Hoerl & McCormack argue that comparative and developmental psychology teaches us that “neither animals nor infants can think and reason about time.” We argue that the authors neglect to take into account pivotal evidence from ethology that suggests that non-human animals do possess a capacity to represent and reason about time, namely, work done on Sumatran orangutans’ long travel calls.

Modeling the extremes of mental/emotional conditions requires explicit accounts of evolutionary-developmental sources of human neurodiversity, not merely psychopathology. The target article's approach could be improved by incorporation of a hierarchical scheme wherein mental/emotional infrastructure interacts across differentiated layers of function. The notion of “symptom networks” thus calls for differentiation into hierarchically interacting components of mental/emotional evolution and development.

Kalisch et al. regard a positive appraisal style as the mechanism for promoting resilience. I argue that knowledge can enhance resilience without affecting appraisal style. Furthermore, the relationship between positive appraisals and resilience ought to be mediated by knowledge and is not monotonic. Finally, I raise some questions about how appraisals fit into the dual-process model of the mind.

Fincher & Thornhill's (F&T's) parasite-stress theory of sociality is supported largely by correlational evidence; its persuasiveness would increase significantly via lab and natural experiments and demonstrations of its mediating role. How the theory is linked to other approaches to group differences in psychological differences and to production and dissemination of cultural ideas and practices, need further clarification. So does the theory's view on the possible reduction of negative group interactions.

Mazur & Booth provide life scientists with an example of the multilevel biopsychosocial approach. Research paradigms have to become more flexible and multidisciplinary if we are to free ourselves from the nature–nurture dichotomy that we have long agreed was simplistic and shortsighted. I point out a variety of kinds of interactions that may be the next frontier for behavioral scientists.

Gold & Stoljar are right in rejecting the radical neuron doctrine, but we argue that their distinction between determination and explanation is not principled enough to support their conclusion. We claim that the notions of multiple supervenience and screening-off offer a more precise construal of the dissociation between explanation and determination that lies at the heart of the antireductionist position.

An attentional-associative model (Schmajuk et al. 1996), previously evaluated against multiple sets of classical conditioning data, is applied to causal learning. In agreement with Mitchell et al.'s suggestion, according to the model associative learning can be a conscious, controlled process. However, whereas our model correctly predicts blocking following or preceding subadditive training, the propositional approach cannot account for those results.

An animal confronts numerous challenges when constructing an optimal navigational route. Spatial representations used for path optimization are likely constrained by critical environmental factors that dictate which neural systems control navigation. Multiple coding schemes depend upon their ecological relevance for a particular species, particularly when dealing with the third, or vertical, dimension of space.

Despite the simplicity of Kurzban et al.'s framework, we argue that important information is lost in their simplification. We discuss research on delay of gratification and self-regulation that identifies key situational and psychological factors affecting how people represent rewards and costs. These factors affect the expected utilities of behavioral options and thus dramatically influence whether individuals persist on a difficult task.

We share Jaswal & Akhtar's concerns about the unintended repercussions of assumed social disinterest in autism. We expand consideration of these consequences with discussion of the literature and our own work on loneliness, mental ill-health, and self-representation, which is a cornerstone to social and emotional health. Further study is needed with expansive, mixed methodologies and involvement of the autistic community.

Novel functions, which emerge by reusing existing resources formerly adapted to other original usages, cannot be anticipated before the need eventually arises. Simple reuse must be accidental. However, to survive the evolutionary race, one cannot merely keep hoping for a string of good fortune. So, successful species might be gifted with “rational” and “purposeful” biological mechanisms to prepare for future reuse. Neural reuse must be extrapolated from such mechanisms.

Skills cannot be divided into the innate and the acquired. Also, genetic effects may not come into play until well after early childhood, and evocative gene-environment correlations are to be expected. Special talents are common in autism and warrant more detailed study, but whether they have the same meaning as talents in nonautistic individuals is not known.

We provide support from attachment research to the argument that children with autism only appear to lack social motivation. This research has shown that the attachment system of children with autism is intact, and one-half form secure attachments. This is illustrated with an observation of a young child with autism during a separation and reunion observation with his mother.

Carruthers argues that an integrated faculty of metarepresentation evolved for mindreading and was later exapted for metacognition. A more consistent application of his approach would regard metarepresentation in mindreading with the same skeptical rigor, concluding that the “faculty” may have been entirely exapted. Given this result, the usefulness of Carruthers' line-drawing exercise is called into question.