The principle of subsidiarity was adopted as part of the law of the European Union as a response to perceptions of excessive centralisation and bureaucratisation within the European system of government. If subsidiarity is a solution to these problems in Europe, it might be asked: could it also be a solution to similar problems that arise in other federal systems, such as those of the United States and Australia? However, posing the question in this way is misleading because it is not at all clear that subsidiarity has been a solution in Europe, and in any case it cannot be assumed that a solution in one context will necessarily operate effectively in another.
This article closely examines the nature and operation of the principle of subsidiarity in Europe and asks what lessons might be learned from it. To do this, the article begins by identifying the carefully defined operation of the principle in EU law and then closely examining the application of the principle, firstly as a political decision-making procedure that involves the Member State parliaments in the European policy-making process, and secondly as a juridical principle enforceable by the European Court of Justice. The possible adoption of the principle in other federations is then discussed, but limitations on its effectiveness in Europe, as well as the different institutional and political circumstances of the Australian federal system, are shown to undermine its likely usefulness, unless other more fundamental issues about the way in which the federal system is understood, organised and operated are addressed.