The stratigraphic record of the Early Holocene in the Nebraska Sand Hills suggests dry climatic conditions and periods of sustained aeolian activity, which resulted in several well-documented instances of sand dunes blocking river drainages in the western Sand Hills. Here, we present evidence that drainage blockage by migrating sand dunes also occurred in the central Sand Hills, where precipitation is higher and dune morphology differs. The South Fork Dismal River valley contains a sequence of aeolian, alluvial, and lacustrine sediments that record a gradual rise of the local water table following a sand dune blockage of the river valley around 11,000 years ago. After the initial development of a wetland, a lake formed and persisted for at least 2000 years. Increased groundwater discharge due to a warm, moist climate in the region after 6500 years ago likely caused the breaching of the dune dam and eventually resulted in the decline of the local water table. Through a careful examination of the intricate relationships between ground water, surface water, and sand movement in a dune field setting, we discuss the hydrologic system's complex response to climate change. We use diatoms to reconstruct the lacustrine environment and optically stimulated luminescence and radiocarbon dating to provide chronological control, based on a careful evaluation of the strengths and limitations of each method in varied depositional environments.

Among various possible options, a theme for the 1993 Menzies Lecture quite naturally emerged for an American whose special field is freedoms of expression' protected by the Constitution. A clear and easy choice was that of an American perspective on issues of free speech and press in light of the High Court judgments in Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (hereinafter ACTV) and Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (hereinafter Nationwide News). The challenge of this assignment was daunting, since I realised that most who would hear and would later read these remarks would be far more conversant than I with these cases and their portent. Yet I took on the task with much enthusiasm, recognising an exceptional opportunity for international comparison and understanding.

Until 1967, Indigenous Australians were excluded from being counted as amongst ‘the people’ in the Australian Constitution, by s 127. That section was deleted by referendum. However, s 25 remains in the Constitution, and allows for the reintroduction of such exclusion. This article is a detailed reconsideration of both sections in light of an understanding of ‘the people’ as a reference to the constitutional community represented by the Parliament. Exclusion of Indigenous Australians prior to 1967 is considered, highlighting the way in which s 127 operated. Then, the position post-1967 is addressed to show that the deletion of s 127 did not result in equality because s 25 continues to provide for racial exclusion. This article argues that this ongoing possibility of exclusion by s 25 affects the nature of the Australian constitutional community, by indicating that it can be racially discriminatory.

This paper examines the recent expansion of the powers of the Family Court of Australia with regard to children. The nature of the change was underlined in Marion's case, in which a majority of the High Court confmned that the Family Court had jurisdiction to hear an application relating to the performance of a hysterectomy on a severely retarded girl. No matrimonial dispute was involved. The fact that the Court may deal with children's cases in the absence of such a dispute has implications for State Children's Courts (which apply child welfare legislation) and for State Supreme Courts (in the exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction). It is these implications which are the principal concern of this paper. Before they are explored, however, it is necessary to consider the Family Court's constitutional and legislative foundations.

Not so long ago, Australian electoral law was described as being in a Cinderella state, a neglected but promising field of inquiry. Some years down the track, it is clear that Australian electoral law is beginning to shed its Cinderella-status with scholars paying increasing attention to the legal regulation of elections.

In this burgeoning field, political finance laws assume critical importance. Indeed, it has been said that such laws probably pose ‘perhaps the central issue facing electoral law’. Arguably for this reason, this aspect of Australian electoral law, more so than any other, has been the subject of sustained scholarship. It is even showing signs of maturing into a distinct area of electoral law.

In this article, Mr Rumble examines the 1977 amendments to the Trade Practices Act’s definitions of the words “supply”, “corporation” and “consumer” and their relationship to that part of the Act which gives contractual protection to consumers. The definition sections are tested against the policy goals identified by the Swanson Committee and against the general need for simplicity in consumer protection legislation. The verdict is unfavourable. It is demonstrated that the definition sections have some anomalous results. Mr Rumble argues, further, that the definition sections are a quag of ambiguity and specific areas of uncertainty are discussed to illustrate this argument.

Mr Rumble suggests that contract protection be taken out of the Trade Practices Act and incorporated in its own legislative framework.

On 5 October 2000, the High Court handed down its latest decision on the scope of s 80 of the Commonwealth Constitution. This note provides an overview of the decision and its importance, and offers a critique of the reasoning employed in the majority judgments.

Section 80, variously described but commonly referred to as the trial by jury provision, “has led to some of the sharpest divisions of opinion in the history of this Court”. Whilst the decision in Cheng v The Queen (hereafter Cheng) confirms the interpretation given to s 80 in Kingswell v The Queen—which involved a challenge to the same provisions of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth)—some of the judges making up the majority in Cheng admitted to reservations about that interpretation. In addition, Kirby J and Gaudron J were vociferous in their disagreement with much of the majority's reasoning, which suggests that fundamental differences over the meaning of s 80 will continue to plague the Court into the future.

Governments have been increasingly preoccupied with the task of reconciling claims to preferential treatment with the principle of equality. The social and philosophical issues raised by this apparent paradox are considered, and the compatibility of benign discrimination with the concept of equality demonstrated by developing a complex normative notion of equality. An analysis is then undertaken of the various attempts made by lawyers, in nearly one hundred existing bills of rights, to give formal expression to these principles. Ultimately the problem of benign discrimination falls for resolution by the courts, and the jurisprudence developed in this respect by the Supreme Courts of Canada and the United States is critically discussed and compared. Having exhaustively developed an appreciation of world experience regarding the interaction of bills of rights equality clauses and benign discrimination, consideration is given to the formulation of the Australian Human Rights Bill—a bill of which Gareth Evans was one of the principal draftsmen.

In an oft-cited passage from Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin Brennan J identified the scope of judicial review in terms which bear repeating:

The passage emphasized the centrality of the distinction between review for error of law and merits review. However, the qualification that the dichotomy, which is so readily stated in principle, is not always easy to apply in practice is also well-taken.

One of the more obvious characteristics of Australian federalism hitherto has been the marked reluctance of the Commonwealth to utilize its legislative powers to the full. The only two areas where the limits have been explored with any determination are taxation and industrial disputes. The phenomenon is no doubt a complex one, not to be explained solely or even primarily by reference to the structure of the Constitution or its interpretation by the High Court. Nevertheless both must have a bearing upon it.

It would be, for instance, hard to doubt that the Commonwealth has been made lazy in its legislative approach to government by the refusal of the High Court to imply any strict demarcation between legislative and executive functions, and by the Court’s generous interpretation of the scope of the power to attach conditions to money grants to the States under section 96. Similarly, growth of the trade and commerce power manifestly has been inhibited by the scope given to section 92, in marked contrast to the lack of interest shown by the Court in giving substantial content to the prohibition on preference in section 99 in relation to revenue laws.

[I]n order to begin to understand public law we must first try to make it strange.

The law of statutory interpretation is often wrongly thought of as a “quiet backwater”. The myth that it is a dry, formal subject containing simple rules persists despite high-level seminars devoted to it, law reform reports, sweeping statutory reforms, mammoth texts, sophisticated judicial descriptions, and, in the last decade, numerous scholarly articles and works emanating particularly from North America.

This article argues against the disenfranchisement of prisoners and explores the terrain of possible political and legal reform in this area. After a brief introduction defending the importance of the franchise, the article falls into several parts. First, there is an examination of the definition of the franchise by Australian electoral law, in the context of international norms. The second part explores arguments for and against prisoner enfranchisement, and draws on overseas jurisprudence, and historical and political theory. The practical effect of the disenfranchisement is then assessed statistically, and also in terms of realpolitik. Finally, the possibility of using anti-discrimination law to challenge these laws is considered.

On 24 February 2011 the Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced proposals for introduction of a ‘carbon price mechanism’ to commence as early as 1 July 2012. This announcement follows the establishment of a Multi-Party Climate Change Committee on 27 September 2010 with instructions to ‘explore options for the implementation of a carbon price [and] help to build consensus on how Australia will tackle the challenge of climate change’, starting from the position that ‘a carbon price is a necessary economic reform required to reduce carbon pollution’. Earlier in 2010 a major review of the Australian taxation system by Dr Ken Henry was released, providing extensive insights into how the tax system should be restructured ‘to deal with the … environmental challenges of the 21st century’, and its ‘interrelationships [with] … the proposed emissions trading system’. These developments are largely driven by the need for Australia to develop a credible climate change agenda once the Kyoto Protocol arrangements come to an end in 2012.

Amongst the nations of the South Pacific only Australia and New Zealand have no constitutionally entrenched Bills of Rights. New Zealand has no written Constitution at all, whilst in the Australian Constitution there are a number of provisions which have the potential to guarantee some civil and political rights.

The founding fathers of the Australian Constitution were pragmatic people. Almost all of them were parliamentarians and many of them either were, or had been, Premiers or senior Ministers in the governments of the various Australian colonies. They were not leisured gentlemen who took time to consider philosophy, let alone write any of their own. They were not concerned about the rights of humankind, nor did they see their role as one of creating an Australian federal parliament and a government that was required to guarantee, uphold and preserve the rights of the people. On the contrary their aim was to achieve some hard, practical, political goals.