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In the sixtieth chapter of this work, I brought down the history of the Grecian communities in Sicily to the close of the Athenian siege of Syracuse, where Nikias and Demosthenes with nearly their entire armament perished by so lamentable a fate. I now resume from that point the thread of Sicilian events, which still continues so distinct from those of Peloponnesus and Eastern Greece, that it is inconvenient to include both in the same chapters.
Syracuse after the destruction of the Athenian armament
If the destruction of the great Athenian armament (in September 413 b.c.) excited the strongest sensation throughout every part of the Grecian world, we may imagine the intoxication of triumph with which it must have been hailed in Sicily. It had been achieved (Gylippus and the Peloponnesian allies aiding) by the united efforts of nearly all the Grecian cities in the island–for all of them had joined Syracuse as soon as her prospects became decidedly encouraging; except Naxos and Katana, which were allied with the Athenians–and Agrigentum, which remained neutral. Unfortunately we know little or nothing of the proceedings of the Syracusans, immediately following upon circumstances of so much excitement and interest. They appear to have carried on war against Katana, where some fugitives from the vanquished Athenian army contributed to the resistance against them.
b.c. Conspiracy of the knights of Orchomenus against Thebes–destruction of Orechomenus by the Thebans.
It was during this period–while Epaminondas was absent with the fleet, and while Pelopidas was engaged in that Thessalian campaign from whence he never returned–that the Thebans destroyed Orchomenus. That city, the second in the Bœotian federation, had always been disaffected towards Thebes; and the absence of the two great leaders, as well as of a large Theban force in Thessaly, seems to have been regarded by the Orchomenian Knights or Horsemen (the first and richest among the citizens, 300 in number) as a favourable moment for attack. Some Theban exiles took part in this scheme, with a view to overthrow the existing government; and a day, appointed for a military review near Thebes, was fixed for execution. A large number of conspirators joined, with apparent ardour. But before the day arrived, several of them repented and betrayed the plot to the Bœotarchs; upon which the Orchomenian horsemen were seized, brought before the Theban assembly, condemned to death, and executed. But besides this, the resolution was taken to destroy the town, to kill the male adults, and to sell the women and children into slavery. This barbarous decree was executed, though probably a certain fraction found means to escape, forming the kernel of that population which was afterwards restored. The full measure of ancient Theban hatred was thus satiated; a hatred, tracing its origin even to those mythical times whenThebes was said to have paid tribute to Orchomenus.
Measures for executing the stipulations made at the congress of Sparta.
Immediately after the congress at Sparta in June 371 b.c., the Athenians and Lacedæmonians both took steps to perform the covenants sworn respectively to each other as well as to the allies generally. The Athenians despatched orders to Iphiskrates, who was still at Korkyra or in the Ionian Sea, engaged in incursions against the Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian coasts–that he should forthwith conduct his fleet home, and that if he had made any captures subsequent to the exchange of oaths at Sparta, they should all be restored; so as to prevent the misunderstanding which had occurred fifty-two years before with Brasidas, in the peninsula of Pallênê. The Lacedæmonians on their side sent to withdraw their harmosts and their garrisons from every city still under occupation. Since they had already made such promise once before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but had never performed it–commissioners, not Spartans, were now named from the general congress, to enforce the execution of the agreement.
Violent impulse of the Spartans against Thebes
No great haste, however, was probably shown in executing this part of the conditions; for the whole soul and sentiment of the Spartans were absorbed by their quarrel with Thebes. The miso-Theban impulse now drove them on with a fury which overcame all other thoughts; and which, though doubtless Agesilaus and others considered it at the time as legitimate patriotic resentment for the recent insult, appeared to the philo-Laconian Xenophon, when he looked back upon it from the subsequent season of Spartan humiliation, to be a misguiding inspiration sent by the gods–like that of the Homeric Atê.
Imilkon with the Carthaginian army marches from Agrigentum to attack Gela
The proceedings, recounted at the close of my last chapter, whereby Dionysius erected his despotism, can hardly have occupied less than three months; coinciding nearly with the first months of 405 b.c., inasmuch as Agrigentum was taken about the winter solstice of 406 b.c. He wras not molested during this period by the Carthaginians, who were kept inactive in quarters at Agrigentum, to repose after the hardships of the blockade; employed in despoiling the city of its moveable ornaments, for transmission to Carthage, and in burning or defacing, with barbarous antipathy, such as could not be carried away. In the spring Imilkon moved forward towards Gela, having provided himself with fresh siege-machines, and ensured his supplies from the Carthaginian territory in his rear. Finding no army to oppose him, he spread his troops over the territory both of Gela and of Kamarina, where much plunder was collected and much property ruined. He then returned to attack Gela, and established a fortified camp by clearing some plantation-ground near the river of the same name, between the city and the sea, On this spot stood, without the walls, a colossal statue of Apollo, which Imilkon caused to be carried off and sent as a present to Tyre.
The peace or convention which bears the name of Antalkidas, was an incident of serious and mournful import in Grecian history. Its true character cannot be better described than in a brief remark and reply which we find cited in Plutarch. “Alas for Hellas (observed some one to Agesilaus) when we see our Laconians medising!”–“ Nay (replied the Spartan king), say rather the Medes (Persians). laconising”.
Peace or convention of Antalkidas. Its import and character. Separate partnership between Sparta and Persia
These two propositions do not exclude each other. Both were perfectly true. The convention emanated from a separate partnership between spartan and Persian interests. It was solicited by the Spartan Antalkidas, and propounded by him to Tiribazus on the express ground, that it was exactly calculated to meet the Persian king's purposes and wishes–as we learn even from the philo-Laconian Xenophon. While Sparta and Persia were both great gainers, no other Grecian state gained anything, as the convention was originally framed. But after the first rejection, Antalkidas saw the necessity of conciliating Athens by the addition of a special article providing that Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros should be restored to her. This addition seems to have been first made in the abortive negotiations which form the subject of the discourse already mentioned, pronounced by Andokides.
The present Volume is already extended to an unusual number of pages; yet I have been compelled to close it at an inconvenient moment, mid-way in the reign of the Syracusan despot Dionysius. To carry that reign to its close, one more chapter will be required, which must be reserved for the succeeding volume.
The history of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, forming as it does a stream essentially distinct from that of the Peloponnesians, Athenians, &c, is peculiarly interesting during the interval between 409 b.c. (the date of the second Carthaginian invasion) and the death of Timoleon in 336 b.c. It is moreover reported to us by authors (Diodorus and Plutarch), who, though not themselves very judicious as selectors, had before them good contemporary witnesses. And it includes some of the most prominent and impressive characters of the Hellenic world–Dionysius I., Dion with Plato as instructor, and Timoleon.
I thought it indispensable to give adequate development to this important period of Grecian history, even at the cost of that inconvenient break which terminates my tenth volume. At one time I had hoped to comprise in that volume not only the full history of Dionysius I., but also that of Dionysius II. and Dion–and that of Timoleon besides. Three new chapters, including all this additional matter, are already composed and ready.