This paper will examine the principles governing standing to seek judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) and administrative review under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act), with particular emphasis on standing problems in actions brought by individuals and organizations seeking to raise broad or non-traditional claims of public interest.

Even though the tests for standing under the ADJR Act and the AAT Act are formulated in different terms than the common law rules and were specifically drafted to broaden restrictive common law requirements, a review of decisions by the Federal Court and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) shows that each has often limited itself to familiar common law concepts of standing, without clearly exploring whether such limits and the doctrines or policies which support them are appropriate to the form of review being exercised.

It is a tenable view of Commonwealth v Tasmania that as a matter of ratio decidendi it added nothing to the judicial construction of the Commonwealth's external affairs powers (Constitution ss 51(xxix) and 61) which was not already adumbrated in R v Burgess; ex parte Henry (in 1936) and clearly established in Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (in 1982). In this range of cases, attention is concentrated on circumstances in which the Commmonwealth claims power to enact and implement laws having a domestic application within Australia which would not be valid unless they were made in pursuance of an international agreement to which the Commonwealth is a party. There are other circumstances in which the external affairs power will support Commonwealth laws, and these are mentioned in all the Franklin Dam and Koowarta opinions, but hitherto the case illustration of such valid laws has been minimal. It has been hitherto assumed, though not explicitly stated, that international agreements and their implementation in Australia constitute a distinct subdivision or aspect of the legal rules in question.

Drug foods are part of every food culture, so Sidney Mintz has argued, and the energy drink, Red Bull, might be understood as one of our latest drug foods. Drug foods pose a challenge from a regulatory point of view for they bring into focus two of the great food debates – the impact of food regulation on food innovation and the role of food regulators in regard to public health. In so far as drug foods have traditionally formed a part of every diet, any attempt to ban or limit new or novel drug foods opens the food regulator to ‘endless charges of hypocrisy and irrationality’, ‘paternalistic’ behaviour and standing in the way of food innovation. On the other hand, if the food regulator does allow new drug foods to be manufactured and sold it is accused of failing in its duty to protect public health or of being ‘amoral’ in this regard.

In this paper, we study the rapid transition in Richtmyer–Meshkov instability (RMI) with reshock through three-dimensional double-layer swirling vortex rings. The rapid transition in RMI with reshock has an essential influence on the evolution of supernovas and the ignition of inertial confinement fusion, which has been confirmed in numerical simulations and experiments in shock-tube and high-energy-density facilities over the past few years. Vortex evolution has been confirmed to dominate the late-time nonlinear development of the perturbed interface. However, few studies have investigated the three-dimensional characteristics and nonlinear interactions among vortex structures during the transition to turbulent flows. The coexistence of co-rotating and counter-rotating vortices is hypothesized to induce successive large-scale strain fields, which are the main driving sources for rapid development. The three-dimensional effect is reflected in the presence of local swirling motion in the azimuthal direction, and it decreases the translation velocity of a vortex ring. Large-, middle- and small-scale strain fields are employed to describe the development process of RMI with reshock, e.g. vorticity deposited by the reshock, formation of the coexistence of the co-rotating and counter-rotating vortices, iterative cascade under the amplification of the strain fields and viscous dissipation to internal energy. This provides theoretical suggestions for designing practical applications, such as the estimation of the hydrodynamic instability and mixing during the late-time acceleration phase of the inertial confinement fusion.

It is a great pleasure to contribute to a festschrift devoted to celebrating the 80th anniversary of our friend and colleague, Emeritus Professor Leslie Zines. His contribution to the study of Australian constitutional law is too well known to require any reinforcement from us. It spans a period of five decades. His principal book The High Court and the Constitution has been and continues to be at the forefront of constitutional scholarship since it was first published. That book and his other writings represent the distilled essence of much of his valuable and incisive understanding of the way the High Court interprets and should interpret, the Constitution – something which has held a life-long fascination for him. In his publications as in his many years of teaching, he displays not only a mastery of the technical and analytical aspects of public law, but a social and functional awareness that goes well beyond deriving the meaning and application of many provisions of the Constitution by the mere contemplation of the language used or by the canons of construction.

There are indications that Australia may shortly accede to and ratify the United Nations 1958 (New York) Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. This Convention, which has recently been the subject of a study by UNCITRAL, provides for the contracting parties to recognize and enforce awards made in the course of arbitration in foreign countries. Should the Government decide to ratify the Convention the manner of putting it into effect in Australia may pose some constitutional problems, and this comment discusses some alternatives open to the Government, bearing in mind the requirements of the Australian Constitution.

Economic and technological developments suggest that the Commonwealth will again be pressed to consider the enactment of a scheme to guarantee universally either a minimum income or a job opportunity. In this article, Mr Arup examines the debate over the efficacy of the two guarantees, concentrating upon their structural problems and operational difficulties as these result from doubts about constitutional power. He concludes that support for either guarantee lies in a combination of heads of constitutional power.

How are we to explain the High Court's reluctance to move into stronger forms of rights protection, as evinced by the disparity between its federalism and rights-based judicial review practices? It has been suggested that the federal and ‘rights’ provisions of the Constitution are equally indeterminate, calling into question the notion that the legal materials themselves compel a preference for one or another type of review. And the Court's record of rendering politically consequential decisions in its federalism jurisdiction suggests that political-institutional constraints may not preclude it from expanding its rights review powers. This article contends that the disparity in the Court's review practices can be explained only by way of a theory of judicial politics that is sensitive to notions of cultural as well as political constraint. It traces the historical emergence of an Australian politico-legal culture, before examining its role in restraining the further protection of constitutional rights.

This treatise, possibly written between 541 and 557 (1147–1162), illuminates the perspectives of a subaltern group persecuted by the Nizari Ismaili hierarchy for agitating to bring about the manifestation (ẓuhūr) of their imam. Ismailis in Iran awaited the manifestation of a descendant of Nizār b. al-Mustanṣir who was killed in Cairo in 488/1095 after a failed attempt to succeed his father as the Fatimid imam-caliph. In 559/1164, the fourth ruler of the Nizari polity proclaimed the Qiyāmat-i buzurg (the Great Resurrection) and was subsequently recognized as the Nizari imam. This text records how its author construed the transference of imamate from Egypt to Iran. It structured continuities between the Fatimid and Nizari daʿwa (summons) and between communities of followers of Nāṣir-i Khusraw and Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ, the founder of the Nizari Ismaili polity. If the dating is correct, then the Ḥikāyat is one of the earliest known Nizari texts and is a very early exemplar of the Nizari appropriations of the poet, philosopher, and Fatimid dāʿī (summoner), Nāṣir-i Khusraw.

The central purpose of this article is to test the assumption that constitutional cases generally produce a heightened level of disagreement amongst the members of the High Court. In addition to extra-judicial statements indicating that is so, there are a number of theoretical and pragmatic reasons why we would expect greater individuality in the delivery of constitutional judgments than might be observed in other areas. However, there has not been an empirical study of the Court’s behaviour in these cases which is of sufficient longitudinal scope so as to verify this suspicion, no matter how compelling the arguments or anecdotal impressions.

This study attempts to overcome that deficiency. In order to do so, it adopts the following structure. In Part II, the hypothesis under examination will be stated with consideration of the reasons currently given for its acceptance. In Part III, the methodology employed to test the hypothesis will be set out. In Part IV, results of the study will be presented with accompanying analysis. In the concluding Part, the findings of the study will be summed up and possible directions for future research will be suggested.

Although some concept of a “market” is inherent in all systems of competition law, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) is striking in that it expressly makes liability under most of its substantive sections (sections 45, 46, 47, 49 and 50, but not section 48) depend in one way or another on the identification of a market or markets in which competition has been injured by the impugned conduct. This is because at the time when the Trade Practices Act 1974 came to be drafted, the concepts of market definition and market control had evolved to a high level in other jurisdictions, particularly in the United States.

Now, however, after five years’ experience with market definition under the 1974 Act, the Australian doctrine should have its own contribution to make. It should be rewarding, therefore, to attempt to state the principles that have so far emerged, in light also of cases and writings in the major overseas antitrust systems, those of the European Common Market and the United States. Since market definition often determines the outcome of suits or applications under the Trade Practices Act, these principles have practical as well as conceptual importance.

Australia has announced the need to review the distribution of responsibility among individuals, businesses and governments, as a consequence of the move to digital citizenship. Australia has formally framed the issues in these terms and has opened dialogue between government and citizens regarding responsibilities for the use and protection of digital identity.

This article examines digital citizenship in Australia and considers the implications for individuals, government and the private sector of the requirement for an individual to use his/her digital identity for transactions. The features and functions of digital identity are examined, and the consequences for individuals, business and government of system failure are considered. The analysis shows that, while there are consequences for all, individuals are most affected.

The author argues that the traditional approach of relying on privacy for protection is inadequate in these circumstances. Privacy, by its nature, cannot adequately protect the part of digital identity which is required for transactions. The argument presented is that, unlike privacy, the right to identity can protect the set of digital information required for transactions. Considering the new system is literally being imposed by government, the inherent vulnerabilities of the system, and the consequences of system failure for individuals, formal recognition of the right to identity is an essential element of accountable and responsible governance. Whilst in time the right to identity in this context may be recognised by the courts, the author argues that legislative recognition and protection of an individual's right to digital identity is needed now as a key component of the distribution of responsibility in this new digital era.

Although lacking an express mandate, since Federation courts have declared legislation ultra vires if they find it contrary to the Australian Constitution. This article undertakes an historical examination in four parts, to determine whether this judicial review of legislation is legitimate.

First, objections to the institution are identified. Second, the justifications for judicial review of legislation developed in the United States, and expressed in the seminal 1803 decision of Marbury v Madison, are examined. Having identified the twin justifications as the supremacy of the Constitution and the primacy of the judiciary in its interpretation, the third section analyses Australian Federation records to see if these justifications are supported, and whether they rebut the objections raised. Finally, the persistence of these justifications after Federation is demonstrated.

It is concluded that evidence of the supremacy of the Constitution, and the primacy of the judiciary in its interpretation, is sufficient to justify judicial review of legislation under the Australian Constitution.