This paper will examine the principles governing standing to seek judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) and administrative review under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act), with particular emphasis on standing problems in actions brought by individuals and organizations seeking to raise broad or non-traditional claims of public interest.

Even though the tests for standing under the ADJR Act and the AAT Act are formulated in different terms than the common law rules and were specifically drafted to broaden restrictive common law requirements, a review of decisions by the Federal Court and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) shows that each has often limited itself to familiar common law concepts of standing, without clearly exploring whether such limits and the doctrines or policies which support them are appropriate to the form of review being exercised.

The common law “punitive” privileges against self-incrimination and exposure to a penalty have received renewed attention in a series of decisions concerning their application in such highly visible and sensitive contexts as Royal Commissions of Inquiry; investigation of corporate crime; police misconduct and economic regulation. Possibly less dramatic but no less fundamentally at issue is their application to the wider spectrum of rights and interests arising from, and affected by, the extensive administrative and discretionary powers in the hands of the executive and government officials.

Central to “this fertile new province of the law” is the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (henceforth referred to as the “Tribunal”). This appeal mechanism has been established at the Commonwealth level for the purpose of reviewing on the merits, decisions of administrators and thereby promoting fair and equitable decision-making principles.

It is strange to think that the question whether the High Court of Australia can grant the writ of certiorari may still be characterised as “unresolved”. To judge from the treatment this issue has received from several commentators, it might be asseverated that the matter is “unresolved” because “unimportant”. This article will examine the heads of jurisdiction which might be invoked to sustain the granting of the writ by the High Court.

As well, it will be necessary to consider whether, as a matter of principle, certiorari can or should issue to a superior court of record such as the Federal Court of Australia. The decision in Re Gray; ex parte Marsh casts doubt on the amenability of those tribunals to the writ at all. Since it has always been hitherto blithely assumed that Federal Court judges are susceptible to certiorari for the purpose of s 75(v), the dissentients’ view of Gray’s case, if accepted, would require a fundamental rethink of the entire area.

Aboriginals – Land Rights – Administrative Law – Inquiry by Aboriginal Land Commissioner – Party not disclosing information to inquiry – Ex parte representations to Minister by party detrimentally affected – Failure to take into account relevant considerations – Obligation of Minister to have regard to exparte representation – Constructive knowledge of Minister of matters within his departmenrs knowledge – Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (C’th) ss 11, 50

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (C’th) s 5(2)(b).