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Policy networks can inform policy design with expertise and build support, or at least acquiescence, for policy change. When policy networks do not arise organically, they can be created through various forms of constructed collaboration. At one extreme, the construction may simply involve tapping expertise through advisory committees. At the other extreme, the constructed arena may delegate policy choice to organizations of stakeholders like the OPTN. Prior research assessed the capacity of the OPTN for evidence-based incremental change in organ allocation rules. This study considered continuous distribution as a radical change in allocation rules. The success of the lung CD serves as a proof of concept for continuous distribution and suggests that it can be effectively implemented for other organs. It also considers stakeholder rulemaking as an institutional alternative in other complex policy areas. Key considerations include whether it can be constructed to engage all relevant stakeholders and induce their willingness to provide expertise.
Public governance is inherently normative, so it is important to study the values of public governance – particularly in the present-day context, where, given increasingly differentiated Western public governance, many different values come into play and new value conflicts arise. In this Element, a value-based governance (VBG) perspective is presented. In this perspective, values take center stage as the guiding concept in the theory and practice of public administration and are used as a heuristic to understand and analyze public governance. One section focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of coping strategies used by actors and institutions when dealing with value conflicts. In the final section, the author returns to the practice of public governance: the VBG paradigm entails public governance with normative reasoning. Value-based governance is about bringing the value rationality back in and recognizing intrinsic values. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
We propose an evolutionary competition model to investigate the green transition of firms, highlighting the role of adjustment costs, state-dependent transition risk, and positive externalities in green technology adoption. Firms base their decisions to adopt either green or brown technologies on relative performance. To incorporate the costs of switching to another technology into their decision-making process, we adopt a novel, ad hoc crafted, replicator dynamics. Our global analysis reveals that increasing transition risk, e.g., by threatening to impose stricter environmental regulations, effectively incentivizes the green transition. Economic policy recommendations derived from our model further suggest maintaining high transition risk regardless of the industry’s level of greenness. Subsidizing the costs of adopting green technologies can reduce the risk of a failed green transition. While positive externalities in green technology adoption can amplify the effects of green policies, they do not completely eliminate the possibility of a failed green transition. Finally, evolutionary pressure reduces the extent of green economic policies required to ensure a successful green transition.
In this paper, we develop a model economy to study how financial innovations affect financial access and inequality. Financial innovations alter distribution of costs. In this way, the measure of buyers is endogenous regarding the payment method. In studying financial innovations in an economy with limited commitment, it is possible to bridge two existing literatures. When comparing stationary equilibria, we find that the results depend on the scarcity of collateral. Moreover, the expected welfare and inequality are affected by consumers access to the form of payment systems.
We study the mortgage rate channel of monetary policy transmission under two different mortgage regimes by analyzing the United States with primarily long-term fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and Spain with mainly annually resetting adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). We find a robust transmission of mortgage rate changes to spending in both regimes, with marginal propensities to consume ranging between 0.58–0.67 in Spain and 0.27–0.52 in the United States. Under ARMs, transmission is stronger when rate changes are expected to persist, whereas under FRMs, the effect is larger when rate changes are expected to revert. We further document the important role of mortgage type in shaping the variation in transmission across mortgagors—while the mortgage rate effect is fairly homogeneous across diverse household characteristics under ARMs, it is more heterogeneous under FRMs and largest among potential refinancers.
The rise of digital money may bring about privately issued money that circulates across borders and coexists with public money. This paper uses an open-economy search model with multiple currencies to study the impact of such global money on monetary autonomy – the capacity of central banks to set a policy instrument. I show that the circulation of global money can entail a loss of monetary autonomy, but it can be preserved if government policy that limits the amount or use of global money for transactions is introduced or if the global currency is subject to the threat of counterfeiting. The result suggests that global digital money and monetary autonomy can be compatible.
Extreme precipitation events have become more frequent and severe in recent years, leading to devastating natural disasters around the world. This paper investigates the impacts of extreme rainfall on corporate leverage dynamics. We find that the increase of extreme precipitation brings about a significant drop in firm’s leverage. The channel tests show that extreme rainfall would generate the recession of firm’s balance sheet and thus tighten the financing constraints, inducing firm to cut down leverage. On the other hand, intense rainfall would depress the land price and heighten local government’s debt risk, which crowds out the credit resources allocated to private sector, contributing to the deleveraging of firms. Simulations from the new Keynesian DSGE model with extreme rainfall shock and local government land finance system, lend further support to our empirical findings. Furthermore, our model shows that the welfare cost of extreme rainfall risk can amount to 2.2% of the agent’s lifetime utility. Lower welfare cost can be achieved by accommodating monetary policy and active fiscal policy.
In the United States stakeholders make rules for the allocation of deceased-donor transplant organs. More than 110,000 Americans are currently awaiting transplants and more than 1,200 die annually before they get transplants; more than 1,700 leave the waiting list annually because they've become too sick to receive transplants. Contributing to better organ transplantation policy is thus socially valuable with life and death consequences. In Negotiating Values, David Weimer deals with this important policy issue. He considers how well stakeholder rulemaking, an example of constructed collaboration, taps relevant expertise and he exploits the unusual opportunity it provides to study the implementation of a substantial planned organizational change. He also explores the implications of “street level” responses for the operation of systemwide allocation rules. Most broadly, Weimer contributes to our understanding of complex multigoal decisionmaking by explicating the interplay between values and evidence in responding to a demand for substantial policy change.
Over recent decades, we find about $80\%$ of widening residual wage inequality to be within jobs (industry-occupation pairs). To explore the underlying drivers, we incorporate into a sorting equilibrium framework with two extensive margin channels (across-job sorting and within-job selection of a performance-pay position) and an intensive margin channel (quality of skill match), in addition to residual job productivity. We show that equilibrium sorting is positively assortative both within and across jobs. By calibrating the model to the United States in 1990 and 2000, we find the improved match quality and rising performance-pay incidence amplify each other, jointly accounting for about $90\%$ of the widening within-job wage inequality. Match quality and performance pay are particularly important in jobs with rising average wages and expansionary employment. Once performance pay and match quality channels are incorporated, job sorting becomes less important and residual job productivity becomes inconsequential throughout.
This paper investigates the welfare implications of the rise of shadow banking in China, driven by regulatory arbitrage and implicit guarantees. Although shadow banking can improve social welfare by relaxing constraints on banks’ capacity to expand credit, it may also hurt social welfare due to the risk-taking behavior induced by implicit guarantees. We study the optimal level of guarantees and shadow banking in a model that balances these benefits and costs. Our findings suggest that reducing the existing degree of guarantees and shrinking the shadow banking sector could enhance social welfare in China.
This paper investigates the stability of the demand for money in the United States and provides a comparison among the simple-sum monetary aggregates, the original (non-credit-card-augmented) Divisia monetary aggregates, and the credit-augmented Divisia and credit-augmented Divisia inside aggregates. We use quarterly data from the Center for Financial Stability and the Pesaran et al. (2001) bounds test procedure to investigate the long-run relation between the monetary aggregates and their respective user costs. In doing so, we use three classic money demand functions—the log–log, the semi-log, and the Selden and Latané specifications. With quarterly data over the 1967:q1 through 2025:q1 period, for which the original Divisia monetary aggregates are available, we find evidence of a stable money demand function only with the Sum M4 aggregate under all money demand specifications, but not with any of the Divisia aggregates. With quarterly data over the post-2006 period, for which the credit-augmented Divisia monetary aggregates are also available, our findings show that the demand for money is stable across all money demand specifications with all of the original Divisia aggregates and the credit-augmented Divisia aggregates (but not with all of the credit-augmented Divisia inside aggregates). We also find evidence of cointegration with the Sum M3 and Sum M4 aggregates under all three money demand specifications, but not with the Fed’s Sum M2 aggregate.
These are the WTO's authorized and paginated reports in English. They are an essential addition to the library of all practising trade lawyers and a useful tool for students and academics worldwide working in the field of international economic or trade law. DSR 2023: Volume II contains the panel report on 'China – Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Products from Japan' (WT/DS601)
These are the WTO's authorized and paginated reports in English. They are an essential addition to the library of all practising trade lawyers and a useful tool for students and academics worldwide working in the field of international economic or trade law. DSR 2023: Volume I contains the panel report on 'United States – Safeguard Measure on Imports of Large Residential Washers' (WT/DS546).
The power that the ruling class has over institutions of authority gives them the ability to use that power to transfer income and wealth from some to others. It enables them to transfer control over resources from the masses to themselves and to transfer resources among the masses to preserve their positions in the political hierarchy by buying support. The ability of the political class to redistribute is the direct result of their control over institutions of authority. Despite the coercive institutions that enforce redistribution, citizens generally view it as a legitimate function of government, and those citizen views are supported by academic arguments that it enhances social welfare. The chapter analyzes this interaction between citizen opinion and academic support for government redistribution.
There is a political marketplace in which individuals transact with each other to produce public policy, but access to the political marketplace is limited because high transaction costs prevent the masses from participating. This divides the population into two groups: the political elite and the masses. Many people have observed this division, but often have gone on to advocate giving more power, and eliciting more participation, from the masses. That is wishful thinking. This volume explains not only why that division exists, but why it must exist. Because political power necessarily rests with an elite few, the only way it can be constrained from being abused is within an institutional structure that requires elites to compete among themselves for power, so some within the elite check and balance the power of others.
One way that citizens can become involved in public policy issues is to join interest groups that share their interests. By accumulating a large membership of voters, and by amassing resources in the form of dues, interest group leaders influence public policy. Individual members face the same incentive problems with interest groups as they do as voters. Each individual member will have negligible influence over the interest group’s activities. They can either choose to join and contribute, or not, but members are still excluded from the political marketplace. Their collective contributions convey power to the leaders of those interest groups, who are able to transact with the political elite in the political marketplace. As individuals, members of interest groups remain powerless. The leaders of those groups gain the bargaining power to enter the political elite.