed at the negotiating table. We test our theory, employing cross-national data concerning the adoption of horizontal application over time, and examples from specific countries’ experiences. Our findings support our theory, suggesting that powerful articulation of interests by expert professionals in inclusive processes is a significant factor in reshaping citizen duties and, thus, transforming society.

Students of comparative law have long argued that undermining judicial independence is electorally costly, and that the norms against interference uphold institutional checks and balances essential to constitutionalism. However, evidence from countries with robust judiciaries suggests that exposing voters to deficiencies in the legal process or the courts’ partisan leanings can reduce perceptions of judicial legitimacy, making such interference on part of would-be authoritarians more likely. The rise of populist politicians poses additional risks: by emphasizing judges’ unelected status and counter-majoritarian tendencies, populists may erode legitimacy, framing judges as part of a “corrupt elite” opposing “the people.” This rhetoric challenges liberal-democratic norms that limit state interference with individual rights. To test whether one observes the effects of partisanship and procedural fairness on voters’ perceptions of the courts outside the US context, and whether populist messages produce comparable effects, a pre-registered survey experiment is conducted in the context of Czechia, a country that, until recently, has had both a populist executive and a strong and independent Constitutional Court. The study presented respondents with vignettes describing an important electoral ruling of the Czech Constitutional Court, embedding messages that highlighted judges’ unelected status, the ruling’s procedural irregularities, or its partisan implications. Contrary to expectations, findings show no significant effects of any message type on perceptions of judicial legitimacy. The results of the study suggest that the marginalization of robust judiciaries in backsliding democracies may be a largely elite-driven institutional process, with uncertain electoral payoffs.

Awareness of courts has long been theorized to engender enhanced support for judicial independence, but this is a logic that works only under the best of circumstances. We argue that interbranch politics influences what aware citizens know and learn about their court, and we theorize how awareness interacts with individual-level and context-dependent factors to bolster public endorsement of judicial independence in previously unappreciated ways. We fielded surveys in the United States (US), Germany, Poland, and Hungary, countries which diverge in the extent to which the environments are hospitable or hostile to high courts, and whose publics vary greatly in both their awareness of courts and perceptions of executive influence with the judiciary. We suggest that in hospitable contexts, awareness correlates with support for judicial independence, but said association depends on perceptions of executive influence. In hostile contexts where executive interference is common, more aware citizens are more apt to perceive this meddling, and although it might undermine trust in the judicial authority, it does not diminish their demand for judicial independence. Together, these findings underscore that public awareness and support for judicial independence are greatly informed by the political environment in which high courts reside.

International courts are increasingly serving as bulwarks of democracy. These courts, however, often depend on the cooperation of the very governments they seek to hold accountable, exposing them to potential retaliation for attempting to constrain their behavior. As governments’ response to adverse decision-making is often conditional on public support, we explore whether citizens actually support international courts’ judicial power over questions of democracy. We argue that citizens’ support for this form of judicial power depends on their democratic values and their desire for institutional checks and balances against the executive. Furthermore, we contest that this support is conditional on partisanship, with this relationship holding for opposition partisans while government partisans are generally opposed to international courts’ judicial power. We support our expectations using original survey data collected from Hungary before their 2022 national legislative elections, and examining citizens’ support for judicial power for the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The number of women on high courts across the globe has been steadily increasing. Recent estimates found that women now make up 61% of the judiciary in European countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2019). The large number of women now serving in judicial positions has resulted in a changing demographic makeup of courts. While the majority might think this is a step forward for diverse representation, there is ultimately a dichotomy between judicial accountability that comes as a result of increased diversity in descriptive representation and judicial independence. Given this dichotomy, along with the increase in women on courts, it follows that the public’s perceptions of courts’ independence has the potential to change. We explore this phenomenon by asking the following question: How does the presence of women on high courts impact perceptions of judicial independence among the public? Using survey data gathered from respondents in twenty-seven European countries from 2016 to 2022, we examine how the dynamics of an increasing number of women on high courts alters the public’s perceptions on the level of independence of the court in their country. We draw from literature on judicial independence as well as women political elites and corruption. Importantly, we document that increasing the percentage of women on courts results in higher perceptions of judicial independence for women. Overall, our findings highlight important trends regarding gender diversity in political institutions and how changes in descriptive characteristics shape perceptions of judicial independence.

Much of the research on public trust in courts focuses on countries with strong rule of law traditions and clear judicial norms. Less is known about such attitudes in young democracies with developing judicial institutions. To address this, we examine public confidence in Ghana’s court system. Ghana’s courts have faced various scandals, from judges’ personal conduct to separation of power conflicts. Using Afrobarometer data, we evaluate public attitudes toward Ghana’s courts. We find that Ghanaians generally have low trust in their courts, with factors such as partisanship, education, standard of living, and gender strongly influencing trust.

How can citizens in authoritarian regimes exercise oversight of the legal system? I examine police and court monitoring, bottom-up oversight activities popular in pre-war Russia (2012–2022). Monitoring pushes the state to honor commitments it has made in its own laws, taking advantage of the authoritarian state’s need for information and legitimacy. Yet monitoring activities are not just about improving the state’s performance. Using interviews, participant observation and document analysis of monitoring campaigns in pre-war Russia, I argue that monitoring can empower citizens in a profoundly disempowering environment, perhaps its most important legacy in a closing authoritarian space.

Proposals to change the institutional features of national high courts have been on the agenda recently in the United States and Israel. Using insights about endowment effects and prospect theory from behavioral economics, we theorize about how citizens may think about benefits from high courts and how those views can influence their support for change to those institutions. Mindful of differences across these countries, we employ a comparative experimental design to explore how people think about personal and societal benefits emanating from the Israeli and United States Supreme Courts. We find interesting differences in how experimental participants think about benefits from courts and how those views shape feelings about recent proposals to alter judicial institutions in each national context.

This is a case study of Guatemala’s judicial system, initially designed to be a pluralist model in 1984. However, it is now captured by political entrepreneurs who are undermining liberal democracy. The research warns about similar risks in other young democracies and explains the pitfalls of judicial councils and capturable courts. Although judiciaries are now seen as safeguards against authoritarianism, this study demonstrates how they can be subverted. Unlike authoritarian populists who weaken judicial institutions through popular support, this case shows how entrepreneurs rely on intimidation and capture. Using data of the growth of lawyers, I propose the entrepreneurs outnumbered the elites committed to democracy and captured the nomination process in favor of uncommitted elites leading to democratic backsliding.

How can autonomous apex courts with specific attitudes and role conceptions counter executive aggrandizement? This article theorizes two causal mechanisms through which justices can resist democratic erosion. The first mechanism involves apex courts employing judicial review to neutralize autocratic legalism by blocking strategies such as institutional conversion, replacement, and layering that executives use to expand their power. The second involves apex courts building coalitions within and beyond the judiciary, enabling diverse actors – including judges, political parties, the media, and NGOs – to leverage their unique resources against executive encroachment. I conceptualize these two mechanisms by combining theory-building process tracing with counterfactual analysis of an unlikely case of democratic resilience: Argentina from 2007 to 2015. Drawing on evidence from 125 elite interviews, over a thousand newspaper articles, hundreds of state documents, memoirs, and other primary sources, this article demonstrates how the Supreme Court nullified President Cristina Kirchner’s attempts to undermine freedom of expression and judicial independence, thereby contributing to democratic resilience.

Popular insurance models of judicial independence contend that electoral competition induces executives to establish or maintain independence as insurance against the risks associated with losing office. Existing accounts, however, focus only on variation in the likelihood of losing office, treating risks associated with losing as constant. This inattention to the model’s causal logic limits theoretical development and empirical conclusions. We model the demand for insurance rather than simply the likelihood of losing office, with empirical implications tested via instrumental variables. This paper offers a major development of the insurance account, with important implications for the study of judicial independence.

What factors explain compliance with monetary damages awarded by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)? States comply with the payment of monetary damages at higher rates than other forms of reparation. However, the higher compliance rate belies the significant variation in time to compliance with the payment of monetary awards. We identify three case-level characteristics that explain this variation: size of awards, number of victims, and victim identity. We test our hypotheses utilizing original datasets on compliance with monetary damages and case characteristics in IACtHR judgments through 2019, and find support for all three factors on time to compliance.

Courts in new democracies sometimes encounter challenges in gaining public trust, even after achieving judicial independence. This study examines how judicial communication can help build trust in the judiciary. Specifically, I address two questions regarding judicial communication: first, what motivates judges to engage in communication, and second, how this communication influences the public’s trust in the judiciary. I argue that members of a judiciary engage in communication to protect the judiciary’s reputation and that this communication fosters the public’s trust in the judiciary. This is because improved communication enhances the public’s understanding of the courts. To test my theoretical argument, I analyze a unique judicial reform in Taiwan, where a public-oriented communication strategy using social media was introduced. Using in-depth interviews with members of the judiciary and a difference-in-differences design, I find that, first, judges seek to protect judicial reputation by adopting a communication strategy characterized by information clarity and accessibility. Second, individuals more likely to be exposed to this communication, particularly frequent digital users, demonstrate increased judicial trust. My findings have implications for how courts in new democracies can use communication strategies to bolster judicial trust.