The purpose of our book is to chronicle and analyze Morgan’s interventions in financial crises, telling the story of how he learned the art of last resort lending by trial and error, and finding its relevance to issues that last resort lenders still face in the early twenty-first century. We classify Morgan’s last resort loans into three types.

This chapter analyzes voluntary compliance in tax contexts, focusing on the importance of procedural justice and tax morale. It also explores conditions under which governments can achieve optimal revenue levels.

This chapter discusses the perils of voluntary compliance, including variation between individuals in the likelihood of voluntary compliance, costs and risks of changing intrinsic motivation by states, and potential risks to the cooperating public. The chapter examines a crucial paradox: When governments shift from monitoring to seeking public collaboration, they may inadvertently create more problematic regulatory approaches. While appearing gentler on the surface, these strategies could prove more manipulative from a democratic standpoint and more intrusive from a liberal perspective.

Most stories of the Panic of 1907 end with activities in December 1907. To truly understand, however, what being a private lender of last resort must have meant to Morgan, we extend the story well into 1908. To close out the story, we track what he did to clean up his own firm and other firms after the crisis, revealing substantial losses well beyond any he had incurred in previous dealings.

This chapter explores the role of culture (e.g., trust, solidarity, rule of law) in predicting the success of voluntary compliance and its malleability toward trust-based rather than coercion-based regulation.

This chapter compares the impact of different regulatory tools (command and control, mandates, and incentives relative to reasoning, honesty oath, and nudge) on the crowding out of different types of intrinsic compliance motivations.

This chapter concludes the book with normative messages on contexts where states can trust public cooperation without coercion, addressing jurisprudential and normative aspects of governments gaining public cooperation.

The arc of our story will show how Morgan evolved from being primarily concerned with providing aid to firms who were his customers to providing aid to the whole system, less centered on individual companies.

This chapter examines the likelihood of voluntary compliance in public health contexts, with emphasis on lessons learned during COVID-19 regarding trust in mask wearing, social distancing, and vaccine uptake.

We have analyzed how Morgan learned to link the three pools of global reserves during American crises, and the Panic of 1907 was no different. Morgan’s lender of last resort skills were on full display during the panic, the last and most severe of the National Banking Era panics. We analyze sixteen last resort activities (eleven domestic, five international) led by Morgan coordinating the three detached sources of liquidity.