IT has been shewn in a former work that the era of Antioch was reckoned from Nov. 1 B.C. 49 U. C. Varr. 705. The first year therefore of Antioch was nearly conumerary with the 264th year of the Selewcidœ, which commenced in October B. C. 49 U. C. Varr. 705. But if the first year was conumerary with the 264th, the 301st of Antioch, with which this Table begins, was conumerary with the 564th of the Seleucidœ.

That the era of Diocletian was reckoned from his accession in A. D. 284 is determined by Theon ad Ptolemæi μ∈y. σuvTαξ. who attests that the 29th day of Aihyr in the year of Nabonassar 1112 fell within the 81st year of Diocletian. Aihyr 29 of the 1112th year was Nov. 25 A. D. 364, and the 81st year of Diocletian was then current. But if the 81st year was current Nov. 25 A. D. 364, the first was already current Nov. 25 A. D. 284, and we are carried back to his accession Sept. 17. It is probable however that in Alexandrian computation the years of this era were deduced from Aug. 29, as in the Alexandrian coins of Diocletian given in the Tables at A. D. 285 p. 328.

The Indictions in Marcellinus and in the Tables of Du Fresnoy torn. 1 p. 174 are compared with the consulship and the Julian year in which they end. In the following Table they are compared with the years in which they begin, because the years of the Christian era are here made the measure of the rest and contain the beginnings of all the other epochs.

Different spirit shown towards Sokratês and to wards the Sophists.

That the professional teachers called Sophists in Greece were intellectual and moral corruptors—and that much corruption grew up under their teaching in the Athenian mind—are common statements which I have endeavoured to show to be erroneous. Corresponding to these statements is another, which represents Sokratês as one whose special merit it was to have rescued the Athenian mind from such demoralising influences;—a reputation, which he neither deserves nor requires. In general, the favourable interpretation of evidence, as exhibited towards Sokratês, has been scarcely less marked than the harshness of presumption against the Sophists. Of late, however, some authors have treated his history in an altered spirit, and have manifested a disposition to lower him down to that which they regard as the Sophistical level. M. Forchhammer's treatise—“The Athenians and Sokratês, or Lawful Dealing against Revolution”—goes even further, and maintains confidently that Sokratês was most justly condemned as a heretic, a traitor, and a corruptor of youth. His book, the conclusions of which I altogether reject, is a sort of retribution to the Sophists, as extending to their alleged opponent the same bitter and unfair spirit of construction with that under which they have so long unjustly suffered. But when we impartially consider the evidence, it will appear that Sokratês deserves our admiration and esteem, not indeed as an anti-Sophist, but as combining with the qualities of a good man, a force of character and an originality of speculation as well as of method, and a power of intellectually working on others—generically different from that of any professional teacher—without parallel either among contemporaries or successors.

B.C. 415 April.

Preparations for the expedition against Siciliy—general enthusiasm and sanguine hopes at Athens.

For the two or three months immediately succeeding the final resolution taken by the Athenians to invade Sicily (described in the last chapter), the whole city was elate and bustling with preparation. I have already mentioned that this resolution, though long opposed by Nikias with a considerable minority, had at last been adopted (chiefly through the unforeseen working of that which he intended as a counter-manœuvre) with a degree of enthusiasm and unanimity, and upon an enlarged scale, which surpassed all the anticipations of its promoters. The prophets, circulators of oracles, and other accredited religious advisers, announced generally the favourable dispositions of the gods, and promised a triumphant result. All classes in the city, rich and poor—cultivators, traders, and seamen—old and young—all embraced the project with ardour; as requiring a great effort, yet promising unparalleled results, both of public aggrandisement and individual gain. Each man was anxious to put down his own name for personal service; so that the three generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus, when they proceeded to make their selection of hoplites, instead of being forced to employ constriant and incur ill-will, as happened when an expedition was unpopular, had only to choose the fittest among a throng of eager volunteers. Every man provided himself with his best arms and with bodily accoutrements, useful as well as ostentatious, for a long voyage and for the exigencies of a varied land- and sea-service.

Capture of Minôa, opposite Megara, by the Athenians under Nikias

About the same time as the troubles of Korkyra occurred, Nikias the Athenian general conducted an armament against the rocky island of Minôa, which lav at the mouth of the harbour of Meeara, and was occupied by a Megarian fort and garrison. The narrow channel, which separated it from the Megarian port of Nisæa and formed the entrance of the harbour, was defended by two towers projecting out from Nisæa, which Nikias attacked and destroyed by means of battering machines from his ships. He thus cut off Minôa from communication on that side with the Megarians, and fortified it on the other side, where it communicated with the mainland by a lagoon bridged over with a causeway. Minôa, thus becoming thoroughly insulated, was more completely fortified and made an Athenian possession; since it was eminently convenient to keep up an effective blockade against the Megarian harbour, which the Athenians had hitherto done only from the opposite shore of Salamis.

Nikias—his first introduction, position, and character

Though Nikias, son of Nikeratus, had been for some time conspicuous in public life, and is said to have been more than once Stratêgus along with Periklês, this is the first occasion on which Thucydidês introduces him to our notice. He was now one of the Stratêgi or generals of the commonwealth, and appears to have enjoyed, on the whole, a greater and more constant personal esteem than any citizen of Athens, from the present time down to his death.

It was while the northerly states of Greece were thus successively falling oft from the common cause, that the deputies assembled at the Isthmus took among themselves the solemn engagement, in event of success, to inflict upon these recusant brethren condign punishment–to tithe them in property, and perhaps to consecrate a tenth of their persons, for the profit of the Delphian god. Exception was to be made in favour of those states which had been driven to yield by irresistible necessity. Such a vow seemed at that moment little likely to be executed: it was the manifestation of a determined feeling binding together the states which took the pledge, but it cannot have contributed much to intimidate the rest.

To display their own force, was the only effective way of keeping together doubtful allies; and the pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed upon as the most convenient point of defence, next to that of Tempê–leaving out indeed, and abandoning to the enemy, Thessalians, Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Phthiôtid Achæans, Dolopes, Ænianes, Malians, &c, who would all have been included if the latter line had been adhered to ; but comprising the largest range consistent with safety. The position of Thermopylæ presented another advantage which was not to be found at Tempê ; the mainland was here separated from the island of Eubœa only by a narrow strait, about two English miles and a half in its smallest breadth, between Mount Knêmis and Cape Kênæum.

430 b.c. Barren results of the operations during the first year of war

At the close of one year after the attempted surprise of Platæa by the Thebans, the belligerent parties in Greece remained in an unaltered position as to relative strength. Nothing decisive had been accomplished on either side, either by the invasion of Attica, or by the flying descents round the coast of Peloponnesus: in spite of mutual damage inflicted—doubtless in the greatest measure upon Attica—no progress was yet made towards the fulfilment of those objects which had induced the Peloponnesians to go to war. Especially the most pressing among all their wishes—the relief of Potidæa—was noway advanced; for the Athenians had not found it necessary to relax the blockade of that city. The result of the first year's operations had thus been to disappoint the hopes of the Corinthians and the other ardent instigators of war, while it justified the anticipations both of Periklês and of Archidamus.

Second invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians—more spreading and ruinous than the first

A second devastation of Attica was resolved upon for the commencement of spring; and measures were taken for carrying it all over that territory, since the settled policy of Athens not to hazard a battle with the invaders was now ascertained. About the end of March or beginning of April, the entire Peloponnesian force (two-thirds from each confederate city as before) was assembled under the command of Archidamus and marched into Attica.

Eighth year of the war—began with most favourable promise for Athens—closed with great reverses to her

The eighth year of the war, described in the last chapter, had opened with sanguine hopes for Athens, and with dark promise for Sparta, chiefly in consequence of the memorable capture of Sphakteria towards the end of the preceding summer. It included, not to mention other events, two considerable and important enterprises on the part of Athens—against Megara and against Bœotia; the former plan, partially successful—the latter, not merely unsuccessful, but attended with a ruinous defeat. Lastly, the losses in Thrace following close upon the defeat at Deliuna, together with the unbounded expectations everywhere entertained from the future career of Brasidas, had again seriously lowered the impression entertained of Athenian power. The year thus closed amidst humiliations the more painful to Athens, as contrasted with the glowing hopes with which it had begun.

Desire of Spartans to make peace in order to regain the captives—they decline sending reinforcenuents to Brasidas

It was now that Athens felt the full value of those prisoners whom she had taken at Sphakteria. With those prisoners, as Kleon and his supporters had said truly, she might be sure of making peace whenever she desired it. Having such a certainty to fall back upon, she had played a bold same and aimed at larger acquisitions during the past year—and this speculation, though not in itself unreasonable, had failed: moreover a new phenomenon, alike unexpected by all, had occurred, when Brasidas broke open and cut up her empire in Thrace.