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A state’s entitlement to tax a person is said to rest on either source, which is a connection between the state and the income, or residence, which is a connection between the state and the owner of the income. The source state can tax income sourced in the state, whereas the residence state can tax all of the resident’s income. Historically, these bases for tax were uncontroversial because most people earned all or almost all their income in a single state. Digitalization and globalization have changed how people live their lives, however, and have provoked questions about whether states can assert an unlimited entitlement to tax all of a person’s worldwide income, even if that person does not reside in its territory. This chapter demonstrates that income taxation of individuals in the twenty-first century does not require a personal link of the ’residence’ kind. It details policy options that would preserve the personal income tax on individuals without a singular reliance on a person having a sole residence. Ending the reliance on residence would alleviate many of the most pressing challenges facing the international tax regime, including the taxation of remote workers, digital services, and digital nomads.
The venture capital ecosystem in Africa is thriving. With multiple large investor rounds and exits in the 2020s, the continent transitioned from having not a single unicorn in 2016 to seven start-ups worth over US$1 billion in less than a decade, while five unicorns were born in 2021 alone. Even though many start-ups on the continent gain traction organically, the current paradigm is no substitute for finding a competitive regional strategy that offers a sustainable flow of successful scale ups that then obtain unicorn status. There is a vast difference in institutional structure, resources and capabilities between African countries and what is found elsewhere. Africa faces different sets of challenges that require a unique approach to venture creation. Reforms capable of strengthening existing policy frameworks, skills development initiatives and a financing architecture that supports entrepreneurship along the entire value chain will be critical in the African context. This chapter situates policy innovation in the context of Africa’s bubbling venture capital ecosystem as a key contributor to unicorn emergence.
This chapter examines the factors which influence the entrepreneurial ecosystems in member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). We present four stylised case studies of successful entrepreneurship featuring Asian unicorns: Bitkub, PrimaKu, Bolttech and Maya. The entrepreneurial ecosystem in Singapore is vibrant, with a growing number of start-ups and venture capital funding sources. Indonesia is seen as the home of somewhat surprisingly successful ventures, whereas the entrepreneurial ecosystems of Thailand and the Philippines are still at an earlier stage of development. The region’s entrepreneurial climate has been continuously improving, facilitating the emergence of more start-ups and a more supportive ecosystem. ASEAN economies embrace digital technologies and leverage them for economic and social advancement. E-commerce businesses in ASEAN have significant growth potential.
Unlike existing studies on labour and income in the digital era, this paper argues not only that the impact of the digital economy’s intervention in the labour process is fragmented rather than comprehensive, but also that the transformation of job demand and labour supply behaviours is simultaneous and related to the attributes of the industries in which they operate. Drawing on the conventional biased technological progress hypothesis and labour process theory, we argue that the digital economy has generally increased the labour income inequality for migrant workers in China. Using geospatially matched China Labour Dynamics Survey 2018 microdata and provincial digitalisation indices, we uncover a digital ‘upgrading trap’: the development of the digital economy hides the process of inequality formation in the hedging relationship between objective labour demand ‘upgrading’ and subjective labour supply ‘expanding’. The former can be summarised as the risk of ‘no job’ and the latter as the risk of ‘no way back’. Counterintuitively, consumer Internet development demonstrates a greater role in both reducing workers’ inequality in secondary labour markets and promoting a fair primary distribution. These findings reconceptualise digital inequality as coevolutionary outcomes, and offer a tripartite governance way for inclusive growth through portable skill certification, algorithmic accountability mechanisms, and interoperable social security systems.
States are reshaping the global digital economy to assert control over the artificial intelligence (AI) value chain. Operating outside multilateral institutions, they pursue measures such as export controls on advanced semiconductors, infrastructure partnerships, and bans on foreign digital platforms. This digital disintegration reflects an elite-centered response to the infrastructural power that private firms wield over critical AI inputs. A handful of companies operate beyond the reach of domestic regulation and multilateral oversight, controlling access to technologies that create vulnerabilities existing institutions struggle to contain. As a result, states have asserted strategic digital sovereignty: the exercise of authority over core digital infrastructure, often through selective alliances with firms and other governments. The outcome is an emergent form of AI governance in techno-blocs: coalitions that coordinate control over key inputs while excluding others. These arrangements challenge the liberal international order by replacing multilateral cooperation with strategic—and often illiberal—alignment within competing blocs.
The chapter discusses the evolution of justice and dispute resolution in the era of LawTech (LT). Traditional taxonomies of justice are mirrored in new forms of digital dispute settlement (DDS), where the idealized Justice Hercules is compared to the prospect of robo-judges. Currently, LT primarily supports traditional courts as they transition to e-courts. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is evolving into online dispute resolution (ODR), with blockchain-based crowdsourcing emerging as a potential alternative to traditional justice. Hybrid models of dispute resolution are also taking shape. The chapter outlines assessment criteria for adopting LT in digital systems, focusing on ensuring that DS in the digital economy remains independent, impartial, and enforceable. Human centricity is core construct for the co-development of LT and DS. This overarching principle requires human oversight, transparency, data privacy, and fairness in both access and outcomes.
Amid China’s goals to reach peak carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, along with its ecological civilization agenda, the synergy between the digital economy (DE) and environmental quality (EQ) in Chinese cities has become increasingly vital. Using panel data from 285 cities between 2016 and 2021, this study constructs an integrated framework to examine the level of coordinated development between the DE and EQ, measured through the coupling coordination degree (CCD) that captures the strength and harmony of their interaction. It further analyses spatial–temporal heterogeneity and influencing factors. The results reveal: (1) both the DE and EQ have improved steadily, with the CCD rising to a moderate level and showing clear spatial clustering; and (2) economic development, educational investment and industrial upgrading boost the CCD, whereas average years of education and government intervention may hinder it. Additionally, economic development and industrial upgrading have positive spatial spillovers, and a threshold effect of government intervention is observed.
The global transformation of the economy towards a digital one has fundamentally restructured business operations, economic models, and tax practices. With digital technologies and electronic communications embedded within industries, the digital economy has fostered innovative business models, transformed user behaviors, and increased operational efficiency. However, such a revolution has come at the price of exposing the limitations of traditional international tax models based on physical presence and tangible properties. The entry of borderless, intangible, and platform-based economic activities necessitates urgent tax redesign, especially amid digital businesses, which increasingly interact across borders yet leave no traditional physical presence.
This research describes the revolutionary influence of the digital economy on cross-border taxation, deconstructs the traditional conceptualization of the permanent establishment (PE), and evaluates the emergent principle of “tax where value is generated” based on recent literature as well as emerging global reform approaches.
Geopolitical forces are fundamentally altering the landscape of e-commerce and digital trade. Cross-border e-commerce is increasingly fragmented along geopolitical lines, as e-commerce companies are forced to reckon with the security implications of their operations. This includes governments’ concerns about data security and sovereignty. When foreign firms collect extensive data on the behavior of the country’s customers, there is potential for those data to be exploited in shaping consumer behavior or spreading information in the country. Additionally, when a foreign firm plays an important role in the domestic economy, local governments have limited means to encourage those firms to act in the “national interest” or broader societal and economic goals beyond maximizing profits. Because of these concerns, governments have adopted policies to shape the behavior of e-commerce companies. This includes shaping market access, level playing field, investment security, and institutional alignment. E-commerce companies have adopted various strategies to manage corporate nationality and geopolitical tensions, including masking country of origin, diversifying supply chains, relocating control rights, focusing on alternate markets, and corporate diplomacy.
This Element develops a theory of institutional acceleration to explain the transformation to a digital economy through a cluster of frontier technologies: artificial intelligence, blockchain, quantum computing, cryptography, and low-earth orbit infrastructure. Unlike previous technological revolutions, these technologies transform not how we organise things, but how we coordinate economic activity. The authors' supertransition thesis explains why these digital technologies shouldn't be understood in isolation, but rather should be understood in how they combine to create new institutional possibilities, leading to more open, complex, and global economic systems. Drawing on evolutionary economics and institutional theory, this Element shows how this evolutionary process is reshaping our institutional economic architecture. Ultimately, institutional acceleration drives greater computation and knowledge into our economic systems.
The chapter offers an insight into the highly fluid field of digital trade rulemaking as a direct reaction to digital transformations. Against the backdrop of the evolution of the trade policy discourse beyond online trade in goods and services and the emergence of new digital protectionism, the chapter explores the dynamics of digital trade regulation in the past decade in a complex geopolitical setting by looking at some broader trends, as well as distinct regulatory models (exemplified by the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), the European Union–United Kingdom Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)) and the new templates of the digital economy agreements (DEAs) that also signal room for regulatory innovation in trade law. The chapter’s enquiry seeks to identify new design elements found in preferential trade agreements (PTAs), to trace how these have diffused over time, and to ask what their implications for domestic regulatory space may be. Finally and linking to the multilateral discussions on electronic commerce, the chapter tests to what extent PTAs have worked as regulatory laboratories and whether some of the newly emerged digital trade rules can be multilateralised.
This Article draws upon and connects three different developments: the ‘internationalisation’ of tax law and EU tax law, specifically; the increasing digitalisation of the economy, and the European Union’s need for more revenue to deal with the financial consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and other policy priorities. It is explained why the taxation of data per se cannot be addressed at the global level at present and why the focus of research has to lie on the taxation of the different business models of the digital economy. In the absence of a global agreement as to how the digital economy should be taxed, the reaction of the European Union to such a fundamental undertaking remains uncertain and politically contingent on the outcomes of negotiation at the OECD level. Most particularly, on the so-called Pillar One agreement. A seemingly temporal solution to the taxation of the digital economy, the so-called DSTs (Digital Services Taxes) have been adopted by Member States of the EU and third countries, but their future remains uncertain. Amidst these developments, the EU has also looked for ways to increase its resources and to finance its post-Covid ambitious recovery plan. This need has led to a reconsideration of whether EU taxes could finance the EU budget (next to the Union’s own resources, which remain for the main part transfers from Member States). In this Article, I argue that beyond tax design considerations and potential constitutional impediments, the EU revenue side should be emphasised in the discussion. Therefore, I suggest that the Union should ensure that at least part of the revenue arising from digital taxation should be channeled to the supranational budget. Whether Pillar One gets adopted or not, the potential introduction of an EU digital levy, ideally by way of an EU tax, could help overcoming several shortcomings of the present tax status quo and could result in an increase of the resources at the disposal of the EU in a fashion compatible with the imperatives of democratic legitimacy.
In a world of weaponized interdependence, middle powers have policy choices that can enhance their autonomy. However, having this policy space is not enough. In order to turn the policy space into policy enactment, domestic politics has to align in a particular way. This chapter considers India and Brazil as examples of “middle powers” and analyzes their capacity to enact autonomy and safeguard their digital sovereignty. The authors argue that when independent institutions’ interests are incorporated into the policymaking process and are not usurped by the parliamentary (political) process, they observe the enactment of autonomy-enhancing policies. Brazil’s and India’s data localization policies are illustrative case studies. While Brazil and India are both open democracies with a technoeconomic landscapes characterized by a similar technoeconomic landscape with a hybrid mixture of foreign-owned and domestically owned companies, they have adopted different data localization policies. The authors argue that the divergent paths of Brazil and India are due to the nature of the policymaking process. India’s policymaking incorporated the interests of independent institutions. In contrast, Brazil’s parliamentary process usurped policymaking power from its independent institutions and has not yet granted the mandate and tools to either existing or necessary new institutions, such as regulatory agencies, to address this emerging and already pressing set of issues. Thus, for countries to enact policies to enhance their digital sovereignty, the interests of independent institutions must be incorporated, and their power must be increased.
The digital transition has become a crucial area of ideological contestation, as ongoing debates on digital surveillance and data commodification exemplify. Yet, we know too little about how political parties tap into these confrontations. This article elaborates a critical approach to map the ideological positions that 25 parties in France, Germany, Italy and Spain adopt on platform societies. The empirical analysis classifies parties' positions to uncover how their views on the digital economy and digital politics reshape their core ideologies. While parties are distributed along six ideological positions, most cases populate three types: Platform Neoliberalism, Social Liberalism 4.0 and Platform Socialism. These types represent the tripartite ideological divide on platform societies. Ultimately, this study provides an empirically informed theory of comparative digital politics and the foundation for research agendas on political parties' views on digitalization and the relations between ideologies, public policy and parties' organizational change in the digital age.
This paper reviews two important design choices for Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs). First, how CBDC intermediaries should be compensated for their services. Second, how payments from traditional banks into CBDC wallets should be cleared. Both of these design choices have important implications for the financial stability of the banking system.
A new form of digital economic circulation has emerged, wherein ideas, knowledge, labour and use rights for otherwise idle assets move between geographically distributed but connected and interactive online communities. Such circulation is apparent across a number of digital economic ecologies, including social media, online marketplaces, crowdsourcing, crowdfunding and other manifestations of the so-called ‘sharing economy’. Prevailing accounts deploy concepts such as ‘co-production’, ‘prosumption’ and ‘peer-to-peer’ to explain digital economic circulation as networked exchange relations characterised by their disintermediated, collaborative and democratising qualities. Building from the neologism of platform capitalism, we place ‘the platform’ — understood as a distinct mode of socio-technical intermediary and business arrangement that is incorporated into wider processes of capitalisation — at the centre of the critical analysis of digital economic circulation. To create multi-sided markets and coordinate network effects, platforms enrol users through a participatory economic culture and mobilise code and data analytics to compose immanent infrastructures. Platform intermediation is also nested in the ex-post construction of a replicable business model. Prioritising rapid up-scaling and extracting revenues from circulations and associated data trails, the model performs the structure of venture capital investment which capitalises on the potential of platforms to realise monopoly rents.
The world of digital commerce is relatively new. It is a by-product of an information technology revolution that started with the invention of the integrated circuit, carried forward with advances in computing and unleashed with the creation of the internet. Digital commerce is familiar in some respects and dramatically different in others from the world of trade that preceded it. It poses special problems of privacy, unwanted communication, and new kinds of competition, stemming from the flow of data across borders. It gave rise to the need to devise rules for its nurture and management. It makes the most sense for the rules to be global, as without interference from governments, e-commerce is global. It creates opportunities as never experienced before for innovation and for individual and small business involvement in international commerce. This is the story of the evolution of the process of rule-making in the age of digital commerce.
Chapter 2 gives an extensive overview of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and how it will significantly change the way the world works. It is defined as a bridge for digital transformation and an innovative combination of “cyber-physical” systems. To better understand the 4IR, the previous three are broken down to give contextual background. The chapter highlights the exact technologies that will shape the broad themes and implications of the 4IR. These technologies include 3D printing, advanced material science, artificial intelligence, big data, blockchain, cloud computing, drones and automation, high-speed internet (5G technology), the Internet of Things, nanotechnology, and quantum computers. The technologies are explained and applied to how they are already being used in Africa or how they might be used. The chapter concludes with several themes based on the analysis of technologies and their characteristics. The four themes are productivity and sustainability, disruption and structural transformation, cooperation and inclusivity, security, privacy, and data integrity.
In recent years, the competition law community has become absorbed in discussions around the dominance of the largest digital platform companies: Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft. Such discussions, for example about the meaning of power in the digital age, have helped to shift the field beyond its narrow focus on price and output effects. Yet, a crucial dimension is missing from the vast majority of commentary on competition law and the digital economy: the role of financialisation. Financialisation—understood as the hypertrophy and increased volatility of the financial sector, together with the reorientation of corporate governance around the principle of shareholder value maximisation—has important implications for the competitive strategies of the Big Tech companies, as well as who benefits from their economic power. Presenting quantitative findings on the corporate governance regimes of the Big Tech platforms, and drawing on insights from corporate law and heterodox economics, this chapter represents an attempt to integrate a financial capitalism perspective into the competition law analysis of digital markets.
This article explores digitalization’s impacts on the existing international investment law regime. In particular, it examines whether international investment agreements (IIAs) apply to the digital economy, analyzing their scope of application, including the definition of protected investment and protected investor, as well as the territorial application of those treaties. We conclude that the IIAs and their provisions are, in principle, not intended for the digital era. However, their usually broad definitions are likely to cover investments in digital assets, if there is a flexible interpretation of the required territorial nexus. However, we believe caution should be exercised about including digital transformation commitments in IIAs, as they could increase the chance of investor-state dispute settlement (-ISDS-).