Mazur & Booth's target article presents strong evidence that social factors influence testosterone; however, the evidence for an effect of testosterone on dominance is considerably weaker. Although social and biological factors may interact, as suggested in the reciprocal model, findings in rhesus monkeys suggest that social factors may predominate. Finally, research is needed to evaluate whether androgens during early life influence later dominance.

Ruchkin et al. ascribe a pivotal role to long-term memory representations and binding within working memory. Here we focus on the interaction of working memory and long-term memory in supporting on-line representations of experience available to guide on-going processing, and we distinguish the role of frontal-lobe systems from what the hippocampus contributes to relational long-term memory binding.

Atran argues that an autonomous ethnobiological information-processing module exists. This module imputes a “deep causal essence” to folk-biological taxa and uses a hierarchy of taxonomic ranks. I argue that Atran's own data suggest that rank is not an essential feature of the ethnobiological module, and that ethnobiological causal essences may be generalized to other domains and vice versa, limiting its autonomy.

Fundamental differences between perception and cognition argue that the distinction can be maintained independently of cognitive penetrability. The core processes of cognition can be integrated under the theory of relational knowledge. The distinguishing properties include symbols and an operating system, structure-consistent mapping between representations, construction of representations in working memory that enable generation of inferences, and different developmental time courses.

Somatosensory processing for action guidance can be dissociated from perception and memory processing. The dorsal system has a global bias and the ventral system has a local processing bias. Autistics illustrate the point, showing a bias for part over wholes. Lateralized differences have also been noted in these modalities. The multi-modal dysfunction observed may suggest more an issue of interhemispheric communication.

Curiously, two central areas are unaddressed by Epstein et al.: (i) L1A–L2A differences; (ii) L2 development. Here, findings relevant to (i) and (ii) – as well as their significance – are discussed. Together these form the basis for contesting Epstein et al.'s “Full Access” approach, but nonetheless analyses of the L2 data argue for UG-constrained L2A. Also discussed is the inadequacy of accounts (like Epstein et al.'s) without an explicit and prominent role for the L1.

Lieder and Griffiths rightly urge that computational cognitive models be constrained by resource usage, but they should go further. The brain's primary function is to regulate resource usage. As a consequence, resource usage should not simply select among algorithmic models of “aspects of cognition.” Rather, “aspects of cognition” should be understood as existing in the service of resource management.

Both Block and the commentators who accepted his P versus A distinction readily recognize examples of P without A but not vice versa. As an example of A without P, Block hypothesized a “zombie,” computationally like a human but without subjectivity. This would appear to describe the disconnected right hemisphere of the split-brain subject, unless one alternatively opts for two parallel mechanisms for P?

McCullough et al. suggest that revenge and forgiveness rest upon risk computation. Risk computation is implemented by emotions that evolved for additional functions, giving rise to phenomena such as betrayal aversion and taboo-tradeoffs, and specific patterns of forgiveness we have documented. A complete account of revenge and reconciliation should incorporate broader constructs from social psychology, including emotions and values hierarchies.

Staying alive theory explains why women have more effective self-protective mechanisms in terms of woman's role as a mother and caregiver. This theory reinforces stereotypes and the relationship of oppression and submission to men. Somewhat paradoxically, it also points to women's lower quality of life, which may be explained by their greater fear of threats caused by men's power.

Children adopt an inherence-based view of some social categories, viewing certain social categories as reflecting the inherent features of their members. Thinking of social categories in these terms contributes to prejudice and intergroup conflict. Thus, understanding what leads children to apply inherence-based views to particular categories could provide new direction for efforts to reduce these negative social phenomena.

In this commentary, I question the idea that positive illusions are evolved misbeliefs on the grounds that positive illusions are often maladaptive, are not universal, and may be by-products of existing mechanisms. Further, because different beliefs are adaptive in different situations and cultures, it makes sense to build in a readiness to form beliefs rather than the beliefs themselves.

If parenting behavior influences attachment, then parental investment (PI) theory can predict sex differences and distributions of attachment styles across cultures. Trivers-Willard, local resource competition, and local resource enhancement models make distinct predictions for sex-biased parental responsiveness relevant to attachment. Parental investment and attachment probably vary across cultures in relation to “local fitness currencies” for status, wealth, and well-being.