This article originally was published as a Law and Policy Paper. The Law and Policy Papers series was established in 1994 by the Centre for International and Public Law in the Faculty of Law, the Australian National University. The series publishes papers contributing to understanding and discussion on matters relating to law and public policy, especially those that are the subject of contemporary debate. In 1999 the papers were published jointly by the Centre for International and Public Law and The Federation Press. This article is reproduced in the Federal Law Review with the permission of the original publishers.

This collection of articles, commentaries and book reviews, published here in the Federal Law Review, forms only the second symposium on electoral law published in Australia. Interest in how democratic choice is regulated and how elections are run – the rules of the game of electoral politics and the ways in which its dynamics intersect with those rules – is a staple of media debate and political science. Yet it is only beginning to emerge as a focus of sustained attention in the legal academy.

In the Australian and New Zealand common law tradition, the law governing elections in particular and democracy in general has been historically subsumed, and to a degree lost, under the broader rubric of ‘constitutional law’. In part this has been imposed from without; a product of the dicing up of the discipline of law into broad doctrinal categories to suit the legal profession, a practice perpetuated by the dictates of the admission rules. However, it has also been the consequence of academic neglect: an overlooking of the potential of the field by legal scholars.

An essential feature of any democratic system is the holding of regular elections that lead to the creation of the government of a nation. It is often said that such elections should be ‘free and fair’. Some obviously fail this test. For example, observers, including representatives of the European Union (‘EU’) and the Commonwealth, found that in recent elections in Zimbabwe the number of polling stations was reduced in strong opposition areas, the body supervising the election was unqualified and the ruling party (Zanu-PF) used violence, intimidation, bribery and vote-rigging to secure re-election. Of course, elections need not be so blatantly violent or corrupt to fail the ‘free and fair’ standard. International observers and opposition parties have, for instance, criticised the recent Russian elections because the state run television station promoted the ruling party while criticising and defaming the challengers.

Not so long ago, Australian electoral law was described as being in a Cinderella state, a neglected but promising field of inquiry. Some years down the track, it is clear that Australian electoral law is beginning to shed its Cinderella-status with scholars paying increasing attention to the legal regulation of elections.

In this burgeoning field, political finance laws assume critical importance. Indeed, it has been said that such laws probably pose ‘perhaps the central issue facing electoral law’. Arguably for this reason, this aspect of Australian electoral law, more so than any other, has been the subject of sustained scholarship. It is even showing signs of maturing into a distinct area of electoral law.

Elections are commonplace events. Both in terms of their frequency, but also in the way they are taken for granted. Especially in Australia, but more generally in western democracies, their ebb and flow forms a seasonal rhythm, against which the more substantive work of government and public affairs – policy debates, law-making, administration and the (re)construction of community and national identities – is played out, through debate in the media, opinion polling and parliamentary and executive activity.

The magic long ago seeped out of our understanding and, for many, the experience of elections. They are major logistical events, certainly. But on the surface they appear to be relatively routine affairs, professionally run by full-time, non-partisan electoral commissions, who are bureaucratically guided, indeed bound, by enormously detailed legislative codes. The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) (CEA), for example, currently extends to more than 350 pages. By contrast, the inaugural Commonwealth Electoral Act 1902 (Cth) and accompanying Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 (Cth) together spanned fewer than 45 pages.

New Zealand’s political landscape experienced a seismic shift in 1993, when the country replaced the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) voting system it had inherited from its British colonial past with a new Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) voting system. The move had immediate and deep ramifications for a whole range of issues: the range of interests represented in Parliament; the way that governments are formed and function; how the country’s public sector agencies operate; the manner in which its electoral participants conduct their campaigns; and so on. Indeed, it is not too much of an exaggeration to say that every area of New Zealand’s public and political life was touched in some fashion by the general ‘systems change’ produced by the country’s decision to embrace MMP.5 These changes have effected shifts in what may be termed the ‘political culture’ of New Zealand; re-alignments in the relationships between various public and political institutions and bodies; as well as alterations to the formal legal rules that govern these institutions and bodies.