Cyber disinformation is a global, very sophisticated phenomenon, capable of producing negative consequences on democratic values and institutions. This chapter argues that individual behavior of users plays a key role in the control of the phenomenon and aims to identify factors that impact on users’ behavioral intentions and cyber hygiene behavior. This chapter integrates the Extended Theory of Planned Behavior and a Structural Equation Model, realized through Partial Least Square – –Structural Equation Modeling, applied to the cyber disinformation phenomenon. The research data were collected using a questionnaire administered in Poland and Romania and analyzed using the Structural Equation Model. The model’s parameters were processed using the SmartPLS software. The reliability of the variables was assessed using Cronbach’s Alpha and Composite Reliability. The research revealed the applicability of the Theory of Planned Behavior model and found that Moral Norms and Perceived Behavioral Control have an impact on Behavioral Intention and Cyber Hygiene Behavior. The findings of this chapter can provide stakeholders with important insights that can lead to improved responses to the phenomenon.

In this chapter, we explore how Israel approaches its protection from cyber threats with a focus on disinformation. The chapter relies on primary source material in English and Hebrew and interviews with Israeli researchers and disinformation experts. This chapter outlines the overview of the disinformation threats Israel has been facing in the recent past and present, diagnoses the presence and absence in legislative policy concerning disinformation, and analyzes Israel’s private industry efforts to bolster cyber security defense. Finally, our conclusion considers a variety of overarching outlooks on the future of countering internal disinformation in Israel.

Rising to speak in the House of Commons in November 1947, Winston Churchill – by then no longer prime minister but still member of parliament, his party having been defeated in the general election of May 1945 – remarked that “No one pretends that democracy is perfect … Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried.” Churchill felt especially convinced that it was superior to those varieties of governance that relied upon “a group of super men and super-planners … ‘playing angel’ … and making the masses of the people do what they think is good for them, without any check or correction.” The following year, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed. While the term democracy is not mentioned, its essence is enshrined in the document, signed by democracies and autocracies alike: “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”

The existence of democratic systems of government threatens the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. Democracy presents unique opportunities and vulnerabilities, including public debate and free expression, which nefarious actors can exploit by spreading false information. Disinformation can propagate rapidly across social networks and further authoritarian efforts to weaken democracy. This research discusses how Russia and China leverage online disinformation across contexts and exploit democracies’ vulnerabilities to further their goals. We create an analytical framework to map authoritarian influence efforts against democracies: (i) through longer term, ambient disinformation, (ii) during transitions of political power, and (iii) during social and cultural divides. We apply this framework to case studies involving Western democracies and neighboring states of strategic importance. We argue that both China and Russia aim to undermine faith in democratic processes; however, they bring different histories, priorities, and strategies while also learning from each other and leveraging evolving technologies. A primary difference between the countries’ disinformation against democracies is their approach. Russia builds on its longstanding history of propaganda for a more direct, manipulation-driven approach, and China invested heavily in technological innovation more recently for a permeating censorship-driven approach. Acknowledging it is impossible to know disinformation’s full scope and impact given the current information landscape, the growing international ambition and disinformation efforts leveraged by authoritarian regimes are credible threats to democracy globally. For democracies to stay healthy and competitive, their policies and safeguards must champion the free flow of trustworthy information. Resilience against foreign online disinformation is vital to achieving fewer societal divides and a flourishing information environment for democracies during peaceful – and vulnerable – times.

How do the dual trends of increased misinformation in politics and increased socioeconomic inequality contribute to an erosion of trust and confidence in democratic institutions? In an era of massive misinformation, voters bear the burden of separating truth from lies as they determine how they stand on important issue areas and which candidates to support. When candidates engage in misinformation, it uncouples the already weak link among vote intentions, candidate choice, and policy outputs. At the same time, high levels of economic inequality and social stratification may contribute to lower levels of institutional trust, and the correspondingly more insular socioeconomic groups may experience misinformation differently. Social policy, as a policy area intentionally designed to alleviate risk and redistribute resources, thus becomes a special case where the effects of misinformation and socioeconomic inequality may be crosscutting and heightened.

Iosif Stalin, along with Adolf Hitler and Mao Zedong, constituted the Big Three dictators of the twentieth century who decisively swayed the course of world history. As is the case with all tyrants, hubris was the underlining feature of Stalin’s rule. As a Marxist, he firmly believed in the inevitability of the demise of capitalism and the ultimate triumph of socialism. As a Bolshevik, he emphatically advanced his mission of spreading war and revolution abroad and defeating world imperialism once and for all. By means of disinformation, subversion, and camouflage, Stalin covertly and openly challenged the liberal world order dominated by Britain, France, and the United States. His defiance found common political ground with his nemesis Adolf Hitler, as seen in the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Nazi-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression) in August 1939. Ultimately, however, Stalin’s hubris blinded him to Hitler’s cunning, resulting in the humiliating and devastating betrayal of June 1941 (Operation Barbarossa). It was also Stalin’s hubris, however, that drove the country to victory over Nazi German, at unimaginable human and material costs.

This chapter examines the phenomenon of disinformation in the digital era and its implications for freedom of expression. It explores how the rapid dissemination of false, manipulated, and misleading information – termed a ‘disinfodemic’ – poses threats to human rights, democracy, and public trust. The chapter outlines the historical roots of disinformation, the technological factors that enable it, and the responses by public and private actors to mitigate its harmful effects. The chapter differentiates between disinformation (intentional), misinformation (unintentional), and malinformation (genuine information used to harm), while highlighting their diverse forms, such as fake news, deepfakes, and conspiracy theories. Disinformation erodes public trust, affects electoral integrity, threatens public health, and harms individuals’ rights to information and privacy. The chapter emphasises the necessity of finding a balance between combating disinformation and preserving freedom of expression.

This chapter examines conservative attacks on social media, and their validity. Conservatives have long accused the major social media platforms of left-leaning bias, claiming that platform content moderation policies unfairly target conservative content for blocking, labeling, and deamplification. They point in particular to events during the COVID-19 lockdowns, as well as President Trump’s deplatforming, as proof of such bias. In 2021, these accusations led both Florida and Texas to adopt laws regulating platform content moderation in order to combat the alleged bias. But a closer examination of the evidence raises serious doubts about whether such bias actually exists. An equally plausible explanation for why conservatives perceive bias is that social media content moderation policies, in particular against medical disinformation and hate speech, are more likely to affect conservative than other content. For this reason, claims of platform bias remain unproven. Furthermore, modern conservative attacks on social media are strikingly inconsistent with the general conservative preference not to interfere with private businesses.

The first goal of this chapter is to argue that the press as an institution is entitled to special solicitude under the First Amendment, not only because it is textually specified in the Constitution or because it serves important roles such as checking public and private power, but because it can contribute to the marketplace of ideas in ways that a healthy democracy needs. In other words, the press as an institution can provide an important link between the First Amendment’s epistemic and democratic values. The chapter’s second goal is to provide a rough and preliminary sketch of the relationship between press freedom, violence, and public discourse. Some elements seem straightforward enough. Violence and harassment obstruct the press’s function, including its traditional role in constituting and shaping public discourse. Distrust, disinformation, violence, and press degradation exist in a mutually reinforcing ecosystem. And even as violence shapes the media, the media shapes the social conditions, understandings, and practice of violence in return. Journalism, albeit in different ways than legal interpretation, “takes place on a field of pain and death,” to repurpose Robert Cover’s famous phrase – not only in describing it but in making it real. This, it should go without saying, is no excuse for violence against media members. The point is, rather, that a healthy press can be a bulwark not only for knowledge and democracy but against the kinds of private and public violence that threaten both.

The chapter explores the impact of new technologies on liberal democracy, highlighting both positive and negative dimensions. E-governance, facilitated by information and communication technologies, improves efficiency, transparency, and accountability, reducing the need for physical government visits. AI-supported online voting enhances participation and prevents fraud, while social media and online communities can foster social capital. However, challenges arise as well. Social media algorithms can manipulate information, affecting public opinion, and tech giants’ dominance may influence democratic participation. Increased reliance on digital systems exposes governments to cybersecurity threats, undermining public confidence. Inequality in internet access disenfranchises those without it, leading to voter suppression and declining trust. Algorithms contribute to polarization and filter bubbles, with deepfakes impacting political discourse. In totalitarian contexts, technology aids activism against authoritarian regimes through anonymous communication and encryption. The chapter concludes by advocating strategies for maximizing benefits and minimizing harm, emphasizing digital literacy, citizen education, data privacy regulations, responsible technology use, community empowerment, activism, awareness, and accountability for ethical use by governments and tech companies. Recognizing the importance of both physical and digital connections is crucial for thriving liberal democracies.