In this paper, we expand on existing studies of Canadian Inuit art in the international arena by examining ways in which this new art served domestic purposes, focusing primarily on the 1950s and 1960s. The Canadian government developed and promoted Inuit art as part of its project to transform Inuit from semi-independent hunters into modern Canadian citizens. In this effort, Canada took up and assimilated Inuit art as a genuine Canadian cultural product, presenting it as diplomatic gifts and for other forms of international cultural diplomacy. Previous studies of Canadian Inuit art from that era have noted the ways that the promotion of Canadian Inuit art supported the young nation’s claims to a deep history, while simultaneously marking the country’s distinction from both the United States and the United Kingdom. In the context of the Cold War, the promotion of Canadian Inuit art also asserted Canada as an Arctic power. Labelled as “primitive modernist” fine art, Inuit sculpture and prints provided a stark contrast to the contemporaneous socialist realist art of the Soviet Union and its allies. We argue that the success of the Inuit art program sustained a belief among government officials that their programme to remake Inuit lives and livelihoods would succeed. Inuit art likely deflected attention from the many things that were going wrong with that northern modernisation project.

Although “urban” and “fisheries” are not commonly paired in the analyses of either urbanism or fisheries governance, today’s large-scale fisheries are often closely organised in connection with cities. In this paper, I build on a feminist perspective and urban studies to examine the makings of a city through contemporary fisheries. Drawing upon observations and interviews conducted in Tromsø, Norway, which is a key site for Arctic fisheries, I review how fish and fisheries are simultaneously made visible and invisible in urban spheres. By analysing the gendered structures and valuations that organise the city–fisheries relations, I introduce three “fishy” windows to demonstrate the kinds of development and future pathways for fisheries that are considered relevant and rational in and for the city. In particular, I discuss how the historical, techno-masculine narratives of mastering Arctic nature frame and legitimise fisheries practices as they expand throughout Tromsø. The study builds on the emerging research on Arctic urbanism to highlight the need to better integrate gendered analyses of the “urban” into social science research on natural resource extraction.

The linkages between the Arctic and the rest of the world have become more profound and the region is increasingly attracting attention, also from non-Arctic state actors. Parallel to this development, the discussion about the future Arctic is taking place in various arenas, forums and among an increasing number of actors with interest in the region. At a time of high tension in international relations, and an increased likelihood of spill-over to Arctic cooperation, issues of governance of the Arctic region are potentially at stake. This makes it important that scholars are accurate in their analyses; confusing the mandate, responsibilities and purposes of different arenas for cooperation can be unfortunate. This article finds support in the literature on regime complexes and aims to show and analyse the differences between three key players in the Arctic: the Arctic Council, Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle Assembly. In addition to exploring their differences, we ask what role these entities play in shaping policy in and for the Arctic. From mapping out the mandates, roles and responsibilities of the Arctic Council, Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly, and by nuancing their formal and informal aspects, we aim to contribute to clarifying misunderstandings regarding their functions and positions vis-à-vis each other.

As ice recedes, the governance of the Arctic is undergoing a significant change. What was once considered a frozen desert with little relevance to the legal system, the Arctic has gradually become a global object of governance. Furthermore, the growing political salience of the Arctic Ocean has generated interest in its governance beyond Arctic states, particularly Asian states such as China, India, Japan, Singapore and South Korea. These countries have been actively participating in regional cooperation arrangements, including the Arctic Council. Undoubtedly, science diplomacy has been an important driver in shaping the governance of the Arctic and maintaining it as a low-tension area. However, this perception is now being put to the test following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Amidst this crisis, we explore whether science diplomacy can continue to promote peaceful collaboration in the Arctic region. Our research suggests that science diplomacy could potentially aid in the future of Arctic governance, particularly with regard to the involvement of Asian states. We analyse the legal and geopolitical factors involved in determining the potential roles of Asian states in Arctic governance, including whether they could serve as a bridge between the West and Russia or if their actions might further fragment Arctic governance.

The loss of Sir John Franklin’s Arctic expedition has provoked speculation about the cause of the fatal outcome from the expedition’s departure in 1845 to the present day. This study describes how The Lancet, first published in 1823 and now one of the world’s leading medical journals, drew conclusions at the time of the expedition’s loss, which closely parallel those of today’s most recent research. The journal took evidence from Arctic medical and naval experts to conclude in 1859 that the Admiralty’s misdirected searches committed the crews to ice-bound entrapment, which had fatal nutritional consequences. The Lancet’s prescience has been supported by recent research showing that the unique physical circumstances faced by the expedition had nutritional effects related to vitamin deficiencies, which explain mortality over the third winter and the eventual total loss. It is significant that, although published 160 years apart and with vitamins unknown in the Victorian era, both studies took robust evidence-based approaches to draw similar conclusions.

In the 19th century, sealing vessels visited the South Shetland Islands to exploit animal resources for the global skin and oil markets. The captains or mates of these vessels were responsible for keeping a logbook in which they recorded daily observations of weather conditions, hunting activities, etc. Despite the value of these documents as a source of information, archaeologists studying Antarctic sealing have not always relied on them. This paper examines the potential of logbooks for providing information that is relevant to the archaeological study of sealing in the South Shetland Islands. In particular, it discusses how documentary analysis of exploitation strategies can provide insight into the dynamics that influenced the configuration of sealers’ sites. To this end, we propose a methodology for investigating exploitation strategies, taking into account several archaeologically sensitive variables, including the number, location and duration of landings, as well as the activities carried out during these events. We have taken four logbooks dating from the early and late 19th century – specifically those of the Aurora (1820–1821), the Huron (1820–1822), the Thomas Hunt (1873–1874) and the Sarah W. Hunt (1887–1888) – as case studies to test the proposed methodology.

Much has been written about the so-called Franklin expedition (1845–), but not about the master mariners, who joined as “Greenland pilots,” as experienced whaling masters on Royal Navy expeditions were usually called in the 19th century. Having been on Royal Navy expeditions to the Arctic before, Thomas Blanky, the ice master of HMS Terror, was mentioned here and there in contemporary sources. But who he was and how and why he joined the expedition are still widely unanswered questions, to be dealt with for the first time here.

The new terricolous lichen species Thamnolecania yunusii Halıcı, Güllü, Bölükbaşı & Kahraman, which is characterised by its cream to greyish brown granulose-crustose thallus without vegetative propagules, is described from Horseshoe Island in the South-West Antarctic Peninsula region. All Thamnolecania species are known only from the Antarctic. The only species of the genus with a crustose thallus is T. racovitzae, but it differs from T. yunusii by growing on rocks, having an effuse to subeffigurate thallus that is sometimes isidiate and with shorter and narrower ascospores (c. 15 × 3.5 µm vs. 15.5–19.5 × 3.5–5.5 µm). The nrITS, mtSSU and RPB1 gene regions of the new species were studied and the phylogenetic position of the species was shown to be in the same clade as Thamnolecania gerlachei, T. brialmontii and T. racovitzae, but occurs on a different branch from these species. As T. yunusii is an Antarctic endemic, like the other Thamnolecania species, and most of the morphological characters fit well with this genus, we describe this new species under the genus Thamnolecania.

The CCAMLR System of Inspection has been in place for more than 30 years, but its implementation and impact have yet to be summarised and analysed. The purpose of the research is to clarify the legal basis, analyse the implementation and make suggestions for further improvements. By analysing the CAMLR Convention and historical files, the System of Inspection has been further improved and many details have been added based on some international fisheries agreements and domestic laws regulating fisheries. Article XXIV of the CAMLR Convention, various Conservation Measures and documents form the legal basis of the System of Inspection. The System is divided into two types, namely At-sea inspection and Port inspection. Combined with the annual reports of CCAMLR meetings over the past 30 years, the System has become relatively complete as a “Compliance Monitoring Mechanism” under the CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure with other monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) tools. However, inspection data have not been stable over the years. Since 2017, the increase in catches has not led to an increase in the number of inspections in the annual reports. In addition, At-sea inspections do not cover all Subareas of the Convention. At present, the objects of inspection have been extended to Non-Member vessels, so that it should also be sanctioned through various mechanisms. In addition, the System of Inspection is different from the Compliance Evaluation Procedure and the relationship between the two needs to be confirmed in practice. Due to the change in inspection methods, the lack of inspection data and the increase in other MCS tools, At-sea inspection does not cover all Subareas of the Convention. The System of Inspection is constantly being practised and improved. The study calls on Members to continue to carry out inspections and to improve the System in order to achieve the conservation and rational use of fishery resources.

Plastic pollution in the Arctic marine system is sparsely quantified, and few enforceable policies are in place to ameliorate the issue. With an inflow-outflow budget for the Arctic Ocean, we identify gateways through which plastic enters and exits the Arctic marine system. While estimating the flux of plastic through rivers, sea ice, and ocean, we also quantify marine plastic pollution from Arctic shipping and fishing. Plastic fluxes are calculated using horizontal volume fluxes of water and ice and combining them with plastic waste concentration data; flux from fishing and shipping is generated through combining waste estimates with estimated ship traffic. We estimate that fishing and shipping contribute 105 tonnes of plastic flux per annum, compared to 10−1 tonnes per annum from river inflow. The ocean has a far smaller net outflow, dwarfed by that of ice, at 10−8 to 10−7 and 10−5 to 10−3 tonnes per annum, respectively. We examine how a suite of proposed policy interventions would quantitatively change those concentrations, and how the current governance environment makes each feasible; we find interventions targeting vessel traffic most effective. These interventions include a prohibition on the use of certain plastics in fishing as well as a Polar Code permitting scheme.

China’s role in the Arctic regime remains a debatable topic in the expert discourse on the High North. Currently, in view of the aggravated conflicts in other regions that include Russia as the largest Arctic state, and China as its strategic partner, the Arctic regimes are experiencing salient disturbances. Against this backdrop, an understanding of China’s opportunities to affect Arctic affairs is urgently needed. We address this issue by combining political and legal analyses. We used the regime theory approach to outline the Arctic regime complex (ARC), and through this lens, we discuss the recent changes that are being observed. Based on this, we determine China’s actual potential for making amendments to the ARC. We conclude that China has no capacity to make a crucial shift in the ARC, but it is still able to alter particular rules, like those related to Arctic Ocean management and scientific cooperation. The further efficient operation of the Arctic Council will play a decisive role in envisaging China’s behaviour in the region.

Russia’s Arctic policy since 2008 has been influenced by two competing foreign policy lines (discourses): the “Arctic as a resource base” and the “sovereignty discourse”. The “Arctic as a resource base” has been the dominant one since the first Russian Arctic Strategy in 2008. It is primarily about exploiting the vast oil and gas resources estimated to be located there, as well as turn the Northern Sea Route into a “global transport corridor”. In Russia’s Arctic Strategy of 2020, however, there is enhanced emphasis on sovereignty and power balancing in Russian Arctic policy. And the focus on sovereignty was heightened with the amendments to Russia’s Arctic Strategy in March 2023. This increased emphasis on sovereignty, territorial defence and balance of power in Russian Arctic policy is likely to be further reinforced by the growing great-power competition between the USA and Russia, which has gained new momentum following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.