In Chapter 2 we raised the question of whether Aristotle thinks that in all cases of coming-to-be (including substantial generation) the subject from which the change proceeds must persist through that change or whether he thinks this holds only for those cases where S comes to be F in the qualified sense. I tried to show that, if Aristotle did think that in cases of substantial generation the pre-existing matter survives to become a constituent of the finished product, it is not obvious that he provides that defence in Physics I as the standard reading assumes. However, because the idea of persistent matter has such a firm hold on the literature, much more will be needed to loosen its grip. Part of the aim of the current chapter is to provide that additional support by examining the account of generation in GC I 1–4.

The seeds of an answer to the question raised at the end of Chapter 7 – how do formal and material natures interact in the creation of a new substantial individual? – have already been sown inChapter 4 in connection with GC II 9. On the reading I defended there, while Aristotle agrees with those more sophisticated materialists who regard natural generation as the effect of the simple bodies and their inherent powers, he ultimately rejects their account on the grounds that the powers they give them are too instrumental (lian organikas) to serve as primary causes of the change (336a1–12). But Aristotle’s positive account in GC II 9 remains undeveloped in two important respects. First, he says very little about the nature of the efficient cause that was ‘vaguely dreamed of’ by all his predecessors but ‘definitely stated’ by none of them (335b7–8).

Chapter 17 sets out the historical factors behind the differing conceptions in India and Greece of the interrelation of universe with inner self and the absence from Greece of karma.

In the Phaedo (Plato’s) Socrates develops an argument for the immortality of the socto be known as the Law of Opposites (70d6–72a7).

This book is an inquiry into an important yet neglected area of Aristotle’s philosophy: the generation of substances. All change for Aristotle is a form of coming-to-be (or passing-away) in some sense. With some changes the substance already exists and simply becomes qualified in some way, as for example when Socrates (a substance) comes to be healthy from being unhealthy (a change in quality) or comes to be bigger from being smaller (a change in quantity). Aristotle calls this coming-to-be in the qualified sense (gignesthai ti). In cases of substantial generation (what Aristotle calls coming-to-be in the unqualified sense, gignesthai haplôs) the change results in a new substance coming into existence. At the end of development, we say that Socrates has come to be (full stop) rather than saying he has come to be F. This distinction was not universally accepted by Aristotle’s predecessors.

I now want to turn to the generation of biological substances in the Generation of Animals. I have stressed the fact that Aristotle treats living things as substances ‘most of all’ (Metaph. 1034a3–4) and so biological generation should be seen as substantial generation par excellence. This forms the focus of the next two chapters. The central aim of the discussion is to set out in detail what I shall call Aristotle’s “reproductive hylomorphism”, which is a more specific application of the basic hylomorphic model from the foundational works to the generation of living things. By way of introduction I shall begin with some remarks about the project of the GA itself.

Chapter 5 begins with similarities and differences beween Vedic and Greek sacrifice, notably the centrality to Greek sacrifice of the communal meal that was absent from Vedic sacrifice, in which the cycle of nature, the payment of metaphysical debt and the rite of passage to heaven and back each forms a cosmic cycle driven by necessity. The individualisation of the Vedic sacrifice, along with its interiorisation and automatisation, cannot be explained by ignoring the factor of monetisation. Individualisation in India and Greece has different cultural consequences.

Chapter 3 describes how there is in the earliest texts of both cultures (Rigveda, Homer, Hesiod) a variety of anthropomorphic deities whose good will is to be elicited by offerings and praise, against a background combination of pastoralism and agriculture, with no money and very little commerce.

Chapter 11 comparesthe interiorisation of the cosmic rite of passage in India (sacrifice) and Greece (mystic initiation), identifies the importance of the soul (psuche) in mystic initiation, which is interiorised in Herakleitos, in Parmenides and in Plato. This Greek interiorisation promoted ideas akin to the coalescence of mental with abstract monism promoted by the interiorisation of the cosmic rite of passage in India.

Chapter 15 discusses the various features of the Platonic inner self (soul, psuche), in particular its interiorisation of controlling abstract value and of the master-slave relationship). We then take a detour through linguistics, the history of reflexivity in Greek and Sanskrit, to provide independent evidence for our view of monetisation as a factor in the emergence of the unitary inner self, which is then related to the influence of monetised self-sufficiency on a continuous passage of the Chandogya Upani?ad.