Embarrassed state of Athens after the Four Hundred.

The oligarchy of Four Hundred at Athens (installed in the Senate-house about February or March 411 b.c. and deposed about July of the same year), after four or five months of danger and distraction such as to bring her almost within the grasp of her enemies, has now been terminated by the restoration of her democracy; with what attendant circumstances, has been amply detailed. I now revert to the military and naval operations on the Asiatic, coast, partly contemporaneous with the political dissensions at Athens, above described.

Peloponnesian fleet—revolt of Abydos from Athens.

It has already been stated that the Peloponnesian fleet of 94 triremes, having remained not less than 80 days idle at Rhodes, had come back to Milêtus towards the end of March; with the intention of proceeding to the rescue of Chios, which a portion of the Athenian armament under Strombichidês had been for some time besieging, and which was now in the greatest distress. The main Athenian fleet at Samos, however, prevented Astyochus from effecting this object, since he did not think it advisable to hazard a general battle. He was influenced partly by the bribes, partly by the delusions of Tissaphernês, who sought only to wear out both parties by protracted war, and who now professed to be on the point of bringing up the Phenician fleet to his aid.

Negotiations for peace during the winter after the battle of Amphipolis.

My last chapter, and last volume, terminated with the peace called the Peace of Nikias, concluded in March 421 B.C.—between Athens and the Spartan confederacy, for fifty years.

This peace—negotiated during the autumn and winter succeeding the defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, wherein both Kleon and Brasidas were slain—resulted partly from the extraordinary anxiety of the Spartans to recover their captives who had been taken at Sphakteria, partly from the discouragement of the Athenians, leading them to listen to the peace party who acted with Nikias. The general principle adopted for the peace was, the restitution by both parties of what had been acquired by war—yet excluding such places as had been surrendered by capitulation: according to which reserve, the Athenians, while prevented from recovering Platæa, continued to hold Nisæa, the harbour of Megara. The Lacedæmonians engaged to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and to relinquish their connection with the revolted allies of Athens in Thrace—that is, Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, and Spartôlus. These six cities, however, were not to be enrolled as allies of Athens unless they chose voluntarily to become so—but only to pay regularly to Athens the tribute originally assessed by Aristeidês, as a sort of recompense for the protection of the Ægean sea against private war or piracy.

Alleged propositions of peace from Sparta to Athens—doubtful.

The victory of Arginusæ gave for the time decisive mastery of the Asiatic seas to the Athenian fleet; and is even said to have so discouraged the Lacedæmonians, as to induce them to send propositions of peace to Athens. But this statement is open to much doubt, and I think it most probable that no such propositions were made. Great as the victory was, we look in vain for any positive results accruing to Athens. After an unsuccessful attempt on Chios, the victorious fleet went to Samos, where it seems to have remained until the following year, without any farther movements than were necessary for the purpose of procuring money.

Eteonikus at Chios—distress of his seamen—conspiracy suppressed.

Meanwhile Eteonikus, who collected the remains of the defeated Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, being left unsupplied with money by Cyrus, found himself much straitened, and was compelled to leave the seamen unpaid. During the later summer and autumn, these men maintained themselves by labouring for hire on the Chian lands; but when winter came, this resource ceased, so that they found themselves unable to procure even clothes or shoes. In such forlorn condition, many of them entered into a conspiracy to assail and plunder the town of Chios; a day was named for the enterprise, and it was agreed that the conspirators should know each other by wearing a straw or reed.

I had hoped to be able, in this Volume, to carry the history of Greece down as far as the battle of Knidus; but I find myself disappointed.

A greater space than I anticipated, has been necessary, not merely to do justice to the closing events of the Peloponnesian war, especially the memorable scenes at Athens after the battle of Arginusæ—but also to explain my views both respecting the Sophists and respecting Sokratês.

It has been hitherto common to treat the Sophists as corruptors of the Greek mind, and to set forth the fact of such corruption, increasing as we descend downwards from the great invasion of Xerxês, as historically certified. Dissenting as I do from former authors, and believing that Grecian history has been greatly misconceived, on both these points—I have been forced to discuss the evidences, and exhibit the reasons for my own way of thinking, at considerable length.

To Sokratês I have devoted one entire Chapter. No smaller space would have sufficed to lay before the reader any tolerable picture of that illustrious man—the rarest intellectual phænomenon of ancient times, and originator of the most powerful scientific impulse which the Greek mind ever underwent.

THE BIRTH of Abraham is placed by Eusebius in October B. C. 2016. The years are computed from that point. In the following Table an expanded view is given of the first 104 years. In the obscure centuries that follow it is sufficient to mark the beginning of each century. But the thirteenth century contains the Olympic era, and in the following centuries the most important events of ancient history are registered down to the Christian era. From this last epoch the Eusebian years are every where quoted in the present Work, and this Table will exhibit them from the year 1201 to the end. The notation of the Armenian Copy is followed, which places the first Olympic games in the year 1240 and the Nativity in the close of the year 2015 in the 4th year of the 194th Olympiad. The Eusebian years commence in October; and as 1240 contained the beginning of Ol. 1. 1 July B. C. 776, it commenced in October B. C. 777. Ol. 194. 4 was the 776th Olympic year commencing in July B. C. 1. But, as the Eusebian year 1240 was still current when the first Olympic year began, then 1240 + 775 = 2015, and the 2015th year was still current when the 776th began. And as the year 1240 commenced in October preceding, or Oct. B. C. 777, so the year 2015 commenced in October preceding, or Oct. B. C. 2. These two epochs determine the position of the other years.

Before we enquire into the Gospel Chronology, it will be convenient to take a brief survey of the whole subject of Scripture Chronology as it is set forth in the first Volume of the Fasti Hellenici. It is there shewn that the Hebrew notation gives 1656 years from Adam to the Flood, and 352 from the Flood to the birth of Abraham; that 505 years are marked in Scripture from the birth of Abraham to the Exode; that from the Exode to the Temple were 612 years. Then followed the last 37 years of the reign of Solomon, and 389 from the death of Solomon to the destruction of the Temple, which happened in the 587th year before the Christian era. Reckoning upwards from this point, we obtain from these collected numbers B. C. 2130 for the birth of Abraham, B. C. 2482 for the Flood, and B. C. 4138 for the creation of Adam.

Mr. Cuninghame, whose laborious calculations and copious Tables are valuable aids to the student in Sacred Chronology, for all the time which follows the birth of Abraham, has preferred in the preceding periods the longer generations of the Septuagint, and places Adam at B.C. 5478 and the Flood at B.C. 3217. The chronology of Mr. Cuninghame has been adopted by Professor Wallace, who also accepts the longer computations of the Greek Version and rejects the numbers of the Hebrew Text; and has fully treated the subject in his dissertation on the True Age of the World. The arguments by which he has maintained his propositions shall in this place be briefly examined.

B.C. 414.

Movements of Nikias in the early spring.

The Athenian troops at Katana, probably tired of inaction, were put in motion in the early spring, even before the arrival of the reinforcements from Athens, and sailed to the deserted walls of Megara, not far from Syracuse, which the Syracusans had recently garrisoned. Having in vain attacked the Syracusan garrison, and laid waste the neighbouring fields, they re-embarked, landed again for similar purposes at the mouth of the river Terias, and then, after an insignificant skirmish, returned to Katana. An expedition into the interior of the island procured for them the alliance of the Sikel town of Kentoripa; and the cavalry being now arrived from Athens, they prepared for operations against Syracuse. Nikias had received from Athens 250 horsemen fully equipped, for whom horses were to be procured in Sicily—30 horse-bowmen and 300 talents in money. He was not long in furnishing them with horses from Egesta and Katana, from which cities he also received some farther cavalry—so that he was presently able to muster 650 cavalry in all.

Even before this cavalry could be mounted, Nikias made his first approach to Syracuse. For the Syracusan generals on their side, apprised of the arrival of the reinforcement from Athens, and aware that besieging operations were on the point of being commenced, now thought it necessary to take the precaution of occupying and guarding the roads of access to the high ground of Epipolæ which over-hung their outer city.

Consequences of the ruin of the Athenian armament in Sicily.

Occupation of Dekeleia by the Lacedæmonians—its ruinous effects upon Athens.

In the preceding chapter, we followed to its melancholy close the united armament of Nikias and Demosthenês, first in the harbour and lastly in the neighbourhood of Syracuse, towards the end of September 413 B.C.

The first impression which we derive from the perusal of that narrative is, sympathy for the parties directly concerned—chiefly for the number of gallant Athenians who thus miserably perished, partly also for the Syracusan victors, themselves a few months before on the verge of apparent ruin. But the distant and collateral effects of the catastrophe throughout Greece, were yet more momentous than those within the island in which it occurred.

I have already mentioned that even at the moment when Demosthenês with his powerful armament left Peiræus to go to Sicily, the hostilities of the Peloponnesian confederacy against Athens herself had been already recommenced. Not only was the Spartan king Agis ravaging Attica, but the far more important step of fortifying Dekeleia, for the abode of a permanent garrison, was in course of completion. That fortress, having been begun about the middle of March, was probably by the month of June in a situation to shelter its garrison, which consisted of contingents periodically furnished, and relieving each other alternately, from all the different states of the confederacy, under the permanent command of king Agis himself.