In the first decades of the twentieth century, the concept of “direct action” emerged as a major presence in radical politics. In the years following World War I, opponents of war and militarism reshaped that concept. They insisted upon its nonviolent character, they specified how direct action might be used to oppose war, they distinguished direct action from Bolshevism and social democracy, they imagined direct action as a key contributor to a future nonviolent revolution, and they drew upon contemporary struggles from the Ruhr, to Samoa, to India to justify their political claims. The radicals who shared these debates were linked by an energetic transnational network, spanning the War Resisters’ International and the International Antimilitarist Bureau. This article recovers this network, traces the key intellectual contributions, and argues for their significance. It aims to contribute to the intellectual histories of direct action and of nonviolence and to draw attention to previously submerged debates of the radical interwar left.

While conducting archaeological survey to document the large prehistoric canal systems in the central portion of the Tehuacán Valley, investigators recorded a mound and plaza complex that includes what appears to be an effigy mound in the shape of a scorpion. Large quantities of ceramics, including surface-decorated and polychromes, indicate a Late Classic and Postclassic occupation. The site is interpreted as being part of an intensive agricultural system as it appears centrally located in the context of highly developed agricultural and irrigation infrastructure. For the reasons described, we interpret this ca. 60 meter scorpion effigy mound as an intentional feature with possible astronomical alignments. It is hypothesized as being part of a local civic/ceremonial complex with the possible use/function of observing the summer and winter solstices. If so, it provides an insight into the integration of calendrical ritual with the surrounding complex system of fields and irrigation canals. Admittedly, these observations and explanations are relatively subjective. However, we consider them to be persuasive when the evidence is considered in its entirety.

How do local officials in China initiate and sustain policy experiments within a bureaucratic system that often obstructs innovation? This article examines local policy experimentation through the lens of bureaucratic power networks, identifying three key challenges: agenda-setting challenges related to superiors, coordination challenges involving peers and implementation challenges concerning subordinates. When formal power networks fail, entrepreneurial officials develop informal interpersonal networks, positioning themselves as “uninvited advisors” to superiors, “rhetorical allies” to peers and “supportive mentors” to subordinates. Using the case of “police–business cooperation” in Shanghai, the study reveals how the committee on comprehensive management of public security mobilized property management companies to maintain social stability. This article contributes to research on policy experimentation by situating experiments within bureaucratic power dynamics and highlighting the role of informal networks in overcoming institutional barriers. It also reveals the mechanisms by which the Party assigns social control tasks to commercial entities.

Addiction was considered ‘alien to Socialism’. At least, that was the narrative upheld by the socialist East German state, which thus followed the traditional argumentation of socialist and social democratic movements since the turn of the century. While the state clung to this ideological claim, the consumption and abuse of beer, spirits, and benzodiazepines continued to increase. However, there was never a central strategy for the treatment and prevention of addiction in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The hesitation and ignorance of the state authorities created a vacuum that was filled by local initiatives and expert discussions aimed at improving the situation of people with addictions. In this article, I analyse the introduction of new treatment methods in a psychiatric hospital in the GDR and show that doctors, psychologists, patients, and local officials had certain freedoms to test new approaches, many of which originated in the West. Even though they had to adapt concepts such as the ‘therapeutic communities’ of British reformer Maxwell Jones to the specific socialist and East German context to avoid restrictions by state authorities, the Berlin Wall did not prevent the transfer of knowledge. This article, therefore, paints a nuanced picture of the therapeutic methods used to treat people with addiction in the GDR. From condemning individuals as outcasts of socialist society for socially deviant drinking behaviour and relying exclusively on aversion therapy and moral accusations, there was a shift towards a mixture of treatments that became increasingly specialised and individualised, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, comparable to Western standards.

This article analyzes the evolution of banking supervision in Spain under Franco’s regime (1939–1975), highlighting how political and economic factors shaped oversight in an authoritarian setting. Two phases emerge. In the 1940s–50s, supervision—lodged in the Ministry of Finance—was weak, poorly staffed, and focused on enforcing banks’ oligopolistic interest rate agreements, reflecting regulatory capture. Following the 1959 Stabilization Plan, rising external pressure, domestic concerns about oligopolistic practices, and the 1962 Banking Law prompted reform. Supervision shifted to the Bank of Spain with the establishment of the Private Banking Inspection Service, resulting in more frequent inspections and gradual formalization of supervision. Archival records indicate that by the 1970s, inspections had become more frequent and rigorous, signaling a cautious shift toward risk-based oversight. However, the reforms remained incomplete. Persistent systemic vulnerabilities culminated in the severe banking crisis of 1977–1982, underlining the limitations of supervisory transformation under authoritarian rule.