I argue that the study of variability rather than invariance should head the reading research agenda, and that strong claims of orthographic “optimality” are unwarranted. I also expand briefly on Frost's assertion that an efficient orthography must represent sound and meaning, by considering writing systems as dual-purpose devices that must provide decipherability for novice readers and automatizability for the expert.

To cover as much as possible the various questions raised by the commentators, I have divided my Response into three major sections. In section R1, I reply to the major comments and remarks dealing with the basic hypothesis upon which the kinematic theory is built (Plamondon 1993b; 1993c; 1995a; 1995b). I focus on linearity, determinism, kinematics, and the biological significance of the model parameters. I conclude this section by showing how, from a practical point of view, the delta-lognormal law can be used to group similar data prior to proceeding with further statistical analysis. In section R2, I address the main comments and remarks dealing with the speed/accuracy tradeoffs. First, I focus on the origin of speed/accuracy tradeoffs and the effect of visual feedback. Then I clarify some terminology problems and mathematical misinterpretations prior to providing new support for the theory using the experiments and data referred to by some commentators. I devote section R3 to a generalization of the kinematic theory and to some potential applications. I first provide new explanations of some classical experiments; then I show how more complex movements can be analyzed using the delta-lognormal law. I focus on perturbed and oscillatory movements as well as on cursive script and signature analysis. I conclude this section and my Response by showing some possible applications to the study of movement learning in children as well as to the study of aging phenomena in movement control. I complete my Response by recalling some technical problems that still need further analysis. Throughout the text, I try to convince the reader that the kinematic theory provides a new window on old and new data in the field.

If sociopathy is a biological adaptation, it probably evolved in small social groups in which individuals lacked the social mobility required for a con-man strategy to work. On the other hand, conflicts between groups may have provided a large niche for sociopathy throughout human history.

Physical attractiveness affects how one gets treated, but it is just a single component of one's overall “market value.” One's treatment depends on other markers of market value, including social status, competence, warmth, and any other cues of one's ability or willingness to confer benefits on partners. To completely understand biased treatment, we must also incorporate these other factors.

Leech et al.'s demonstration that analogical reasoning can be an emergent property of low-level incremental learning processes is critical for analogical theory. Along with insights into neural learning based on the salience of dynamic spatio-temporal structure, and the neural priming mechanism of repetition suppression, it establishes relational primacy as a plausible theoretical description of how brains make analogies.

In the present commentary we expand on two concepts relevant to understanding affliliative bonding. Differences and similarities between the functions and actions of oxytocin and vasopressin are difficult to study but may be critical to an understanding of mechanisms for social bonding. What is termed here a “trait of affiliation” may reflect in part the capacity of these same peptides to program the developing nervous system.

We suggest that certain experiences reported by patients with schizophrenia show that priority, consistency, and exclusivity are not sufficient for the experience of willing an action. Furthermore, we argue that even if priority, consistency, and exclusivity cause the experience of being the author of an action, this does not mean that conscious will is an illusion.

Koehler's (1996t) target article raised, and various commentators discussed, two issues that seem far separated but actually have a great deal in common. These are the value of “ecologically valid” research and the effect of direct experience on base-rate usage. Koehler discussed the former as a methodological issue and the latter as a normative one, and no commentator chose to incorporate them, but directly experienced base rates are a good example of ecologically valid research. The state of the literature with regard to directly experienced base rates is reviewed, and the emerging perception, that direct experience has a profound Bayesian effect on base-rate usage, is rejected.

Even if people are experts at understanding how various input cues landed them at a particular decision (something the authors refer to as cue utilization), they may still fail to appreciate how context influences the weight given to those input variables. We review evidence suggesting that people are unaware of contextual influences on their decisions.

Dream content is more coherent, consistent over time, and continuous with waking emotional concerns than most brainstem-driven theories of dreaming allow, but dreaming probably has no adaptive function. A new neurocognitive perspective focusing on the forebrain system of dream generation should begin with the findings on dream content in adults and the developmental nature of dreaming in children.

[Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]

Mele questions the prevalence and ontological status of strong forms of self-deception, as well as our attempt at experimental demonstration. Without validated indicators outside laboratory contexts, statements about prevalence are purely speculative. Conceptualizing self-deception without positing the motivated lack of awareness of a contradictory belief is unsatisfactory in dealing with issues of “agency,” that is, how can we stop the processing of threatening information unless we recognize that the information is threatening?

The search for a universal theory of reading is misguided. Instead, theories should articulate general principles of neural computation that interact with language-specific learning environments to explain the full diversity of observed reading-related phenomena across the world's languages.

Leibovich et al. claim that number representations are non-existent early in life and that the associations between number and continuous magnitudes reside in stimulus confounds. We challenge both claims – positing, instead, that number is represented independently of continuous magnitudes already in infancy, but is nonetheless more deeply connected to other magnitudes through adulthood than acknowledged by the “sense of magnitude” theory.

As a comment on Hibbing et al.'s paper, we discuss the evolution of political and social views from more liberal to more conservative over the span of adulthood. We show that Hibbing et al.'s theoretical model creates a false prediction from this developmental perspective, as increased conservatism in the adult life-span trajectory is accompanied by the avoidance of negative bias.