We question whether empathy is mediated by a unitary circuit. We argue that recent neuroimaging data indicate dissociable neural responses for different facial expressions as well as for representing others' mental states (Theory of Mind, TOM). We also argue that the general empathy disorder considered characteristic of autism and psychopathy is not general but specific for each disorder.

The principal target of this article is the reification Bruineberg et al. perceive of formalism within the literature on the variational free energy minimization (VFEM) framework. The authors do not provide a definition of reification, as none yet exists. Here I offer one. On this definition, the objects of the authors' critiques fall short of full-blown reification – as do the authors themselves.

The suggestion that three-dimensional space is represented by a mosaic of neural map fragments, each covering a small area of space in the plane of locomotion, receives support from studies in complex two-dimensional environments. How map fragments are linked, which brain circuits are involved, and whether metric is preserved across fragments are questions that remain to be determined.

Walker's target article proposes a refinement of the well known two-stage model of memory formation to explain the positive effects of sleep on consolidation. After a first stage in which a labile memory representation is formed, a further stabilisation of the memory trace takes place in the second stage, which is dependent on (REM) sleep. Walker has refined the latter stage into a stage in which a consolidation-based enhancement occurs. It is not completely clear what consolidation-based enhancement implies and how it can be dissociated from a stage for memory-stabilisation. A more serious consideration, however, is whether a second stage in memory consolidation that is solely dependent on sleep, is really necessary. The classical, passive, interference theory is able to explain adequately the findings related to the effects of sleep and memory, and can lead perhaps better to an understanding of the highly variable data in this field.

Studies with humans have failed to produce evidence that any direct causal relation exists between the asymmetry of one function in an individual and the asymmetry of a different function in that individual. Without such evidence, factors external to an individual’s nervous system, such as social interactions, may play crucial roles in explaining the directions of all asymmetries at all levels.

This response clarifies the nature of reappropriation and the definition of language. It explicates the relationship between neural systems and language and between homology and evolutionary gradualism. Through a review of ape capacities in the realms of language and tool use, it distinguishes human language acquisition from nonhuman learning. Finally, it suggests the appropriate sorts of evidence on which to base further evolutionary arguments relevant to the origins of language.

The sensorimotor theory of vision is the best attempt yet to explain visual consciousness without implying a Cartesian theatre. I suggest three experiments which might test the theory.

The theories of cerebellar function presented in this BBS special issue cannot be reconciled with the established induction properties of cerebellar LTD. At the same time, the authors presenting their research on cerebellar LTD do not appear very interested in function.

We argue that confusability between items should be distinguished from generalization between items. Shepard's data concern confusability, but the theories proposed by Shepard and by Tenenbaum & Griffiths concern generalization, indicating a gap between theory and data. We consider the empirical and theoretical work involved in bridging this gap. [Shepard; Tenenbaum & Griffiths]

We seek strength in numbers as a survival strategy, so it seems unlikely that social bonds would make us want to intentionally die. However, our deep desire to be protected may explain our attraction to exaggerated notions of intentional self-sacrifice – even though research on suicide terrorists, kamikaze pilots, and cult members suggests they were not actually dying for their group.