The target article contains a number of distinct but interrelated claims about the cognitive nature of folk biology based in part on cross-cultural work with urbanized Americans and forest-dwelling Maya Indians. Folk biology consists universally of a ranked taxonomy centered on essence-based generic species. This taxonomy is domain-specific, perhaps an innately determined evolutionary adaptation. Folk biology also plays a special role in cultural evolution in general, and in the development of Western biological science in particular. Even in our culture, however, it retains an autonomy from other domains of thought and from science. These claims are questioned and clarified.

Regarding Rachlin's behavioral act/pattern theory of self-control, it is argued that some cases of self-control involve pattern/ pattern conflicts rather than merely act/pattern conflicts and that – if all cases of self-control are to be accounted for – some patterns must be viewed as internal representational states of mind (plans) rather than merely as patterns of actual overt behavior.

A rigorous cladistic analysis of the dorsal pallium of amniotes indicates that the stem amniote lacked sensorimotor areas. Reptiles apparently acquired a visual cortex by parcellation from the multimodal, hippocampal-like mediodorsal pallium of stem amniotes. The high number of sensory areas of the mammalian isocortex might derive from the specific properties it shows, such as growth-promoting influence on thalamic axons.

Behrendt & Young (B&Y) suggest that hallucinations occur as a result of decoupling of neuronal populations from sensory control. I propose that such a decoupling is in fact a constant feature of brain activity, even under nonpathological conditions. This position is justified by evidence from recent neurophysiological recording studies. I suggest that hallucinations arise because of a breakdown in segregation of internally and externally generated activity in a neuronal population.

Pessoa et al. (1998a) underexposed the broad and rich variety of stimuli in the amodal completion domain. The disambiguation of occluded shapes depends on very specific figural properties. Elaborations on such disambiguations of rich and complex stimuli, tied up with a visuo-cognitive origin of amodal completion, further position Pessoa et al.'s considerations on neural filling-in and the personal-subpersonal distinction.

Atran proposes that humans have a unique, innate, domain-specific tendency to create taxonomies of biological kinds. We show that: (1) in ontogenesis, children develop a notion Atran claims to be innate; (2) what Atran claims is unique to biological kinds may be found in artifact kinds; and (3) although Atran proposes a domain-specific mental construct for biological rank, it can be explained in domain- general terms.

Respecting all constraints proposed by Firestone & Scholl (F&S), we have shown that perceived facial expressions of emotion depend on the congruency between bodily action (comfort/discomfort) and target emotion (happiness/anger) valence. Our studies challenge any bold claim against penetrability of perception and suggest that perceptual theory can benefit from demonstrations of how – under controlled circumstances – observer's states can mold expressive qualities.

The authors evaluate evidence for general intelligence (g) in nonhumans but lean heavily toward mammalian data. They mention, but do not discuss in detail, evidence for g in nonmammalian species, for which substantive material exists. I refer to a number of avian studies, particularly in corvids and parrots, which would add breadth to the material presented in the target article.

Some questions, such as when a statistical distribution of incomes becomes too unequal, seem highly attention-grabbing, inferentially productive, and morally vexing. Yet many other questions that are crucial to the functioning of a modern economy seem uninteresting non-issues. An evolutionary–psychological framework to study folk-economic beliefs has the potential to illuminate this puzzle.

The correspondence view is consistent with a theory of direct remembering that assumes continuity between perception and memory. Two implications of direct remembering for correspondence are suggested. It is assumed that forgetting is exponential, and that remembering at one time is independent of factors influencing remembering at another. Elaboration of the correspondence view in the same terms as perception offers a novel approach to the study of memory.

Self-control is in the eye of the beholder. However, we speak of ”self-control” if a person has come to think conscious thoughts that change the motivational value of stimuli in the outside world. It is claimed that conscious thinking, and not habits bordering on compulsion, is behind self-control.

Self-organizing dynamic systems (DS) modeling is appropriate to conceptualizing the relationship between emotion and cognition-appraisal. Indeed, DS modeling can be applied to encompass and integrate additional phenomena at levels lower than emotional interpretations (genes), at the same level (motives), and at higher levels (social, cognitive, and moral emotions). Also, communication is a phenomenon involved in dynamic system interactions at all levels.

Charney's target article continues a critique of genetic blueprint models of development that suggests reconsideration of concepts of adaptation, inheritance, and environment, which can be well illustrated in current research on infant attachment. The concepts of development and adaptation are so heavily based on the model of genetics and inheritance forged in the modern synthesis that they will require reconsideration to accommodate epigenetic inheritance.

Knobe reports that subjects' judgments of whether an agent did something intentionally vary depending on whether the outcome in question was seen by them as good or as bad. He concludes that subjects' moral views affect their judgments about intentional action. This conclusion appears to follow only if different meanings of “intention” are overlooked.