Considerable confusion and difference of opinion exists as to the precise boundaries of jurisdiction in custody matters between Federal and State courts. This Article examines the main cases in which the scope of the Family Court's custody jurisdiction has been in issue, and reviews suggestions made to remedy the problems resulting from the division of jurisdiction. The authors argue for an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) which is consistent with the trend of High Court authority as to the scope of the marriage power (section 51(xxi) of the Constitution), and which would remove much of the uncertainty concerning the Family Court's jurisdiction.

In Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (‘Plaintiff M61’), the High Court held in a unanimous joint judgment that the plaintiff asylum seekers on Christmas Island were entitled to procedural fairness and to have their claims for refugee status determined according to law. This decision has significant ramifications for the government’s asylum seeker policy, and it has already been the subject of academic commentary from an immigration perspective. The case also has broader doctrinal significance because it is only the second time that the full bench has considered what this article will call a ‘no-consideration’ clause. The Court held that the legislature can validly confer a power on a decision-maker and at the same time provide that the decision-maker has no duty to consider exercising it. However, on the facts before it, the Minister had decided to consider all requests for asylum and thus had moved beyond the protection of the no-consideration clause.

There is no doubt that the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ('ACCC’) has provoked very strong opinions among big business in Australia. This criticism reached its height in 2002 and 2003, at the end of Professor Allan Fels’ period as Chairman of the Commission. At this time, the Chief Executive Officers of a number of Australia's biggest companies regularly and publicly criticised the ACCC, and Professor Fels himself, for being ‘unfair, unjust and immoral', and having no ‘line of accountability at all.’ The ACCC's behaviour was criticised for being ‘a corruption of administration of the Trade Practices Act', ‘false and misleading behaviour on the part of the cop', and for using publicity ‘in a way that damages companies before they are proven guilty'. One chief executive said that ‘Fels’ use of the media … smacks of the Gestapo.’ Another called Fels a ‘smiling assassin’ who had inflicted ‘irreparable harm to the Australian economy.’

A court's approach to non-parties, such as the amicus curiae and intervener, reflects its perception of its own larger role. The Supreme Courts of Canada and the United States, as well as the Constitutional Court of South Africa, have welcomed submissions from public interest organisations and others and have drafted Rules of Court to allow their participation in cases raising important issues of public policy. The South African Court has even solicited submissions from strangers to the litigation, such as academics, in order to broaden its perspective on a case arid on the consequences of any decision it might reach. The approach of these courts shows how each has embraced the roles of law-maker arid interpreter of an ambiguous constitution.

The High Court of Australia, on the other hand, frequently denies the amicus curiae and intervener any meaningful function. They are riot even mentioned in the Rules of Court. While it is true that the total number of interventions in the Court has increased over the last decade, the door has often been closed.

If an aircraft’s initial mass, the variation of true airspeed, true rate of climb, wind speed and wind direction with time and the relationship between barometric altitude and local temperature are known, the performance along the entire flight path can be determined. Previously published work has provided the building blocks for a simple, fast, open-source and transparent method to estimate the instantaneous fuel flow rate and the engine overall efficiency, plus several other performance characteristics for turbofan powered, civil transport aircraft. The flight phases of primary interest are the climb, cruise, descent and holding, when the flaps and undercarriage are fully retracted and the engine is providing significant, positive thrust. However, for completeness, an approximate relation is provided for the engine’s ‘flight idle’ condition, together with simple estimates for fuel use during take-off and landing, plus a factor to allow for in-service deterioration. Detailed consideration is also given to the operating limits and relations are developed for the estimation of their location in Mach number and flight level space. To apply the method, a series of characteristic coefficients and constants must be known. Estimates for these quantities have been progressively improved and extended over time. Initially, results were published for 53 aircraft types and variants. The data base has now been extended to 67 entries and this is given in tabular form. Finally, to demonstrate the method’s accuracy, estimates of fuel flow rate are compared with flight data recorder values for 20 complete flights of six different aircraft types.

In 1981 and in following years Australian parliaments embarked upon a novel experiment: statutory reform of the general approaches to statutory interpretation. The best known of these provisions (called here “purpose rules”) is s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth).

The implied freedom of communication about government and political matters is now firmly entrenched in constitutional jurisprudence, following the High Court decisions in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation and Levy v Victoria. Both its existence and the manner of its implication, namely from the text and structure of the constitution, are “not open to doubt”. Although this more “traditional” approach to the derivation of constitutional implications appears to reduce the likelihood of further implications based upon representative government, the scope and extent of the implied freedom still require considerable elaboration. However, the application of accepted principles to particular areas, even if that leads to an expanded interpretation of the freedom, has a surer foundation than the derivation of new freedoms.

I begin this paper with a disclaimer: it does not pretend to be a definitive study of freedom of information in Australia. Rather, it presents the experience of an official who has been concerned with the development of the Commonwealth freedom of information legislation from the time it first appeared on the political agenda in Australia; who has taken part in hundreds of hours of discussion and debate on the topic by officials; who has shared in much of the academic consideration of the subject; who has drafted a score of Cabinet submissions on the subject for consideration by Ministers; who has worked closely with three Attorneys-General on the matter; who has both formally and informally canvassed a wide range of issues with members of a Senate Committee, and who has spent long hours with one of our best parliamentary counsel in the business of translating concepts into legislation which, it is hoped, is reasonably workable.

Whether words in the singular include the plural or whether words in the plural include the singular is a common problem of statutory interpretation. Acts interpretation legislation of the States and the Commonwealth offer slightly varying presumptions for dealing with the problem. Professor Sawer analyses these presumptions and their application in numerous cases. As well, reforms that would lead to greater clarity and uniformity of such legislation are suggested.

The second part of the article explores the special problems regarding singulars and plurals in the context of the Constitution and, in particular, section 57 which provides for the resolution of deadlocks between the Senate and the House of Representatives with regard to “any proposed law”. The High Court's resolution of some of the problems raised when more than one proposed law is the subject of disagreement between the Houses of Parliament is exhaustively analysed. In addition, solutions are offered to a number of judicially unanswered questions relating to section 57 of the Constitution.

This article examines historical aspects of the convention that Australian judges are precluded from engaging in political activities. That convention is an element of the strict separation of judicial functions and the independence of the judiciary. Apart from the deliberative component which may be carried out in private and the very limited role for closed hearings, the judicial process is essentially acted out in public. However, upon appointment to the bench, a judge is expected to limit involvement in other forms of public life and to conduct his or her private life so as to avoid, as far as is reasonably practicable, involvement in activities which might (or might be seen to) compromise the judge's or a court's independent status or the impartial disposition of specific cases or issues. The less involved a judge is in non-judicial activities the less likely it is that the judge will be confronted with determination of a case or an issue in which he or she has some interest.

Technological developments, particularly the advent of the Internet and the mobile phone, have spawned a vast increase in the volume, type and availability of telecommunications information. Mobile phones are now capable of sending and receiving SMS text messages and emails, accessing and downloading material from the Internet, taking photographs, streaming video and audio content and providing GPS navigation. National security and law enforcement agencies frequently wish to access telecommunications information for national security and law enforcement purposes. The desired information may be ‘telecommunications content’ — that is, the actual substance of a communication — or ‘telecommunications data’ — meaning information about a communication but not the substance of it.

International humanitarian law is a subject of universal importance and relevance. Since 1974, the problems of restatement and development have engaged the attention of the Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts.

In this article, Professor J. G. Starke, Q.C. surveys developments in international humanitarian law over the last quarter century and examines in detail Australia's contribution to those developments. The process by which the idea of “laws of war” has come to be superseded by the concept of international humanitarian law is outlined, while reference is also made to the principal sources of international humanitarian law. Australia's interest in international humanitarian law since World War II is discussed, as is the background to the present continuing Geneva Conference and proceedings at its first three sessions in 1974, 1975 and 1976. The contribution of Australia to the work of the Geneva Conference is thoroughly examined. In particular, the stance of the Australian government on various issues before the Conference is set forth in detail. The article also assesses Australia's contribution to the development of international humanitarian law.

Naples suffered a significant loss of political and economic power following Italian unification, a decline seemingly echoed by the collapse of its opera buffa tradition. Yet Naples played a central role in generating an Italian operetta tradition across entertainment venues both old and new, with canzone napoletana becoming a key feature of operettas composed (and performed) across Italy. This article explores the crucial contribution of Naples and the Neapolitan song tradition to the development of Italian operetta, focusing particularly on composer Mario Costa. Neapolitan operetta, I argue, reveals the complex interplay between regional, national and international practices and discourses in constructions of ‘native’ Italian operetta, while exposing the generic and aesthetic ambiguity of Italian operetta within shifting hierarchies and changing repertoires c.1900. At the same time, the study of key figures such as Costa can revise and reorientate musical narratives of Liberal Italy that have typically focused on opera, the Giovane Scuola and the North.

The passage of the Airlines Agreement Act 1981 (Cth), along with other supporting legislation, represents the culmination of the most detailed public debate on airline regulation in Australia for almost 30 years. During this period, Australia has had an airline system characterised by the presence of essentially only two main carriers on the trunk routes. This system has been maintained by deliberate government protection of the two carriers in accordance with the terms of a series of airlines agreements. This protection is to continue. The 1981 Agreement is, however, significantly different from the earlier airlines agreements. The objective of the new Agreement is to maintain the previous two-airline policy “but with the objective of increasing the level of competition within the industry in a rational and orderly manner”.

The public debate that took place prior to passage of the legislation is not likely to cease. There is to be an inquiry to “undertake an objective assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of deregulating the domestic aviation environment”.

Over the years there have been established, at Commonwealth and State levels, a multiplicity of independent or semi-independent public bodies outside the traditional departmental structure. As far as conditions of employment with such bodies are concerned, some fall within the Public Service Board system, while others are governed by separate legislation which tends, however, to bear considerable similarities to the prevailing Public Service Board system. In addition, there may be some intersection of institutions—in New South Wales, for example, employees of a number of bodies which are not under Public Service Board control have, in common with public servants, a right of appeal to the Crown Employees' Appeal Board (though railway and transport employees retain their own appeal tribunal).

The relationship of the King to the persons who actually perform the work of government has changed profoundly over the last 250 years. The purpose of this article is to analyse those changes and to analyse how the common law reacted (or failed to react) to them.

For this purpose I propose first to consider the structure of English government in about 1750. Although the structure was already evolving into a more modern form, in 1750 it was still a relatively simple governmental structure based upon a sovereign Monarch and upon public officers, many of them in regional areas.

At that time the common law clearly distinguished between the Monarch and his officers. Although the extent and importance of the various legal powers and immunities of the Monarch are now often overstated, the Monarch did possess special powers and immunities which reflected or, at least, were derived from his sovereignty.

The principle of subsidiarity was adopted as part of the law of the European Union as a response to perceptions of excessive centralisation and bureaucratisation within the European system of government. If subsidiarity is a solution to these problems in Europe, it might be asked: could it also be a solution to similar problems that arise in other federal systems, such as those of the United States and Australia? However, posing the question in this way is misleading because it is not at all clear that subsidiarity has been a solution in Europe, and in any case it cannot be assumed that a solution in one context will necessarily operate effectively in another.

This article closely examines the nature and operation of the principle of subsidiarity in Europe and asks what lessons might be learned from it. To do this, the article begins by identifying the carefully defined operation of the principle in EU law and then closely examining the application of the principle, firstly as a political decision-making procedure that involves the Member State parliaments in the European policy-making process, and secondly as a juridical principle enforceable by the European Court of Justice. The possible adoption of the principle in other federations is then discussed, but limitations on its effectiveness in Europe, as well as the different institutional and political circumstances of the Australian federal system, are shown to undermine its likely usefulness, unless other more fundamental issues about the way in which the federal system is understood, organised and operated are addressed.