Since the Internet’s mainstream inception in the mid-1990s, the global telecommunications network has transformed from one that offered egalitarian promise to a network that often compromises democratic norms. And, as its conceptual linchpin, Internet “openness” provided the potential for technological innovation that could revolutionize both communication and commerce. The regulatory schemes introduced in the early Internet era thus sought to advance openness and innovation in the fledging online world. But, while the times and technologies have since changed, the regulatory frameworks have largely remained the same. Accordingly, this review essay examines the Internet’s regulatory and cultural history to explore how the open values of the information age gave way to our current era of online disinformation. To do so, I reflect upon two early studies of the digital realm that have advanced discourse and scholarship on Internet openness: Lawrence Lessig’s Code: and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0, and Christopher Kelty’s Two Bits: The Cultural Significance of Free Software. Informed by these works, along with related digital scholarship, this essay argues that remembering the history of Internet openness reveals how the free access ideals of the Internet’s foundational age have been transformed by the renewed proprietary conventions of our current disinformation era.

This scoping review investigates the complex landscape of fake news research, focusing on its link with attitudinal polarization and identifying key themes in the literature. Our objectives included mapping the main themes in fake news literature, analyzing how these themes connect, examining how polarization is conceptualized across studies, and how fake news and attitudinal polarization are related. Through an extensive theme analysis of fake news research sourced from SCOPUS and Web of Science databases, we identified four major thematic areas: (1) the influence of technologies and platforms on fake news, (2) user engagement and behavioral responses to fake news, (3) fake news characteristics and their social consequences, and (4) strategies for fake news detection and countermeasures. In-depth analysis of 20 selected peer-reviewed papers revealed significant inconsistencies in the operationalization of both fake news and polarization and in the definitions of polarization. Regarding evidence on fake news’ influence on polarization, mixed results are found, with some studies indicating attitude reinforcement, while others find negligible effects. This scoping review highlights the need for standardized methodologies to clarify fake news’ role in attitudinal polarization and societal division, calling for a unified framework in fake news and polarization research to advance understanding of fake news’ societal impact.

This article argues that the environmental contexts of memory are vulnerable to Artificial Intelligence (AI)-generated distortions. By addressing the broader ecological implications for AI’s integration into society, this article looks beyond a sociotechnical dimension to explore the potential for AI to complicate environmental memory and its role in shaping human–environment relations. First, I address how the manipulation and falsification of memory risks undermining intergenerational transmission of environmental knowledge. Second, I examine how AI-generated blurring of boundaries between real and unreal can lead to collective inaction on environmental challenges. By identifying memory’s central role in addressing environmental crisis, this article places emerging debates on memory in the AI era in direct conversation with environmental discourse and scholarship.

With formal international organizations (IOs) facing gridlock and informal IOs proliferating, cooperation in the twenty-first century looks different than it did in previous eras. Global governance institutions today also face additional challenges, including a fragmented information environment where publics are increasingly vulnerable to misinformation and disinformation. What do these trends portend for international politics? One way to answer this question is to return to a core ingredient of a well-functioning IO—information provision—and ask how such changes affect efficiency. Viewed through this lens, we see decline in some arenas and adaptation in others. Formal IOs are struggling to retain relevance as their weak policy responses and ambiguous rules create space for competing signals. The proliferation of informal institutions, on the other hand, may represent global governance evolution, as these technocratic bodies are often well-insulated from many political challenges. Yet even if global governance retains functionality, the legitimacy implications of such trends are troubling. IO legitimacy depends in part on process, and from this standpoint, the informational gains of informal governance must be weighed against losses of accountability and transparency. Ultimately, evaluating the normative implications of these trends requires making judgments about the preferred legitimizing principles for global governance.

Disinformation is a growing epistemic threat, yet its connection to understanding remains underexplored. In this paper, I argue that understanding – specifically, understanding how things work and why they work the way they do – can, all else being equal, shield individuals from disinformation campaigns. Conversely, a lack of such understanding makes one particularly vulnerable. Drawing on Simion’s (2023) characterization of disinformation as content that has a disposition to generate or increase ignorance, I propose that disinformation frequently exploits a preexisting lack of understanding. I consider an important objection – that since understanding is typically difficult to acquire, we might rely on deferring to experts. However, I argue that in epistemically polluted environments, where expertise is systematically mimicked, deference alone provides no reliable safeguard. I conclude by briefly reflecting on strategies for addressing these challenges, emphasizing both the need for promoting understanding and for cleaning up the epistemic environment.

The spread of disinformation, such as false and fabricated content, as amplified by the expansion of artificial intelligence systems, has captured the attention of policymakers on a global scale. However, addressing disinformation leads constitutional democracies towards questions about the scope of freedom of expression as the living core of a democratic society. If, on the one hand, this constitutional right has been considered a barrier to public authorities’ interferences to limit the circulation of disinformation, on the other hand, the spread of fabricated content and manipulative techniques, including deepfakes, has increasingly questioned liberal views. This constitutional challenge is further enriched by the role of online platforms which, by mediating speech in their online spaces, are essential tiles of a mosaic picturing the potential regulatory strategies and the limit of public enforcement to tackle disinformation. Within this framework, this work argues that the European constitutional approach to tackle disinformation has defined a unique model on a global scale. The European Union has developed a strategy that combines procedural safeguards, risk regulation, and co-regulation, as demonstrated by initiatives such as the Digital Services Act, the Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation, and the Artificial Intelligence Act. Positioned between liberal and illiberal models, the European approach proposes an alternative constitutional vision to address disinformation based on risk mitigation and the collaboration between public and private actors.

This commentary examines the dual role of artificial intelligence (AI) in shaping electoral integrity and combating misinformation, with a focus on the 2025 Philippine elections. It investigates how AI has been weaponised to manipulate narratives and suggests strategies to counteract disinformation. Drawing on case studies from the Philippines, Taiwan, and India—regions in the Indo-Pacific with vibrant democracies, high digital engagement, and recent experiences with election-related misinformation—it highlights the risks of AI-driven content and the innovative measures used to address its spread. The commentary advocates for a balanced approach that incorporates technological solutions, regulatory frameworks, and digital literacy to safeguard democratic processes and promote informed public participation. The rise of generative AI tools has significantly amplified the risks of disinformation, such as deepfakes, and algorithmic biases. These technologies have been exploited to influence voter perceptions and undermine democratic systems, creating a pressing need for protective measures. In the Philippines, social media platforms have been used to spread revisionist narratives, while Taiwan employs AI for real-time fact-checking. India’s proactive approach, including a public misinformation tipline, showcases effective countermeasures. These examples highlight the complex challenges and opportunities presented by AI in different electoral contexts. The commentary stresses the need for regulatory frameworks designed to address AI’s dual-use nature, advocating for transparency, real-time monitoring, and collaboration between governments, civil society, and the private sector. It also explores the criteria for effective AI solutions, including scalability, adaptability, and ethical considerations, to guide future interventions. Ultimately, it underscores the importance of digital literacy and resilient information ecosystems in supporting informed democratic participation.

While peacekeeping operations have always been heavily dependent on host-state support and international political backing, changes in the global geopolitical and technological landscapes have presented new forms of state interference intended to influence, undermine, and impair the activities of missions on the ground. Emerging parallel security actors, notably the Wagner Group, have cast themselves as directly or implicitly in competition with the security guarantee provided by peacekeepers, while the proliferation of mis- and disinformation and growing cybersecurity vulnerabilities present novel challenges for missions’ relationships with host states and populations, operational security, and the protection of staff and their local sources. Together, these trends undermine missions’ efforts to protect civilians, operate safely, and implement long-term political settlements. This essay analyzes these trends and the dilemmas they present for in-country UN officials attempting to induce respect for international norms and implement their mandates. It describes nascent strategies taken by missions to maintain their impartiality, communicate effectively, and maintain the trust of those they are charged with protecting, and highlights early good practices for monitoring and analyzing this new operation environment, for reporting on and promoting human rights, and for operating safely.

There are two main ways Russian propaganda reaches Japan: (a) the social media accounts of official institutions, such as the Russian Embassy, or Russian state-linked media outlets, such as Sputnik, and (b) pro-Russian Japanese political actors who willingly (or unwillingly) spread disinformation and display a clear pro-Kremlin bias. These actors justify the Russian invasion of Ukraine and repeat the Russian view of the war with various objectives in mind, primarily serving their own interests. By utilizing corpus analysis and qualitative examination of social media data, this article explores how Russian propaganda and a pro-Russian stance are effectively connected with and incorporated into the discursive strategies of political actors of the Japanese Far-Right.

Democratic backsliding, the slow erosion of institutions, processes, and norms, has become more pronounced in many nations. Most scholars point to the role of parties, leaders, and institutional changes, along with the pursuit of voters through what Daniel Ziblatt has characterized as alliances with more extremist party surrogate organizations. Although insightful, the institutionalist literature offers little reflection about the growing role of social technologies in organizing and mobilizing extremist networks in ways that present many challenges to traditional party gatekeeping, institutional integrity, and other democratic principles. We present a more integrated framework that explains how digitally networked publics interact with more traditional party surrogates and electoral processes to bring once-scattered extremist factions into conservative parties. When increasingly reactionary parties gain power, they may push both institutions and communication processes in illiberal directions. We develop a model of communication as networked organization to explain how Donald Trump and the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement rapidly transformed the Republican Party in the United States, and we point to parallel developments in other nations.