In my Précis of Social Perception and Social Reality (Jussim 2012, henceforth abbreviated as SPSR), I argued that the social science scholarship on social perception and interpersonal expectancies was characterized by a tripartite pattern: (1) Errors, biases, and self-fulfilling prophecies in person perception were generally weak, fragile, and fleeting; (2) Social perceptions were often quite accurate; and (3) Conclusions appearing throughout the social psychology scientific literature routinely overstated the power and pervasiveness of expectancy effects, and ignored evidence of accuracy. Most commentators concurred with the validity of these conclusions. Two, however, strongly disagreed with the conclusion that the evidence consistently has shown that stereotypes are moderately to highly accurate. Several others, while agreeing with most of the specifics, also suggested that those arguments did not necessarily apply to contexts outside of those covered in SPSR. In this response, I consider all these aspects: the limitations to the tripartite pattern, the role of politics and confirmation biases in distorting scientific conclusions, common obstructions to effective scientific self-correction, and how to limit them.

Anderson claims that the hypothesis of massive neural reuse is inconsistent with massive mental modularity. But much depends upon how each thesis is understood. We suggest that the thesis of massive modularity presented in Carruthers (2006) is consistent with the forms of neural reuse that are actually supported by the data cited, while being inconsistent with a stronger version of reuse that Anderson seems to support.

We applaud Boyer & Petersen for the advancement of an ultimate explanation of the dynamics of folk-economic beliefs and the political actions linked to them. To our mind, however, key inference systems regulating societal interaction and resource distribution evolved for more core relations than those of proportionate exchange, and situational factors are not the only constraints on how such systems produce economic beliefs

In early hominins, there possibly was high selective pressure for the development of reciprocal mother and child vocalizations such as proposed by Falk. In this context, temporoparietal-prefrontal networks that participate in tasks such as working memory and imitation may have been strongly selected for. These networks may have become the precursors of the future language areas of the human brain.

The imagery debate re-enacts controversies persisting since Descartes. The controversy remains important less for what we can learn about visual imagery than about cognitive science itself. In the tradition of Arnauld, Reid, Bartlett, Austin and Ryle, Pylyshyn's critique exposes notorious mistakes being unwittingly rehearsed not only regarding imagery but also in several independent domains of research in modern cognitive science.

Placeholders enable conceptual change only if presumed to be relevant (e.g., lead to the formation of true beliefs) even though their meaning is not yet fully understood and their cognitive function not yet specified. Humans are predisposed to make such presumptions in a communicative context. Specifying the role of the presumption of relevance in conceptual change would provide a more comprehensive account of Quinian bootstrapping.

I appeal to Merker's theory to motivate a hypothesis about the ontology of consciousness: Creature consciousness is (at least partially) constitutive of phenomenal consciousness. Rather than elaborating theories of phenomenal consciousness couched solely in terms of state consciousness, as philosophers are fond of doing, a correct approach to phenomenal consciousness should begin with an account of creature consciousness.

Social behaviour is but an expression of instinctive mechanisms whereby the aggressive instinct is of particular importance, having given rise to most of the complexity of social behaviour through processes of phylogenetic and cultural ritualisation. The role of the aggressive instinct is to dynamically maintain the ranking order in a group, and much of social interaction is concerned with this, including monetary exchange.

What is certain, is that with the elimination of aggression, … the tackling of a task or problem, the self-respect [in] everything that a man does from morning till evening, from the morning shave to the sublimest artistic or scientific creation, would lose all impetus; everything associated with ambition, ranking order, and countless other equally indispensable behaviour patterns would probably also disappear from human life.

— Konrad Lorenz (1963/2002, p. 269)

Cross-cultural personality research suggests that individuals from wealthier countries tend to be more open-minded. This openness to values may support more democratic governments and the expansion of fundamental freedoms. The link between wealth and freedom is evident in cold-to-temperate climates, but not across wealthy nations in hot climates. Furthermore, temperature and economic conditions shape perceptions of national character stereotypes.

Tomasello et al. argue that the “small difference that made a big difference” in the evolution of the human mind was the disposition to share intentions. Chimpanzees are said to understand certain mental states (like intentions), but not share them. We argue that an alternative model is better supported by the data: the capacity to represent mental states (and other unobservable phenomena) is a human specialization that co-evolved with natural language.

Schizophrenia has attracted more than its fair share of evolutionary-based theories. The theories involving balancing selection are based on the assumption that the incidence of schizophrenia is invariant across time and place. Modern epidemiology allows us to reject this dogmatic belief. Once variations in the genetic and epidemiological landscape of schizophrenia are acknowledged, more productive research models can be generated.

McKay & Dennett (M&D) observe that beliefs need not be true in order to evolve. We connect this insight with Schelling's work on cooperative commitment to suggest that some beliefs – ideologies – are best approached as social goals. We explain why a social-interactive perspective is important to explaining the dynamics of belief formation and revision among situated partners.

Singh's analysis has much to be said for it. When considering the treatment of illness, however, he begins from a shaky premise about uncontrollability and, so, fails to make the most of what shamanic treatments – as placebos – can deliver.

Ramsey et al.'s article provides a more sensitive framework for comparative innovation than others' operationalisations have done. Nevertheless, a methodology has to be elaborated in order to determine to what degree a behaviour is novel. Psychological processes have to be considered when evaluating the value of reference groups and in order to figure out where to look for innovation.

It may be useful to consider the application of Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) theory of unconscious motivational processes to psychopathology. In disorders of compulsivity and impulsivity, an unconscious habit system may play a key role in explaining ego-dystonic or self-destructive behaviour. H&B's theory may provide some insights into understanding conditions such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and drug addiction; however, additional work is needed to address the neurocircuitry and neurochemistry mediating their abnormal underlying motivational processes.

Many studies have demonstrated differential resistance to change in the context of negative behavioral contrast. That is, as a result of introducing a disruptor, response rates decrease to a greater extent when the maintaining reinforcement schedule is leaner. Resistance to change also applies to positive contrast, in that increases in response rate are greater in leaner schedules. The negative contrast effects seen in studies of intrinsically motivated behavior reflect an increase in resistance to change as a result of adding extrinsic reinforcers.

The only commonality between the various psychiatric disorders is that they reflect contemporary problematic behaviors. Some psychiatric disorders have a substantial genetic component, whereas others are essentially shaped by prevailing environmental factors. Because psychiatric ailments are so heterogeneous, any universal explanation of mental illness is not likely to have any clinical or theoretical utility.